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Tlie

New Ikmpshire PreBidential Primary of
2968 vas a unique political event.

The opportunlf.y to account for bow that event
occirred

r.ay

also be unique.

The

author brings to this study something more than
the perspective of an observer
or reporter.

He vas, with several others, an organizer,
motivator, strategist,

and total participant in that campaign from its
inception until its corclusion.

To this account he brin^;8 a point of view of New Hamp^fhire
politics that provided
a practical br.sis for developing the strategy of the
campaign and seeing that the

plan was executed.

As a political scientist, he brought to the

.1568

campaign

earlier political e^^pericnce in New ha^pGhire as well as an applied synthesis

drawn from his exposure to the literature of his discipline.
continually related his studies to

hi:;

In his mind he

experience to shape the political effort.

It is from this dual perspective thst he diev the concept of the campaign and

that he

nov;

offers this account,.

In the preface of his bock, The KauaiTement of Elec

qtLJ?gjgi]^^£i-lg.*

Robert

Agranoff \<Toce:
This book is devoted to tne principle that political science
does have scraethlng to contribute to those who are interested
in. practical politics.
Too often the practitioner has ignored
the academic as unconcerned x^'-ith the real experiences and problems that politicians confront on a day-ro-day basis, (xiii)
He went on to bemoan the fact that there are

fevr

ones there are are "of elections held long ego."

dents and cainpaigner.3

,

studies of elections and the
To bridge

tlie

gap between stu-

Agranoff feels, "...it seewed necessary to compile, for

the ccmpajgncr, that which is relevant fiom the past quarter-century of research

V

into carapuigns, clcc-Mons, voting, political parties, commmilcations

Bocio-politxcal procesBcs..." Uiii)
case study

in orGei.

.

.

end other

,

To help iu tuis bridge building a

x,ew

A case otudy of a ctmpaign that was tianageJ by a person

jrcanding on the bridge who feels that the case study and analysis that
follows

strengthen the structure.
In this case study care has been taken to develop the material from what

was experienced and what influenced decisions during the span of the campaign.

The author has attempted to re-create the selected events of the campaign ay they
happened rather than from the perspective of hindsight.
ture of the bridge becomes more evident.

la this way the struc-

For the reader familiar with Agranoff'r

"quarter century of research" one will find evide/ice of the impact of that material in the strategy and decision-making of the cam.paign.

For the campaign

participant that reader will sense the relationship between the science of politics and the imprecision of the art that the worker feels.

For the scholar the

case study offers an account of a campaign, resembling a docuiaentary

,

that can

be probi-d and questioned with the recognition that the details have been precerved and the subtle interactions recorded.
This profile shows that McCarthy's New Hampshire success came not from an

after the fact evaluation but as the consequence of

a

series of pre-planned stra-

tegies suited to New Hampshire's unique political environment.
the campaign was isimedinte.

McCarthy had von what was

victory over President Lyndon
what

i^le-pH v>ere

ccatf^J

-is

taken, how

t>).e

B.

JoJinson.

he.ld

How that victory

The impact of

to be a ^significant
'.jas

accomplished,

campaign evolved, and how the conf rovatatlon was

tba setting of this case study,

vi

what went on in the organizers' minds,

vhat InLonr.a^.ion Uicy bad end used

f:o

make their decisions

,

vhat evpiicB thoy had

to renci: to with thcii; stiatc-^jy, vhat campaign techniques were used have been re-

viewed in order to select those that respond to the questions of impact and effectiveness.

The irony of the event was that the successes of the campaign came iuspite
of the fact that Lyndcn Johrson was rn undeclared write-in candidate in New
Han'pshire.

of an

]?riraai.iec

i.xicuii'.hent

ticipation.

were viewed as of limited iniportancc to the re-nomination

president and thus it

\.'a£

thought posKiblc to avoid direct par-

The advantagec of incurabency and a campaign operated by surrogates

would be sviffici.ent to denonstrate party unity.
One conatqueucs of the 1968 primary experience was that when the 1972
preriidential priner/ season came nroutul, President Richard Nixon did not hesi-

tate to participate actively.
inLeatlonfi early in 1972,

mary and came to

Ilf^-w

He broke tradition and announced his re-election

He then entered the New Hampshire presidential pri-

Hampshire as a candidate.

Taking nothing for granted,

the Nixon sLratcgy of insuring both his re-nomination and his re-election led
to his downfall when carried to the extreme

—

Watergate.

camIt must be noted that for the leaders of the New Hampshire xicCarthy

paign the decision to challenge the incumbent president of their
a difficult one.

ovTn

party was

As the author contends, that like himself, many of the indi-

difficult choices.
viduals both inside and outside of New Hampshire had to make
of an incumbent with
To become involved in a campaign against the re-nomination

wnom many,

if not moFt,

had some measure of respect, was most difficult.

The

efforts, legislative program
cross pressure of President Johnson's civ^l rights

vli

ro end poverty, his concern for the problems
of the cities, and his emphasis on

educatJoual and cniployBient equity presented those
who were to become his political challengers v/ith wrenchins personal decisions.

To lend their nauies

capital to

a

,

energy, their experience, and their
personal political

challenge based on

a

deepening concern about the impact of the ad-

rainistrntion's Vietnam war policy called for deep personal
examination of one's

values, a measuring of the consequences, and finally a
commitment.

meant becoming involved in the McCarthy campaign.

For some it

For others it meant sticking

with the President to work from the inside to modify his administration's
foreign
policy.

To others the choice was made on personal priorities.

Domestic accom-

plishments and the trend Johnson had set were more important than the skirmish
in Vietnam, or the opposite, v/here one argued that Vietnam involvement had made

further domestic advances improbable inspite of the "guns and butter" rhetoric
of the administration.

The personal docis ion-making that brought together the formidable organization that eventually became the McCarthy campaign must not be overlooked as an

important part of the 1968 political context.

For this case study it will be

necessary to note its ii-iportance £S both an accomplishment of the
campaign and an aspect of the impact of
other accounts:

(^.ee

bibliography).

Th-;

'-hat

Nevj

Hampsliire

campaign and to direct readers to

depth of personal commitment,

lated into poliricai energy, while not unique in Axnzcican politics,
an important contribiat i on to the success of McCarthy in 1968.

££•

v.'as

trans-

certainly

It is hoped that

the analysis survives with the above notation and the recognition that every

political ciimpaign has its commited participants.

viii

The autlior more than recognized

that in 1968, at Icaof as It begati in New JlampGhire, the commitment
the candidate

himf,t;ij:,

vati

less to

than to the issues and concerns wliich ho repreeente.d.

This difference may account for the intensity and unusual breadth of participation
in the cair.paign but

thi.'f

difference is not felt to invalidate the subsequent

analysis.

Observing the centh anniversary of 1968 the American Broadcasting Corporation prepared a documentary of the events of that year entitled, "A Crack in

Time."

The program, iilred during the spring of 1978,

v/as

a summary of the bead-

line events of 1968 beginning v;ich Senator McCarthy*s surprise showing in the

New Hampshire presidential primary.

To go beyond headlines and to assess the

total political, social, institutional impact of that year or even of

Hampshire presidential primary reaches beyond the scope

tl\e

of this study.

New

For the

record and perhaps to challenge other researchers, it is worth noting at least
some, cf the

political consequences of McCarthy's New Hampshire success.

Briefly, svd not in order of importance some of these are:
1.

1.

3.

A.

5.

Ineffective anti-Vietnam war protest was organii;ed into votes
v/hich Ted to the de-escalation and eventual end of United
States military involvement in Vietnam.

An incumbent president was challenged effectively in a primary
which contributed to his decision not to seek re-election.
The presidential primary as an institution and as a viable
route to a presidential nomination was not only recognized
but vridcly instituted.
The pres;idanrir.l nominating proc>-ss was tho.-ough.Ty exam.ined
and Gxtr'n:;ivaly reforraed to assure timeliness, equity, and
openness.
cf the vitality of American political instipartitutions and processes came as the result of widespread
reform
see
to
cipation in the campaigns and a commitment
carried to logical conclusions.

A revived sense

ix

6.

A convoraence between the practitioners of politics
and the student o of political science bej^an lending to a greater
appreciation of ones contribution to the other.

7

The etiirncme abyss \<novm as the "Generation Cap" began to close
as political activities led to shared experiences and attitudes.

V

p..

Double standards for the sake of national security chat led to
official secrecy, a lack of accountability end a presumption of
official perogatives were challenged. Widespread institutional
and societal reforra has resulted.

Kevlewing the foregoing and recalling other events of thau time, has the
effect of pushing time back.

It may be presumptuous to raark such widespread

change back to the McCarthy Kew Hampshire primary of 1968

»

but whether it is or

not Gomething happened at that time that did serve, as ABC television felt, to
be "A Crack in Time.'"

The ar.Gumptloa that the event itself was significant, not only a point of

departure

for.

charge, but as au important political happening is the principal

justlf:! cation for this study.

The contribution of this work is intended ior the

student of pclitiCT. and to urge an appreciation for the campaign in the e.lectoral
process.

Ihe historical significance of the event should be seen as enriching

the value of the study for those who might choose to examine the genesis of an
era of significant societal change.
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Eugene J. McCarthy entered the New Hampshire presidential primary in 1968
as an obscure U.''.

Senator supported by

a

cadre of unknown individuals.

ran against an incumbent President of his own party

wlio

He

was sufficiently

assured of renominatijn and popular iiupport that he did not become an active
candidate.

March 12

j

1968, Senator McCarthy captured

Forty vote against

^^S

i^l

perceiit of the Deniocratic

percent for the incumbent President.

Senator McCarthy

also attracted enoiigh voters to elect twenty of the twenty-four covivention

delegate seats aJ.loted to New Hampshire.

This case study documents how this

electoral succef-s was accomplished.
The author was one of the principal organisers of the campaign.

He

brings to the case study an extensive background in New Hampshire politics

preceeding the McCarthy candidacy.
an

et

This perspecti-ve coupled with his sL.udies

political scientist offers a unique view of
The conceptua] background for

tlic

a benchii'.ark

political event.

study is an assessment of the view of

political
political science toward both presidential nominating process and

campaigning.

an era
The author finds that 1968 serves as a watershed between

xl

when politic! scientists viewed with
distaiu presidential primaries In
favor
of the brokoraj^e function of
nominating conventions and saw political
cam-

paigns as coatributins little ..ore than
entertainment to the electoral process.

The studj reveals how the McCarthy organizers
responded to events and

opportunities in their quest to attract a candidate
and then to produce votes
for thot candidate.

The scone shifts from that of a small
New England state

to the national and international stage as
both the campaign and events interact

to produce an electoral result.

Issues, candidates, organization, strategy,

and campaigns are pursued in a way that reveals
interactions that are lost to

both the strict empiricist and the journalistic observer.
The headline events of the campaign are not simply recorded
but are

placed in a context that shows the nature of the contribution
of each
resu.lt.

The candidate McCarthy, the iscues of

v^ar,

to the

credibility gap of the

Johnson administtation, generation gap of the late 196C's, conditions of economic oncer Uainty, end the misconceptions of New Haiiipshire politics are

recorded and analyzed

a-s

each functioned within the campaign.

The nature of the coalition of individuals that first, became the McCarthy
organization, and second became the McCarthy vote, is carefully assessed.

The

strategy that guided the organization of the campaign is pursued to deraonstrate
how a campaign was organized and how closely
of the strategiGtc-;.

How the strategy

v.'as

thiC

result matched the intentions

implemented, vzhat techniques

w'ere

used to reach voters, what messages were developed to con)municate the issues
nnd personality of

tlie

campaign, and how the print and electronic media re-

R^ponued to these efforts are documented to substantiate the strategy.

xil

To test the validity of

the.

campaign as an inCIuenclng factor on the

voter's decision, an empirical test of effectiveness was
used.

observation was made.

McCarthy attracted more votes

in predominantly Republican voting diistricts than

Democratic voting districts.

be.

A puzzling

Democrats residing

aiuong

did in predomiaantly

A careful analysis of this observation found

that while the strategy called for an emphasis upon primarily Democratic
voting

districts, the socio-economic status of the voters in Republican districts per-

mitted then to absorb the non- transferable information costs more easily and

make the vote decisions without direct campaign contact.

to

The analysis went

further to measure the effectiveness of quantif ifible campaign techniques as

contributors to a vote decision.
The impact of McCarthy's candidacy in New Hampshire was both immediate and
of continuing duration.

President Johnson withdrew from contention.

escalation ox the Vietnam War began.

De-

Social conflict began to subside.

Of

continuing impact have been major changes in the presidential nominating process, wider participation of individuals in public caciGiou-malcing

,

an openness

in public affairs, and finally, an appreciation for the contribution that cam-

paigning makes to

th?.

electoral process.

1968 marked profound political, social, iuotitutional

said to have tcixlied off a decade of change

not be fully understood for a generation.

document and analyze that

p<.

cultural, and even

McCarthy's New Hampshire surprise may

economic change in the United States.
be.

,

riod prior

The

thf-

consequences of which may

purpofje, of

to March 12,

this study is to

1968 in a way that permits

others to examine both the campaign and the consequences that have become its
descendents.

xlll
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CHATTER

I

THE CONTEXT FOR A CASE STUDY

P r e 3 id en t i a 1 Caud :i.d a te Selection

Determining how the head of the executive branch of
the federal government
to be chopen produced one of the more farous
coinpromlses of the Constitutional

vjaB

Convoation.

The Convention delejiateG deb3.U:d betv^een methods
which Included

direct election by the people, election by the .-tatc
governors, election by
Congress, nnd election by an electoral ccliege.

favored in two votes b> the Convention.

would

1,1-kc

Argmaentc that such a selection method

the president subservient to Congress and thus weaken
the office were

eventuall:/ pursuasive.

concluded.

Election by Congress was

Toward the end of the Convention a famous compronilse was

The president would be elected by an electoral college with member-

ship apportioned in accord v/ith representation in the Congress.-of the cotiproraise

v^as

The key acpect

to be that selection of the actual electors was to be

placed in the hands of the states to determine.
Fortunately, the fledgling Constitution and the government

that it con-

tained were not faced with an jinmediate test of the presidential selection com-

promise.

President.

George Washington

v/as

selected by the Electoral Collegia as the first

As his second term was ending the test of the succession system began.

The first rteps in a continuing trend toward the democratization of presidential
selection began

v/ith the

action of the etates.

Scon after the adoption of

the.

Confitltuticn the states individually adopted the process of direct election of

presidential elector.^.
be.

a

What had been intended by the Constitutional framers to

deliberative model for presidential selection was quickly changed to that

1

of a representative nodel.

The republican form of gov.rn.e..
that the fra.ers

had created wich the Constitution began to
change.

mutation vas the

i.odif ication in the

Among the steps in this

process of presidential selection.

Instead

cf a gathering of notables, representing
various interests, much like the framers

themselves, there emerged a pattern of voter mandated
Electoral College representatives.

The trend toward -democratizing presidential
selection was underway.

A Constitutional Convention that feared royalty, that was
uncertain about
direct democracy, and skeptical about political parties,
found that in less than
eight years after the adoption of the Constitution, a measure
of democracy had

been inserted to overcome the deliberative model of the Electoral
College.

By

1796 political parties had emerged representing differing philosophies concerning the role of the federal government.

Both of these trends seem to have miti-

gated against the rival of the most feared of all tyrannies that of royalty.

With the end of Washington's second and final presidential term in 1796
the backers of Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson had split to form their

own parties:

from that time until 1824 the candidates for the presidency were

deteiTDined by caucuses of the respective party members in the Congress.

caucus was the next step in the democratization process.

The

Another institution,

the political party, not desired by the framers came into being and used the

congressional caucus as the means to validate a party role in the presidential
selection process.

To reach beyond the clique of congressional power » Andrew Jackson's supporters advised assembling a national convention to demonetrate Jackson's grass
roots popularity.

This first convention was the model for all subsequent conven-
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tions.

Delegates vere elected from the
various states to convene for
the purpose of noMinatiug a caudiuaco for
the presidency.
Delegates were apportioned
among the states in accord with their
representation in the Electoral College
and chosen according to the state party's
ov^ti
system.

The values of deliberation, bargaining,
and direct democracy
were reflected in the structure of the
nominating process in
a proportion wnich ren.alnad approximately
static, at least
In form, until the end of the nineteenth
century.
The convention provided a means to facilitate
communication between inte-

rests and sections of the nation that would
not be rivaled until the invention of
the telegraph, the mass circulation newspaper,
and the telephone.

Delegates

gathered in convention, could bargain for the
protection of their regions and
their economic interests.

For more than seventy years conventions of
delegates

selected by state party caucuses or conventions determined
the respective party
candidates.

With increased mobility, made possible by the railroad, and
coramuni-

caticn, made possible by electronics, a new challenge for democracy
occurred.

Candidates could travel and meet not just delegates but voters.
could organize on behalf of their o\m needs.

The interests

The convention, once seen as a

major step toward democratization of presidential selection itsell faced wide
criticism as being a step child of the trusts, monopolies and giant national
interests.

From the Populist struggle of the late nineteenth century arose a

demand for direct participation in the presidential nominating process.^

A

nev;

wave began to grow.

Joint pressure from late 19th century Populists

and Progressives led to another modification in the nominating process.

Without

constltuticiial mandate the parties had formed and a process for the selection

4

of vroi^idcnrn
:nore

luid

been created,

Nov time procees would be n>odified to
allow

exteasive popular participation.

convention was not scrapped.

Unlike the earlier reform, the nominating

In the states vhn.re the Progressives and
the Popu-

lists gained political strength delegate selection became
the target.
tapon the

Depending

political strength of the Progressives and their ability to
wrest power

from the old guard, delegate selection primaries were enacted
during the period
1900-1910.-'^

la some states delegates were selected directly by primary
open

only to members of the respective political parties (i.e., New Hampshire).

Others set no party membership requirements for participation in primaries
(i.e.» Wisconsin).

Others permitted some delegates to be selected by primary

while others were selected by convention or appointment by elected office holders and party leaders (i.e.. New York).

The high water mark of the early

twentieth century democratization effort was reached when nineteen states

adopted primaries prior to the 1912 contest for the presidency.^
The penalty for not having allowed the primary reform to extend further was

quickly brought to the attention of the Republican Party leadership by the end of
that political year.

V.laen

former President Theodore Roosevelt challenged the in-

cumbent President, William Howard Taft, for the nomination, he amassed broad

popular support but was unable to gather sufficient convention delegate votes
to displace Taft as the nominee.

rau as a third party candidate.

Roosevelt rejected the convention decision and

The split among Republicans made it possible

for VJoodrov Wilson to gather sufficient electoral votes to become president at
the eoise time the country was casting a majority of its votes for his opponents.

Con«.cntlng on the vonsequences of the 1912
election, Louise Overacker wrote,
"If the primary had been in more General ur.e
in 1912, Roosevelt probably would

have been the ncirdnee of the Republican Party and
the schiBin of 1912 would

have been avoided."^

Almost as an anti-climax three more states enacted
primary legislation
prior to the 1916 presidential elections.

With the debacle within the Republican

Party in 1912 and its failure to defeat Wilson in 1916, the
First World War, and
post-war desire for "normalcy", the wave of progressive reform
receeded.

The

primary would not be eliminated from the nominating process, but since
it had
failed to dominate presidential candidate selection at its peak, it was
gradually

circumvented by modifying legislation. Ignored by candidates, disregarded as a
result, and always produced far less than a majority of the convention votes

needed to nominate a presidential candidate.

Although more than one half the

states did, on occasion, elect convention delegates by direct ballot or solicit
a presidential preference ballot, the much heralded democratization of the Pro-

gressives languished for more than fifty years.

In the interim, sectional poli-

tics and resurgent party organizations managed to keep presidential nominating

politics sufficiently close to the will of the populace to prevent a renewal cf
the earlier call for reform.

During the period between 19A5 and 1968, the remaining presidential preference

primary laws were gradually wit tied away.

Incumbent Presidents avoided the pri-

maries retaining contact with the public via modern media and with the party
leadership through the perquisites of off5.ce.

President Truman ones called

presidential prinaries "so much eyewash" and refused to participate in them.

The presidential prinuirles that did survive caused
minor embarrassments during
the post war period.

The New HajDpshire presidorxtial primary of

.1952 is

credited

with launching the presidential candidacy of Dwight D.
Eisenhower and ending the
aspirations of Robert Taft.

The Democratic primary in the same state and
that

same year saw Senator Estes Kefauver challenge President Truman
who had not then

announced his intention of not seeking a second full term. 8

Few other primaries

were contested as the respective candidates maneuvered like soldiers
through a
minefield, to avoid triggering disaster at the hands of a capricious public

while at the same time attempting to demonstrate vote getting strength.
In 1S60, only sixteen states and the District of Columbia retained some

fom

of presidential primary.

aggressively in three:

John Kennedy entered six of these and campaigned

New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and West Virginia.

When the

political year of 1968 began states with primaries had dwindled to fourteen
excluding the District of Columbia.

Not since John Kennedy's success in select-

ing decisive primary contests had the primaries led to a convention decision and

then only when accompanied by broad state-level party leaders' support.^

Students of presidential nominating politics tended to down grade the im-

portance of presidential primaries as being of little importance to the ultimate
conveuticn decisions.

As rebuttal to the Progressive^ arguments in favor of

direct participation in presidential candidate selection, scholars tended to
favor the brokering function of conventions composed of party leaders, elected

officeholders, sectiouai delegations, and some directly elected delegates.
Thsfcie

studciits saw the co-aveution as a vital institution capable of incorpori^t-

ing diverse views within one decisicn making setting and producir^g not cimply a

ncm.e

for

candidate.

presidency, but also a unified party
capable of electing that
AgainsL thl. view were those few who
recalled the failurcn of the
f.hc-

conventious to reach a unifying consensus. 10

The selections of the Republican

Conventions of 1912, 1936, and 1964. and the
Democratic Conventions of 1920
and, eventually, 1968, were scattered
points in the primary proponents' favor.
In her study of the presidential primary,
Louise Ovcracker wrote in 1926:
It should be noticed that the primary has
served the useful
purpose of forcing canoidates to use more open
methods and
of abandonins subterranean methods in the
primary states.

In conclusion, we may say that although the presidential
primary- has seldom controlled the decisicn of
the convention it has often affected the course of national
politics
.... The effectiveness of the presidential primary as an
Instrument of control over the convention is licited by the
fact that it is not in operation in all cf the states, or a
consider able majority of them.^^

With that work, the decline of the institutional reformist sentiments of
the
early tv7entieth century, and the restoration of party leadership in the Populist-

Progressive states the primary was left as evidence of the good intentions of
historic but misguided reform effort.

a

The proponents of the convention, as a

gathering of party leaders unemcumbered by the direct participation of the electorate in their deliberations, created their own straw man to counter advocates
of v/ider use of the presidential primary option.

presidential candidrte uoi^inating prijuiry.

This straw man was the national

If direct participation in the selec-

tion of a presidential nominee was what the reformers sought, then a national

preference primary should be the logical objective cf those favoring widespread
public participation in the selection of presidential candidates.

Public

support:,

ior a i^ational primary has remained
high giving credence to

the arguments put forth by those arguing
the virtues of convention decision

making as opposed to a national prlitiary.i3

The debate between proponents of

the intra-party brokerage function of the national
convention and concept of a

national primary, left the surviving system of state
primaries without either
proponents or students.

The hodge-podge of preference primaries, delegate
selec-

tion primaries, open or closed primaries continued without
proponents nor careful

analysis.

While it is not the purpose of this section to provide a comprehensive
re-

view of the presidential primary institution, it is important to establish
the

condition of that Institution as the political year of 1968 began.

Little seri-

ous attention had been given to the process of nominating presidential candidates

since Louise Overacker and Charles Merriam's work in the 1920's.l^

analyzed the presidential prij-aries in

hifj

Jaraes W.

Davis

1967 vork but neither the earlier

studies nor the later ones, prepared prior to 1968, comprehensively evaluated
the consequences of a nominating system that contained a separate selection system

for each of the fifty states.

It was not until after 1968 that the disarray of

the nominating system was discovered. -^^

As Louise Overacker observed after the devastation of the Republican Part>
in 1912, the same might be said of the Democratic Party in 1968.
the speculation as to a different result will continue.

As with 1912,

The importance of the

presidential primary had been neglected by students and uiiderestimated by even
8uch astute politicians as Lyndon B. Johnson.

Louise Overacker 's question con-

cerning 1912 had even more meaning following 1968 than it did in the earlier

-9-

context.

If the reforms that have occurred
in the presidential cnndldate
selec-

tion process since 1968, had been in
place in 1968, would Eugene McCarthy
have
been the Democratic Party' naminee? What
e
can be said is that without the
reforms that came, after 1968 George McGovern
and Jl^y Carter would not have been
the nominees of the Democratic Party.
The New Hampshire Primary

The New Hampshire presidential preference primary
has retained significance

by being the first such event to be held in a given
political season.
choices offered to the voters take two forms.

preference section of the ballot.
date of their choice.

The

The first is the presidential

The voters may select or write-in the candi-

This so called "beauty contest" has no connection with

the delegate selection portion of the ballot.

Names of state residents are

listed in the delegate selection portion of the ballet and run for delegate or

alternative delegate slots as apportioned to the state by the respective Democratic or Republican National Committees.

candidate's name is listed

TABLE 1.01:

viith

A delegate or alternative delegate

place of residence and candidate allegiance.

PROLIFEPJ^TIGM OF PEESIDENTIAL PRUIARIES

COVERAGE

Number of states using e primary for selecting
or binding national convention delegates
Number of votes cast by deJ.egates chosen or
bound by primeries

Percent of all votes cast by delegates
chosen or bound by primaries

1968-1976^^
1963

1972

15

23

983

1,862

2,183

37.5

60.5

72.6

1976

29*

*Does not include Vermont which held a non-binding presidential preference
poll but chose all delegates by caucuses and conventions.

s
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T);reo.

opLio.s are available .o the candidates.

dent:,

run as favorable to a candidate, or, vith
the permission cf the candidate,

run as pledged to the candidate.

The person may run as an Indepen-

Participation in the primary election was

liiulted to those vho had either declared
a party preference upon registerins
to

vote, had voted in a previous party primary, or
those independents who had not

either declared a party preference or had not voted
in an earlier primary. 17

The New Hampshire prer^ideutial primary is an cx.ample
of just one system.

In

1968 it had no duplies ue..

Primari es and Pre-C onventlo^n_ j^o 1 i t ic
V.O.

Key, Jr., reflected the pre-1968 attitude toward presidential
ncminat-

ing politics when he wrote:

The process of nomination of a presidential candidate begins
lo-ag before the convention in campaigns to sell a potential
cav:didate to the party to obtain the selection of delegations
instructed tc support him at the convention. These preconventlon maneuvers fit no set pattern and cannot be easily
described in general terms. -^^
No predictable route was identified for a candidate nor was an entry point to

the contest, such as a presidential primary, listed as the beginning.

If sell-

ing the candidate to che convention would be adied by showing a vote attractlr^,

capability presuiuably a candidate should enter a primary.

If the candidate's

vote getting power were sufficiently demonstrated, i.e., winning an elective
office, then convincing party leaders as to one's presidential stature would be

more important than wasting time in a primary contest.

In fact, Key noted that

preconvention manuevers could be best understood "...if they were observed with
an awareness that the task cf the convention is to unite the party in support

.

11

of a presidential candidate . "1^

The
emohaqlK nn
111^ empnasib
on rp^»^r^^.
letainins

t>r

creating a unified

party are clear in Key's view.
The character of the preconvention caiBpaign
to round up
support for aspirants for the nomination thus
becomes a
function of the tensions and cleavages within the
party.
Durable bases for conflict exist within each party. 20

The prJmnry was net viewed by Key as

vxi.Vlng a

significant contribution to the

evaluation of a candidate or to the objective of securing
a nomination.

The pri-

mary as a part of the nominating process, had receeded to
such a low level of
regard that even as perceptive an obsei-ver of American politics
as V.O. Key Jr.,
did not identify it as important to the success of a potential
presidential

nominee
Louise Overacker characterized presidential primary campaigns as having
three stages:

the preparation or stimulation period; the active campaign for

presidential preferences and the support of delegates, and the post-primary
activities. 21

While not unlike the activities for any campaign she connected

these pre-convention efforts to the option of the primary.

V.O. Key, Jr.,

writing decades later, noted five pre-convention aspects that tended to structure
his analysis of the nominating process.

First, he looked upon tha pre-convention

campaign as a rehearsal for the presidential campaign itself.

A candidate needed

to show his skill at maintaining the dominant coalition within the party in order
to accomplish the same when facing the general electorate. 22

Secondly, the possible presidential candidate faced a tactical problem that

being when to announce a candidacy.

A valid consideration for the candidate was

also whether or not to promote a draft, that is to be solicited as a candidate

rather than seek the office directly.

Should this strategy be used prior to the

12

convention or should the candidate wait until
all other candidates had faded
and
the convention would draft.23 while a draft
luight be an attractive alteriaative.

without Key's third activity, that of enlisting
the support of state and local

political leaders, such a result would be merely a
fantasy.

Any candidate,

avowed or subrosa. to succeed in a convention would
need at least the recognition
if not the active support of the political power
structure of the party. 24

This

obligatory tactic could be accomplished with a direct appeal
or via Key's fourth

pre-convention ritual, appealing to the wider public. 25
Key noted, presented certain hazards.

Appeals to wider publics.

Candidates are advised to make policy

speeches on current issues at "widely separated points in the country
to let
themselves be seen and heard and to gain national attention."
speeches could not only gain supporters but also make enemies.

But to make

Key reminds.

One speech may be enough to demonstrate that a man cannot
capture popular favor, and his boom is deflated early in
its career.

While risking one's presidential aspirations on the political stump is

a

serious step, but obligatory in Key's mind, entering presidential primaries offer similar uncertainty without the obligation.

A question of strategy that vexes managers of

v7ould-be

nominees is whether to enter the presidential primaries
that are held by about half the states from Jiarch to May
to select convention delegates.
An early victory in a
pivotal state may win the delegation and impress the
party in other states with the aspirant's vote-pulling
power.
On the other hand, a defeat may bring the boom
Yet a refusal to enter the primary
to a premature and.
may bo interpreted as a manifestation of lack of confij
27
dence.'^'
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While

not:

^eJ

^

co'.npel''od
J
^

to t-i^tT
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option, cnc.rm, ,.i.^rie. vas ccncUt,lou..

how presidential rri.arie. functioned.

l,y

-i

j

V'vin^rri.i«

was cenululy a valid

the .hen con.c.po.ary view as
to

Key rejected that view when
he .^ote:

Since the primary choice is to a large
extent sovcrned by
tae wishes of 'J.e state organi::atior.,
it; would oe rash to
enter a primary unless the candidate
hay vhe -„pper^
the organization or of an important
faction, or ^cll tl^t
he could defeat the state machine.
He Height veil have added to his concluding
phrase "...or whether defeating the

state machine would be in the interests of
his ceudidac.y

Concedins sone

i.o.por-

tance to presidential primaries Key noted that
pri..ariee probably make some men

presidential hopefuls who would not have been considered
as such in earlier dsys.29
To conclude, as late as 1968 Key's account of
the route to the presidency

was the prevailing reality.

political parties.

Presidential nominations were

a

perquisite of the

State party organizations, national party leadership,
and

party elected office holders were managers and keepers of the
pr-sidentia], 5election process.

Party cci:-ventions and the selection of party nominees were vehicles

by which sectional conflicts could be ameliorated in order to maintain electoral
coalitions.

Since no great politically divergent issues were evident during the

post war period to disrupt the alignmencs or to challenge the processes of coali-

tion building or maintenance, no serious pressure for change in the nominating

process was seen.

Even the sectional conflicts over ci\il rights

legislation

that threatened the Democratic Convention of ]948 or the conservative take over
of the 1964 Pvcpublican Convention were not reflected back as evidence of a need

for nominating process reform.

Not until the McCarthy challenge in New Hampshire

and the subsequent lessons of the 1968 Democratic National Convention was the

14

selection method for presidential
candidates given the complete
exa.l.atlon that
led to the delegate selection reforms
of the 1970's.
With Jl^y Carter's nomination via the nevly established priiaary
route in 1976. it see.s fair to
conclude
that first, primaries are once again
in the ascendency as a part, if
not the

major part, of the presidential non^inating
process, and secondly, no candidate
for the presidency will be able to avoid
entering .t least sone of the primaries
in the future.

Understanding the background of this political
system change is

at least a part of the reason for the
case study of the 1968 McCarthy candidacy

In New Hampshire.

The democratization of presidential selection
that bc^in in

1796 reached a new plateau in the 1970'

s.

While the possibility of a national

primary remains as part of the democratization debate
the proliferation of pri-

maries seens to have, in part, lessened its vibrance.
a scheme of

In its place has emerged

staggered regional primaries leading to the convention
validation. 30

The debates will continue but unquestionably a major reform
has been accomplished.

A Context for Presidential Nominating Campaigns
In 1S68 instead of a candidate seeking a constituency, an issue with
an
implied constituency went looking for a candidate.

Along with the search for a

candidate went a search for a contest, a place appropriate for the contest, and

people to organize a campaign.
political system.

Along the way much was learned about the American

The microcosm of the New Hampshire primary provides a glimpse

of how this change was begun.
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James W. Davie
ing nationalized. 31

vnrlr.lng in the

middle 19608 uoted that politics were
becom-

that process he saw two pbenomena
emerging.

The first

which was in distinct contrast to the views of his
academic colleagues, concerned
the role of the presidential primary.

The second, while less clearly stated
by

Davie, is manifest in the first.

Political scientists and newspaper commentators have
been long
preoccupied with the mechanism of the presidential primary
the types of laws, the scattered election dates, the
advisory
mandate of many primaries, and the limited number of states
holding such elections. They have mistaken the form for
the
substance of the primary system.
It is no longer important
whether there is a mandate binding the delegates to vote for
the winner of the primary.
The vital point is that a presidential candidate challenge and defeat rival contenders in the
primaries to demonstrate to uncomiaitted convention delegates
and the American public that he, the candidate, is a powerful
vote getter. 32

—

The thesis which Davis espoused contrasted sharply with that offered by

Nelson Polsby, Aaron Wildavsky, Paul David, and other proponents of the brokering function of the nominating convention.

Davis identified the importance of

the campaign in the context of a direct and meaningful appeal to voters, voters

that could participate in a presidential primary.

and

B<'

In contrast David, Goldman

in wrote:

A nominating campaign is a connected series cf operations; it
Involves a great deal of talk, but it is made up of much more
than talk. Like a military campaign, it involves movement,
supply, attack, defense, and all requisite maneuvers. The
candidates and their managers are continuously involved in
decisjons and expressive acts. The voters, on their part,
are given an exposure to persons and events as well as to the
words the candidates say, 33

"Exposure" is the key concept in the David, Goldman, Bain thesis.

Opportu-

nities to "display personality" and to "discuss issues" were the central elements
of the nominating route outlined by Davis. 3A

\Jhile Davis would contend that ex-
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ponuro in the context of a meaningful political event,
such as
primary, would have greater meaning, David, Goldman,

ai.d

a

presidential

Bain would write:

"...changing patterns of nominatins campaigns are increasingly
under discussion.

Much of the discussion focuses on the presidential priiaaries, with
proposals to
curtail their influence as well as to extend it* "35
As a reference fcr their position that the presidential primaries
did not

contribute meaningfully to the ultimate nominating decision, the authors quoted
a

prevalent view.
In the course of a television interview on June 1, 19.58,
Adlai Stevenson commented that the presidential priiuary
"is almost a useless institution." He went on to note
the difficulties iTTiposed on governors and other busy
executives when required to campaign in the primaries.
He cosrmenf.ed on the small turnout in most primaries, and
on the confusion and lack of uniformity in the rules.
Stevenson concluded, "Finally it is terribly expensive;
it's exhausting physically; you burn up yourself, you
burn up your ammunition, you burn up your means. I
think that it's a very, very questionable method of
selecting presidential candidates and actually it never
does. All it does is destroy some candidates 36
.

Stevenson's comments and what David contended were "Sober af terthoughts"^?

following the 1952 and 1956 priinaries, led to the repeal of primary laws in
Itlnnesota and Montana,

contests discussed a

v;ay

Those preparing candidacies for the 1960 presidential
to avoid the hazards of the primaries.

...The presidential aspirants, by mutual agreement, vi'ould
cut up the primary states among themselves according to
geographical or iaeological divisions. .only one candidate
would enter in each state. The alternative would be to
Ftay out of primary states and let them elect favorite
sons.
.
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While

the.

19C0

aMdates

seemed to fear contested primaries, what
appears

most interesting io ^ commitinent to seek popular
support for a candidacy while
at the same time, shying avay from primaries as
a means of organi..ing that support.

Presidential caudidates needed to be tested prior to nomination
but a valid test
was not seen as being a primary.

With the exception of James Davis's contention

that primaries did serve an important function, others favored
what appears to

be a combination of party responsibility for nominations and an
assumption of
voter interest, i,e., national commitment, outside the confines of
an electoral
context.

The Intensification of campaigning for popular support that
has already occurred may rest on underlying changes in sentiments and conditions that are too powerful to resist. At
any rate, public criticism of the primaries is noteworthy
for the lack of any tendency to question the desirability
of campaigning for popular support.
It seems to be taken
for granted that some appeal to the people is required to
assure the legitimacy of the nominations, and that popular
mandates, to the extent that they exist, must be given
weight in the nominating choice as a condition for popular
favor in the election campaign to follov7.39

Somewhere in the extensive analysis of the nominating process conducted by
David, Goldman, and Bain the connection between campaigning for public support
and campaigning in a presidential primary was lost.

Louise Overacker's chide

concerning the 1912 election did not register in the analyses of the 1950s and
1960s.

Perhaps there lust were not enough primaries to offer the range of con-

tests that vould make the presidential primary a meaningful contribution to the

nominating procest;.

If they could be avoided without political cost to a preai-

dential candidate then they could not be considered as being meaningful
ultimate decision.

to the

To many observers the presidentiel primaries were simply
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capricious minefields, veil .a.kcd, to
be entered only .ith kuowled^e
of the
ri.ks and to be avoided if at all
possible. When a candidate entered
the
minefield, as did John F. Kennedy in
1960, he did so with great precision.

prWy

Kennedy entered New Hampshire to show he
could attract votes and to test his
organization. Wisconsin was entered as a
test of his midwestern - large
industrial state

appeal and his ability to campaign against
his Minnesota opponent-

Hubert Humphrey.

West Virginia was entered to test voters'
reaction to the

barrier of his Catholism.
the brokers.
year.

After those three popular appeals, Kennedy
went to

Lyndon Johnson avoided the primaries as did
Stevenson in the same

Both hoped their national reputations would secure
support from the un-

committed, non-primary state delegations.

Their tactic failed.

miat emerged from 1960, to spite of the contentions of
those opposing the
use of the presidential primary, was the route to the
presidency that James

Davis would later describe.

Before leaving this subject it is important to

note another aspect of the view of politics prevalent at that time.

Political

scientists were taken by the idea that the American political party should
be

intrinsically integrated as a vehicle for national policy positions and as a

means by which adherence to those positions could be assured.

Those party

organizations and those officials, elected under a party label would be expected
to support the party position, carry out the party program, and stand before the

public with a commonly ennunciated party program.

Sectional differences would

fade, a national political jyarty structure would emerge, end a clear distinction

between national party philosophies vculd

bf;

evident.

clear between candidates representing the parties.

party

iriiindated

policy charges.

The choi es would be

Elections would produce

^
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Reflective of this discussion io the desire
of .any political scientists
to make
candidate nominations a function of the party.
Instead of permitting a candidate
to appeal directly to the voters via a
candidate selection primary, a would-be

candidate would have to demonstrate his or her
allegiance to the party, its
headers, and platform before being permitted to
carry the party label into an

election.

Summarizing the view relative to presidential
primaries Paul David

wrote:
The
the
but
for

issues of the primaries and of their relationships
to
party organizations are far from generally resolved,
once strong tendencies to curtail party responsibility
candidates selection seems to be undergoing reversal. 41

The common element that emerges from the preceeding discussion is
the

portance of some popular appeal by a presidential candidate.

inj-

While many reject

the presidential primary as a way to direct that appeal, James Davis
sought to

establish some rules that would shape
route to the presiciency.

a

candidate's attitude toward the primary

His rules V7eie:

1.

A combination of several presidential victories against
strong opponents, blended with solid organizational support in a number of populous convention states, will
usually give a candidate such an imposing lead that he
can't be overtaken.*^

2.

Winning uncontested or contested presidential primaires
v/ithout some corcmitted delegate support in states electing delegates by party convention is a futile exercise
and will not open the door to the nomination. ''3

3.

Once defeated presidential candidates campaigning for a
second chance must let voters in several primary states
pass judgement on their candidacy before asking the
convention to nominate them again.

4.

Opposing a first term president in the primaries is
fruitless, for the incumbent is never overtaken.
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The preslaential candidate must be.
careful in choosing primary
contests to try to avoid serious defeats;
but, at the sLe
time he must appear to be a fearless
candidate, prepared to
tackle ail comers in the primaries. ^6

5.

Davis made a persuasive case for using the
primary route to

a

nomination.

In hie view entering primaries was obligatory
as a means of testing a potential

nominee, reviving a defeated nominee, and manifesting
a candidate's popular appeal,

To

hLr.

the flaw in the analysis of those advocating
party responsibility and con-

vention brokering, was the lack of a measurable, accepted,
and structured public
appeal that could rival the recognition of a presidential
primary contest.
ing such an appeal would be the challenge.

Shap-

As the democratization of the presi-

dential nominating process has continued there appears to be no
substitute for
the process where citizens case votes.

P^olit ical Science and Camp a igns;

An Un e.a sy Marriage

The party responsibility debate that dominated political scientists' thinking during the 1950s and early 1960s not only reduced serious discussion about
the role of presidential primaries, but also diverted attention from examining

the rcle of campaigns in elections.

The argument follows that if parties were

properly charged with the responsibility for candidate selection and adherence
to party platforms, then election campaigns become

translators of the party message.
the

r.ev7E

much less significant as

The print and electronic media could carry

of the party based upon the statements of its candidates, its leaders,

and the details of the party's stated positions.
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Whil. rhla sqenario was attractive
to

the,

political rationalist t«o other

Images of the political process were
beElm,lnB to develop.

The fir.t «as the
one that would preoccupy political
sclentlsta to the present, voting
behavior.

The other was the evolution of the modern
political campaign, which went ataost
un-noticcd by political science.
The earliest voting behavior studies
employed sophisticated research methods
in a sociological context to profile
voting behavior. ^7

^hese studies were cri-

ticized because they failed to consider the
psychological reality of the voter
and to place the elections in an appropriate
political context.

As the metho-

dology evolved with it came an under stand.ing of
the relationship of present

Influences and past experiences on the way individuals
perfom politically.
This became the main objective of voting behavior
research.

The conceptual

bridge that advanced voting behavior research was the
definition of "party
identification. "^9

What wa^ discovered was that "party identification" is

"...a psychological identification, which can persist without legal
recognition
or evidence of formal neabership and even without a consistent
record of party

support. "50

Taken with socio-economic status as background descriptions of the

Individual voter and related to a present political need to make a choice, the

voting behavior researchers found that the individual could orient oneself to
make a voting decision.
What becomes important between a review; of voting behavior and the role of
carapaigns is that party identification helps sort political images for the voter.

The objects of elections are party linages, candidate characteristics, and percepC

-I

tions of issues.-'-^

outcomes.-^

These are the "proximate" forces that may influence election

The survey research model, that attracted
behavlorallsts' attention, was

seen as a way of explaining election outcomes by
focusing on the dominant vote
determinant, party ideutitication.

With such a powerful variable operating to

explain an election outcome, it became less necessary to
discover and analyze
other contributing variables of a voting decision.
The literature that developed around the party identification
vote determinant, concerrzed itself with elections where party labels were
evident.

Conse-

quently, in elections where prxrty labels were absent, i.e., ncn-partisan
elections
and primaries, other factors riight be of Importance in explaining election
outcomes.

Because of the predictive power of party identification and a general

disregard for non-partisan elections, the importance of many campaign variables
(e.g., canvassing, direct mail, types of media, or direct candidate contact)

not assessed.

vras

In fact, it might be said that the preoccupation with party iden-

tification as a principal explanation of vote outcome has tended to mask the
importance of these other influences.
Subsequent research has begun to identify the importance of campaign variables as determinants of the vote decision.

Among these, as mentioned above,

are the role of the candidate and the effectiveness of particular campaign tech-

niques.
a

Neither of these general groups of variables are solely dependent upon

party identification mechanism.

This situation becomes especially evident when

party identification is removed from an electoral contest as it is in the non-

partisan or primary election.

The literature that has evolved concerning such

elections has tended to identify alternative explanations for voting behavior.

Both bi-variate and .ulti-variate
analyses have been conducted to
assess the
individual effectiveness as well as the
relative effectiveness of campaign
techniques. This evolvxng experizuental
research has begun to explore those

other than par.y identification factors
that contribute to vote decisions.53

Voting behavior research of the 1970s
has determined other characteristics
of the voter's field that relate
significantly to election results.

and long-term influences of party iaentif
ication and

irnP.ediate

Both short

political events

have been assessed as well as rates of participation,
characteristics of elections, and the institutional aspects of elections,
to mention a few.

While

considerable attention has been paid to the behavior of
the voter in partisan
contests and some also to the vote in non-partisan
elections, little attention
has been devoted to presidential primaries.

esteem such events were held

This results partly from the low

from 1945 to 1968 by political scientists and

partly from the relative insignificance of the contests.

There were few states

with primaries, the pre~1968 and especially pre-1960 impact of the primaries
on
presidential candidate selection was limited, and, further only a small number
of delegates were selected by the primary states.

tention the presidential primaries did receive
tradition.

cair-.e

The result was that what atas part of the journalistic

Even these accounts were encompassed in a comprehensive discussion

of the total presidential election campaign.

The details of such contests were

lost or blurred as the limited discussion of a particular primary became almost
a footnote to the ultimate contest.

^'^

In addition, other trends were also becoming evident.

While voting be-

havior research was making significant progress in helping to explain the
American voter, the advocates of party responsibility were losing ground.
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A. the .an^e

tixuo

thac party Identification was
being revealed as an Important

determiner of voting behavior, loyalty to
th3 institution of the political
party
and to the stated philosophies of the
party was declining.55 ^ less
intensely
committed partisan was emerging which undercut
those seeking to subsume political
images and objects within vertically integrated
national parties and those seeking to explain voting behavior or the basis
of party identification.

emerges is a more fluid portrait of the voting
public
lihood of intra-party contests.

.4:ich

What

increases the like-

As party loyalty declines, so does party
unity

and those aspects of political attachment that
mitigate against family fights

within the ruberlc of the political party.

The primary election, whether presi-

dential or otherwise, is an institution that works as a
safety valve for venting
such conflicts.

As a result of a combination of factors and trends
electioneer-

ing is no longer centered in the party organization but has
now entered the era
of the candidate centered campaign.

The party no longer plays the main role as

the organizing intermediary in the campaign; as the style of campaigning
shifts
to mass media, advertising, and public relations. 56

create their own organizations to attract voters.
date a route around or through the party.

xhe result is that candidates
The primary offers the candi-

Modem mass media have

reduced, if

not all but eliminated, the information translating function of the party, while
the socio-economic complexity of modern living cross-pressures the voter to an

extent that the party as a single source of vote instruction is no longer relevant. 57

Vnu>t the

while

conta.porary literature of cmapalgn
management tells us

is

that

political scientists vere exploring voting
behavior and others urging
the reformation of the .Wican political
party, at the same tlr.e, candidates
were organizing, outside of the party, direct
appeals to the voters. To do this
.oxne

those vith experience drawn from advertising,
public relations, organization
managen^cnt, rnotivational research, as
primarily applied disciplines, were being

drafted by the candidates to organize the
political campaigns. 58

As a result

an experiential literature has been produced
by those who aided candidates to

chart their pciitical destinies outside the institution
of the party. 59

Campaign management evolved as an eclectic profession
drawing broadly from
sociology, psychology, political science, and economics.

The amalgum relies

most heavily upon the application of the social sciences

as transmitted into

various professions such as public relations counseling, advertising,
motivational research, marketing, and organizational raanagement.

From campaign case

studies, and accounts of campaign tactics that worked or failed, has
evolved a

guide to campaign organization that is reaching the point where tests for effectiveness may be made.

The marriage remains uneasy because the background for

conducting such research is still not well understood.

Documentary evidence

of caii:paigns tends to be fragmented, concentrating more on the campaign head-

lines rather than upon the subtitles of the campaign's field. 60

Robert Agranoff writing in his important study of election campaign management, summarized why he felt caiupaign processes and management have been neg-

lected as product research subjects for political scientists.
that It

\jiis

He noted first

assumed that "party organizations, were the exclusive agents for
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election campaigns"' and that when
voters were staunch party
supporters, "the
greater e.pha.ls in electioneering was
the mobilization of the faithful
behind
the ticket"
something party organization did well. 61

—

His second point was that "campaigns
are short-term operations."
ca:.paigns are not a "continuous or evolving
process. "62

j,,

As result

^^^^^

i8 that the significance of a campaign
is not always known at the
beginning nor

does a serious campaign lend itself to
experimentation in a manner that would

allow analysis of the effectiveness.

The applications and the research modes
are

not easily maintained during the heat of a campaign
contest.

manage at the expense of possible research
opportunities
be more than an empirical test.

The manager must

if the campaign is to

Nothing can be worse than for a candidate to

discover that the election was lost because of adherence
to a research objective

rather than the objective of winning the election.

Agrnnoff's third point is that "campaign personnel (party workers,
volunteers, managers, and candidates) change from campaign to campaign."

"inexperience and discontinuity

—

This lends

few records are kept, procedures are rarely

codified, and techniques are passed on haphazardly "^3
.

vJhen the

election campaign

is over the workers have traditionally either gone on to be reapers of the
rewards

of the victory or have returned to the pursuits they abandoned to join the cam-

paign.

Only rarely have participants taken the time to reflect on their campaign

experiences in a way that would provide the researcher with useful insight as to

how campaigns are managed.

Only recently, with the advent of the political cam-

paign managemeiit specialist, has there evolved
management.

a

recorded technology of campaign
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As Agranoff points out as his
fourth observation. -Campaigns
are usually
characterUed by an aura of secrecy and
self-interest because it is thought
advantageous to keep one's strategy and
techniques within the organization, "64
The similarities between traditional
campaign management and the
practice of
witchcraft cannot be overlooked. As a
cadre of campaign management
professionals
has emerged, and now with the existence
of an increasing number of
campaign

management consulting firms, sharing trade
secrets has become a part of establishing the professional character of the
practice.

Agranoff -s fifth observation holds that
"until recently, a functional body
of scientific knowledge for the purpose of
gaining insights and making useful
inferences for planning campaigns did not exist. "65

3^^^^^ p^^^^ ^^^^

Agranoff credit the change to the "development
and application of technology in
the form of television, computers, and opinion
polls..." to this advancement.

To him "...campaign management has more closely
resembled a cottage industry

rather than a business availing itself of modern technology "66
.

xo a consider-

able degree this consequence can be laid at the doorstep
of political science
for having disregarded the role of campaigns in the political
process.

Agranoff concludes:
The advent of campaign technology has produced a corps of
technologists concerned v/ith the art and science of
campaigning. These new campaign specialists are developing a new technical field of applied campaign management.
Thus, new political forces and advances in knowledge and
technology are contributing to an emerging tradition of
campaign, managemen t ^
nev7

.
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^S::=12^L^ll^±oI_tho^o litical Campai gn
In the 1950s one of the most perceptive
observers of American political
processes, V.C. Key. Jr., wrote of elections:

Presidential elections constitute decisions of
fundamental
significance in the American democratic process.
The trooping of millions of voters to the polls
s-.Tnbolizes self-rule
and legitimizes the authority of government.
But beyond
such mystical functions of the electoral
process, elections
are pivotal decisions which in turn control
many lesser
determinations in the name of the people.
He went on to categorize types of elections:
Some elections.. .express clearly a lack of satisfaction
with
the performance of the crowd that has been in charge
Other
elections may be plausibly interpreted as a vote of confidence.
More commonly the electorate may bring in a mixed verdict;
come voters are happy with the course of affairs and
others
are deeply dissatisfied. Even these confused elections
may,
in their situational context, be meaningful decisions
a'
series of elections may fix the contours that guide the
broad flow of public policy. Specific elections may give an
unmistakable mandate for a change of direction. Others may
approve a newly instituted order of affairs. Still others'
may record a majority of support for the status quo but the
mumblings of the minority may be a portent of a growth of
discontent. ^9

This categorization led Key to his important theory of critical elections.

Key's observations are important to the McCarthy in New Hampshire case study in
two V7ays.

First, Key reveals with his theory the prospect of important societal

change-producing political events.

Secondly, he opens to question the then

asstimed relationship between voting behavior and politics.

This opening may

be seen as the door through which contemporary attention to campaign management
has walked.

The "mystical" nature of what leads to these events remains as an

underlying theme of Key's writing.

The study of campaigns is beginning to shed

some light on this discussion of the political process as well.

As Key wrote:
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A concept of critical elections has
been developed to cover a
type ol election in which there occurs
a sharp and duroble
electoral realignment between parties, although
the techniques
as employed ao not yield any information
of consequence about
tne mechanisms for the majntenance of a new
alignment, once

it has formed.''-'

While the theory may be useful as a general means of
organizing types of elections
Key conceded that "the actual election rarely
presents in pure form a case fitting

completely any particular concept."

He then observed that "In truth, a consider-

able proportion of the study of electoral behavior has
only tenuous relation to
politics. "71

At this point it might have been possible, to show a
connection be-

tween electoral behavior and politics.

It may be that this link is the political

campaign as students of campaign management now contend.

Key stood back from his

observation puzzled, "...what characteristics of the electorate or what
conditions permit sharp and decisive changes in power structure from time to
time?"72

There are three types of voters in Key's view, the "standpatters, the switchers,
and new voters."
comes. 73

The

vray

these voters respond tends to deteraine election out-

How these voters were influenced to participate in elections escaped

his analysis.

Part of the problem was Key's view, and that of others, concerning

the role of the political campaign.

The studies conducted to profile Key's three

voter types relied upon pre-election and post-election surveys.

In fact, much of

the analysis depended upon pre-election surveys V7hich reflected voting intentions

rather than the actual vote.''^

An attempt to determine the function or impact of

the campaign did not enter the analysis.

In part. Key reflected this view when

he wroce, "An American presidential campaign is one of the most awesome spectacles

known to

raan;

the fate of a nation may hinge on the outcome of what seems to be a

donnybrook among demagogues and Madison Avenue types. "^5
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Observing further Key did concede a role
for the political cau.palgn,
but
offered little that would assist In
analyzing the functions of campaigns.
Campaigns are likened to the appeals of
opposing counsel to
They are said to be a means of educating
and informing the people about candidates and
issues.
They are classed
along witn soap-selling operations as
systematic manipulations of the mass mind.
They are treated as a ceremony hy
which a party obtains popular consent to govern.
They are
cynically dismissed as a ritual through which
politician,
tools of the interests, profess a love for
the people and
humbug them. A presidential campaign may contain
all of
these elements, but whatever its precise nature,
it moves the
electorate to a determination of who shall govern. ''^
a jury.

While Key and others could not overlook a major
artifact of American politic
they tended to treat the electoral campaign more as an
artifact than as a substan
tive element of the electoral process.

When discussing campaigns, Key reflected

the prevailing attitude cf the time which ranged from a view
of campaigns as pure

hucksterism to a more respectful view of campaigns as having a mystical
quality
that somehow contributes to electoral decisions.

What he did contribute was a

categorization of campaign methods that revealed aspects of the electoral role of
campaigns.

A presidential campaign may be thought to be the work of a
tightly knit organization §pread over the entire Country
and directed by cunning men wise in the ways of managing
the multitude.
In truth, the campaign organization is a
jerry-built and makeshift structure manned largely by
temporary and volunteer workers who labor long hours
amidst confusion and uncertainty.^''
With this statement, Key introduced both
campaign.

a

note of humanity and realism to the

Reduced from the august and yet raised from

th'e

it was now possible to sort out the contents of a campaign.

depths of deroogogery
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A prime necessity In the management
of a presldenti -,1

.

level ot tlie party organization
to permit the execution of !
°^ ^
coherent and considered campaign
strategy. 78

Two basic ingredients of campaigns
emerge, "management- and "strategy."
Charles
Merrlam had discussed both much earlier
but in a different context.
To him
"...campaign management does not rest with
organization,
speeches, literature
and canvasses..." but "it undertakes
the tasks of influencing groups
of inte-

rests of various types by various means. "79

m

part, this contention is supported by
Merriam's view of the manager as

one who seeks to Influence groups.

The "campaign Merrla:. saw was not one
that

reached directly to the voters but one that
In the name of party and candidate
sought to "...reach the nests and groups of
voters through their leaders great

and small, and by means both direct and devious,
as occasion may require. "^0
To Merrlam the campaign manager was not the
contemporary strategist and tacti-

cian of a campaign, but rather a person with "superior
acquaintance with men

and Interests, quick and accurate evaluation of them,
untiring energy, diplomacy,
shrewd judgment, prompt decision, coolness and balance
amid wild conf uslon. ."^1
.

While there is a certain universality concerning the qualities of
the manager,

Merriam's Image of a manager as one who bends groups and Interests to a
political cause shapes his view of a campaign.

One may conclude that "organization,

speeches, literature, and canvasses" for him are the hucksterism of American
politics.
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EaU. campaicn consistB of two parts.
One is directed upon
an appeal to ti.e co..:non interest,
or the theory that there
are no ciassoc, no races, no religious,
no sections, uo
special interests, but that the common
interest of all will
be the criterion by which each voter
will decide his party
allegiance. The other section of the
caaipai^n is based
upon the opposite theory that the whole
electorate is made
up cf a long series of special interests
which must be
shown their special advantage in the
support of the particular party a7;d its candidates in order
to obtain their
support °^
.

The mechanisms of a political campaign x.ere,
in Merriam's view, "organization, propaganda, and finance."

The organir.ation was of the "regular nationalis-

tic groups, and specialized groups (lavo'ers, doctors,
etc.)."

The propaganda

mechanisms were the press, demonstrations, or meetings,
radio, canvassing, and
the "conference," the latter being his charactj:ri2ation
of campaign management.

Finance, as a campaign function he allocated as strictly

a

party activity.

But

as has been noted above, his true image of a cantpaign was
one of direct pursua-

eion of blocks of voters by reaching their leaders.
Key began to break down Merriam's campaign elements reflective of the
post-

World War II shift from party dominated politics to candidate organized campaigns.

To Merriam's list of campaign activities Key observed a considerable change.

The

campaign leadership now was seen as being responsible for "planning the broad
lines of campaign strategy."

Strategy that included speech writing, wide ranging

propaganda activities, a changing role for media as television emerged as significant, major iiitra-party communication and mobilization efforts as stimulated

by the candidate and finally, the involvement of non-party organizations. 84
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For a nation emerging fro. the
victory of World War II it was
not surprising
tc find the rhetoric of political
management resembling that of a
military cam-

paign.

"Com^uentators on politics have borrowed
frora the military the
concept of
strategy/' Key wrote. "A presidential
campaign, as a military campaign,
may be
conducted in accord with a broad strategy
or plan of action." The plan
Key alluded to was to "fix the principal
propaganda theme to be emphasized in
the cau.-

paign," to define the chief targets within
the electorate," to "schedule peak
output of effort," and to "set other broad
features of the campaign." The cam-

paign strategy, Key commented, would serve as
a "...framework to guide propagandists, speech writers, funding, scheduling,
and activities of organization. "85
The ultimate comparison to politics as military
strategy came with a book en-

titled Politics_Batae_Pl^

prevailing upon him to choose

"The inexact science of reaching the voter and
"the

right marf or make 'the right decision' is the

social science of political campaigning "87
.

This statement rather than the no-

tion of politics as war demonstrated the changing concepts
of campaigns.

Beyond

the use of an effective campaign strategy the authors identified
"the desire of
the winning side - the side that most fiercely wants to win;
sometimes the side

that has been 'out' the longest; the side that is roost driven, most determined,

most dedicated.
time

David beat Goliath, and Alexander conquered the world of his

"88

From Key's observations the campaign strategy began to take on significance
that would be important as political scientists and political campaigners began
to converge.

If the impact of campaign efforts were to be evaluated then the

specific activities would have to be not only identified but placed in a context
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capable of vaUc, measurement.

At one U.,e

U

„a. „eld that the "active
ca.pai,„

be.l,. When the candidate or his
friends put hi. forward as
an avowed contender
for the nomination." As the
next step "an organisation
of so.e Uind is essential
....someone .ust arrange for filing
the candidate's na„e. for
pre-pri.ary meetings or speeches, and for the
distrlhution of literature." And.
finally,
".here

must be some central headcuartcrs to
which inquiries may be addressed,
if nothi,^
more. "89

Key noted that often the outlines of
a campaign strategy are
"scarcely
visible amidst the ncl.e and confusion of
the campaign." The strategic
pi.
Lans
Key saw were sketchy.
"The preparation of a reasoned and
comprehensive strategy
requires more of a disposition to think
through the campaign in its broad outlines than often exists around a national
headquarters. -90

Key's focus remained

on the political party as the presidential
campaign's strategic planner rather

than on the candidate or candidate organization.
plan itself was perceptive.

But his observation about the

"Once the plan is made, its execution requires
an

organization sufficiently articulated to respond to
general direction in accord
With the plan..."

Of more importance he noted, "And even when
a campaign is

blueprinted in advance, a flexibility must be built into it
to take advantage
of the breaks and to meet unexpected m.oves by the
opposition. "^1

The ability of

a carefully drawn campaign plan to anticipate events and
to accommodate the un-

expected has become an Important principal of campaign management.

Agranoff

noted, "campaigns must be planned, but sufficient leeway must also be allowed
for contingency tituations.

Campaigns must not only consider what they will do,

but also what an opponent is likely to do."92
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A study of the 1964 campaign
organization of Lyndon Johnson and
Barry
Goldwater deunonstrated the contrast
between the military-like model used
by

Goldwater and the more flexible campaign
plan that guided the Johnson candidacy.
Goldwater'
Image of a successful campaign was of
s
national decisions being made
at the top of a pyramid, "with each
decision-maker cognizant of their role,
rank
and responsibility. "S3 In the model,
defined as the "comprehensive ideal
model,

each step of the campaign would be precisely
planned and researched, and once
the plans were set, they were to be faithfully
executed.

The Implementation

would be similar to a coordinated blitzkrieg of air
power, landing force, infantry assault and decisive armor.
What the researchers found was that the rigidity of
the model made it diffi
cult to reach operational campaign decisions, information
needed to make strate-

gic decisions was excluded if it had not been included in
the original plan,
and that decisions once made were hard to enforce.

The conclusion was that a

campaign plan analogus to a military strategy locked the managers into
pre-

arranged decioions they were unwilling to adjust.

The level of detail and the

operating complexity of the plan left no room for resiliency ^5
.

The Johnson

campaign, on the other hand, did offer operational flexibility within
ture of overall management.

a

struc-

Objectives could be set but in such a way as to

perniit modifications that could take advantage of opportunities without jeopard-

izing the ultimate goal.
Key recognized that there were what he described as "Situational Limita-

tion on Strategy."
The characteristics of the situations within which presidential campaigns operate set limits on, or conditions, the
kinds of strategy that may be employed in the battle for
the voters' at f cctions.
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Wl.ne. as Key noted, "campaigns
have thel. unlovely aspects,
the .ores of
the democratic order .s well as
the particular circumstances
of individual campaigns place bounds on the types of
strategy that .ay be profitably
pursued."
Like Merria.. he noted the importance
of groups' targets
classes, races, and
religions but unlike Herria... he went
further to reflect the evolving
.ode of
the then contenporary campaign.
To group targets he added
"geographical targets"
to be followed by a discussion of
the concept of campaign timing
and resources
allocation. 97 This final addition was the
concept of the campaign theme. A

-

campaign strategy had created a "dominant
theme or themes" for a campaign.
theme would be used to capsulize the campaign
meaning and objective.

The

"It extends

to the creation of a tone or a spirit for
the campaign, an auro that envelopes

the entire operation and gives a distinctive
character to the undertaking in all
its details. "98

with the notion of timing and of theme. Key
reflected the impact

that the public relations, advertising, media, and
organizations management profe

sions were having upon politics.

He noted that "public relations specialists"

had developed the Eisenhower campaign strategy of 1952.99

^he documentation of

their effort, written by Stanley Kelley, Jr. and titled P rofessional
Pub lic

Relati ons and Political Power

,

was an early effort to reflect the impact of this

new actor on the political campaign stage.
Kelley found that from advertising and corporate public relations management
had emerged several organizations that had become skilled in the organization of

political campaigns.

The success of these cultures had led to a shift in the

emphasis of a firm from politics as a sideline to political campaigns as a major
component of a practice.

The firm that led this transition was the California

'
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based

fin,, of

whlf„Uer an, Baxter.

Fon,eci In the 1S30=

a.,

.

p„bUc relattons

consulting organization, by the
1950. they had evolved to the
point „h«re thelc
reputation had been .ade in politics.
Their success coincided with
the .edia
revolution of the 19.0s and 1950s
that was especially evident
on the West Coast.
For Khitaker and Baxter political
campaigns were a business, not
Just a sideline
of an advertising agency or the
periodic activity of a volunteer
but a business.
Their tenet was:
""^"^^^ campaign, to get a dollar's value
for eve.y dollar
for'^L^^v
TTr'' spent,
just as we would if we were merchandising commodities instead of selling
men and measures. We
use campaign funds, not to dispense favors,
but to MOULD
PUBLIC SENTIMENT, to present our candidate,
or our issue
in the most favorable light possible.

As the public relations and the advertising
specialists, and, more recently,
the campaign management specialist, came upon
the scene the image of the tradi-

tional electoral functions of the party, the
partisan workers, and the campaign
faded.

As Kelley pointed out, "...the public relations
man is in part, calling

attention to the rapid growth of population, the rising
level of popular education, the achievement of universal suffrage, changes
that together have increased

the d-fficulty of settling political issues by
understandings reached among mem-

bers of a limited ruling group."

As importantly he observed that the "...deve-

lopment of the mass media of communication has brought a fundamental change
in
politics. "102

The public relations professional began to introduce to political campaign

management

a

methodology that contained empirical research antecedents.

At the

same time as Key wrote of campaign strategy, behavior ial research was converging,

outside political science, in the applied practice of the market researcher and

public relations specialist.

Key observed:
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that are supposed to embody the
wisdom of political
-L-ixicai experience as guides to action. 103

Described by Key as the "Art and
Artifice in Campaigning" he left
the campaign in a .ystical state. Rather
than examining the various
campaign techniques
to sort out those that were
effective from those that are
repeated because of the

dictates of tradition, he classified
activities without documenting
according to
Impact.
The un>itaker and Baxter message that
it was possible to allocate
dollars
in a carapaign on the basis of
predictable impacts was beginning to prevail
as the
preferred method of the contemporary campaign
manager. Campaign planning was
begirding to fox-m as a means of allocating
scarce resources, (money, energy, and
people) to accomplish specific electoral
objectives.

John

1^.

Commenting on this change.

Bailey, then Democratic National Chairman,
said, "The key elements of

v^inning politics are sound planning, strong
field organization, and communication,

that carry your campaign into the minds and hearts
of the voters.

means more than making noise.
tions to the electorate. "104

Communications

It means actually transferring your ideas and
emo-

What the modern campaign manager was seeking was a

guide to effectiveness so that if a campaign could not do everything
it could at
least pick those tactics that offered the greatest potential impact.

Key's approach war to chronicle the collection of time-honored tactics and

candidate

dileniinas. ^-^^

nications revolution.

Key did note the importance to campaigning of the commuThe first use of political television, he noted, coincided

with the advent of the first modified New Hampshire presidential primary of 1952.
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He saw the dramatic advances

cc^unlcatlone teC.ology aa profoundly
altering

the character o£ the campaign and
perhaps also changing as veil
the "fundamental
basee of political power. "^^^

As for

impact of campaigns. Key observed,
"the hard knowledge about the
interaction between campaigner and voter
is thin, yet enough operative
inquiry
has been done to help put the role of
campaigning in perspective." He conditioned this observation by noting that
the efforts of campaigners are
"limited
by the loyalties of the party faithful."
He held that as much as three-fourths
the.

of the voters remained loyal to the same
party's candidate from one presidential

election to the next. 108

^hile the number of voters converted during
one elec-

tion campaign may be small. Key realized that
this swing vote could be sufficient to change an electoral result.

The state of carapaign impact research had reached
the point where it was

possible to identify three campaign effects.

Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet's

1944 study, The Peoples Choice had found that campaigns produce
re-enforcement

activation and conversion results.

Re-enforcement was found to strengthen the

loyalty of partisans and motivate them to participate.

Activation alludes to

the effect of the campaign upon those who are indifferent at the
beginning of a

campaign but are eventually induced to vote.

And finally, conversion is the ef-

fect of the campaign upon voters who were inclined to do something other than

participate as the campaign suggests,

l^'-*

Each successful campaign must observe

the three effects in both its strategy and the tactics that are used to imple-

ment the strategy.

Instead of recognizing the contribution to the understanding

of campaign methodologies, Key expressed a fear as to the consequences for

'

AO

^^eru..n po.U..cs .e^l.,., ^.e„
techniques;

Key felt t. identify

of

wUh

c^un.caUo.s

ca„p.,,„

'fair precision" the effects
of ca.-

palonlne could lead to "a complacent
vie. of the state of the
practice of democracy." The result, he suggested.
.i,ht be that the "capacity
of the people to
govern themselves and of popular
Institutions to shape questions
for popular
decision .ill... be subjected to far
.ore severe tests
than they have been in

the past."

Dependence on the niedla was thought
by Key to be the root of

this concern as the voter was asked
to react to problems beyond
one's
experience.

Mediate

The controllers of the media, as
well as political campaigrers
come to be equipped with both instrmnents
and propaganda terh-'
niques more suited to manipulation of
the mass from central
points of power. These and other
tendencies will doubtless
make the maintenance of civic intelligence
of profound continuing significance. ll'J

This fear has not been realized partly
because no one was able to corner
the market.

"Central points of power" have emerged, to
some extent, as Key found

but countervailing forces have tended to retain
a balance within the political
process.

As experience has increased, instead of leading
to greater simplifi-

cation, and manipulation, the result has been some
considerable dispersion of

decision-making, greater participation, an appreciation for
the complexity of
the electoral process, lessened prospects for manipulation,
and an increased

appreciation for the public ability, even willingness to evaluate and
respond
to information beyond one's ovni experience.

This result came in no small part

from the events of 1968 led by the McCarthy candidacy in New Hampshire.

That

venture helped shape the marriage between political eclence and campaign managemeiiL.

Each showed the failures and the contributions of the one to the other.

^
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on Uu. one ...e U.e p.ospects
for a par., ao.ina.eci
political process can.
a. en. a. ... U. no.lon o.
electorate as .eln. Irrevocably
.eter.lned
by past evidence o. political
behavior.
On the other side the
relevance of the
ca.pai,n, its ability to process
information anc, to focus decisions
in a way
that would elicit voter response
began to e.erge. The view of
the campaign as
hucksteris. with little to contribute
to national decision-.aMng
began to decline.
The empirical studies of the
political scientist and the applied
experiences of the campaign manager
began to converge. A new group
of political
process students and practitioners
also shared an appreciation for
the validity
of each others view and ability
to contribute.
The result has been an increasing sophistication about campaigns
and their relationship to the
electoral process.
This sophistication has not led to
increased capability to manipulate

-

a sheep-like public but rather an
unusual sensitivity to the capacity of
the

public to respond to issues, candidates,
arguments, and complex choices.

dern campaign management contains, as Agranoff
writes,

botli art and

Mo-

science.

It is difficult to plot the precise causes
of the change that has occurred

in both the attitude toward and the structure
of the modern political campaign.

For reasons other than a fascination with politics,
many skeptics were prompted
to become involved in political campaigns in 1968.

Those individuals, many

social scientists, shed their distain for partisan politics
in order to express
their concern about the directive of national policy.

The war in Vietnam, the

urban civil disorders, a perceived social and institutional disintegration
forced many to face a difficult choice, find a way to express concern or stay
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out an. sua-er the consequences.

Per .,any who had never
entertained the thought

of being involved In politics
participating in a 1968 campaign

„a.s

the lesser „£

several evils.

Because participation was so
widespread and deeply telt in
1968.
the impact upon social disciplines
was also widespread. For
political science,
the deter^iniso of the behavioralists
seeoed less absolute and predictable.
A
populace could be motivated by political
events, even by a political
campaign,
to violate long held tenets of
political behavior.UZ The New
Hampshire presidential primary success of Senator Eugene
McCarthy sparked many changes; among
them was a change in the perception of
the political campaign and its
place

within the electoral process.

The Contemporary Campaign;
..

So mP Introductory Comments

Fascination among academics with John

F.

Kennedy's tradition defying cam-

paign for the presidency in 1960 led to a
recognition that

paign management was evolving.

a

technology of cam-

The brief campaign organization manual prepared

by Kennedy worker and former publicist Lawrence
O'Brien began the shift from art
to science.

tant

The manual was a how to organize statement but it contained
impor-

,-.u!iimation3

drawn from voting behavior studies welded with experience
and a

sense of the political art.

Overcoming formidable odds to win in 1960, the John

F.

Kennedy organizers

and especially their tactics gained an immediate popularity among the campaign
practitioners.

The next to contribute to an emerging body of campaign manage-

ment literature was Stephen

C.

Shadegg, an Arizona Republican leader and organizer

of Barry Goldwater's senatorial campaigns.

The Art of Political Victory

. -^--^-^

His book. How to Win an Election;

was much less a how to organize manual than was
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0'B.l.„.s,

shados« cchined a sopUlacicated
understanding o£ pu.Uc
relations
atrategie. with a perceptive view
„f political processes
and behavior. The
result. .Hc^.t.o_W,^a^ctlcn.
not only explains wh.t to
do
a ca..palgn.
out when and why the advised
tactics should he employed.
Shadegg challenged
his reader to be acre than a
practitioner of a cookbook of
political recipes
but to reach to the art. If not
yet the technology, of
campaign „anage.ent. He
asks his reader to develop an
understanding of the political
process represented
by the campaign.
Fro. that understanding Shadegg
challenged the reader to d evelop a conceptual and intellectual
understanding of the campaign dynamic.
In
his 5-ntrocluction he wrote:

m

...I can document the following conclusions:

Only a very few successful candidates
have any real understanda.ng of why they were victorious.
The segment of the population which is
least interested in
politxcs decides the outcome of most elections.
The party organization can help a candidate
tremendously
but, it cannot elect him.

Party labels are misleading and party registration
is
never the key to a candidate's strength.

Millions of dollars are wasted in every political contest.

—

Elections are mote often lost than won
by that I mean
the error or mistakes committed by the loser have a more
profound effect upon the outcome than does the positive
performance of the winner.
There is no surer way to lose an election than to think
you have it in the bag.

Virtue in politics is not its own reward. And while the
big issues count, more often than not the little things
make the difference between defeat and victory. ^^'^
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As an introduction to
the
-ne. McCar^hxr
j
McCarthy ^^^^
campaign
of 1968 in New
Hampshire it
would be possible to stop
rxght
riRht
hero
i
.
P
here and begin the case
study.
Shadegg's eight
obse^ations are decunented by the
events of tha. campaign.
To leave the
Shadegg discussion at this
point would noc serve to
illustrate the change in
i

campaign n.nage.ent fro. art
to technology or fro.
generalist to specialist.
When he wrote 3hadegg noted

that "all sorts of people
get asked to manage

political campaigns''
but ^^^^
H
Chat
8 .

'Vv.^>-^
theie

^
aie
axmost no professionals In
the field."

He observed that with the 'exceon-m, ^^f n,„
exception of the national
conmittees of the parties,
there Is no full-time e^ploy^ent
opportunity." With "AS.OOO people
running for
office every two years" and the
"wise candidate has a manager."
there are "no
schools for candidates or for campaign
managers." There are "thousands
of
excellent text books on political
science, but there is very little
written
about campaign management "l^^
.

To begin to fill this considerable
void, Shadegg wrote and others have

begun haltingly to follow.

With a nod toward the discipline of
political

science, Shadegg offered to analyse campaign
management, campaign techniques,

and procedures.

What he promised were "opinions and conditions"
not "theory."

His basis was not "abstract discussions,"
but techniques "documented and sup-

ported by... use in actual political contests
ranging from Massachusetts to
Arizona. "11^'

A brief review of the importance of the "undecided"
voter as

playing the pivotal role in elections introduced Shadegg's
concepts and examples of effective campaign activity.

shadegg produced the first list and

.
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thorough Ci.cu3sion of th.
i.p„„a„.. of U.e campaign
manager. i„age of the cantdldate. campaign expectations,
tiding, knowing the
opposition, targeti,^ vot er
populations, organising the campaign,
using public opinion surveys
to develop
ca.>pai8„ strategy, and .odern
co^unication technology. He concluded
with the
practical advice don't "...let the.
steal" the election fron, you.U8

With each subject he developed
approaches that had been successfully
used.
Illustrated each with appropriate
examples, and indicated what was of
generic
value to subsequent campaigns. The
work was concise, experiential and
offered

'

a new discussion to the earlier
how- to-do-it and anecdotal accounts
of campaigns

Shadegg offered a rationale that
demonstrated his own synthesis of the
other cur
rent work on voting behavior, motivational
research, marketing, conmunicatlons

and political institutions.

While the work fell short of establishing
the tech-

nology of campaign management, it did provide
a contextual background for the
next steps.
Following Shadegg and stimulated by the events of
1968, has evolved an

increasingly sophisticated literature on campaign
management led by Robert

Agranoff's book The Management of Election Campaign s,
published in 1976.

As

if in response to Shadegg 's complaints there are
now campaign management con-

sultants who have sufficient business to occupy themselves
with campaign assign-

ments on a full-time basis.

A national campaign consultants organization has

been established which holds conferences, and runs seminars in campaign
management techniques, financing, and communications as well as serving an increasing
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body^of recosni.,..d practUioners
of campaign „a„a,c..„t
an. candidate counseling,
candidate, ate now teachins £ot
the professional political
consultant
in increasing nu..bers when not
too Ion, ago. as Shadegg
noted, the function was
being filled as a seasonal
sideline of so.e public relation
or advertising £ir„s,
CHART 1.02
Number of Campaigns in Which
Professional Services Were
Provided 1960-1970.
(143 finns renorced actlvUies
during this period. )120
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The public relations counsel was the generalists, the
immediate predecessor of the specialist, the campaign management counselor.

The contemporary

campaign, Marjorio Randon Hershey found, "...is not composed of
generalists but
of specialists."

rocal roles.

She observed that the "candidate and the manager play recip-

The activities of each depends upcn the activities of the other. "^^'-
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In addition to the manager there
are other specialists in
campaigns,

raisers, the publicists,
coznc to

l:hc

the fund

organisers, the schedulers, ana
others who have

fill rather definite niches in
almost all serious campaign efforts.

As Kershey noted, "no matter how broad
their interest in politics may
be.
persons who become actively involved in
cam.pai8ns tend to specialize.

They

specialize because it is an efficient method
of handling election tasks and
because they are more interested in some
aspects of campaigning than others. "122
As

a

transition to what has become known as a technology
of campaign

management, it is important to note that the
context for the technology has
Important social characteristics.

ism

Hershey notes. "...We see both traditional-

and the spread of innovations in campaigning.

looking at campaigns as a learning process."

Both can be explained by

She suggests that, "the diffu-

sion of new campaign methods is part of the process by
which new and underdog

campaigners seek successful models of campaigns on which to
pattern their own
efforts."

She concludes, "...behaviors that work will be retained, and be-

haviors that fail V7ill probably be dropped..."

Learning is a form of adapta-

tion, she notes, in which both campaigners and campaigns adapt.

"It adapts

not only to its environment but to ihe experience, attitudes and personality

traits of the candidates and managers. "123

^^^^

^^le

campaign, its partici-

pants and its constituency are part of a social field that must be understood
as the context for analysis.

What subsequent work begins to tell us is that the

learning process can be accelerated and some of the mistakes and waste avoided

by testing the efficiency and the effectiveness of the techniques of the campaign.

A8

As the latest work on campaigns
and with the stated objective
of "...bring
in, together political trends,
knowledge, and experience...Robert ..granoff be

summarizes the state of campaign
management.
^™^-^^P^rt,s in other fields of management,
both art and science.
It is predicated on th^
following assumptions:

T

Vr'^ll^'l
it contains

1.

That one must understand campaigns and
attendant political processes before one can manage
them;

2.

That management of campaigns involves a
blend of the
best information obtainable and the wisest
judgmen^
about that information;

3.

That campaign strategies and campaign tactics
are
situational
one must understand the situation and
supply relevant knowledge;

4.

At present, campaigns are among America's
most poorly
managed enterprises; and,

5.

They can be better managed with information and insight

—

.

"'-^^

The case study follows that is intended not only to chart
the evolution of
a campaign but is intended to demonstrate the nature of
both the art and the

science of campaign management.

It responds to Agranoff's assessment that "A

campaign is a coordinated effort to achieve seme objective, such as electing
a candidate to office, connecting various operations that organize and use en-

vironmental, human, social, and material resources "^^^
.

It is this connecting

function that has the potential for bringing the political scientist and the
campaign manager together.

A dependency of one discipline upon another profes-

sion offers the chance to respond to Agranoff's five assumptions that will lead
to a better understanding of the electoral process and to management of more

A9

efficient c^pal^^ns.

The observation that offers
this opportunity is that,

•in election campaigns the campaigner
tries to win by connecting
operations that
deal with idio.orpWlc forces:
basic premises about the nature
of the constituency,
political resources, assets and
liabilities, and advantages "125
.

Methodolop.ical Notes

As primarily a case study, the account
of the 1968 McCarthy Canvpaign
in New
Hazupshire has two r^ethodological
antecedents. Both are drawn from the
research
approach described as participant observation.
The approach evolved from the

anthropological field studies of the past several
generations where researchers
joined communities to record their social and
cultural characteristics. With
the evolution of the discipline of sociology,
the participant obserx^er methodo-

logy of anthropology, primarily a descriptive
methodology, was used as a basis
for a scientific analysis of social and cultural
phenomenon.

Precise rules for

the conduct of field research and data collection
evolved which offered the

observer the chance to quantify, compare, and to evaluate
the social and cultural

phenomena that were experienced through participation within
social communities.

through several generations of researchers and field studies it
is now
possible to state three principal axioms with corollaries of participant
observation methodology.

Axiom

1:

The participant observer shares in the life activities
and sentiments of people in face-to-face relationships. 127

The axiom places the obser\-er not in the traditional scientific role of a

neutral observer but expects the obser^rer to share in the live activities of the
social community being observed.

V.Tiat

distinguishes the researcher as a partici-

50

pan. observer is an expected scienUfic
role of "conscious and systematic
sharlr.g..."l^^«
The participant shares in the "lifo
activities" of a group of person
with the research objective of observing,
quantifying, and analyzing the conununity.

Not simply participating for the sake
of participating, nor observing
in
a detached manner, but accounting
for the characteristics of the
social group

by systematically recording, even quantifying
the social behavior shared and

observed.

From this axiom comes a corollary.

The role of the participai;i!t-observer requires
both detachment
and personal involvement "^"^^
.

The researcher joins a social community for the
purpose of study which re-

quires a certain detachment but to be totally
detached would rot produce the

opportunities for evaluation that come with personal
involvement.

In most cases

involvement means more than joining a community, but actually
finding and assuming a proper role

~

one which offers the maximum opportunity for participation

that will produce thorough and accurate observations.

Axion

2:

The participant observer is a normal part of the culture and the life of the people under observation. 130

The researcher must find a role, a site within the community, that is not

"forced" or "artificial" to the "ways of the people

unde.-

study."

The objective

is to study the nonaal processes of the life and culture of the community and

not to distort that culture by introducing the research objective in a manner
that would be disruptive.

To some, proponents of participant observer research,

this implies some concealing of the observer's research objective in order to

keep that objective pure, while to others stating the research objective becomes
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par.

«.e

eonfe...

Uo„e..„ .He confidence
.uUdln« pro.es. of c.ea.in^
.ho research

Po. eaC, .esea.cHe.

„UM.„

a s.ud. sf.uaf.on
.He ,„es.fo„ of „He.he.

to announce .he observer
aspec. of .he ac.ivi.y and
.he In.ended research
is

funda.en.al.

Each par.iclpan.-oBserver
.us. ans.er .he ,ues.io„
for oneself
and .hen rela.e accordingly
to the comunl.y being
studied."!

The corollary of the second
axiom s.ates:
The scientific role of the
par.lcipant observer Is interdependent with his social role In the
culture of the ob.4rvea"5f
The participant observer Is a
social scientist who distinguishes
oneself as an
observer of social co»uni.ies
conducing that observation through
the use of
scientific .ethodologles and analyses.
The participant observer Is
obligated
to design a s.udy. .ta.e
hypo.heses. and evolve an evalua.ive
context .ha. responds
to the situa.lon being obser-.ed
as veil as .o .he require-nents
of sound scientific
methodology. Unlike .he scientist working
fro. a laboratory, the participant
observer rccogni.es .hat the dual role is
an interdependent role which produces
research strength that might otherwise not
be available If one were detached from
the other.

Ine final axiom validates the methodology
as a contributor to a further under-

standing of society.

Axion

3:

The role of the partitipant observer reflects
the
social process of living in society. 133

The rer.earch objective of the participant observer
extends beyond understanding
the social and cultural characterisitcs of a particular
community.

It is from

these understandings that it becomes possible to broaden
the understanding of

social processes for all communities.

To distinguish between the artist using
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a local sctti,^ for the basis
of a social account and the
work of the social

scientist is that the "latter seeks
certainty outside oneself by following
rules
and procedures for verifying one's
findings." While the process for
interpreting the "collective s>^bols is an
intuitive process (as much as rational)"
it
is a "process that can be scientifically
verified "l^A
.

It is from these axioms and corollaries
that the scientific method of the

participant observer descends.

To summarize, Severyn T. Bruyn wrote:

Since the observer plays a natural,
interdependent role in
the culture he studies, sharing in the life
and becoming
involved in the activities of the people he
observes, new
methooological problems are necessarily set up to
be solved
which have not been previously encountered.
Unlike the
traditional empiricist, the participant observer
must view
a culture just as the people he is studying
view it, including reflecting on the social process in which
he is inwardly
engaged.
Tn-'s means he sees goals and interests of
people
the same way that the people see them, not as
functions
or experimental causes as would the traditional
empiricist;
it means that he sees people in the concrete
reality in
which rhey present themselves in daily experiences, not
as
abstractions as would the traditional empiricist; it means
he senses that these people act freely within the scope
of
what they see as the possible, not as determined agents of
social forces as the traditional empiricist would see them.^^^

m

What the methodology of the participant observer presumes is that the
researcher enters a social situation for the purpose of study.

Participation is

incidental to that research purpose and is extended to facilitate the research

objectives rather than to contribute inordinately to the condition of the social
community.

Given this as a precept, it then becomes possible to organize for

research, within the setting, an empirical evaluation that responds to the prin-

cipals of such research.

Hypotheses are drawn, data is collected and analyzed,

hypotheses tested, theories drawn, and results verified.

The principals sought
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arc those which a.uess sc„e
universal character

£ron, the

cooMuaity rese.rch.d

Which When tested in other settings
„ay be found to be valid as
descriptors o£
social condition.
The problem with this strict
methodology when applied to the
McCarthy campaign case is that participation
dominated obser^-ation until after
the event
was completed.
The author did not enter the
campaign with a research motive,
but,
rather, with a political objective.
He did not plot a research direction,
nor
organize a sequence of observations, nor
assume a role for the sake of observation.
His objective was to organize and
manage a political campaign designed
to have a political result.

Only after the fact did he consider
the contribution

that a thorough accounting of that campaign
might offer.

While the methodological requirements of a
participant observation study
are less stride than those of classic
empirical research, even these requirements
exceed the evaluative possibilities of the New
Hampshire McCarthy campaign.
This, however, does not mean that the author
must reject the methodology of the

participant observer but it does mean he must place his
study in either its own
context or in a context that has been recognized previously.
To help with this task Bruyn has described a series of
sociologically impor-

tant studies that do not fit his methodological structure as
"the stylistic study."
To define this term Bruyn writes:

Although the scientific process predicts what appears to be
an unknov/n future, it does so within closed systems; and,
although it purports to study change in the world, it does
so by abstracting laws or patterns of phenomena which are
historically repeatable and are based upon the relatively
pemanent character or structure of the world. This is
reality discovered through the scientific tradition.

54

leallty in its studies. Therefore,
another type of resea>-ch
has earned a pl.ce of special
value within the field 1 tlm
study which does not follow the
systematic traditions of
science, but rather has a particular
style of its own
It
functions to reveal new meanings
in data as well as1^;w
meanlnsful posGibilities in theory.

Bruyn lists as styles found in past
studies as being:
factual, analytic, satiric,

i

ournalistic

romantic, realistic, poetic,

and existential ^37
.

.

^.^^^^

has described the final three; satiric,
journalistic, and existential appear to
relate most closely to the case study of
the McCarthy campaign.
Satiric studies have
tended to account conditions in "total
institutions" and to use an informal style
to relate the conditions and circumstances
of those housed in institutions, as

Bruyn notes.

^

^^^^^.^^ ^^^^^^^

^ political campaign might be analogous
to

an institution and to account for the activities
and behavior of those within campaigns in the satirical fashion of certain participant
obseirver studies, seems

reasonable.
Secondly, the journalistic style is especially well
suited for accounting,
as a case study, a political campaign.

Although Bruyn contends that "journalistic

reporting shows no Interest in the sublteties of satire... it is
nevertheless the
same in its interest in commenting socially on affairs of everyday
life."139

Reporting becomes an important aspect of the analysis of the McCarthy campaign.

Developing the stream of events, the inter-actions, and the consequences fits

well into the journalist's demand that facts are the gist of the news, the who,
vhat, v/hen, where, and sometimes the how of the reporter.

Thirdly, Bruyn notes that "authors of research studies have recently begun
to report their

ovti

existential orientation, that is, their own personal interests

and relationsb.-ips with their subjects."^'^^

This latter perspective is important

In the account of the McCarthy campaign since the author does feel his own
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sltuauon and circuastanc. led

to hi. participation
In that political venture

If his situation had been
different,

so .i,ht either

involvement and even

hl.s

the outcome.

He also suggest, that the
existertial situation for himself
and the
decision procesH which he experienced
.ay well have described the
situation of
many others who became Involved
in the McCarthy candidacy,
vmile the study does
not presto to draw existential
generalizations fro. the particular
role of the
author, it does suggest that such
generalizations .ight be drawn if the
existential question v/ere pursued.

lo summarize his definition of the
stylistic study of social phenomena
Bruyn
VTrites:

The stylist ideally

finds his home more in the cultura]
world
of man than in the structural
world.
He assumes that the
phenomena he studies have quality and are
rich in meaning.
He assumes that what he studies contains
innumerable possibilities for interpretation, of which his
is only one.
He
assumes that man's nature is of infinite
variety' and that
man is to be explored in this light. 1^1

While this may be a satisfactory description of
a less constrained researcher

within the sociological interpretation of participant
obsex-vation, it does not
account for a political science perspective.

To provide a context for a politi-

cal study of the McCarthy campaign sort and to
suggest

a

methodological antece-

dent that does recognize the range v/hich Bruyn reports,
is difficult.

The

closest that one can come is to the first study of a presidential
cam.paign

written by Theodore White in 1960. ^'^2
White observed as

a

journalist and political analyst.

He participated as

an associate of the principals, especially as a friend and counsel to John F.
Kennedy.

He brought to his v7ork a refreshing Insight uiilch came from his

familiarity with the institutions and processes he was observing.

While prin-

:
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cipally a Journalistic effort,
the case study th.t he
produced contained perceptions of the political processes
that functioned during the
political year
o.

I960,

these insights provided a useful
basis for subsequent studies
of elections
and electoral processes.
It is this .odel that seeas
to fit the case study
objective of the 1968 New Hampshire
McCarthy campaign.
It is a .odel that recognizes the perspective of participant
observer as stylist, the author's
own
existential perception, while reaching
further than UnUte reaches, co
test, em-

Plrcally. questions that are not answered
in tne recounting of the observations
and events.
The case study of the McCarthy
campaign must of necessity, be eclectic in its methodology.

Its purpose is to describe in detail
as a journalist

might, but also to describe as a
participant observer would do with greater

precision than the journalist.
examine outcomes.

Its purpose is also to explain events
and to

Finally, the study will conclude by empirically
testing

hypotheses in order to explain observations
that otherwise would escape explanation or be misunderstood in their implications.
To demonstrate through Bruyn's words how this
methodology applies, the fol-

lowing quotation, as revised by the insertion of a few
words (in parenthesis),

concludes
The larger truth will appear in the judicious combination of
those partial perspectives which, on the one hand, can predict the behavior of man (political behavior), on the other
hand, can enlighten his (the political) world of choice by
disclosing its variety, thus increasing his (society's)
freedom of (political) action. Man is truly a paradox
steeped in irony (as are man's political processes). He
is predictable and he is unpredictable (as are man's politics).
He is individual and he is communal (as are man's
politics).
He is, indeed, richly endowed (as are man's
politics). 143

.

.

.

.
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IIAHPSHIRE 1968

A political event, like the
McCarthy pre-convention campaign
in New
Hampshire, has many, perhaps even
thousands of beginnings, as many
in fact,
as the individuals who become
involved in the campaign. The
beginning for
.>any

occurred with the returns of the
New Hampshire Presidential Primary

on the evening of March 12,

that evening possible,

1968.

For those who were involved in
making

the beginnings occurred long
before March 12th.

Later it would be said that many were
caught up in the events and were
moved by changing conditions to join the
movement, but in the early stages
what was to become the McCarthy campaign,
and even later the "New Politics"
m.ovement, was made up of persons who
deliberately took a different direction

from that of their friends, neighbors,
colleagues, and even families.

At the time these personal decisions were made,
the goals seemed un-

obtainable.
times,

2

No incumbent president had been denied a
nomination in modern

and no essential policy embodied by an incumbent
president had been

changed as a result of renomination challenges.

The objective for those who

were concerned about the state of national affairs in 1967

—

to get the

president to change Vietnam policy or to replace the incumbent as
the nominee
of the Democratic Party

~

was not considered to be politically realistic.

The personal decision to oppose, politically the policy and/or the President

became a decision of personal vindication, almost an act of private absolution,
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ln.re., or

i.„ui-...rt.,8l,.,

frustration

»n.l.

perhaps. Implied complicity with

contcnporary .vents, people sought methods
to ..bsolve themselves, to
clea,,
their hands, r.ot merely by expressing
their opposition to policies and
actions
they did not like but by actually
creating organizations through which
they
might be absolved.

In the back of many minds was a lingering
question reflecting a lingering

guilt:

would our children in the future ask, "Where

^.ere you

and 1968 when the war in Vietnam was being
escalated?
that war?

l^eve did you stand on

What did you do to affirm yourself as an
.\merican capable of

speaking out and working to change such policies?
years?

during 1967

How did you spend those

Were you the quiet generation of your youth (the
i950's) or the progeny

of a new quiet generation?

What did you do to grasp control of your destiny?"

Newjjam pshire Political Dem o graphics

Although New Hampshire is

a

small state with an estimated 1968

population of 700,000 persons, the distribution of that population and the
diversity of its information sources makes it politically unique.

To

many political observers that very diversity is a microcosm that reflects
and represents the political dynamics of the United States.

By working within the political process of this

peculiar

state and

gaining experience with the variety of its political and voting populations,
the future McCarthy campaign leaders came to knov; the breadth and limitation
of each political -'^Ituatioa

From the fire of the several campaign experiences

of the 1960's, a generation of New Hampshire Democratic Party activists
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the extent to which

a

political situation was elastic,

capable of manipulation, and when
a situation would bo
unresponsive, it
least in the context of a campaign.
They learned that the rules,
mostly
unwritten, for each electoral event
were distinct, each campaign,
for each
office, and each election (local,
statewide, primary or general)
produced
its ov.n particular political
ethos.
An ethos that had to be understood
in
order for an electoral objective to
be reached.

For presidential primary politics
the state conveniently divides
into
Democratic areas and Republican areas.
Democrats tend to be concentrated
in the states 13 cities and larger
urbanized to.^s, while the Republicans

are dispersed to the suburban towns and
rural areas.

The first Congressional

District is the more urbanized of the two and
contains an almost equal share
of registered Democrats and Republicans.

Its information sources tend to be

Intra-stace daily and weekly newspapers and radio
stations.

Television is

Boston-based as are several regional newspapers, principally
the Boston
Globe.

The population of the first district is relatively
dense with major

growth centers occurring adjacent to the Massachusetts
border.

The area of

the district is approximately one third of the total state.

The western and northwestern cities and towns of the 2nd Congressional

District

are dispersed over a much larger geographical area and tend to be

more isolated than those of the more dense 1st District.

The economic ties

and incdia sources of the 2nd District are less linked to Boston and more
to their own regions.

Vermont, New York State, Maine, and even Canada

provide the external media that supplements the coverage of the radio and the
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lUstrtcfs daily and weekly press.

As an example, the newspaper
with the

largest circulation in Berlin,
the state's most northerly
city, is the
Lewiston Sun, published in Lewiston,
Maine.

The combination of geography,
both physical and political, as
well as
economic and social demographics
produce from .he relatively small
New Hampshire

population an unusual microcosm.

It is both urban and rural,
working class

and middle class, provincial and
cosmopolitan.

There are strong religious

and ethnic ties, deeply held political
traditions and areas of great change.
VJhile the state contains only a
small non-white population ethnic
rivalries

of several generations in length have
produced social responses not unlike

those experienced between racial groups.

For reason of location, tax policies

(the only state without a sales or an
income tax), preference and available

land, New Hampshire's growth and patterns
of social change have tended to

keep pace with those of the nation.

As the years have passed, instead of being

less representative as a microcosm it has tended
to maintain its position.
For this reason and for the reason that it holds the
first in the nation

presidential prim.ary, it has maintained its stature as an import.mt
political
bellweather.

New Hampshire Politics:

Pre 1968

New Hampshire's Presidential politics duplicates its state traditions.
Political credits have often been amassed through working for the right

candidate (the eventual winner) in the Presidential Primary and then cashing
these credits in for jobs or favors should the candidate actually win.
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TO .naxl.„i.e

.:his

strategy. New Hampshire created,
on purpose or by accident,

its Presidential Primary which,
by its very existence, gave
New Hampshire

politicos the chance for direct contact
with potential presidents.
Through
this contact and appropriate political
work a political tie could be
established
The better debt payoffs are the
federal rewards, such as postal
jobs, judgeships, contracts, and access, those
who wanted such jobs or rewards
tend
to support the perceived winner

Ideology is an inconvenience.
facilitator.

-

the frontrunner.

Under such circumstances

The appropriate role is that of the
broker or

The local political operative puts
oneself in the position

of delivering votes, rather than trying
to influence policy.

For the majority of New Hampshire's urban
Democratic party organizations,

delivering votes was accomplished by contacting and
then appropriately
rewarding, promising to reward, or actually paying for
the services of the

individuals who made it their business to produce "the vote."
not unlike that of urban machine politics in other cities;

was different.

The model was

only the scale

As insignificant as 3,000 to 4,000 Manchester votes might

be when compared to the output of

magnifying lens of

tl.e

Tammany or a Daley machine, under the

national media. New Hampshire's early returns have

always meant more than their actual numbers.

The New Hampshire Presidential Primary

The New Hampshire Presidential Primary is a product of Yankee frugality.
The early date is set to coincide with the first Tuesday in March, the same
day as the annual

siderable time,

to'-^m

HiOTioy,

mseting.

Two elections on the same Jay saves con-

and results in a larger vote.
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Pa,:..ci„.u„n

H.e

^^^^
^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
partie.- representaUvs
to the Hotio^X Conventions
by popula,: vote rather
than State convention.
3y act of the 1948 New Hampshire
Legislature, the

presidential preference section
of the ballot was added,
which has since
beco,„e

kno™

as the "beauty contest" a poll of the electorate's
choice

of Presidential candidates.

The addition of the presidential
preference section of the ballot

ended the localized popularity
contest for convention delegates.

Before

1948, delegate candidates popular in the
State at the time of the election

usually represented their party at the
National convention, regardless of
their personal preference for President.
By adding the preferential section,
the in,portance of the Presidential
candidate and his delegate candidates

transcended the local popularity of the
state's politicans.

The presidential preference section of
the ballot made the New Hampshire

primary a national attraction.

A presidential candidate could benefit from

the publicity of New Hampshire's "first in the
nation" primary and do so at

relatively little cost.

Several factors make New Hampshire

early date of the Presidential Primary.

voter participation.

a

key State also.

The first is the

The second is the relatively high

The third, although a rural New England state by image,

New Hampshire, is, in fact, heavily Industrialized, second only to Connecticut
In the percent of its population holding industrial jobs.

The fourth,
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candidates since WilUa™ McKinley.

According to

a stud, by Professor
Robert Dls>™an of the University
of New Hampshire, ^ the
barometer counties
reflect the thinking of the
American public and do so on
almost every index
that political science can
devise.
Therefore, It is possible to
state and
show by voting patterns that
New Hampshire's nine other
counties do not
deviate greatly fro™ the nor. of
Strafford County, the bellweather
county.

The politics of the .ass .edla
transforms the trickle of New
Hampshire
votes into an avalanche of national
significance. Dwlght D. Elsenhower
and
Estes Kefauver did It first In
1952.
Richard Nixon saved his political
neck
in the 1956 New Hampshire primary,
and Insured It in 1960 and 1968.
John
F. Kennedy scored an initial
triumph by gathering his unheard of
40,000 vote
total in the Democratic primary.

Others have seen their political hopes die
in the voting booths of
this prin,ary.

Robert Taft suffered a defeat at the hands
of the Eisenhower

people in the 1952 primary.

Although Harry Truman chose to ignore the New

Hampshire primary, the 1952 boost given to Kefauver
may well have influenced
the President to make his final journey to
Independence, Missouri.

In 1956,

Harold Stassen made an attempt to dump Vice President
Richard Nixon from the
ticket by urging the candidacy of Massachusetts Governor,
Christian A. Herter,
A 73,000 write-in vote for Richard Nixon ended Herter

's

chances and also the

politJcal career of Minnesota's "boy wonder," Harold Stassen.

In
.

spue

or the national implications
of the early primary, it
1« still

New Hampshire phenomenon.

The organization, strategy,
issues and methods

need to fit the Mew Hampshire
political mold.

The results bear the mark
of

the state's electorate, and
when it comes to the Presidential
Primaries that
electorate is at least as sophisticated
as any other.

New Hampshire has a large and
accountable weekly press.

The small

circulation papers reflect the political
activities of the people in the
local communities.
Their greatest impact is on the way
local affairs are
conducted and by conveying certain conmmity
social norms and mores.
in a weekly paper, on a regular and
favorable basis,

Coverage

can be ot great assistanc

to any political candidate.

Six of New Hampshire's seven daily newspapers
are responsible, moderate-to

liberal Republican in tone.

urban centers und

,

They are distributed geographically in seven

with the exception of one, maincain regional
circulations.

In no case is there more than one daily
newspaper in a given city.

Associated Press (AP) and United
service offices in the state.

P. ess

International

('JPI)

Both the

maintain wire

One or both of the services is purchased by

all the daily papers and radio stations.

The exception mentioned above is the Manch ester Union Lea der.
since the mid-1940'

s

by William Loeb,

Owned

this paper has continually supported a

series of right-wing and conservative causes.

The paper is consistently

partisan and will use all the tricks of "yellow journalism" to support its
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positions.

u

l,as

Jo.,,

been a„«ho«a to sensible
political discussion

and Journalistic responsibility.

Skillfully propagandist ic

,

the paper

has perfected the f.ont page
editorial and adjusted its news
stories as best
.serves Its Interests.
President Kennedy said, while
speaking in Manchester
during the .960 campaign, that he
though there ,„lght be a .ore
irresponsible

newspaper in the nation than the M
anchester Union Leader

,

but he had never

seen it.

The UnicM^ I^der has an uncertain
impact on New Hampshire politics.

claims

a

state-wide circulation in excess of
60,000 papers.

It

At least half

of this circulation is in the state's
largest city, Manchester.

UT^ether

Mr. Loeb is an arbiter of Presidential
candidates is questionable.

Ke does

however, frequently determine the issues of
a political contest.

T he 1960 Kennedy Delep.ate Stratef
^y

The 1960 Kennedy strategy for New Hampshire was
to begin assembling a

New England block with as tight

a

delegate to candidate tie as possible.

meant that a carefully selected slate of "pledged" to
Kennedy

This

delegate

candidates would have to be placed on the ballot and then elected.

Those

seeking the spoiler or broker role contended that to be "pledged"
was

antithetical to the concept of a self -nominated
selected delegation.

,

freely elected, and voter-

A pledged delegation to the Los Angeles Convention would

have no room to maneuver and, therefore, could not effectively barter for the
Interests of New Hampshire.

On the other hand, a delegation composed of

representatives elected as "favorable" to the nomination of John

F.

Kennedy

would have room to maneuver should the Kennedy candidacy weaken as the con-

vention approached.
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1960 Kennedy primary was not the
autcnatic victory that It
appeared

once th3 votes were counted.

Although no serious opposition
materialized

during the weeks prior to the March
election, the problem of turning
out a
significant vote, when almost no contest
existed, was the first test.
The
second test was to put life into the
New England delegate bloc strategy
by
electing the full slate of pledged to
Kennedy delegates. On both counts
the

Kennedy forces, led by Bernard Boutin and
William Dunfey were successful.
An unprecedented 40,000 votes were cast
for John

pledged slate of Kennedy delegates was elected.

F.

Kennedy and the total

The Kennedy candidacy had

passed through the exceedingly hazardous waters
of the New Hampshire Pre-

sidential Primary not only unharmed but battle-wise
and confident as well.

Kennedy's New Hampshire leaders, Boutin, Dunfey and
others who had helped
gain the victory played important roles in
other pre-nomination contests.

They were eventually to hold numerous state and federal
offices as testimony
for their services and ability.

During that same presidential primary the role of New Hampshire's
most powerful state-wide newspaper, The Manchester Union Leader

,

became

clear.

The newspaper, a durable critic of John Kennedy and the Kennedy

family

did all in its power to torpedo his presidential candidacy at the

New Hampshire stage.

Long an opponent of party endorsements and pledged delegations, the

M anchester Uni o n Leader supported the disruptive-to-Kennedy activity of the
Democratic Party old guard.

Their strategy was to slate "favorable" to

Kennedy delegate candidates in opposition to the "pledged" slate picked by
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The Nev Hampshire Kennedy leadership.

The presidential candidacy
of a

Chicago ball-point pen manufacturer,
Paul Fisher, was identified
by the
Unicn^^eader as a major and substantive
challenge to the Junior Senator
from
Massachusetts. The Unic^Leader even
prompted its surrogate, the Governor,
Wesley Powell, to charge Kennedy with
being "soft on co^^unism" and
encouraged
Powell to announce that Kennedy would
have to exceed a 20,000 vote total
in

order to justify the continuation of
his candidacy beyond New Hampshire.
Kennedy responded by calling upon Vice
President and presidential candidate,
Richard M. Nixon, to repudiate the remarks
of his New Hampshire campaign

manager. Governor Wesley Powell, and to
advise Powell to apologize for his
intemperance.

Nixon responded that Powell was not speaking
for him and

that he, Nixon, certainly did not share
Powell's opinion of Kennedy.
.hazards which William Loeb,

The

(the Manchester Union Leader's publisher and

frequent editorialist) had placed in Kennedy's path
were successfully navigated.

Kennedy carried the Democratic preference ballot by
20,000 more votes

than Governor Pox^ell said would be required to be a
significant vote.

The

Kennedy "pledged" slate of convention delegates was also elected.

The results accomplished for Kennedy in New Hampshire by the young
and aggressive new Democratic activists in the 1960 Presidential primary

further reduced the liveliness of the "Old Guard" New Hampshire Democrats.

During the next few months they would become themselves strong supporters of
President Kennedy's nomination and election.

The irritation of that 1960

primary contest would remain and the experience would be one that would

return in 1968 to bother its principal New Hampshire leader, Bernard Boutin.

i
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The status quo in Northern New
England is not paradise, but it
is a
knowi condition.
^ ^ ^
Change
^nan^,e as
ns an n,-.i
political promise is only attractive
in New
Hampshire when the status quo has
itself become uncertain.
Hard work is
perceived to insure not only survival
but a modicum of prosperity.
Sudden
riches are not part of the northern
New England experience.
Conservative
i'

-;

governraents, churches, schools, and
philosophies have dominated as the

institutional backbone of New Hampshire
for too long to respond to a
sudden
call for change.
the 1960 presidential election,
political change for

m

its

o™

sake was not seen es a virtue in New
Hampshire,

l^.atever desire

there was within the state to change
national leadership it was not strong

enough to overcome the habit of voting straight
Republican Party ticket, nor
was it strong enough to overcome an underlying
resistance to electing a

Boston

Irish Catholic, President of the United States.

That year,

Richard Nixon carried New Hampshire by a wide margin
while
for U.S.

H.

1960,

Styles Bridges

Senate smothered his opponent, Dartmouth Professor
Herbert Hill

and Wesley Powell, Governor, proceeded to swamp even
the spunky candidacy
of Bernard L.

Boutin.

The 1964 Presidential Primary

The 1960 presidential primary contest of John

F.

Kennedy had been

instructive to the future McCarthy campaign organizers in terms of managing

delegate selection and campaign organization.

New Hampshire presidential primary provided

a

The 1964 version of the

further education in campaigning

but this time from the contest on the Republican side of the ballot.
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The contest wns between two
announced and a.resslvely
campaigning
candidates. Nelson Roc.ereller and
Barry Coldwater, and two
unannounced
absentee candidates, Henry Cabot
Lodge and Richard Nixon. The
latter
two were represented by s.all
local organisations trying to
stir up a
write-in vote for their respective
candidates. When the votes were
counted,
Henry Cabot Lodge's organization
had succeeded in attracting
enough write-in
votes for the non-candidate, then
Ambassador to Vietnan,, to win the
contest
and elect a full slate of delegates
to the 196A Republican convention.

The election was instructive to those
who would eventually organize the
1968 McCarthy can,paign both in terms of the
result and the organizational

methods.

It would also influence those who
would manage President Johnson's

candidacy and even those campaigning for
Republican candidates.

The Rockefeller vote followed the pattern of
a friends' and neighbors'

vote coupled with support among liberal organization
Republicans.

The town

of Hanover recorded a strong vote for Rockefeller
as evidence of their

friendship and his association with Dartmouth College.
County, was carried by Rockefeller.

Berlin, in Coos

An industrial Democratic city, Berlin

was affected by a resurgent liberal Republican organization which
responded
to the wishes of an announced and campaigning candidate rather than
the

independent spirit of a write-in.

Rockefeller also found support in the

upper middle class towns where a sophistication, either intellectual or
cultural, encouraged the voters to overlook the issue of divorce and re-

marriage.
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Senator Goj dv;.i tcr e^.rl.d
c-irr-toH thJrtoun
or Mnnchost.r's
fourteen wards,
and most by substantial
pluralities
iitic...
Oih...
Other co„„„„niti9s In
which Powell had
had strong organizations
also gave Goldwater
considerable support. The
t

,

was Poweirs most ardent
supporter until its
disaffection with
h- in 1,«. ,he split between the
Ni.on and Coldwater votes
revealed that
Poweirs support was dissipating
and that the Coldwater
strength was less
related to the pull of his
prominent supporters, but
rather to the effectiveness
of the Unlon^_L evader.

The Lodge vote was a .ore
difficult pheno.enon to identify.
It was
partly a negative vote and
partly a neutral vote. There
are .any New Hampshire
voters who are nominally registered
as Republicans in order
to vote in the
Republican primaries. For .ost of
the past 40 years the
Democratic Party
has been unable to elect its
candidates to .ajor office. Only
once prior
to 1958 had a Democrat been
elected Governor and that was in
1922.
The
gubernatorial election (the only elected
constitutional office) was decided
.in the Republican primary.
Moderates, who in other states would
be Democrats,
registered as Republicans to vote In
that Republican primary.

This bloc of moderate swing voters
would not vote for Goldwater and

many would vote against him. Many in this
bloc also held a deep dislike
for Wesley Powell and, therefore, would
not vote for a candidate receiving

his endorsement.

Nixon had not been an

appealing candidate for the moderates,

especially since his defeat in 1960 and again
in 1962.
voters also have

a

New Hampshire swing

high regard for the power of their votes and will
attempt

to direct support where they think their
vote will have the most impact.

.
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„,„,^^,„^^^^^ ^^^^^

^^^^^^

^ ^^^^^^^

bM.ncing the ..U«n.tlvo3.
Henry Cabot Lod^e appe^ed
even
att.acMve to the „o.,„.l

^^^^^^^^^^

in

,„ore

^^^^

.xp«s.io„

o,

pretest and as

a

.eans c£ .,aU.ng the,r votes
count in the

scheme of national politics.

The Lodge vote In New
„a„pshlre ca.o fro™ the
ecnunltles in „hich
considerable independenee has
been shown in recent years.
The Democratic
Party had received an increasing
vote in these co^unitics as
the internal
Republican Party c.^nflict increased
irrrp^Qf^ri
tu
The ubest example of voter
independence
was the City of Concord.
In the 1962 Republican
primary, incumbent Governor
Powell lost in Concord to his
opponent, John Pillsbury, by a
considerable
.

-.argln.

John

W.

m

the general election, Concord
gave the Democratic candidate,

King, a good majority towards
his convincing victory.

Lodge
carried every ward in Concord by
large margins in spite of the work
of both
the Rockefeller and the Goldwater
comir.ittees

The New Hampshire voter had weighed
the alternatives, had rejected the

advice of the state's most prominent
elected Republican leadership and the

campaigning of the announced candidates, to
write in the names of Henry
Cabot Lodge and Richard Nixon on their
presidential primary ballots.

Lodge organization had detected

a

The

vacuum developing in the candidate field,

(something that former Governor Powell also saw
somewhat later) and they,

with considerable imaginatioii, devised
to the undecided voters.

a

strategy to suggest an alternative

Without much money, with little time to prepare

f

...

„^,^„
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

endorsements and Rofkc*"cn
-Kc._ciicr
pr

T..e

'

^
s

....

•

.
campaigning
had failed.

vou.
^^^^ ^^^^^

RepuM.eans.

The Ti...

estabU,„™en. vote..

U,e eonse.vaUve

pa„, lea.e.s

^^^^

an. u,03e

.espon.e. to s.,,esUo.s
of ..o.,

support of Senator Gol
.lvj-i
atwoiuwater.

tk
These

voters were scattered
^r^it^^-^^ throughout
the
sta.c .u. .e„.ea .o
p.e.o™,„ate ...re .He conservative
estaMish.en. of
Republican party was the
strongest.

The seeond

Moc

of voters were those of
the .ore Uheral Republican

estahiish^ent.

,

These voters and their leaders
tended to support the candidac.
of Governor Rockefeller and
to receive the endorsement
of the liberal Republican press for their activities
in the state.
Li,e the conservative
Republican establishment vote,
this vote was widely dispersed
throughout the
state but «as strongest in those
communities where the newspapers and
the
leadersliip had been relatively
more liberal.

Neither of these two blocs
would play a role in the 1968 Democratic
party or have p.irticular influence
on what occurred that year.

The con-

servatives would vote for Richard Nixon
and the liberals tended to support
Governor Romnoy and then to write-in
the name of Nelson Rockefeller.
It is
the last two voter types that are of
interest.

The

flrai: o£
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these vorc the vci
»r^. who
i
vctars
responded to the susgestlon
of fo
.

r

lot.

the

- - ---^

Xhese vote., tended to
predominate in the hi,h

e

>Wh,,,,^JM^
^^^^

than ten years until a sniitsplxt

-nt KepuhUean

m
^r

ion
1961.

«^on

Wation
^

o„ the.

co„,™Uies

,

^^^^

Powell had attracted an
antl-establish-

vote In h.3 prl.ar,
contests and had won his
two ter.. as
governor with the support ot
.overlc. Be„oerats £ro„ these
Union leader dominated co^unltles. The
strong Powell eo^nltles
also tended to he of
middlelower socio-economic status.
Loeb eould not overcome
Powell's residual appeal and
failed to hold
Powell's loyalists for his
candidate Barry Goldwater.
Powell's vote bloc tended to be the mavericks of
New Hampshire
iie poxitic,
F
politic- and,
an,l
fk.,
t
therefore,
not persons
closely aligned with either
political party.

Although the 1904 Republican
presidential primary did not show
Powell's
strength among the maverick Democrats,
it had been these same
.averieks who
had elected him tvlee over his
Democratic gubernatorial opponent
Bernard L.
Boutin.
When Powell endorsed John King in
the 1962 gubernatorial election
this bloc shifted to King.
The anti-establishment views of
these Democrats
would be found again In the 1968
Democratic presidential primary. Without
Governor Wallace as a presidential
candidate (a politician much like Powell
in his appeal) these mavericks shifted
to McCarthy, a candidate they perceived
as anti-establishment.

The final

Hoc

of voters were those independent
Republicans that contain

Democrat-like liberals, non-organization
Republicans, and tended to be of a
higher socio-economic status.

These were the Lodge voters who were able to

make a vote decision with a minimum of campaign
provided information, and to
register that decision in the more demanding manner
of the write in and

.

8^f

3e,oceio., or Oelesaca
candidate..

These voto„ their
.heir co
,
conmunitles
and their similar Drnocr-.-i
ucuocra.i. voter counterparts
are of F-iiLxcuiai
particular importance
i^..
to
-.e e.pla„a.o„
o.co„e
X,.S p.esiden.ai p.i.a..
.He Oe.oe.atic party.
,

,

,

.

in

sn^a.,

.He

.epuHUcan p.es.den.iaX p.i.a..
,ave

basic lnslsH.s .o .He
d,na„lcs

sucH elee.lon..

THe

whlcH U,e .odse c.anl.e.s
Had used .o a...ac. a
vo.e

.He o.se.ve. .„o

U.S. „as

.He .ac.lc

.Hel. candidate. THe

were especlall, attractive
to .Hose organizing
ca^.paigns for 1968.
Secondly
the way tHe voters Hro.e
into HloCs and How tHese
Hloeks responded

to cHan-lng

political conditions attract
considerable Interest.

IHe posslHilitv .Hat Democratic voters „lgHt respond,
like tHe Republican voters
Had responded, to tHe

various options, indicated a
potential In the Democratic
electorate to produce
a surprise result like tHat
which tHe Lodge organizers Had
accomplished. THe
19M presidential primary was a reference
Point that Helped the campaign
planners of the 1968 primary to
Judge the potential of their strategies.
Xt
gave

them new options that, because they
Had worked in 1964, might be
made to work
again In 1968. Without that reference
point much of what happened in 1968
might
not have happened. To experiment,
as the Lodge organizers experimented,
would
have been much too risky given the
issues that were at stake. There had
to be
some feeling that an effort to test
public opinion on the war issues would
be
politically viable. IHe Lodge success was
a political reality. .Something
like
it might work again was the conclusion
of those considering options for 1968.
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U,a.

...e.lv.s.s

capaUe o. .,„c.„, .He
desUn, „o. on.,
his poUUcal pa„,;
.Hac He could co„„ol
„a.s

o.

.He

naUon ... aUo

o.

.Hose „Ho Had produced
His legisla-

tive victories.

A creeping cancer „as
beginning .0 nibble a. .He
facade of .oHnson's
leadership. Karl,
1963 .He .ili.ar, build-ap
in Sou.H Vie.na„ Had

m

beg.n
AS .ho casual.ies increased,
draf. ,uo.as grew, „ar
e.pendi.ures cue .he funding of .He Grea. Socie.,
progress and .He credibill.y
of .he ad.inis.ra.ion
began .0 decline. Those who
had worked for .he elec.ion
of Lyndon .,ohnson as the

peace" candida.e in

196.',

ques.ioned the wisdom of .Heir
loyal.y.

Through .he spring, su^ner. and
fall of 1966, many of .He
Congressional
Class of 1964 maintained .Heir
loyalty .0 .he administration
they had supported
during .he previous two years,
expecting that some break would occur
in Vietnam
policy.
The rising insecurity among
politicians and the public took several
significant fonns in New Hampshire.
The first was that in the 2nd
Congressional District, Eugene S. Daniell, a former
Franklin Mayor, State Senator, State
Representative, and 1960 Congressional
candidate, announced his candidacy for
Congress,
The unusual part of his announcement
was that he would run in opposition to
the

continuation of the war policy in Vietnam.
In addition to the two Congressional
seats to be filled in the 1966 election. Governor King would be seeking an
unprecedented third term and, Thomas

Mclntyre,

(elected to a short-term U.S. Senate seat in
1962). would stand for

election to his first full term.

1966 was to be the high watermark of the New

86

Hampshire Domocratir
In Parr-v
t^-tev,
P.rcy „xLh
l„cun,bent candidates in
Congress, the Coveti

-^3

.«lce. U.S. se„«e, and .ot

«-i,en.s candidacy, avowed
oppcsUlon

.^U-e

seats o. tHe Oovernofs
ConncU

to the administration's

poMc,

in Viet-

nam and possioie nomination
wonld .e an emhatrassment
to the unit, tht.st
o.
the New Hampshire
Democratic Incumbents.

At that stage the
opponents to the war in Vietnam
were viewed as a ragged
fringe of anti-social
malcontents who had little
faith in the eapaict. of

Lyndon aohnson to control the
Vietnam situation and to manage
U..S. involvement
The same was the case in
Now Hampshire. With the
exception of Banlell. who had
an extensive though
controversial i^uxxLxcai
political hi-torv
.
nibtory, ^h.
the scattering
of dissidents .ere, for the .ost
part, non-political, politically
inexperienced, with•

.

out party ties, and with

M.i.ed organisational interest

or capaicty.

Fro.
the perspective of the Democratic
Party organisation these
malcontents, represented by Daniell, could not be
allowed to disrupt the Party's
drive to consolidate the 1964 electoral gains.
To create the unity ticket a
Nashua attorney,
William Barry, was drafted to challenge
Daniell for the 2nd Congressional
District nomination.
This he did successfully. Daniell
and the Anti-war activists
were once again shunted to the fringe
of New Hampshire politics.

On election night King was re-elected
Governor by his Manchester friends
and neighbors and Mclntyre was re-elected
by approxiiaateiy the same margin as

the Governor.

The list District incumbent Democrat,
J. Olive Huot, lost his

seat to Louis Wyman who he beat in 1964.

Huot would be one of the 40 plus mem-

bers of the class of 1964 to be defeated
that election eve.

The Barry contest

in the 2nd Congressional District never got
beyond the blush of the primary

victory.

Lacking resources, manpower, a sufficiently clear
image, Barry lost

by more than two to one to the incumbent Republican.
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ne.ocr... lost their scats
In the Governor's
Council and rescued their
former minority position in
both houses of the- Legislature.

Election eve 1966, produced a
quantum increase in the depth
and
breadth of the Vietnam dissenters.
Lyndon .ohnson had not succeeded
in
producing the Vietnam miracle
that might have saved at
least some of
the outstanding members of
the Congressional class of
196A.

During the
last weeks of the fall campaign,
Lyndon Johnson seemed to be
running away
from those Congressional loyalists
who had delivered the landmark
legis-

lative calendar of the 89th Congress.

Instead of staying to help with
the

political fight or to produce the
Vietnam policy change, the man who
had
appeared omnipotent, the consummate
politician, the creator of the 1964
landslide, vanished from the political
stage.

In fact, during those final

weeks of the campaign, he seemed to
retreat inside the White House.
the end, Johnson actually left the
country on a tour of the Pacific.

Toward

When

his power was needed most at home, and
in the face of a pre-election

faith in his ability to make politically
right the gloomy international

situation, Lyndon Johnson, by his withdrawal,
symbolically jump.-d ship.
He was leaving the sinking class of 196A
alone while he, their skipper, fled
to safe ground.

For those political activists who had accepted the
notion that Lyndon

Johnson could manage Vietnam with restraint and that he would
protect
the political fortress of the DemocraLic Party, election
eve 1966 was a

major blow.

Those who supported William Barry against Eugene Daniell, those

who accftpted the party unity strategy for the re-election of Senator Tom

Mclntyre began to feel that they had been duped, not only had they been taken
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those

Who were re-electe., In New
Hampshire .cfle<:tej Che state's
support of the
administration's „ar poliey. An added
conse,ueneo was the fear that
those
who were re-elected, King and
Melntyre, wo..ld Interpret their
suecess as
the result of their unquestlonlns
support of the administration's
policies
Southeast Asia. To bring the. back
to a happier political day
In 196^,
when they joined Lyndon Johnson on
the pjatfor™ in Manchester, and
applauded
their President's commitment to keep
our boys out of Vietnam, would
be a

m

difficult, even Impossible, task.

The chronicle of the escalation of
the U.S. involvement in Vietnam
from late 1966 through 1967 has been
recounted, examined, and dissected in

numerous accounts.^

Those accounts do not need to be re-stated
except

as personal recollections of events that
influenced individual decisions to

actively oppose the war policy and, eventually,
the leadership of the New

Hampshire Democratic Party.

During the 1966 election year, the administration's war
rhetoric
increased.

Deliberate allusions to the memories of a period of national

unity which had accompained United States participation in World
War II were
used to cloud the public consciousness of the Vietnam war.

Increased draft

quotas, escalating war costs, increasing casualties, and a growing
uncertainty
as to the utility of that war policy countered point by point the adminis-

tration's attempts to wrap U.S. involvement in a blanket of patriotism.
Skepticism, distrust, and disillusionment were re-manufactured with each full-

color television evening news report from Vietnam.

A steady rise of protest

was also being broadcast from the nation's universities and colleges as student

protests increased.
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Many had thought ««.t the
defeat of Senator Barry
Goldwater by
the landslide vote in 19f^A
v
U64 hnA
had bur.ed
once and lor aU the slogan,
).

•

i

in the defense of liberty
rty .Ts
is nn
no vin«
vice. "

"Extre,„ls„,

o
Quickly
•

i

-.

they began to realize that
extremis, in the defense of
administration war policy was
acceptable, and
With it they began to feel
that extremism ir defense
of personal liberty
.ight also be necessary.
fact at one point during this
period, old phrases

m

re-discovered in early state and
national founding and organizing
documents
were dusted off for reconsideration.
As an example, the New
Hampshire Constitution, one of the nation's
oldest state constitutions,
contains a section
headed;
.'The right of revolution." '
U^en all else fails, the article
im.plies
revolution is an acceptable policy
when used to secure liberty and
human

rights-at least

in the State of New Hampshire.

During the months following

the 1966 elections, it was clear
the high watermark of the Democratic
Party
In New Hampshire and the "Great
Society" had been reached and had passed.

Disillusionment and frustration began to sink
in as those who had labored
to bring the New Hampshire Democratic
Party its successes faced 1967.

Governor Geo rge Wallace Visits New
Hampshire

The first evidence of the depth of the frustration
came in the Spring
of 1967 when Governor George Wallace of Alabama
visited New Hampshire to

sound the starting gun for the 1968 presidential
primary.

While not an

avowed candidate for the presidency. Wallace had run
as the candidate of the

American Independent Party in 1964.

He had attracted impressive crowds and

recognition in his forays into the industrialized north.

New Hampshire seemed

a logical first stop in a renewed effort to attract votes
and thereby to

influence national civil rights and social policy.

The Manchester U nion Leader
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paper
aod rollUcal constituency
could bo ^xpccccd
expected to respond
well to a
.0. „e.p....e. . 3ucce3s.u.
..,.te.te3t.„,.
'

.--«o.-.s
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aU.ce
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encoo„,e K.U.ce

to enter t.e We„

„.„,3Hi„

P--s«e„t..,
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^^^^^^^^^^
votes Of the politicaUy
alienated, frustrated,
and confused.

^or t.e Spr.n, ,967 New
Ha.ps.fre trip Wallace
scheduled a visit ending
speech at Oart„,„uth College.
He had heen to nart.ooth
several years earlier
and had received a
friendly if not serious
response.
He had charged his
ivy league audience
„ith cuips ahout Oart.outh's
Ivy league rivals, life
on
an isolated campus, aud
his standard i^peecn
speech of
ot anti-federal
anti f.H
government, antiintervention states rights
theses.
It was a show, a
southerner outside the
south saying things that
see.ed .ore for entertainment
than to be taken
seriously.
To northerners during
the early 1960's ..llace
was an outrageous
oddity of little consequence
outside his own state. He had
not begun to
threaten the politics of the
north as he would in subsequent
years.
i

The Dartmouth Wallace visited
in the spring of 1967 was
quite a
different Institution than he had
visited earlier. The civil rights
movement
had been taken seriously xu
in the
Lne years
veir^ since
^inr^o K-to
ihis earlier
visit.
Dartmouth
had enrolled a significant number
of Black students.
Wallace had become a
)

tnajor national political force.

college student.

The war in Vietnam was now reaching
the

Wallace now represented a solid political
threat by his

anti-civil rights position and his support
of the war in Vietnam.
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W.nacc was p.rCnctor lly Introduced
and then began his us.al speech.

hy the editor of the
l)onxJ2irJa,™th^

The 1967 Dartmouth Audience was
tense, not

receptive to Wallace's attempts at
humor, and, while not obviously
hostile,
were cool to his performance.

Part of the Wallace style was to
confront heckling by baiting the

hecklers.

A part of his notoriety came from
the success of this technique-

especially before regional audiences and most
especially before the national
television cameras.

Although the heckling, response and increasing
agitation

of the audience made interesting theater,
it did not make

New Hampshire.

Wallace brought his speech to

to answer questions, and left the stage.

a

good politics in

somewhat abrupt close, refused

The audience, both inside and outside,

listening to snatches of the speech through open windows,
were upset by the
chain of events.

A large crowd formed between the building and the street

where Wallace's two cars

x^ere parked.

Leaving the hall, Wallace was rushed

to the car inside a phalanx of his guards and the local
police.

The crowd

surged around the cars, climbed on them, and prevented Wallace's
quick escape.

Photographs and television clips of the exit showed two slowmoving
cars, covered with students, being rocked and trying to get away from the

hall to the Green and Main Street.

This task was ultimately accomplished, but

not before local police and college officials had some exceptionally

nervous moments.

Wallace left New Hampshire that night.

National television and the

national press devoted considerable footage and space to the incident.
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ev.,u.uU,.,„

ever „,s

.«enUon.

WaM.ce

neve, re.un.ed

Ha. ,.e„ for scHea.X.n,

v.sU an., perhaps, .e,,„„,„,
an early presidential drive
In New Hampshire, these
were dashed by the
reception he received in Hanover.

The fact that Wallace did
not eventually enter the
1968 New Hampshire
presidential primary was important
given subsequent analysis of
the election
results and the level of frustration
with conventional political
choices
harbored by .any New Hampshire
voters.
Whether Wallace would have
attracted
a winning vote against
President Johnson is not possible
to know.

^'^^^-^I^-^nlZolitic^^

Hampshire

If there is one prevalent
characteristic in New Hampshire politics,

is opposition to controversy.

make the elements of

a

it

Perhaps because the state's media does
not

controversy intelligible, controversy and
the con-

troversial rapidly lose the attention of
the voting public.

In simple terms,

if someone is said to be "controversial"
and then behaves in a controversial

manner, the level of public uncertainty increases
and the credibility of the

person or the issue represented by the person
declines.

New Hampshire's media

situation is such that political reporting tends to
be highly personalized.

Personality is far more important to the New Hampshire
body politic than
are the issues which a person espouses.

To a considerable extent this condition

is attributable to the small size of the state and the
inconvenience that

issue polarity presents in the conduct of daily affairs in
small communities.

Credibility is a function of acceptance, for whicli the avoidance of
controversy
is necessary--especially controversy generated by the Manchester
Union Leader

.
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is what happened to
Wallace 1„ Hanover that
April .vcni„,„

controversiai as a re.ult of
bis perfonnance.

i„ «

,,,,

Ke beca

A possible president

in the

eyes of New Hampshire citizens,
sbould not bebave that way
or elicit that
kind of response.
U1,ile not fully understanding
tbe clients of tbe controversy, they were disposed
to throw the baby out
with tbe bath water.
Presidential candidates, at least
in New Hampshire, have
to look like presidents, speak like presidents,
behave like presidents, and
earn the respect due
a president.
With al.ost complete disregard
for what is actually said
or for
what the candidate represents,
the instinctive, al„,ost
physical response to

personality prevails.

George Wallace did not .eet that
measure on bis spring

trip to New Hampshire in
1967, and somehow he got tbe message
that it would
be unproductive for him to come
back.
By skipping the 1968 New Hampshire

Presidential Primary, be, conceivably
became

a

major factor in its result.

In January 1968 Robert Craig found
that Wallace held a 5Z rating which
was

higher than McCarthy's at that time.

Given subsequent analysis of the

McCarthy vote It is probable that McCarthy
attracted much of the potential
Wallace vote (see Chapter XIV).
If Wallace had become a candidate
in New
Hampshire in 1968 he might have severely reduced
McCarthy's vote.

SHIFTING POLITICAL SANDS
What had appeared to be fringe dissent on Vietnam
during the prc-1966

election period bad, by tbe Spring of 1967, tbe appearance
of a sustained

commitment to see Vietnam policy changed.

Political action groups that had

long sought to change national policy on Issues of
nuclear weapons control,

military Influence ou foreign policy, and tbe expansion of the
military
establishment, now nlilfted their emphasis toward stopping the war in Vietnam.
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They did so with the
obiectlve ot
of brlngaig
hr1n,>^,„> about
k
cnanges In United States
policy.
Converting fringe dissent
into a political fore.
-0 was underway.

An essential part of this
conversion was speculation
as to what avenues
the protest should ta.e
to be effective.
Petitions were circulated
advertisements placed, solicitations
for funds and supporters
conducted, and
-llings to influential groups
and persons distributed.
Drives to send
letters to congressmen and
senators were organized and
other tactics, all
designed to demonstrate the
concern of the public, were
tried.
Vigiis, marches,
teach-ins, debates, forums,
articles, books and prayers were
conducted,
written, and sent forth.
Even as desperation led to
raids on Selective Service
records, draft avoidance, desertion,
exile, and even personal injury,
the

impenetrability of the polic>^akers, the
ambivalence of Congress, and the
steady escalation of the war was
frustrating! y evident.

Throughout 1967 the dissenters, now
called the "peace movement," flailed
at the political system without
impact.
Strategies were confused. Options
were unclear.
Leadership was scarce and limited in appeal.
Other than two
United States senators, Wayne Morse and
Ernest Gruening, vocal opposition
from higher office was limited and timid.

None of the leaders with national

constituencies had expressed their opposition to
the point of breaking with
the administration on Vietnam.

Vice President Hubert Humphrey was an

enthusiastic apologist for the administration.
critical and snide, would not adopt
the stature to make a difference.

a

Senator Robert Kennedy, though

confrontation posture.

Few others had

It seemed too early to expect a coalition
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or <0.ccu.„

coonuon
fro,,,

the

ofricl,U

to confront the President.

«„,la have ho. to arise

pent

iron,

ca,„pa:-.£n

within tao President's

of view of an incu..ent
senator,

his administration is considerable.
in the fall of 1968,

To be elective, such a
ov,n

party.

Even

the powe,- of the president
and

For a senator anticipating
a re-election

keepins things in order within one's
own house

and party was of utmost importance,

but from the perspeetiv. of a
congressman,

who must face the voters every
two years, the power of the
presidency is
awesc.m.e.
For a congressman the nec-sity
to express and maintain loyalty
is of the highest order.

sequences that

shape

T„ lave an impact on the mutually
relnrorc'ng

the dynamics of the American
political system, public

opinion wedges had to be driven between
the Congress, the President, the
party,
and the electorate.
The flr,» structure of rewards and favors,
confidences
and re-enforcements that supported the
scheme of ,»utual reliances had to be
cracked.

Ey the end of 1967, the foundations began
to shake.

Elected officials

who as recently as one year before hadn't been
concerned with the war a;
issue, began to -ense the shifting sands not only
under thair o

.n

c'n

feet but

especially as reported by those close associates elected
officials rely upon
to do their fund-raising, election, and re-election work.

It was still too

early for the high office holders even to contemplate abandoning
the ship of

Lyndon Johnson.

Below the high officials are those individuals who, through their
political skills, hard work, money, considerable time and energy sustain those

holding the offices.

Thesp are the workers, the friends, the professional
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c.oU.-,oucs.

u,e lav ...rtn.rs.

the husl.,ess aBsoclato=.

union leaders, the Industrialists,
and the
those in public office.

„,any

the bankers, the

others who have aceess to

When the sands of public opinion
shift, they shift

first and with the strorsest
effect upon those diverse
individual who are
the interpreters, the translators
of the political mood.
From trusted
voices are heard the first hints of
political trouble.
It is in these
circles that the discussion of
options beco„,es meanxngful. These
are the
individuals who are likely to know the
options, understand the risks, contemplate the possibilities, and organize
within the constraints of the

political system.

When, toward the middle of 1967, it was
evident that few elected officials
of the Democratic Party would be
willing to risk splitting with the administration

over the war in Vietnam and thus threaten
the system of mutual reinforcements,

another cadre of converts began to join the
peace movement.

These were the

same people whose importance to the political
system was their willingness
to work at the day-to-day business of politics.
thes-.

An increasing number of

politically sensitive individuals, such as Richard Goodwin,
Bill MoyerG,

John Gardner, and Roger Hillsman, began to research
the options offered in
the political system and to speak out against continuation
of the Johnson

administration's Vietnam policy,

mat

prompted them

x^as

first, the result

of not being able to convince their elected friends to come
out against the

war politics; secondly, the result of pleas from their elected friends to

demonstrate that there really was anti-v/ar support in the home state or
district; and third, out of personal frustration over a Vietnam loss or the

sting of the generation gap conflict that was growing over the war issues.
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staae

n„.,ny

h,.<,

c„,„e

aoainst l.-.divlCual con,r<.ss,„on

One or tvo congressmen or
even

to the conclusion tlu.t
the use of pressure

senators was not
a

particularly

effective

senator or tvo would respond
by being

critical of the administration's
handling of the war. Very
few, however
could maintain this position
with enough Intensity to
have even a marginal
effect,
certainly the bloc of com.,ltted
war opponents In the Congress
capable
Of attracting converts and
having an impact on policy
did not exist.
The
likelihood of a bloc forming In
the Congress from within the
party of the
President was small especially
since the election year of 1968
loomed ahead
on the calendar.
Congress felt that the President
held the power with
respect to the war. Many congressmen
and senators were in awe of that
power
and felt vulnerable should they
assert opposition to how the President
was
handling the war. A change In policy,
a victory in Vietnam, or a
major

intervention by China or Russia, they
perceived, would undercut their
election prospects.

own.

Getting too far away from the pack for a
congressman

is

an exceptionally rare and unsettling
experience-especially when the pack is

led by the President of one's own party.

Recognizing how difficult

it

would be to change a large congressional

bloc, those considering political options began
to direct their attention
to the up-coming presidential election.

Organizing to take hold of the political machinery had
promise.

In

many states, even before the nominating process reforms of
the 1970's, the
political party structures and the electoral process were open
and penetrable,
in others, as would be discovered, the party structures were
not protected

by law and had become closed or so atrophied as to be almost unusable.
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Detcrmlnu.i' the structure of
oarh
uai ..Late
state'-o piesJdeutial
nro.,nominating process
was the first requirement.
(

l

.
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In either case, whether
moving into an accessible party
organizat::ion or

developing new organizational
vehicles, an acceptable and legally
reinforced
system was available. To go outside
this system, or to neglect to
examine
tins system as the vehicle for
political action meant one would have
to not only create new
organizations, but subject these to
tests of legality

and community acceptance.

By using the same organizational
tools and

structural arrangements that elected
Congress and the President, and then
putting these tools to a different
purpose was at least legally acceptable.
To build barricades and organize ad
hoc revolutionary committees seemed
extreme when on any night

a

citizen or group of citizens could meet to

organize a campaign or attend a local party
committee meeting.

If a citizen

could not influence the committee decisions
he could go off and establish his
own ad hoc organization and accomplish almost
the same objectives as the so-

called party regulars.

Even in 1968, there were legally set time-locks

opening and closing political system doors that led
to party organization
and candidate nominations.

All those in opposition had to do was learn the

laws, determine the sequence and schedule of political
events, and organize
to participate.

The system was so penetrable that the exclusions and con-

frontations that would lead to extra-legal and even revolutionary tactics

were unnecessary.
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fall of 1967, Lyndon Johnson
appeared uninfluenced by the

arguments of the opponents of the war.

Those few n.e.bers of Johnson's
party

m

high office, such as John Gardner,
who were staunch opponents were
being
systematically excluded fro. either their
offices or the prerogatives of office.
Opposition within the administration was
not wise if officials wished to

retain their influence if not their
Jobs.

Even opposition to the war policy

anywhere in the political structure of
the Democratic Party was viewed as
disloyal, devisive, and possibly traitorous.

Eliminating opponents to the war from the party
tickets as was done in
New Hampshire in 1966, now moved several steps
further to exclude dissenters
from party offices and councils.

Until then, Lyndon Johnson had been

successful in diverting, disrupting and disregarding
the mounting opposition.
He was, for all intents and purposes, invulnerable.

His presidency was secure

from the threat of dispute from the Congress because the
Congress was controlled
by his party.

He was not vulnerable to the voters because they could
not

affect him outside a regularly scheduled election.

Lyndon Jchn^on had one weakness:
closer.

Johnson had

a

the election of 1968 was drawing

lengthy hristory of political quick-steps.

He had

survived and prospered through years of legislative offices where his skill
at balancing the needs of his Texas constitutency with the requirements of

congressional leadership had made him

a

legend.

It appeared that the peace

movement had tried all of its tactics except those that would strike the
politica] nerve of his system.

If votes could be cast that would show

disapproval for his handling of the war, and at least have some of these
votes counted directly against him, then Lyndon Johnson could be made to react.,
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To work, the votes would
have to be
oc cast in a ..nH.^
political. context that Lyndon
Johnson undetstood.

2lL^i.Ojlg_

and Alternativ es

In 1967 evaluating the
options led in^ediately to
the presidential priories that would be conducted in
15 states.
The proble. with primary
elections is that, in order to
.ake the syste. work, there
:nust be a candidate in

opposition.

Although the procedure varies fro.
state to state, it is difficult
if not impossible, to register
protest in a presidential primary
without at
least a na.e to vote for or to
write in.
So.e statesS list all possible
candidates and require a disclaimer of
candidacy on or before a certain
date priox
to the primary election in order
to have a name removed.

Other states9

required those wishing to have their
names listed on the ballot comply
with a
filing procedure. Only one state,
Wisconsin, in 1968, offered the voter
the

option of voting "no" to the names listed
on the ballot.

A vote of "no" would

be a rejection of all the candidates
listed.

Early in 1967, anti-war groups in Wisconsin
began orgakizing with the

objective of identifying the "no" option as
a protest vehicle for those opposing the war.

The option met all the requirements of a
political protest; it

did not. however, represent an alternative.

A significant "no" vote would

show the size of the opposition to the war and the
lengths to which they would
go to manifest their concern.

What it would not show was a commitment to a

viable political alternative.

The possibility that such a vote would be dis-

regarded or only peripherally considered by the President and
Congress was high.
The movement, however, lent

a

sense of political responsibility to those con-

sidering protest options within the political system.

Those organizing

lo;

the Wisconsin effort rocoived
a ,reat deal of publicity
on the possible
Impact of a large "no- vote.
This speculation was the 1967
genesis of news
reporters' preoccupation, throughout
the presidential primary season,
with

vote size and significance.

In each event,

in each primary, a magic number

had to be determined, how i.any
votes would have to be cast for the
"no"
option or for candidate "X" in order
to be large enough to be considered

significant opposition to President Johnson.

Playing the numbers was a Strang

but ultimately important part of the
1968 political game.

It made possible

the less than majority win which gave
the opposition an important advantage.

In New Hampshire,

the site of the nation's first presidential
primary,

the search for alternatives was underway
early in 1967.

Eugene

S.

Daniell,

the defeated 1966 primary contestant for the
2nd district congressional nom-

ination, had renewed his anti-war activities shortly
after the first of the
year.

The politically skillful Franklin lawyer, noted as
a stump speaker and

press release writer, announced the formation of a committee
to draft Senator

Robert

F.

Kennedy.

Daniell had been contacted by a New York City group headed by
City psychiatrist named Dr. Martin Shepard.

a

New York

Without contacting with Robert

Kennedy or any close Kennedy family supporters, Shepard was on his own.
effort had the distinct ring of an amateur venture.

operation from the receipts of

a

Shepard financed the

weekly New York City cocktail party.

visibility was dependent upon Dr. Shepard

's

The

Its

ego and penchant for press release;

Shepfird had heard about Daniell as the result of the anti-war position

he had taken in 1966, and sought him out to organize the Draft Kennedy drive
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conco,.,.., ,,„ou.

,-o..U.., Of a

draft .„ ,.„„ini„,, snbjoct.

polU.c,

In fact,

.ct.„„

base, on

.o

both lacked a sense of „o„
to organise

effectively.

The, were content to issue
p.ess releases, raise a few
dollars.
meet others with like interests
r^^.r on the
and rely
coverage their respective
press
releases for impact.

in the early stages of any
political year,

thlng to report.

vould

seelc

the n,edla is hungry tor scne-

Especially in a year when it was
certain that Lyndon

B.

Johnson

reno.lr.ation and would not face serious
opposition, anything that

varied the set the.e was attractive.

At the same tl.e.

«ch

of what would

heeo,„e politically interesting
in the Republican Party was
beginning to for™.

Shepard and Daniell gave the hungry
reporters some political hard news to
report, and news that was appealing
in its populist disregard for
usual political
conventions.

Both Shepard and Daniell were eminently
quotable, and both were

not above using their self-generated
forums to criticize administration

handling of the war.

Precisely because both Shepard and Daniell were
self-motivated operators
who were quick to spot an opening for a
printable charge, both were incapable
of attracting an effective following.

Shepard

's

cocktail group remained

about the same size for weeks at a time, while Daniell
's potential disciples

were put off by his lack of interest in building an
organization and his
frequent press release diatribes.
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H

Kober. Kennedy had

.,:,y

intention of .parking or subtly
approving .

prl.ary-orle„ted draft, that thought
was ,ulcUly snuffed out hy
the aetlvltles of Shepard and DanleH.
Their repeated letters and
press statements

caning

for his candidacy „ere set
aside by Robert Kennedy.

Eventually, the
irritation of the press prompted
and forced Robert Kennedy's
hand.
He wrote
to both Shepard and Danlell
disavowing their activities and
stated that he
would not be a candidate, drafted
or otherwise, in 1968.

A political option which, pertops,
Kennedy would have liked to have
kept
open in order to apply greater
pressure on the administration from
the Inside,
had to be closed.

The timing and the auspices of the
draft venture forced

Kennedy to reveal his position long
before It was advisable.

Kennedy's flat-

footed public and private denial of the
Shepard-Danlell overture did not

discourage them.

Even

V7ith the

Kennedy denial, Daniell still had several
options open.

Since his mission was to express protest
against the war, the availability
of

popular name was enough.

He stated early in his effort that his objec-

tive was to manifest dissent on the administration's
war policies.
a "no" option, like that in Wisconsin, Daniell needed
a name.

Without

He said he would

file a slate of delegate candidates favorable to the
nomination of Robert
Kennedy.

In spite of the protestations of Robert Kennedy, both of
these

actions were x/ithin the Eugene Daniell perogatlve.

All he needed was a sem-

blance of an organization and sufficient New Hampshire voters wiUing to
file
as delegate candidates.

classic was underway.

The 1968 edition of the New Hampshire presidential
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At lhi.s point a cligrcssion is in
order.

As has been discussed in this

SGction the 1960 presidential prJuKu-y of
John Kennedy revealed some of the

political dynamics of the New Hampshire
presidential primary.
of that event revealed additional options.

The 19GA version

Both experiences were to have an

Important influence on the planning of the 1963
contest.

What is important to note is that the 1960 primary
was principally of

interest to Democrats seeking a nominee who could win
the Presidency for their

party in 1960.

The 196A primary was of particular interest to
Republicans

who had to select a candidate to face the incumbent
President, Lyndon Johnson.

Regardless of the party for which the election interest was greatest,
the
lessons, the experiences of the various primaries are important to
those

who observe and for those who might be tempted to be involved in planning
and

managing

a

New Hampshire presidential primary campaign.
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CHAPTER

III

POLITICAL ALTERNATIVI^S AND
NEW HAMPSHIRE

Early Chronolog y

Accounts of the national search
to find

a

person to be a candidate

against Lyndon Johnson have been
well documented.

^

It Is sufficient to note

that a series of separate and
unrelated organizational activities
and alternative
candidate searches were underway.
The searches which had succeeded
in

attracting attention in New Hampshire
were:

The Draft Kennedy

stimulated by Dr. Martin Shepard of
New York City;
option;

the Wisconsin vote "no"

the California Democratic Council
organization;

Coalition for a Democratic Alternative.

movement

and the New York

Little if anything was known of the

activities of Allard Lowensteln, Russel
Hemenway, Maurice Rosenblat, Curtis
Gans, and others as they went from
office to senatorial office trying to
con-

vince first Kennedy, then McGovern, then
McCarthy to become a candidate against
the certain renominatlon of President
Lyndon B. Johnson.

All that has been reported subsequently of
Lowenstein's search from
one possible candidate to the next inside
VJashington and elsewhere, was unknown
to those who were evaluating presidential
prl:nary options in New Hampshire.

As September and the political season of 1968
began, the possibility of working

with the Draft Kennedy movement in New Hampshire seemed
to be the only remaining
option.

Others in New Hampshire had come to the same conclusion and
had

already begun to attend the meetings that Eugene Daniell held in
various parts
of the state.
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Once Lowo..s..in

h.ul

secuved a tenCaLLve

c:on„:.lt:,nont

f.o.n

McCarthy

that he would consider
being a presidential primary
candidate, Lowenstein
and an associate, Curtis Gans,
wanted to see what such a
candidacy might

attract.

The two with several others
began visiting the various
presidential
primary states to talk with those
who might work in such a campaign.
Gans
was assigned to visit New Hampshire
where he had been given the name
of David
Hoeh a twenty-nine year old Dartmouth
Co] lege administrator who had
had
extensive experience in New Hampshire
politics.

Although Hoeh did not recall Cans' name
when the meeting had been
arranged, when Gans came into the room he
immediately recognized Gans as having
been an effective proponent of the Democratic
Party at a 1959 National Student

Association meeting Hoeh had attended.

After introductions, the next words

from Gans were that there was a possibility
that Senator Eugene McCarthy

would run for president against Lyndon

B.

Johnson, and that there was a

possibility that he would enter the New Hampshire Primary.

Without elaboration

Gans then asked what Hoeh thought of McCarthy's
prospects as a presidential
candi^iate.

Stunned, Hoeh remembered that in the spring of 1960 a little
kno\^n U.S.
Senator, Eugene J. McCarthy,

w^as

introduced to a student audience at the

University of New Hampshire by the Catholic Student Chaplian, Father Francis
0' Conner.

a candidate

He vas speaking in behalf of the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, then

for the presidency against John F. Kennedy.

for that brief exposure to McCarthy was indelible.

Hoeh's impression
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Mcc:an.,y

,.ui

he.,

.csp.nd.n. to nues. loom..

see
a

errecUve speake. and
He

sprinUed his answers with facts
and disarmed

hostility With hu.or and subtle
barbs.

style

that,

an especially efrcctive

He .as ,uiet spo.en.

tended to bring his audience
close to hi..

Incld, with

Fro. that experience

Hoeh felt that McCarthy conld
campaign well in New Hampshire
even upon such
emotionally charged issues as the war
in Vietnam.
Hoeh's reaction to Cans
was -yes" he thought McCarthy
could be a good candidate but that
a successful
candidacy would depend upon attracting
support fro. those experienced with
the machinery of New Hampshire
cam.paigns.

Cans began the exploratory contacts
with a list of names that Hoeh
provided.

Several meetings of potential McCarthy
supporters followed leading

to the formation of a New Hampshire
committee.

the October 22,

In the weeks that followed

1967 meeting with David Hoeh, several campaign
efforts began

in New Hampshire.

The first was to assemble a state-wide cadre
of potential

McCarthy supporters who could become a McCarthy
campaign organization.

The

second was to demonstrate to McCarthy that he
should enter the New Hampshire

presidential primary.

The third effort was to counter the pro-K:.nnedy

write-in drive of Eugene Daniell so that McCarthy would be
the only anti-war
name with organized support in New Hampshire.

A fourth campaign sprang from

the others as an effort to keep the New Hampshire Democratic party
from

converting itself into a campaign organization for the renomination of

Lyndon Johnson and an endorsement of his Vietnam policies.

By the middle

of November 1967, these four efforts were well under way and led by the cadre
of supporters that Cans had found and Hoeh had brought together into the

McCarthy Now Hampshire Steering Committee.
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TO a ,reac ex.on. the
s.cces. of

ca.palcn ..a. followed in
New Hampshire was dependent: upon
U.e lengths to which
Lowensteln and Cans had been
able to demonstrate to
politically experienced individuals
that a contest in
the presidential primary
might have an impact on
national affairs.

Without question, the lengthy
and fruitless work of those
who had first
opposed the war policies of the
Johnson administration had
stirred the consciences of at least some political
activists.

To those like the emerging

McCarthy leadership in New Hampshire,
Wisconsin, California, New York
and
other states, who were looking
for a way to express oppostion
to the war, a
live candidacy by a respected
political leader, within the political
system
was by far the preferable protect
route.
Their experience, their political
skills, and their understanding of
the political processes could
direct the
energy of protest within a political
system designed to absorb such discontent,
In contrast to those with political
expertise were those in the national
peace

movement who had already written off the
possibility of creating a policy
change by using the political system.

Later, when the success of the politi-

cal efforts began to show, some of these
groups and individuals joined the

effort.

But even until the very end in Chicago
1968, some substantial and

vocal groups did not join, did not see the efficacy
of participating in the
political system, and felt vindicated by the miscarriage
which the Chicago

Convention produced.

To support their argument for inside the political
system activity,

Allard Lowensteln collaborated with a University of Michigan
Professor,
Arnold

S.

Kaufman, on a policy statement agruing why President Johnson should

be challenged.

Cans capsulized the argument in each of his subsequent meet-

ings as he pursued the list of twenty names that Hoeh had given him on October 25th.

Ill

To ccn.nter the

ar,^.uncnt:.=

of those who felt that the political
system

could not produce policy change Allard
Lowenstein and University of Michigan

Professor, Arnold

S.

Kaufman, collaborated on

Democrats Should Work to Stop Johnson."

a

statement titled, "Why

A verbal summary of this statement

became the argument that both Lowenstein and Cans
used in their efforts to
organize the opposition among Democratic party activists.

The statement

sought to counter prevalent themes of party loyalty
with higher questions
of national morality.

"...If a president is wrong but popular, political

realities may make opposing him difficult, however right;
is right

if a president

but unpopular, supporting him may be a duty, however difficult.

But when a president is both wrong and unpopular,

to refuse to oppose him is

a moral abdication and political stupidity."

They felt that Johnson was bound to be opposed, as they put it,
"... whatever liberal Democrats may 'decide'

one vote 'Yes' or 'No' when those
on the ballot?

to do.

In Wisconsin, does

words appear beside Mr. Johnson's name

In California, can one simply avoid the primary contest

between the CDC "peace" slaue and a coalition of party regulars ...led by

Mayor Yorty?

And if one does these things is the anti-war cause strengthened

by the stronger pro-Johnson vote that would presumably result?"

To tliese questions Lowenstein and Kaufmann offered alternatives.

The first was that there could be "somebody" to counter the "you can't
beat somebody with nobody" argument.

They wrote, "There will be an

acceptable "somebody" as soon as the depth and extent of Democratic dissatisfaction is clear."

They de-bunked the idea that achieving

a

"peace

plank" in the 1968 Democratic Party Platform would be a worthy accomplishment,
as they did those who attributed to Johnson motives of eventual Vietnam
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poMcy

change.

To each of these reasons for
withholding support for a

counter candidacy they offered the
long-shot political route,

a route,

however, that had the potent ial for
at least tapping public frustration
'

with the status quo.

For liberal Democrats they offered
the prospect of

a "new coalition en^bracing much
of the disenchanted left and of the
anxious

muddled middle -

a

coalition that would be based on present
realities and

needs rather than on fading memories of
past political victories."

They

concluded their manifesto by writing:
The American people are generally appalled
by the prospect of
a Johnson-Nixon-Wallace choice in 1968.
One may hope Republicans
will do a]l they can in their party to avert
such a choice.
But it is conceivable that those of us who are
Democrats will
surrender the party of Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt
and
of John F. Kennedy to those whose policies are
shattering
our hopes for a just society and a peaceful world.
To accept
the Johnson record as the basis for a national campaign
is
such a surrender.
It may seem difficult at first to fight
for the party against the power of the presidency,
but that is
how the fight must be made if it is to be relevant.

It became a fact that as the political year of 1968 approached,

the

possibility of influencing Johnson's war policies within the Democratic
Party was remote.

New Hampshire Republicans and liberals wanting to

attack administration war policies were looking at the Republican presidential nominating contest as being the place to have an impact.

If the

candidate in the Republican primary who was most critical of the administration on the war were to prevail, then
be transmitted to President Johnson.

process in New Hampshire.

a

strong political message would

Changing party was then

a

complicated

The possibility that a significant number of

these anti-war Republicans would switch to the Democratic Party and thereby
be eligible to vote for or against its candidates was negligible.
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AUhoufi!, the rcady-n,ade organizations of
peace activists and anti-war

committees were thought to be of value in
the ultimate organization of the
political campaign, in the early stages
these groups presented problems.
Most of New Hampshire's anti-war groups
were located in the less populous
college communities while their impact would
be slight and their value to
the larger state organization limited.

Early contact efforts, therefore,

were concentrated in the large to.ms and cities
where a significant Democratic
primary vote existed.

Generally, these were not the communities that had

been politicized by the war.

Where anti-war activity had occurred, in Nashua,

for example, it had emerged from the less political
and the radical activists
of the community.

McCarthy leaders did not want to build the possible alternative candidacy
on a base of pre-existing anti-war organizations, but rather to create
a new

organization developed from the disaf f ections of those with political
experience in the Democratic Party.

Once the statewide nctvrork of politically

experienced leaders was established and local groups formed by

t'.-.ese

leaders,

then it would be possible to form coalitions with the existing peace-action
and anti-war protest groups.

If the

This sequence of organizing was important.

McCarthy activity had been built on the foundation of existing

anti-war organization before attempting to create a politically experienced
cadre, it is probable that the radical public image of the anti-war activists

would have kept away tliose politically experienced Democrats who could make
the effort succeed.
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A consensus amour, t.hose

iiinkin);

the contacts was that

a

successful, had to be mounted within the Democratic Party.

drive,

to be

It had to be

built Inside the structure of the New Hampshire primary election
process and
It had to be directed toward massing votes that were clearly
Democratic

Party vote?;.

Lyndon

B,

Only in this way

v,7ould

it be

possible to convince President

Johnson that the opposition was not

a

collection of miscreant

radicals outside respectable partisan politics.

The peace-action and anti-war groups in New Hampshire were composed of
a conglomeration of some Democratic and some Republican Party activists,

resident and ncn-resident students, radicals, and non partisans.

To some,

there was a feeling of a "curse on both of the political houses," whicli made
it difficult to be involved in political action tied to a specific party.

In

contrast there was a viev; that the Democratic Party, to which they had owed

allegiance for some years, was being taken in
to its liistory.

a

direction that was not true

Past involvement in the Democratic Party was important in

planning the early McCarthy organization.

Once an identity had been estab-

lished for the group of Democratic Party dissenters, then they felt a

coalition could be constructed of others willing to share

a

common litany of

dissent.

Toward the middle of November,

began to emerge.

a

pattern of escalating political events

A flurry of reports on the pending McCarthy candidacy dom-

inated the ruminations of the columnists and the dispatches of the wire services.
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Various or,v.nJzations In other states
wore reporting favorable reaction
to a
possible McCarthy candidacy. The
pro-Johnson organizing effort, active
since
early In the Fall of 1967, set November
19th as the date when the New

Hampshire Democratic State Committee would
consider
endorsement.

a

Johnson renoinination

In order to orchestrate that meeting
properly and to repress

Darnell's pro-Robert Kennedy activity, Bernard
Boutin, che Johnson committee
chairman, scheduled an evening social
gathering of New Hampshire's Democrats
for Friday, November 17th.

The star attraction would be Senator Robert

Kennedy's younger brother, the senior Senator from
Massachusetts, Edward

M.

Kennedy.

The Kennedy "Endorsement"

The invitation to Edward Kennedy had been extended several
months earlier

through Kennedy's Senate colleague, Tom Mclntyre, on behalf of
Governor John
W.

King and Bernard Boutin and had been accepted by the Senator as

a

personal

gesture to those New Hampshire loyalists who had helped with the 1960

Presidential Primary.

The event, scheduled for the ballroom of the Sheraton-

Wayfa.er Motel, Bedford, was organized as a $5.00 per person reception.

The

price and the attraction of the star, Edward M. Kennedy, insured that most
of the party's leadership and faithful would be attending.

A tally of the

receipts for the evening siiowed that more than 2,000 turned out on that snowy

November night.

(

Boutin had scheduled the reception in cooperation

v;ith

the party

chairman, Manchester attorney William Craig, as the first social event in his

strategy of organizing and then representing to
Party Jn support of President Johnson.

was to pay tribute to several leaders

Tlio

of

tlie

public a unified Democratic

public reason for the gathering

the party for their years of service.
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HrcMU.'io c Ircuuist aiicrs
()i:U^l).'i

ap.(!

.Mrlv Wfcks of

opporltinlt y In

of Johnr.on.

overpov/cr

Tlu-

vlsnal

h.id

hc)-,UM

Novi-inlu" r

to c\v\m\r dui

inc.

t

lie

BoiiLin saw Ihc y.ov\:\\

,

any of those who

unity of the New

cvonlii}',

re party's leadership,

delivered throupli Senator Edward Kennedy, he reasoned, should he
tliat.

Tn fact,

in

the days prior to the Kennedy visit and In

iU)ston to Mancliester

,

Mclntyre and

li(nilin

speculation that his brother mip,ht be
would lend moral

rnijiport

a

urp,ed

as an

bo wavorinj- in thoir support

iiiij-liL

HainiLslii

lasL vn-fk.s of

tlie

to do

enouj'.li

car from

Keiuiedy to lay to rest any

candidate or that the Kennedy family

to any alternative drive for

wanted Kennedy to renew Boutin's promise that

if

a

tlie

nomination.

lioutin

Kennedy came to New

Hampshire during the time of the presidential primary campaign it would be
for the purpose of endorsing President Johnson, or, actually campaigning for
the.

John.son write-in.

Kennedy arrived, spoke and shattered the Boutin dream.

Not only did

Kennedy not eiuhirse the President for renomination in unequivocal terms,
he only mentioned hyntWin Johnson's name once and then only among the list of

heroes.

the Democratic Party's presidentia""

The visible

>',ap

l)etween Rolx-i

t

Kennedy and

tlie

President had been

widening in the weeks prior to the November 17th gatiicring.
had broken with Jolinson over the war in
Alth(ni)',li

hi;;

Robert Kennedy

speech delivered earlier that fall.

a

public stateuu^nts continued to support .lolmson's renomination

and he had privately refused to consider
1968, Robert Keiuiedy was seeking a policy
F.upport of those in dissent.

a

candidacy for the presidency in
cliang,e

on Vietnam tlirough his
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To the chagrin of the New Hampshire
Democratic Party leadership, dutifully assembled behind Kennedy on the
platform, he launched into a series
of

humorous one-line accounts of conversations
between himself and his brother,
Robert, and comments on the contemporary
political scene.
After perfunctory introductory remarks,
Edward Kennedy recounted recent
conversations he had had with his brother,
"When I said I was going to New

Hampshire

I

asked my brother if he wanted me to file
a disclaimer removing him

as a candidate he said,

'Mind your own business.'

vril;e-in campaign he said,

'Robert Kennedy spelled

is not a write-in candidate.'"

Wlien I

told him about the

ROBERT KENNEDY

In his traditional review of the great names

in Democratic Party history, the names of Roosevelt,
Truman, and John

Kennedy drew the loudest response.

F.

Johnson was extended courteous but not

extraordinary recognition.
The climax of his speech began with a warning, "I have heard
in recent
days that there is a man considering a campaign in New Hampshire
for the

presidency.
.This man,

This candidacy poses a serious threat to the Democratic Party.

from Minnesota, must beconie well known to you all so that you will

understand the seriousness of his positions.
not deserve your support."

hushed the audience.

This man, Harold E. Stassen, does

Kennedy's tone, at one playful and yet serious,

The leaders on the platform hung in anticipation of

words that would tell the gathered Democratic faithful that Eugene McCarthy
was to be feared and could not expect even the slightest encouragement from
the Kennedy clan.

Those in the room

v/ho

had begun their early contacts for

McCarthy were equally suspended by Kennedy's rhetoric.

To the noticable relief

of many in the audience and to the visible distress of those on the platform,

Kennedy had not singled out McCarthy for his

t;rath.

He had instead taken all
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on n rhetorical trio.
Kennedy'.^ performance.
naTTie

More questions were raised

tluin

answered by Edward

No ringing endorsement of the President
had occurred.

was barely mentioned.

Ills

No great upswelling of emotion had been
generated

from the crowd to discourage an effort to build an alternative
organization
from within the party.

In fact,

to those of McCarthy leaders observing the

carefully orchestrated events of that evening, nothing happened that
was
anything less than reassuring and even encouraging.

The J ohnso n Endors ement
The Democratic Committee assembled for its previously scheduled meeting
at 2:00 p.m.,

Sunday, November 19th at the New Hampshire Highway Motel, Concord.

The meeting was set to closely follow the "unity" reception held the previous

Friday evening.

Undaunted by the lack of an endorsement of President Johnson

by Senator Edward Kennedy, the Johnson leaders now sought to convert the

Democratic State Committee into the Johnson write-in campaign organization.
In order to do this Boutin had to secure the endorsement of the State Committee.

The Democratic State Committ'-^e was then composed of the officers of
the ten county committees;

additional members based on county population and

for counties casting a majority vote for the gubernatorial nominee in the

most recent state election;

present and past party chairmen;

major elected

officials, and the immediate past candidates for statewide or national

elected office.

Of the approximately seventy persons eligible to vote in a

State Com.mittee meeting, twenty-eight were on hand for the November 17th

meeting.

1.19

TlK-

r.solulicn .iraU.d by

tl.o

National

Co.nnu

t:ee,„an .osopl>

MllU.onl:.
vas in..oauc-.a by Covcvno. Kin,
and seconded by Senator McTnty.e.
Supporting
the resolutions. King said,
'Mohnson is in the company of
greatness and is not
the first president to lose public
opinion because of an unpopular
war.
t

Of course lus popularity is
dwindling, but he wasn't elected to
please all of
the people all of the ti.e."
King went on to compare Johnson's
war problems

with those of George Washington, Abraham
Lincoln, and Franklin
-We elected him because we had faith
in
to do the rigl^t thing,

popular or not."

l,is

D.

Roosevelt.

ability to lead this country and

He concluded by vowing strong support

of the President for re-election, "When
the chips are down,

the people of

this country will realize the fact of life
that this man, in four years, has

done more in the way of concrete accomplishments
for this country than any
other president in history.

Tliis

is the man who has had the tenacity and

determination that perservered in the great struggle in
Vietnam at the cost
of his own personal poimlarity.
of greatness.

And in

tliat

situation he is in the company

For this is not indeed the first time that a president
of the

United States faced this very same situation."

"I cheer President Johnson for upholding and maintaining that
honor in

the face of the worst personal abuse any President ever had to endure.

South Vietnam the United States has made
agression, and

tliat

a

In

solemn commitment to stop communist

commitment is a matter of our national honor."

The debate continued for almost an hour.

resolution arg.ued the issue on two grouiuhs.

Those opposed to the endorsement

The first was their disagreement

with the administration's war policy and the second was the argument in favor
of an open primary and again£;t endorsements.
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n

.an argued thnf without an
endor.cmeat, individuals could
support
whom th.y .i.hcd and the ,arty
structure would remain accessible
to all its
members.
An endorseraent would shut out
those in opposition at a tl.e
when each
and every Democrat was needed in
order to elect the nominated ticket
in tne
fall,

The endorsement resolution was approved
by a vote of 23-5.
the vote a victory of sorts had been
won.

In spite of

Five members of the Democratic

State Committee voted in opposition to the
party leadership's resolution.

What had been a desire to explore alternatives
on the part of the

McCarthy group now became a resolve.

The language of the Democratic State

Committee resolution and the arguments of those who
supported its adoption
grated their sensitivities.

The endorsement meant that for all intents and

purposes the state Democratic Party was now the Johnson
organization.

Those

not willing to support Johnson's renomination or even those
concerned about
the issues while still wanting to remain within the party,
had no room to

maneuver.

For those who had been considering a McCarthy for Prer-ident

organization this would be the last time for many months that they would share
the Democratic Party as friends.

The Re-Regist r ation Proble m

One of the McCarthy Committee objectives was to organize a campaign to

encourage the re-registration of Republicans as Democrats during the re-

registration

period set by law.

In 1963 New Hampshire maintained a

rather tightly regulated party registration system.
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Mcbcshlp

in a

party by fact ot registration or
previous non-parMcipation

in a primary and,

therefore, status as an independent,
were voting re,aire,nents

m

order for a person registered as
a Kepublican to participate
in the
Democratic presidential primary that
person would have to have re-registered
as a Democrat ninety (90) days prior
to the primary election date.

The re-registration period opened for
the 1968 presidential primary
early in December and was to end December
12, 1957/

This would be the only

time that either Democrats or Republicans
could switch their registration in

order to make them eligible to vote in the
opposite party's primary.

In

their preliminary planning the committee felt
that it would be important to

have the McCarthy campaign sufficiently organzied
so that they could get some

Republicans to change their party registration.

The committee hoped that these

nominal Republicans might feel that their vote would have
greater dissenting
impact when cast directly against the administration, in the
Democratic

primary, rather than for some Republican candidate.

Unfortunately, re-registration was a difficult process.

T:ie

voting lists

are maintained by uncompensated Supervisors of the Checklists who are required
to "sit" for the purpose of receiving re-registration requests during periods

defined by the law.

These periods vary in duration and number, and are deter-

mined by the population size of the voting precinct.

Also to be considered

was the fact that in New Hampshire the voting machinery, with few exceptions,
is controlled by locally elected supervisors who are usually Republicans.

closed registration system favored the majority party and changes in that

system that would

iiuake

it VAora open were resisted by the majority party.

The
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offorL on the

1

);u.i f

i)ai

I

f

cant rc-rogisLraL ion drive would have
roquired a

oi"

Ll.c

McCarthy Stoorin^^ Comrnitteo,

To bo successful

there would have to be an actual candidate ready
and willing to challenge

Lyndon John.son in New Hampshire.

On the Republican side. Governor George

Komncy was orfcring that attraction to both the real
and noininal Republicans
upset with the Johnson administration.

The Committee estimated that they might be able to rc-register
4-5,000

Republicans if they were successful in making known the existence of
the
re-registral ion period by publicizing the actual times, dates, and places
of

re-registration.

On this latter point, it was not unusual fot the supervisors

to select difficult times to comply with the iaw.

Saturday evenings and dates

in the middle of long-weekend holidays were often the times selected for re-

registration.

Only the most dedicated and persistent of those wishing to

re-register bothered to take the trouble.

The independent is a voter of one of several types. The independent could
be a new voter who had just reached the voting age of 21 years and registered
for the first time, a recent arrival to the state, or a person who had not

previously voted in a primary election.

Under the closed primary rules of

1968, an inde]>endent seeking to vote in the primary election, had to select
a party ballot and

tliereby became designated as a registrant in that party.

Later he or she could chang.e parties by following the re-registration procedure, but independent status, like virginity, could not be restored once
It was lost.

For reasons, botli personal and political, this rule had dis-

couraged participation by the sl/.able pool of Independents
had

i^ot

previously voted in

a

partisan primary.

wlio

by definition
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Ncvortholess In every

pr.I.n.ny

rlecLlon, some

i

,ulepondont:s did j^ivo up

Lheir status to participate in th.
primary of the party of their ehoice.
r,ot

them to do this for

a

To

particuiar candidate is one of the
important

strategies that both parties and all
candidates attempt during

a

primary

season.

The outcome of the re-registration effort
was more successful than the
committed had expected.

Although Senator McCarthy did not announce his
entry

Into the New Hampshire primary until long after
the end of the re-registration

period, his November 30th announcement of candidacy
did prompt a significant

increase in the number of re-registrations from Republican
to Democrat.

The

committee estimated that upwards of 5,000 persons entered the
Democratic
Parly and that a majority of these did so to vote for
Senator McCarthy.

McCarthy A Presidential Ca ndidate

While the New Hampshire McCarthy Steering Committee was pursuing its

organizational objectives, McCarthy was preparing to announce his presidential
candidacy in Washington.
edition of the New

during the period

E.W.

Ropubj_i_c,
f rom

(NED)

Kenworthy, writing in the November 25th

reviewed what Senator McCarthy

"November

9

to 13."

liad

been up to

McCarthy had visited five important

states (New York, Minnesota, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Illinois) testing

sentiment and gathering pledges of financial support for what McCarthy then

described as his "personal confrontation" of Johnson's Vietnam policy.

Ken-

wortliy wrote:

by the end of tliosc^ five days the Minnesota Democrat had
reached, if h\i hac; not done so earlier, the jjoint of no

return
lie

would still be contactipg,

brothers and

VJi

sconsin

'

s

hi'^

senatorial colleagues, such as the Kennedy

CayJord Nelson who was facing re-election, before
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.alcing ..o f.nal decision.

But unle.s these leaders
and his close potential

associates objected strenuously
McCarthy would announce his
candidacy.
So.eti.e prior to November 30th.
McCarthy concluded his preliminary
search
for support and co:B.itted
hi.self to that "personalised
alten.ative. " W.en he
entered the Senate Caucus Roo. to
.ake his announcement
at a press conference,

It was a sense of the personification
of protest that surrounded
hi..

He was'
a rallying point, a vehicle for
dissent on the war, a spokesman with
standing

and credibility.

He was not, however, viewed by
himself or by many others as

being viable as a candidate for the
presidency.
The press conference was notably low-key.

He began his announcement by

not saying that he was a candidate for
the presidency but saying:
"I intend to enter the Democratic primaries
in four states, Wisconsin, Oregon, California, and Nebraska.
The decision with reference to Massachusetts and also New Hampshire
will be made
within the next tv/o or three weeks.

In the remainder of his statement, he set
forth the tone of his effort, making

clear that he was not a candidate in conventional
terms.
Since I first said that I thought the issue of
Vietnam and the issues related to it should be raised in the primaries
of the country
I have talked with Democratic leaders from
about 25 to 26 states.
I've talked particularly to candidates for re-election
to the SenateDemocratic candidates— some House members and also to students
on
campus and to other people throughout the country.
^

My decision to challenge the President's position and the
Administration position has been strengthened by evident intention to
escalate and to intensify the war in Vietnam and on the other hand
the absence of any positive indication or suggestion for a compromise or for the negotiated political settlement.
I am concerned that the Administration seems to have set no
limit to
the price which it's willing to pay for a military victory. Let roe
summarize the cost of the war up to this point;

The physical destruction of much of a small and weak nation by military operation of the most pov/erful nation in the world.
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Our Inimlii'd 1\(hi;;.iiu1 to ISO, 000 civilian r.i;;u,i
in Sonl
Vlclna
alone, o :;ay nolliin)-, ot
iu- di'sl luc
on of lllc and propcrLy in
t

1

I

Norl.li

I

I

(

li

1

i

VJi}Lnaiu.

The upj-oot Inr. and the rrnctiirlnp, of the st-riicLtirc of he society
of South Vietnam where one-fourth to one-third of the population
are now reporteil to he refuRecs.
t

For lie United Stat(\-; as of yesterday over
nearly 95,000 wounded hroupji November.
I

lb, 000 (oiiihat dead and

t

A monthly expenditure in jiurrailt of the war aiuoun
between $2 billion ami $i billion.

t

i

nj',

somewhere

am also concerned about the beariuji; ol tlie war on other areas of
the United States responsibility, both at home and abroad.
1

The failure to appropriate adecpiate funds for the povt-rty pro)',ram
here, lor housing, for education and to meet other national ni-eds
and the prospect of additional cuts as a condition to llie possible
passap.e of the surtax bill.

The drastic reduction of our foreign aid program
the world.

in

other parts of

A dangerous rise in inflation and one of the indirect and serious
consequences of our involvement in Vietnam, tlie devaluation of tlie
British pound, whicli in many respects is more important east of Sue?today than lie l^ritish Navy,
I

liero is growing evidence of a deepening, moral crisis
In addition,
discontent and frustration and a disposition to take
in America
extralegal if not illegal action to manifest protest.
t

—

am hopeful that this challenge which I am making,, which T hope
will be supi^orted by other members of the Senate and other politicians, may alleviate at least in some degree this sense of
political helplessness and restore to many people a belief in tlie
processes of American politics and of American Government.
I

—

The college campuses especial ly-on those campuses and also among
adult thoughtful Americans, that it may counter the growing sense of
alienation from politics which I think is currently reflected in a
witiidraw from tlie political action, to talk of nonpartitendency
clpation, to b(-come cynical and to make threats ol support for third
parties or fourth parties or other irregular political movements.
t

stren)',th
do not see In my move any great threat to the unity and
whatand
of the Democratic party, whatever that unity may be today
ever streng.lh it may be.
I

separate issue
The issue of the war in Vietnam is not really a
of other
configuration
the
in
with
dealt
\ubut one tlK.t must
It is within this broader context
problems to which It is related.
the United States.
that 1 intend to make tlic case to the people of
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lo say that I m
a. I'm sure I shall be charr,ed- 1 am not
for
peace at any price, but for an honorable,
rational and political
solution to this war, a solution which I
believe will enhance our
world position encourage the respect of
our allies and our potential
adversaries, which will permit us to give the
necessary attention
to other commitments both at home and
abroad, military and nonmilitary and leave us with resources and moral
energy to deal
effectively with the pressing domestic problems
of the United States
itself
In

this— this total

effort— I believe we can restore to this nation
a clearer sense of purpose and of dedication
to the achievement of
our traditional purpose as a great nation in the
10th century.

The statement and McCarthy's response to the questions
that followed

constitute important political documentation of his attitude
toward the
venture.

As Warren Weaver reported in his New York Times article
that day,

"During a bantering, low-key news conference, the Minnesota Senator
never

actually declared himself a candidate for president or contended that he
could deprive the President of the nomination.

Re viewed his function as

being that of the vehicle, the personification, that would make it possible
to manifest the extent of the national concern

—a

concern he saw as dividing

the young from their parents, the campuses from their communities, the

present from the future.

It was not possible simply to vote "no" on the

issue of the renomination of the President as Wisconsin offered.

There had

to be a focal point, a name, but not a great deal more, and certainly not a

candidate projecting the impression that he expected to displace the President.

McCarthy did say, "...I don't mean to draw off at any point, and

I

think

this challenge v7ould have to go all the way to a challenge for the nomination
for the presidency.

It

may not be me at that point.

but so fas as the end result of the effort,

I

It

may be someone else,

think it has now to go to the

point of trying to change the policy and direction and also

America...

9

It was a modest

tlie

mood of

beginning marked by realistic language tied
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to the accept
if

t-d

wisdom

tb.r.t

a

sitting president was impossihlo to displace

that president wished to seek renominat ion

.

One questioner, in fact,

asked if McCarthy's move wasn't actually political suicide,
to which McCarthy
replied, "not suicide but it might be execution.

The crucible of the New Hampshire primary would change the tone of
the

McCarthy effort but the essence remained.

McCarthy was responding to

a call.

There was a spontaneous national uprising that needed a point around which
to organize.
v/ho

The movement needed someone who sensed the urgency of the time;

could give voice to the senses, who could respond to the vitality of the

concern, and would remain solid when faced with pressures to adjust from within
as well as from without.

role for himself.
call.

McCarthy did not describe a traditional political

He was there because he was willing to respond to the

That was the only condition.

sense was not possible in 1967.

president and

I

To become a candidate in the traditional

To have said, "I announce my candidacy for

expect to be nominated and elected to that office" would

have been a false and misleading statement totally out of step with the

needs of the moment.

The insincer

'..ty

of that statement would have driven

away the very support which had created the conditions of the draft.

There

were those who faulted McCarthy in his announcement for his lack of passion,
charisma, and firebrand dedication to the cause.
to speak with their own sense of urgency,

They were seeking

a leader

an amplification of their concerns,

rather than a political educator, one capable of expanding the constituency
of dissent with effective arguments and carefully put questions.
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The reaction to the announcement was extensive
though widely varied.
The New York Times editorialized:

The decision of Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota to
challenge
Johnson in the Democratic Presidential primaries now enables
those
who dissent from the administration's policy in Vietnam to
find
political expression for their convictions...
.

It is highly unlikely that President Johnson can be denied
renomination
if he wants it.
Senator McCarthy's more optimistic supporters argue
that if he should be successful in the primaries, such a show of

strength might impel President Johnson to withdraw voluntarily
to prevent a hopeless split with the party.
We believe this kind of
reasoning to be based on a complete misreading of Mr. Johnson's
temperament.
He is not a man likely to quit under fire.
But it is true that the nation's policy can only be changed by political
methods.
How the Vietnam issue is fought out within each party and
between the two parties in the coming year will go far toward determining the shape of American policy in the next presidential term.
Since Senator McCarthy is a thoughtful, responsible man, he can be
expected to clarify the alternatives in Vietnam and usefully contribute
to the complex political proces^^by which the American people make
up their minds on great issues.

Not quite believing what they were seeing, the mystics of the national

press began to probe immediately for the hidden McCarthy agenda and the

personal moti^^es of his action.

The first theme, that of the "stalking

horse" for some othe candidate, usually considered to be Senator Robert
Kennedy, was the most persistent early press question.

F.

McCarthy did not fully

allay that contention in his press conference when he said that he had
talked with Senator Kennedy about his decision to oppose the President and

Kennedy "had not tried to dissuade him." He indicated that Kennedy was his
second choice as a Johnson challenger.

moved early.
anything."

I

"I would have been glad if he had

think if he had, thcre'd have been no need for me to do
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The New Hampshire and regional newspapers gave
McCarthy's announcement

prominent coverage.
newspapers.
LBJ in
::he

A

Major stories appeared in the Boston and New
Hampshire

The Boston Herald-Traveler ran a large headline,
"McCarthy Tests

Primaries," with a column head "Seeks Reaction on War
Policy."

C hristian Science

Monitor headline read, "McCarthy Rallies War Critics."

The New Hampshire newspapers ran page one stories with
headlines like that in
the ValJey News, "McCarthy is Going to Run" or the Daily
Dartmouth 's headline,

"McCarthy Challenges LBJ for Presidency."
on other themes such as Raymond Lahr

'

s

But inside stories often concentrated

UPI article headed in the Valley News,

"Is McCarthy Running Interference for Challenge by Bobby Kennedy?"

His lead

paragraph read, "Democratic leaders wondered today whether Senator Eugene

J.

McCarthy's presidential candidacy was simply clearing the way for Senator
Robert

F.

Kennedy to challenge President Johnson in 1968."

article in the Herald Traveler

,

In Relman Morin's

dated 12/1/67, headlined "McCarthy Offers a

Choice" the lead read, "Senator Eugene J. McCarthy's decision to challenge

President Johnson in four Presidential primaries could polarize the movements
of dissident Democrats already under way in a number of states to block the

renomination of

tlie

President next year."

The announcement had been received well.

It vjas serious news from a

serious man who was challenging the President.

The "stalking horse" theme was

carried with the story but as

Editorial reaction reinforced

a

minor element.

the seriousness of the announcement.

The tone was one of the "test" which

McCarthy was prepared to make rather than promulgating an aggressive candidacy.
Even the "stalking liorse" theme took on a jaded aspect when surrogates for
the administration, accused McCarthy of being a front runner for Kennedy.

The
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Front."

"Gov.

Connally

ol"

"Connally Hits McCarthy as RFK

Texas charged today that Sen. McCarthy
is a

"stalking horse" for the Presidential
aspirations of Senator Robert

F. Kennedy..
His (Connally' s) charges came after his
W.ite House meeting Wednesday with

JohnsonV'3 "The stalking horse" theme did
stimulate interest in the McCarthy
activity.

It is possible that without the
sub-plot and the reportorial

sniffing for intrigue, the McCarthy story might
well have died during the
next month when there was little for the reporters
to cover except the

preliminaries of

a

newly born political venture.

Newsday_^ Nick Thimmesch in

a

December

1,

1967 column headlined "McCarthy

Aides the Crux," identified an ultimately more important theme:
The "McCarthy for President" movement has an attractive candidate,
a lively issue, the promise of plenty of money and the
immediate problem
of developing an effective campaign apparatus.

The celebrated Minnesota Senator made his big splash yesterday by
announcing that he would enter four primar ies ... Today his staffers
and supporters are busy arranging schedules and organization in a score
of states in addition to those where he will definitely
be on the ballot.
,

Until that organization is
formed, McCarthy must rely largely on
the Conference of Concerned Democrats and similar groups uuich have
been pushing a "Dump Johnson" movement for two m.onths....
The Senator has not signed on any issues specialists and relies on
staffers and friends in universities and in the military for advice on
his principal issue, Vietnam.
At this point he does not have a staff of
the dimension usually required for a presidential primary campaign.
.

.

At the end of McCarthy's announcement session yesterday, v/here the
Senator showed good wit and poise, a man long associated with liberal
causes remarked:
"Gene was great today, but he's so casual about
organization.
Vietnam is the big issue and lots of people are for
him.
The question is whether he can get well enough organized to make
some impact 1"^

Later in this campaign, as in most others, to show that one was an early
supp(jrter of a candidate became a form of intra-campaign one-upmanship.

the McCarthy campaign, two themes were Important.

The most prominent was

In

.
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«mN,i or "for «.CrtUy before
Now Hampshire."

Tho ,.l«,.ost order of ,„crl.

was to be "for McCarthy before
MeCartby."

Thim,„esch and other,, inventoried
the support that existed In
eaeh of

the states where McCarthy would
definitely run.

What they found was tapresslve

McCarthy would have to "rely" as
Ti^esch put it, on these "groups" until
he built his own orsanizatlon.
What he „,issed was that building
his own

organization had, to a great extent,
already been accomplished.
a legitimate draft.

This was

Organizations were really seeking a candidate,
whereas

usually candidates stimulate organizations
to support what they already
have firmly in mind.

Thimmesch wrote:
On the West Coast, McCarthy's initial
support is the California
Democratic Council, headed by Gerald N. Hill and
Edmond Gerald Brown
son of former Governor "Pat" Brown;
California Congressman Don
bdwards, and former Oregon Democratic State
Chairman Howard Morgan.

Jr

In Wisconsin, where McCarthy is popular,
Donald 0. Peterson, Democratic
chairman of the 10th Congressional District Committee,
is the organizer
The key men in the New York effort are reformers—
Attv. Allard K.
Lowenstein, Assemblyman Jerome Kretchmer, City Councilman
Ted Weiss and
Ronald Eldridge. McCarthy also has the backing of
Michigan's most
publicized dissenter from Johnson's Vietnam policy, Zolton Ferency,
who
recently resigned as state chairman.

A "Citizens for McCarthy" group is active in New Hampshire
under the
leadership of David Hooh (sic), former assistant to Gov. John W. King
and Sen. Thomas J. Mclntyre.
.

.

He (McCarthy) would also like to get supplemental support in the form
of favorite son candidacies from three s>Tnpathetic Senate colleagues:
Indiana's Vance Hartke, Ohio's Stephen Young and South Dakota's
George McGovern.
Invitations to speak are pouring into McCarthy's
office.
His first campaign speech will be delivered to the Conference of
Concerned Democrats, who are already believers, in Chicago tomorrow.
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Covon,or J„„n

W.

Kinc and

Son.nto,: J.

Hdntyre vore contacted

f.. tl,.U- reaction to the
McCarthy a„nounce,.,e„t.

King was asRcd whothcr

he agreed with Senator Robert
Kennedy when Kennedy said he
thought McCarthy's

decision "would be good
for the
lor
r.ne party.
Dirfv
h

Vnr.^
King

"My inclination is to support the
President.

^
said t,he disagreed
with Kennedy.
•

I

,

have complete confidence that

the .an who has led this country
with vigor and determination and
unshakable

courage for the past four years will
be re-elected for another four year
term.

Mclntyre said that, "he. Governor King,
and the members of the New
Hampshire State Deniocratic Committee will
'do our best' to make sure Senator

McCarthy 'gets as few votes as possible' if
he enters the state presidential
primary.

The only McCarthy New Hampshire people know
about is the late one"-

referring to Senator Joseph

R.

McCarthy of Wisconsin.

"It poses the threat of early injury to the
President," Mclntyre noted,
"it doesn't take too much for the news media to read
into the results a

possible threat to the President."

But he added, "his own polls and readings

indicated New Hampshire was quite hawkish though he did sense
some build-up
for a move to get out of Vietnam."

He estimated a turnout of 40,000 of the

state's 87,000 registered Democratic voters and thought that would be
a good
showing.

Earlier, Mclntyre had projected that the most McCarthy could expect to

receive in the primary was "3,000 to 5,000 votes!'

This statement became

an early target for the McCarthy campaigners who could then say that anything

above Mclntyre 's prediction of 3-5,000 votes would have to be considered
significant.
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jtatus of Lhc Cam2aj
^;

^

Early Deceinh

combination of the announcement of
McCarthy's national candidacy, the
surge of various state activities
for McCarthy and the publicity
given the December 1st weekend Conference of Concerned
Democrats began to stir the smoldering
dissident Democrats' fire. 19 The Conference
of Concerned Democrats had brought
the activities and individuals of
the state organizations in contact
with the
national press.
Reports and columns were written about
the conference.
As an
The.

example. Paul

R,

Wieck (one of the more perceptive of those
reporting the early

months of the campaign), wrote in the New
Republic

;

In many respects, the Chicago weekend
offered a study of the stren^^hts
and weaknesses of the McCarthy movement
punctuated by a series of "ifs."
"If" the mood of the electorate is really
such that a major effort
can be made to deny renomination of President
Johnson, a good start
has been made.

—

This will be answered early
by the v/orking class Catholics in
Massachusetts and, possibly, New Hampshire; by the farmers
in Wisconsin and Nebraska; by the Negroes in the ghettoes of
Milx^aukee
and Boston; by the white collar workers in the Boston
suburbs.
If the answer is "yes, the mood is there," Senator
McCarthy v/ill
assuredly return to Chicago next summer with a sizable block of
delegates in as much as the Democratic Party's structure, outside
Chicago and a few machine-oriented states in the Northeast, is, at
best, a shell.
It wouldn't resist a massive, well-funded effort
riding the crest of a voter mood. Thanks, in part, to the way
President Johnson has run, or failed to run, the Democratic National Committee.

If the answer, is "yes" one can expect top officials in the party to
come forth as the months roll by.

Its long-range significance could be to recharge the batteries of a
tired party structure and convert it in many areas into a vehicle
responsive to the will of the electorate.
If Senator McCarthy accomplishes nothing more than this, he will have
made a valuable contribution. Much now rests with him.
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translated Into convention dele-

gates!

-

The beginnings
by just beginnings
the first weekend in December. 20

-

were to be found in ^nicago
Chicago

When uncertain campaign workers read
encouraging stories, such as above,
in influential national magazines and they
began reading similar analyses in the

columns of their daily newspapers and saw the
networks extensively cover their

early national meetings, confidence was created,

l^en the New Hampshire trave-

lers returned home from Chicago to find editorial
support in their local news-

papers the recharge was iimnediate.

Under the headline "An Overnight Phenomenon,"

the Concord Daily Monitor wrote in its lead editorial
December 5, 1967:

A person can rise to national prominence in this country
in a
surprisingly short time.

The latest example is Senator Eugene McCarthy, endorsed as
a
Democratic candidate for the party's nomination for President
by dissenters to the policies of President Johnson

Accentuating the rapidly spreading awareness of his presence as
a national figure is the degree to which it has evoked concern
by the Democratic regulars who support the President's presumed
ambition to succeed himself.
The loud cries of pain, especially from Senator Mclntyre of New
Hampshire, and Governor King's studied efforts to dismiss Senator McCarthy as a nonentity, belie their expresses confidence in
the President's cause.

Related is the release of Secretary of Defense McNamara at this
particular moment and the subtle drawing back of Senator Robert
Kennedy from his unconditional endorsement of President Johnson's candidacy.

McCarthy has been boosted by those with whom he dissents to the
position of stalking the nomination for Senator Kennedy, whether
he planned it that way or not....

hor'es"

'"f'

—
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'-^Un, Do.nocrats to change

He favors free choice by
Democrats of their party leadership
^"-^ inspirational
in s^p^^J?
su:h1r::S::!^

"

lanUI

His personal political future
seems to be of no concern to him
wh.ch 3.S one reason he has already
attracted a respectab^^ l^oliowing,
On the same day, December 5th,
Louis Harris released his latest
poll

which showed that "Senator Eugene
McCarthy would lose a nationwide primary
battle against President Johnson for
the Democratic nomination for
President
almost 4 to 1 if it were held today'.'

The survey showed that a national cross
section of Democrats preferred

Johnson by 63 percent to McCarthy with

17

percent and 20 percent were unde-

cided

The story went on to say:

McCarthy runs weakest in precisely those regions
where his backers
have been urging him to confront Mr. Johnson.
In the East, including New Hampshire and Massachusetts, McCarthy trails
by 72 to
11 percent.
In the Midwest, including Wisconsin, the Senator
has
a 67 to 19 percent disadvantage....
Mr Jolmson makes his poorest showing against McCarthy in
the South,
where LBJ leads by 54 to 20 percent with 26 percent undecided
It should be pointed out that the results represent the
situation
at a time of weakness for any challenger —before he has had
an
opportunity to develop as a serious alternative in the public mind.
How much the Senator could gain on the President would depend partly
on the kind of campaign he waged, the support he could organize and
what happened to the prevailing mood about the Vietnam war, likely
to be the principal issue of any such confrontation.

The potential for which McCarthy might aspire was recorded by
Senator Robert Kennedy of New York in the Harris survey when he
led President Jolmson in preference for the Democratic nomination
by 52 to 32 percent.
The gaps between McCarthy's initial support
and Kennedy's demonstrated support are greatest among young people,
Negroes, women and Catholics.
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i...ht:

n,ako a contest: of a

campaign against PresiLnt John;on!23

From these accounts could be
read important implications.

The first was
that a 17 percent level of
favorable recognition was reported
five days after
an announcement of candidacy
which was not preceded by the
usual pre-announcement build-up.
This indicated an important foundation
of support.
The sizable

undecided percentage was also encouraging,
considering a campaign had not
begun.
Thirdly, the early comparison between
Johnson and Kennedy indicated
that Johnson's 63 percent against
McCarthy was anything but rock hard.
fact the hard commit.nent to Johnson
was only at the 37 percent level.

In

The

fourth, and most important implication,
was that to strike an early blow

McCarthy would have to enter and do well in
one of the states where he was
perceived by the poll to have a difficult contest.
vote to Kennedy and percent undecided, such

Given the size of the swing

a contest,

New Hampshire, might be impossible for McCarthy.

even if in conservative

Certainly a campaign could

succeed beyond the 10 percent or "3,000 to 5,000"
vote level that Senator

Mclntyre predicted would be necessary in order to be considered
significant.
The problem remained one of convincing McCarthy to run in
New Ha.-ipshire.

McC arthy's December 14 and 15 New Hampshire
Visit
At the Chicago meeting with McCarthy the New Hampshire delegation

pressed an invitation to him to visit New Hampshire and to do so as a lecturer
in a University of New Hampshire sponsored series.

and came to New Hampshire December lA.

public was through

a

He accepted the invitation

His first contact with the New Hampshire

lecture before an audience of 1,500 at the V/ayfarer Con-

vention Center, just outside Manchester.

His second was a meeting with potential

supporters and the McCarttiy for President Steering Committee.
living room in
a goveriiinent

vv-hich

As he entered the

the meeting was being held, McCarthy said, "This looks like

in exile."
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David

.,oeh

Introduce. McCan:hy by saying.
-Toni.ht we have had

a chance
now we would liKe to tell
you what we see are your
chances
New Hampshire and what we would
like to do for you in this
prinury."

to hear you .peak,

m

The Steering Cotn.ittee had been
working hard during the past several
weeks.
The news fron, the Chicago meeting,
McCarthy's announcement and the
New
Hampshire Democratic State Committee's
endorsement of the Johnson renomination
had stirred great interest in McCarthy
in New Hampshire.
One of the first persons
Hoeh asked to speak was Dennis Sullivan,
recently elected as Mayor of the city
of Nashua.
A maverick Democrat who had taken a
leave from his job as a postal
clerk to run for Mayor, Sullivan professed
to reflect the view of the New

Hampshire workingman.

Sullivan was the senior elected official
in the room.

Although he had not been involved in the McCarthy
activity, he was attracted
to the m.eeting by his opposition to the
Johnson administration and the re-

nomination endorsement of the Democratic State Committee.

His comments about

the impact of a possible New Hampshire McCarthy
effort were disjointed and

confusing.

He was clear, however, in his view that it was
desirable to confront

the Democratic Party organization of the State.

he did not want to give McCarthy a bum steer.

He concluded by saying that

He did not think McCarthy's

anti-war position would be well received in New Hampshire and advised him
not
to stake too much on

New Hampshire race.

a

Issues of intra-party "fair play",

and adverse reactions to the Johnson administration and New Hampshire Democratic

Party heavy-handedness

,

he felt, were more likely to produce results.

Others, like David Underwood of Concord, Jack Holland of Bedford/Man-

chester, Paul McEachern, Deputy Mayor of Portsmouth, Jean Wallin, Nashua State

Representative, Joseph VVelton, Nashua Democratic Party Cliairman, Ron O'Callaghan,
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Democratic Party activist of Laconia, were
basically positive toward the
prospects of a live candidacy and about the
organizations they could generate
for such a candidacy in their communities.
John Wiseman, a Keene State College
history professor, recounted the independent
organizing efforts that were already
well under way in his city. Without prodding
from outside, Keene Citizens had
begun a series of activities aimed at focussing
public opinion on the impact of
the Vietnam war and toward expressing that
concern through the New Hampshire

Presidential Primary.

Petitions were being circulated, teach-ins held, and

antn-war activities were regularly scheduled.

A broad organization of

community and college persons was already spreading outward
from Keene to the
smaller towns of surrounding Cheshire County.

Wiseman wanted McCarthy to enter and said that his organization was
prepared to support the effort.

He said that a live candidacy was more

attractive to his committee than the write-in campaign for
Robert Kennedy.

a

reluctant

His account of the Keene effort showed that such activity

would also increase the size of the sympathetic audience even though their
early activities had been met with serious establishment resistance.

The most startling comments of the evening came from John Teague,

member of a prominent New Hampshire Republican family.

Teague, an Amherst

College senior, head of the Amherst College McCarthy for President group,
had become a Democrat much to the surprise of his conservative Republican

father.

"Students" he said, "are tired of protests.

They are tired of

sit-ins and women pushing baby carriages in protest marches.

They are tired

of burning their draft cards, and all of the usual kinds of war protests.

want to push

th(;

We

political system just as hard as it can be pushed to see

if we can accomplisli anything."

He concluded by urging Senator McCartliy to be
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serious cnnd ulate for the presidency
and to say that he is running for
president.
.'k this happens and young people
get the message clearly, then
a

thousands will join the campalgn.-^^
mood of the evening.

'

With these words, league had captured
the

Perhaps having McCarthy as the
personification of the

war issue, the focal point of protest,
would not be enough.
becon,e a serious candidate for the
presidency.

McCarthy had to

If he entered the New Hampshire

primary he would need to understand that
that would be a consequence.

Macy Morse,
in Vietnam,

a

Nashua mother of eleven sons, two of whom had
served

recounted how disturbed her boys were with what was
going on over

ther and how concerned she was about the fate
ahead for others of her family if

the war continued.

She urged McCarthy to run in New Hampshire, but,
more

importantly, to run hard.

2S

A Manchester man who introduced himself as

Republican said that he

a

would support McCarthy, if McCarthy ran in New Hampshire, and that he
expected

many other Republicans would do the same.

In reply the Senator said,

"Yes,

at this point there is no indication that the Republican Party will come up with

anyone better than the present administration."

"My purpose in announcing my candidacy in November was threefold.
I

First,

want to challenge the administration's course in Vietnam and to bring about a

public debate or discourse on the issue.

change in the present administration.
of the United States."

Secondly,

And third,

I

I

want to bring about a

want to be elected President
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McCarthy's voice dropped

n

bU

when he added his third purpose
as

though the woids were not as fa.niliar
to

Perhaps this addition

ca,.e as

hin,

as "challenge" and "debate."

an innnediate response to John
league's direct

challenge to McCarthy himself.

With the exception of Mayor Sullivan's
early consents, the tone of the
remarks had been serious, positive, and
encouraging.
over.

Little had been glossed

McCarthy had to know from the comments that New
Hampshire would be

tought but that he could count on the support
of a considerable group of

experienced workers.

With this as background, Hoeh felt safe in
turning to

the Steering Committee's skeptic, Peter Freedman.

Freedman began by telling McCarthy that he didn't think
McCarthy would
do well among the blue collar New Hampshire workers.

He recounted conversations

he had had in the past weeks with Manchester Democratic millworkers
who

thought McCarthy was Joe McCarthy, and that the best solution to the
Vietnam

situation would be to "bomb it off the face of the earthl'^^
by saying, "No,

think

I

I

don't imagine

I

will do well with the labor vote.

will do well with them in Minnesota either, but

be much of a problem."

McCarthy responded

I

I

don't

don't think it will

But in the final analysis, if he did get the Democratic

nomination, we felt the labor vote would go either to him or George Wallace,

rather than to the Republican candidate.

McCarthy also said that he would

not consider running as a third party candidate and was not at all interested
in that prospect.

28

Freedman went on with his account of the informal polls he had taken
among

liis

workers in both the Democratic cities of Manchester and Claremont.

Both samplings showed that his workers held "hawk" positions on the war.

He
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concludod wltli the queslloiu "ScMiator, don't you

tl.ink you

should have a poll

before deciding whether to enter the New Hampshire Primary?"
a moment,

then said, "No,

couraging."

I

don't think so,

I

think

a

McCarthy reflected

poll would be very dis-

This comment seemed to capsulize the nature of his effort and

unified the gatherings' commitment to

liim

in one quite prophetic response.

The Senator then asked several questions concerning when a decision on

entering New Hampshire would have to be made.

David Roberts, Dartmouth College

professor and member of the Draft Robert Kennedy Committee, said that an organizational meeting would be held on December 28th and that that would be the
final date before their organization would be fully committed.

Roberts added

that he felt that organizing two conflicting anti-Johnson efforts could not

work.

In his mind it was clear that if McCarthy entered the New Hampshire

Primary the Draft R.F.K. movement would shift to the McCarthy candidacy. 30

In response to a question concerning New Hampshire specifically,

McCarthy said, "You know the New Hampshire electorate is known to be somewhat
michievous in nature.

I

don't really know how we would do here.

very much committed to the Wisconsin campaign and

I

to the Far East stopping over in Saigon and Japan.

know later.

My time is

planned to make a trip
I

will have to let you

..31

Hoeh was about to bring the session to

a

close when McCarthy said

that he greatly appreciated the meeting and that it had given him a great

deal to consider.

rash."

32

He then said, "I had better leave before

The meeting ended.

I

do something
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The N.W lla,npshlre leaders had
thought that the meeting had
gone
exceptionally well. The right tone had
been maintained.
A frank discussion
of New Hampshire, its political
problems and potential had been
accomplished
in a way that showed McCarthy
the sincerity of those who would
be the activists.
All of the hard questions concerning
McCarthy himself as a candidate, and

New Hampshire as

a test of his

candidacy had been raised.

McCarthy's responses

were thoughtful, perceptive, and reassuring,
not concerning his decision as
to whether he would enter New Hampshire,
but his competence as a candidate.

The big question remained

were they closer to a positive decision
from

McCarthy about New Hampshire?

The_Campaign St rategy and Schedule Proposed
to McCarthy
Inspite of the success of the December 14 and 15
visit to New Hampshire

McCarthy was overheard to say to David Halberstam, then
writing for Harper's
magazine, that he was not inclined to enter the New Hampshire
primary.

Hearing

this David Hoeh and his co-leader, Gerry Studds, were determined
to present
the argument once more as to why McCarthy should enter the New
Hampshire primary

They had been urged by McCarthy's Administrative Assistant, Jerry Eller,
to
contact McCarthy's newly named campaign manager Blair Clark.

McCarthy, Clark,

and others would be making final decision regarding which primaries to enter
In the days remaining before the end of the year.

Studds agreed to draft a memorandum and schedule summarizing how
the campaign might be conducted.

Hoeh agreed to telephone Blair Clark.

To make contact with Clark was difficult.

No campaign headquarters had

been established, nor were there campaign telephones.

Clark was travelling
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cxtonsivoJy

t:o

,.cet

with campaign committees in the states
where McCarthy

had said he would campaign, and spending
the remainder of his time between

his New York City apartment and the Senator's
Washington office.

Hoeh left

messages in all conceivable places hoping that
Clark would return

a call or

that with luck Hoeh might catch him at one
spot or the other.

Failing in

these attempts, Hoeh then placed all of their hope
in the arguments of the

memorandum that Studds was drafting.

Hoeh received the draft of the memo from Studds on
approximately

December 20th and reviewed it with Studds on the telephone.

It contained all

of their contentions and the schedule and was titled, "Senator
McCarthy and

The New Hampshire Primary".

Hoeh mailed it to Senator McCarthy December 22

with the following covering letter.

A copy of the memo and the letter was

also addressed to Blair Clark in care of the Senator's office.

The letter

read

Dear Senator McCarthy:
Since your recent visit to New Hampshire Gerry Studds and I have
discussed the possibility of your campaign in New Hampshire
and have attempted to summarize the time requirement and the
mechanism of such a campaign.

Gerry is responsible for the statistical work enclosed and for
drafting the analyzed schedule. We think that this schedule coupled
with strong internal and external media support, direct mail, and
telephone canvass will produce the desired result. The organization
is ready to go and prepared to program each of the campaign elements.
Since the enclosed was prepared, the New Hampshire Attorney General
ruled that permission must be secured from a candidate before funds
may be solicited or expended in a Presidential Primary in his behalf.
This ruling effectively eliminated the write-in campaign planned by
the LBJ committee.
They will not be able to expend funds to stimulate
the write-in and v;ill either have to shift to a "stand-up" caij^idate
or concentrate on the delegate section of the Primary ballot.

We liopc. tlK. oncl,uu.cl rc-achos
you In time to .-.ssist vou In formin,,
your cn,„p„l,.„ stratoKv and tl,au
you „1H e„t« the Now Ham, si!
P Imary w.th the intontion oE „lnnl„s.
Please be in touc
If there are questions on the
enclosed.
We are willing to meet

"'NerL:ps,=;ir:;""

"

pot^ntian^^ort

'°

Sincerely,

CoI^itt;e"''''

"^"^P^^"^^ Chairman, McCarthy for President Steering

The memorandum read:

SenatorJIcCa^^yr^^

New Hampshire Primary

The following factors (listed in no particular
order of priority) ought
h ^
to be given consideration:
- We

already have the nucleus of an experienced, broadly
representative

^ncLconmiit^e^^

^fl^ta~I7^.repared T^^kT^^IFEiZi

leaves of absence in order to give the N.H. campaign
professional guidance.
- We already have done statistical research to a
degree without precedent

m

this state— we have pinpointed the Democratic primary
vote with considerable precision, both statewide and by congressional
district.

- We have already acquired the votin g lists for the entire
state (all
registrants: Democratic, Unaffiliated and Republican).
- We are encouraged about the possibility of a write-in effort
for Senator
on the Republican ballot (particularly given the number of

Aj-CCar thy

Republicans who were willing to change their registration this month even
though Senator McCartliy was not yet a candidate in New Hampshire).
- We

envision

a

—

massive mailing effort of the quality and extent of
196A— to all registered Democrats and Independents.

the Lodge effort in

- We have access to almost unlimited voluntee r help which we foresee
utilizing for a) addressing and stuffing envelopes, b) door-to-door

canvassing, and

c)

telephone canvassing,

Cam paigning in Massachusetts and New Hampshire is, in many ways, a
single "package" there is a great overlap of radio, TV and news paper
coverage
Activity in one state is covered in great detail in the
other.
~

—

.

McCarthy's candidacy in New Hampshire would lead to the almost
total dissoJution of th e RFK "movem e nt" here most whose Executive Comm ittee have already indicated a desire to work for McCartliy.

- Sen.

,
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- nvcry minute

in Now Hampshire in January,
February, and March will
bring nuiss.vo nationnl ovp......
....
''n, „ Ha
Ire Is
Lhe principal T^T^rnriTTnin;^^
.j. ''[n
troop, rn Wisconsin Massachusetts.
California.Vegon ^
'wi l\ead
of, see. and hear the Senator every
day he spends in
Hampshire

- Th^j^^ated^
to New ^^^J^n^sU,r,~K^^r^^^^

logically

want, and need, someone for whom they
can work and vote.
~ M^2nZJlLfi£i£ls of the New Hampshire_ Democr^jtj^^_P^
have already

McCarthy and haiTid-hiT^urage

^

rn n
""''k''''^
to
them ^-f
if he
bypasses New Hampshire?

.

l^.at^

happens

- An effective campaign here is relatively
inexpensive— $50 000 would
sustain a major statewide effort of the magnitude
,

anT^quality we envision.

is nothin g to be lost - and a great deal
to be gaine d - by coming
: IlL^^_g
^
into New Hampshire:
a)

Given the general impression that this is a "hawkish"
state and
a
conservative" state - plus Senator Mclntyre's extraordinary
prediction that McCarthy would get 3,000-5,000 votes, anything
better than that - can be hailed as a stunning performance
(and
we can do considerably better than that).

b)

The Senator would reaffirm the seriousness of his national
candidacy
by his willingness to enter against odds (e.g., JFK in W. Va.).
A victory here— which we think we ought to shoot for— and which seems
to us far more within the realm of possibility than it did a month
ago
ould have major national repercussions

—

.

- There has been a clear,

panic reaction to the threat of McCarthy's
candidacy among the Party hierarchy in this state - and with real
reason.
Many prominent Democrats have quietly refused to serve on the
LB J Committee.
If we are to move on the Senator's behalf, we must get going yest erday,
e.g.. in the city of Keene, a McCarthy committee, with 90 adult volunteers,
-

has already located office space for headquarters and is awaiting word
from us to install phones and begin operations.
Similar efforts throughout
the state need rapid encouragement.

Finally, New Hampshire Democrats - just as Democrats everywhere else - are
deeply concerned about the present leadership of their party and their
country - and they want an opportunity to express that concern.
(Signed)

David Hoeh
Gerry Studds for the N.H. McCarthy for
President St.eering Committee
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The iiu-morniuium

of

argiuiienf.H

was followed by a document entitled, "12 Day

Schedule - Explanation" wliich read:
The percentage figures for each town represent the averag e percentage
of that town's vote in the last three Democratic primaries
(1960,1964,
1966) —computed both as a percentage of the total, statewide vote
and'
as a percentage of the vote in its congressional district. These towns,
then represent over three quarters of the total Democratic primary
turnout (N.B.:
It is far less dispersed than is the Republican vote.)
and they include every single daily paper (9) and three major weeklies
in the state.

The full schedule was displayed in the following which considered the
time needed (12 days), the places to be visited either by name or by cluster
of names,

the importance of each place or cluster by the percentage that

cluster represented of the statewide primary vote, and percentage of the

respective congressional district within which the cluster was located.

The

schedule, as developed, would cover areas of the state that contained 76.8

percent of the statewide Democratic primary vote, 79.7 percent of the vote in
the more compact 1st Congressional District, and 72.4 percent of the vote in
the geographically larger 2nd Congressional District.

With proper scheduling,

advance work, and good local organization supported by well managed statewide
activities,

Hoeli and

Studds thought the schedule would provide Senator McCarthy

with enough exposure to draw a meaningful vote.

With the exception of the

Berlin cluster, all of the others either contained a dally newspaper or were
served by one near-by.

(The Hooksett-All enstown-Pembroke cluster is between

Concord and Manchester and splits circulation between the Concord Daily Mon itor
and the Manchester Union Le ader.

)

The twenty percent of the statewide vote

not contained in the cities and towns included in their list was scattered

widely in the smaller towns of the state.
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NEW HAm^SHIRE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
12 DAY SCHEDULE

SENATOR EUGENE

Time
3-1/2.

citz
Days

Manchester
Gof f stown

J.

McCARTIIY

% Vote
Statewide

27.3
1.4
28.7

Vote

%

1st

CD.

Nashua

9.9

1/2 Day

Portsmouth
New Market

1.5
1.0
2.5

2.4
1.7
4.1

1/2 Day

Hookset
Allenstown
Pembroke

0.6
0.9
1.2
2.7

1.0
1.4
2.1
4.5

Berlin
Gorham
Northumberland

6.3
0.6
0.6
7.5

Pelham
Salem
Derry
Hudson

0.8
2.2
0.8
1.6
5.4

1.2
3.6
1.4
2.7
8.9

Laconia
Franklin
Concord

2.0
1.2
1.7

3.3

Day

1 Day

1

Day

25.7

15.7
1.5
1.5
18.7

3.3
1 Day

1

Day

Rochester
Somorsworth
Dover

Hanover
Lebanon
Claremont
Newport

2.0
3.0
2.2
7.2
0.7

0.8
2.0
0.8
4.3

CD,

44.8
2.3
47.1

1-1/2 Days

1

% Vote

2nd

3.0
4.4
7.4

3.3
4.9
3.6
11.8
1.7
2.1

5.0
2.1
10.9
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lime

^ Vote
St atewide

Cit y

1 Day

Keene
Jaff rey
Greenville
Milford
Wilton

%
1 st

Vote

CD.

1-5
0-^
0.6
0-8

CD.

3.9

1.0
1.6
2.1
1.1

3.7

76.8

% Vote

2nd

~t:i

79.7

72.4

Reflecting later on the schedule and memorandum, Studds recorded,
"That
document is actually one of the few pieces of paper that has emerged from
the

campaign of which we are very proud

"

They told him (McCarthy) that they

felt rather presumptuous giving national arguments, as they sat up there in
the 'woods', but that were McCarthy to wait, if Wisconsin were going to be his

first primary, that the months of January, February and March would be rather

bleak ones in

terras of

national publicity for him, that the national media

would be in New Hampshire in any event for the primary in March, and this is
where the spotlight would be for these three months.
"It would be crucial for the troops in California and Oregon and Wiscon-

sin and everywhere else to be reading and hearing about him at that time and
not to have him in Vietnam or God knows where else he was going.

We told him

that if he meant vjhat he said, he damn v^ell ought to be in New Hampshire any-

way because there are people here who feel very strongly and want someone to

work for," Studds recalled.
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Memo to McCarthy:

Basis for Analysis

The strategy outlined in the memorandum to McCarthy contained the two

major questions that will be reviewed in this study, questions of how to
accomplish the desired political impact and how to accomplish a significant
result.

The case study that follows describes the most important events of

the campaign that were felt to be the ones that contributed the most to the

result.

While many lesser events and activities are omitted it is important

to note that what follows is an abstraction and compression of the totality

of a political campaign.

The purpose is to identify aspects that were seen

at the beginning as being important and evaluating the respective contributions
of these to the result.

The memorandum to McCarthy is an especially interesting

document because it outlined both the method of the campaigii and the impact
that was intended.

Generally, what will be examined are the critical events

of the campaign, predicted and unpredicted;

principally as outlined in the memorandum;

the organization of the campaign,
the methodology of the campaign

as represented by candidate scheduling, use of media, and voter contacts;

and the environment of the campaign that contributed to or detracted from the

result

Not all of these descriptions can be subjected to empirical analysis.

Many will stand as descriptions for the reader to assess as to the relative
impact upon the result.

evaluated.

Five indices of campaign activity will be empirically

These are campaign visits, local camapign organization, canvassing

activity, auxiliary campaign activities, and newspaper attention.

reads the subsequent descriptions of the ciimpaign

As one

and events important to the

campaign it will be useful to keep in mind the activities that lead to the
indices
empirical assessment of the relative importance of the five selected
of campaign activity.
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To orr.anizo the case study and the concludinp,
empirical analysis

both

a

chronology of events and a discussion oi campaign
operations is

necessary.

Encompassed in the memorandum to McCarthy are the
following basic

campaign elements:

organization, schedule, resources, issues, media, manage-

ment, and knowing the opposition.

The case study is organized to show how

each of these elements was woven into the campaign and then
how selected

indicators of the impact of the campaign are extracted to provide
a measure
of effectiveness.

The primary point of reference for both the case study and the analysis
is the December 22,

1967 memorandum to McCarthy and the few subsequent

operational memoranda prepared by the McCarthy leaders after McCarthy's
announcement.

In a ten week campaign there was no time to prepare other

more detailed campaign plans.

The case study serves to document how the

campaign evolved, what decisions evolved from the early strategy and what

decisions came as the result of unforeseen events.

In this latter context,

a sound campaign plan is one that also provides for the unforeseen and is

capable of responding effectively when an advantage emerges from such
events.

Part of what made the McCarthy strategy work was that the leaders

understood the political environment of New Hampshire and they sensed that
the strategy they had outlined was also one that would amplify McCarthy's

own assets as a politician.

The test was the campaign which tried both

candidate and organization.

The result makes a review of what happened

worthy of analysis.
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N otes

^^^ost all accounts of the 1968 presidential campaign
describe the search
for a candidate to face Lyndon Johnson in the
Democratic primaries. The best
report was that written by three English journalists:
Lewis Chester, Godfrey
^"""^
An i^merican Melodrama, The Presidential Camna lPn
of
?off
196_8, (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), pp. 51-1027

~~— —

2 Allard

Johnson,

Lowenstein and Arnold Kaufman, "Why Democrats Should Wo^k
to Stop
(mimeographed statement, 1967), p. 4.

^nion Leader (November

20,

1967), pp. 1 & 14.

^"New Hampshire Political Calendar," (Concord: Office of the Attorney
^
General, 1968).

following the 1968 presidential primary the New Hampshire General Court
changed the law to allow voters to regain Independent status.
Eugene J. McCarthy, The Year of the People
Company, Inc., 1969), p. 265.
^Ibid., pp. 265-267.

% ew

York Times (December

1,

1967).

^Ibid.

lOlbid.
^^Ibid.
12

^''ibid.
•^

^New York Post (December 1, 1967).

^ ^Newsday

(December 1, 1967).

^^Ibid.

^^Lebanon Valley

Nev/s

(December 1, 1967).

l^Ibid.

^^Newsweek (November 27, 1967),

p.

28.

,

(Garden City: Doubleday and
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I-owenstoin-Gans organizing effort was the
national meetJn. of tL
cl f
ing
the Conference
of Concerned Democrats held in Chicago,
December
1
1967
The meeting brought together the anti-war,
pro-alternative cindidateorgani'al*
tions from across the nation. The meetings
had the appearance of a national
^i'-h McCarthy as the presumed nominee.
In addition to the
^K^i^i that the meeting gave
visibility
to the emerging McCarthy leadership it
also
gave the state delegations a chance to meet with
McCarthy for the first time
The New Hampshire delegation took advantage of this
opportunity to press their
argument that McCarthy should enter the presidential
primary and that he should
visit New Hampshire as soon as possible.
20
^
^The
21

22

New Republic (December 16, 1967),

The Concord Daily Monitor (December

5,

p.

11.

1967).

The New York Post (Demceber 5, 1967).

23ib±d.
'Barbara Underwood, St. Chri sp in's Day. Gene McCarthy in the New Hampshire Primary (unpublished typescript, 1970), The Locals, p. 26.

^^David C. Hoeh, "Memo re: Chaplain Meeting," (unpublished notes, December 14, 1967).

2%nderwood, B., p£.£it

.

,

The Locals, p. 26.

Op. Cit.

,

The Locals, P. 26A.

27ibid., p. 25.

^hhld.

,

p.

^^Hoeh, D.

,

25.

0£. Cit

.

30lbid.

^Hjuderwood,
32Hoeh, D.

,

B.

,

Op. Cit

.

•^^At this stage Hoeh and Stvidds were operating on the assumption that the
Attorney General's opinion would apply to the Johnson Committee. The full mean
Ing of the Johnson re - nomination endorsement by the Democratic State Committee
was not clear at the time Hoeh wrote the above but was just beginning to emerge
through the probing of Eugene Daniell on behalf of his Draft R.F.K. Committee.
Their position at that point v/as to keep the Johnson forces on the defensive
while not being particularly concerned about the nature of the actual confronta
The letter reflects this early naivete on their part.
tlon.
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If McCarthy entered, Gerry Studds hoped to
receive a partial leave of
absence from St. Paul's School to manacc the effort.
Senator McCarthy wrote
making such a request of the school's headmaster, but
it was denied.

35„

^
Professor
Robert Craig had secured most of these lists for public opi
nion surveying purposes. He was willing to make the lists
available to anyone who asked for them. The McCarthy campaign was the only
organization to
make such a request.

Gerry Studds, Transcript of a Tape Recorded Interview, (Washington,
D.C.: McCarthy Historical Project, Georgeto\m University,
1969), pp. 11-12.
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A WAITING POLITICAL STAGE

Wait_irvg^

Since McCarthy loft New Ilanipshlre December 15th lloeh and
Studds had
had no communication with him;

they had also been unable to make contact

with his manager, Blair Clark.

The memorandum was mailed;

it was their last

effort to convince McCarthy and his Washington advisors of the merits
of

New Hampshire contest.

In the meaatime,

a

press accounts of McCarthy's thoughts

gave them little to hope for.

On December 23rd, a Boston Globe headline read, "Senator McCarthy to

avoid New Hampshire Primary,"

Turn to Bay State Primary."

The continuation headline read, "McCarthy Plans
The story's lead read:

Eugene McCarthy has made a firm decision to avoid
the March 12 New Hampshire primary.
The only decision
pending is how and when to announce the fact.
Sen.

And vjent on:

McCarthy's decision to -.Lay oi;t of New Hampshire was a
concession to the political realities.
Some of his
supporters had urged that he enter the primary, saying
that if he was going Lo make an issue against President
Johnson's conduct of the Vietnam v;ar, he could hardly
begin by skipplag the first in the nation primary.
But the more cool-headed among his brain trusters suggested
that running in Nev; }!ampshiro could deal a crushing blow
to the entire McCartiiy campaign.

The Democrats there are showii^g a unique unity over the
primary, and the Democratic vote is so small and concentrated v/ithin the few industrial centers that an
attempt to overcome the organizations would be difficult.
Bcslden that, the national spotlight will be on the
Republicans in Now Hampsliire, with Nixon and Romney
fighting wl.at nigjit be a deatli struggle for their party's
McCartliy would risk being depicted as an
nomination.
eccentric loner, a sort of Democratic Harold Stassen with
practically no impact on tlie public or press.

I-; 5

The lurthcr dnnper is tlial a hip, flop in New Uanipshi
riwould spill over into Massachusetts, dei-aoraIi/.ing
the
campai^',n workers and conditioning the Bay
state voters
to view McCarthy as a loser.

December 23rd was

a

there was little anyone

Saturday, the beginning of the Christmas Holiday,

could do to check whether the story was correct.

December 28th was the date the McCarthy Committee had given McCarthy as

a

last day before the plans to organize the Draft-Kennedy effort went
forward.

A decision to enter the primary much after

tlie

first of the year would not

provide time enough to organize an effect campaign for McCarthy.
the afternoon of December 27th Clark finally called Hoeh.

the call

Vr7as

to assure I^oeh that,

Late in

The reason for

contrary to what he would hear on Walter

Cronkite's CBS-TV "EVENING NEWS," a decision regarding New Hampshire had not
yet been made.

Hoeh asked Clark to confirm his call with a telegram. The

telegram arrived the morning of December 28th and read:

It was good to talk to you yesterday and I send you this wire
simply to confirm what I said on the pl;one, thai: the McCarthy
decision on the New Hampshire Primary is still not made,
despite press reports, that it is being actively considered
from the point of view of scheduling and where the best effort
can be made nationally, and that you and your group will be
the first to knovc when the decision has been made within the
next several days. Many thanks to you and your colleagues.

Sincerely, Blair Clark

Hoeh imm.ediately prepared a memo which he sent to the members of the
Steering Committee and a larger list of those titled "friends."

Since the

key 28th date was the Thursday before the New Year'p holiday weekend, little

would happen between

?;hen

and January 2nd,

la his conversation with Clark
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Hoel. di.l

discuss the

planniiH',

for

tlic

sir,n

i

C

icancc of the Docomlu-r 28th dale In torms of
Clark's

New Hauipsliiro decision.

llocli

indicated

tliat

ho did not expect

anything irrevocable would happen on the 28th and that most of
those who
would form the leadership of the Draft-Kennedy organization had
already
agreed to shift to McCarthy if he were to enter the New Hampshire Primary.

Hoeh's memo to the Committee opened:
The question s where do we stand? The answer is that we now
serve by standing and waiting.
This has been our posture since
Senator McCarthy's visit to New Hampshire December 14 and 15...
:i

,

Since his New Hampshire visit, he has taken the important
stops to equip his campaign with the necessary national
staff to begin the important scheduling work and strategy
planning that had not been accomplished at the time of his
New Hampshire visit. Numerous meetings have taken place in
V>Jasliington and the results have been reported in various
and sometimes, inaccurate ways.
It has been my position to
await the outcome of these meetings knowing that the N.H.
McCarthy for President Steering Committee had made strong
and compelling cases for entering the N.H. primary... .2

Hoeh then recounted the conversation with Clark and the contents of
the telegram.

Since up to this point the memo had a rather neutral tone and

since Hoeh wanted to indicate that he expected a positive decision from

McCarthy, he ended by setting

week in January.

a

probable meeting time for the end of the first

He also enclosed petition forms that had to be circulated

in each congressional district in order to place the Senator's name on the

ballot

Hoeh's final note was:
is now expensive
Our organization has grovm considerably.
Any financial help,
to mail and the phone bills are piling up.
at this stage, would be greatly appreciated.

A HAPPY

Nl'W

YKAR????
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That .v.ninn

W.Uer Cronkite

did reporl.

not enter the New Hampshire presidential

the next morning.

Lhal:

McCarthy definitely would

primary.

Hoch's memo would arrive

In addition he had called a number of
the Steering Committee

members so that

Clark's information could be spread among the
local

supporters.

Th e Announcement

December 31st, the telephone rang in David Hoeh's home.
calling.

Blair Clark

i-jas

He wanted to come to New Hampshire the next day, to meet
with members

of the McCartliy for President Steering Committee.

Hoeh replied that it was

Sunday evening, he had a New Year's Eve party to attend, and assumed
that most
of our committee members would be engaged likewise.

He said that it would

be impossible to make the calls to set up the meeting for January 1st but
that he could do it for Jiinuary 2nd.

Hoeh tried to push Clark for details

on the possible agenda for the meeting, indicating that the Steering Committee

would not be in the mood for another indecisive review.

Hoeh said they would

need an answer one way or the other, but Clark said he wanted to meet with
the committee before committing hr.nself or McCarthy to a final decision.

This

was satisfactory to Hoeh, so he agreed to gather as many of the committee

members as possible at the Chaplain's home in Bedford, for the evening of
January 2nd,

1968.

Hoeh made calls to the committee members during the

afternoon, and evening of New Year's day and was able to contact most of them.

Hoeh's memo of December 28th had arrived and was viewed as optimistic news.
The members

\>rere

now ready for the challenges of a New Year.
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Sanciy ilooh,

Gerry Studds and David Hooh met lUair
Clark for the first

time ia his Sheraton Wayfarer room.

Tall, lanky, and casual appearing

Clark immediately made his guests feel comfortable
by complimenting them on
their persistence.

lie

assessment and that

a

said that he had come to New Hampshire to make
a final

decision on whether or not McCarthy would enter the

primary would be made within 2A hours.

During the discussion Clark was

interrupted by a telephone call from Senator McCarthy.

While discussing

situations in other states and parts of the campaign, Clark suddenly
motioned
to lloeh that McCarthy v/ould like to talk with him.

McCarthy's question concerned the status of the LBJ write-in effort.
wanted to be sure that

a

He

direct confrontation with Johnson would be possible,

Hoeh explained that in the time since he had last written a clarification of
the Attorney General's position had been received.

endorsement of the Johnson renomination

The Democratic Party

effort constituted a legal action

which allowed them to run the write-in effort without specific approval from
Johnson.

Daniell was challenging the interpretation for the Draft RFK

Comiuittee but if he

Johnson

ajid

(McCarthy) entered the primary, a clear contest between

himself would

be.

possible.

McCarthy seemed pleased with this infor-

mation and ended by saying that he did not want to waste time in efforts that
did not present a clear test of the issues.

During dinner with Clark in the Wayfarer dining room that evening Hoeh
Senator McCarthy \ms on the line.

was called to the dining room telephone.
In barely audible tones he said,

New llampsliire primary".

vork for

a

"Dave,

1

have decided that

I

will enter the

Hoeh resimnded by saying they had been waiting for that

Jong time and that thoy were ready to go to work.

Not wanting to

359
1<>1

Iho convorsat

icni

ci

the decision drop at

thai

point, lloch said that

ho would Tike to aiHiounco the decision Jn Now
Hampshire at

before McCarthy node

t:he

announcement in Washin;.,ton.

the same Lime or

Uoeh explained that the

New Hampshire reporters and wLr- service porsonne] had
been extremely cooperative
in the past weeks and that he wanted to give them the
headstart on the story.

McCartliy said

this would

tliat

be-

okay and that

Hoel,

could

liold

a

press conference

the next day before noon and that McCarthy would hold one in the
early afternoon.

reviewed

Hoel\

tlie

conversations they were liavlng with Blair Clark and asked

McCartliy how he sliould relay the contents of

I

lie

teleplione call to Clark and

to the meeting they were about to have at the Chaplain's.

should use his

lloeh

judgment

McCarthy said

tliat

and that ho could handle these things as he

wished.

Hoeh returned to the table, looking, according to Gerry Studds, "like
he had just swaljo\;ed a canary", and began by saying to Clark that

phone call was from "your Boss," Senator McCarthy.

and

I

soup,

thought Sandy was going to faint.

(Stu(Uls)

at that time."

liis

tele-

"Me has just told me

that he is going to enter the New Hampshire primary."

according to Studds' "sort of fell into

tlie

T

Blair Clark's chin,

(Studds) dr..pped everything

We were not prepared for it

3

Clark recovered from his surprise, muttered

tliat

of course he could call

McCarthy back and further delay or chang.e his mind, but that since, they had
a

decision and the details of an announccMuent

plan the announcement, give the news to
campaign.

That was Blair Clark's style.

th.e

liad

been outlined, they should nou

committee, and get on with the

No point rehashing the events of
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the.

past-

two hours:

too much

h:id

to bo done and there was little time

available.

They agreed that they eould not hold a press conference on the
basis of
a

personal telephone call to Hoeh.

There would have to be a document of some

sort from McCarthy that could be released since they were going to make
the

announcement in New Hampshire.

They concluded that a telegram would suffice

and that they themselves had better draft the telegram, check the contents

with Senator McCarthy by telephone and ask that he send
record.

it to them for the

Studds and Hoeh drafted a telegram for Clark to review.

They then

called McCarthy again to check the text of the telegram and the timing of the
release.

Clark would return to New York in the morning before the announcement

press conference.

By 9:30 a.m. Tuesday, January 2nd, Hoeh had called the "Dean" of the

New Hampshire press corps,

D.

Frank O'Neill of the Manchester Union Leade r to

announce that he would be holding a press conference at the State House Press
Rooir.,

in Concord, at

11:00 a.m. O'Neil would notify the other reporters and

make the arrangements for the conference.

In his call to O'Neill he simply

said that they would be making an announcement concerning the McCarthy effort.
V\\en

Hoeh read

tlie

telegram, it took

a

moment for the mind-set of the reporters

to change from that of knowing that McCarthy would not enter to actually

understanding what Hoeh

liad

just read.

There were one or two questions about

v/hether McCarthy was holding a similar conference in Washington or how the

message would be confirmed by him.

Tlien

they sensed that an import^mt national

scoop was in tlieir hands and they rushed to the nearest telephones to call in
a

s-.tory

lead and the text of the telegram.
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1 have cIocichMl to carry my caiupaijui for the
presidency of the
UnlLod States JiUo New Hampshire.
I will enter the New Hampshire
primary.
My name will be entered in the presidential
preference
section and, with your committee's valuable help,
we will run a
full slate of pledged delegates.

I plan, as you know, to campaign in five
other state primaries,
but am now satisfied that I will be able to devote to the
New
Hampshire primary the time that is required.
It is important
to give the Democrats of New Hampshire the opportunity to express
freely their choice on the grave issues facing our country.
I
wil] press my campaign vigorously.
I thank you for wliat your committee
has already done and look
forward to working closely with you in the weeks to come.

Addressed to:
David C. Hoeh
Signed:
Senator Eugene J. McCarthy
Dated:
January 2nd, 1968^

Studds and Hoeh wr;ited in the press room for a few moments to
reaction.

Within moments

a

the f].urry had begun to subside.

Within one-half hour

As they left the press room, Studds and

Hoeh looked at each other and almost simultaneously said,

gotten ourselves into now."

mentally inventoried

responsibility.

"\^^lat

have we

The full weight of not only the McCarthy
a

failure in New Hampshire would

of Vietnam policy suddenly became incredibly real.
tliey

the

series of return calls came to the press room

requesting wire service taped interviews with Hoeh.

candidacy but of the impact

vjatcii

tlie

ha'/e on

tlie

issues

It was a lonely moment and

resources they had at hand to assume the

Given even an optomistic view they had a total of $500 in

their campaign bank account, no headquarters, no telephones, no mailing address,
no manager, no m.aterials, and only a tenuous tie to the new McCarthy manager

whom they had onJy met the day before.
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Recalling,

t-lu.

event Stu.Ids said. "We enjoyed this one
because it was not

particularly v.-cll-attended
the AP and

a

.

Tliere were the local reporters of
the UPI and

few others who had obviously come to hear
us say,

terr.ibly sorry,

'Well, we're

but Senator McCarthy is not entering New Hampshire.'

Their

expressions were rather fun to watch as we read the
telegram."

In a campaign strategy designed to have maximum
impact the timing and

method of the announcement could not

liave

been better.

The story drew front

page attention across the nation and held the lead position in
many radio and

television broadcasts throughouu that day.

The New Hampshire Associated Press

version of the story, under the byline of Adolphe V. Bernotas, read:
Concord, N.H. (AP)
Senator Eugene McCarthy, D-Minn. an
opponent of President Johnson's Vietnam policy, will enter
New Hampshire's March 12 Democratic presidential primary,
David Hoeh of Hanover, the senator's chief Granite State
backer, told nev;smen today....

Until very recently, McCarthy had indicated he would use
the Massachusetcs primary as his test of New England
sentiment.
However, Hoeh said today, there was no clear
reason v/hy McCarthy changed signals.
"He isn't running just to make tests--he*s seeking the
presidency", Hoeti added.

McCarthy had called off plans to tour Europe and Southeast
Asia, Hoeh said, and v;ould be in New Hampshire within the
•next two weeks to campaign "in excess of 12 to 15 days."
Hoeh said his group plans to spend $50,000 "to do
job in the campaign."

a good

He added that the organization expects McCarthy to pull
"about a third' of the state's 80,000 Democratic votes...."

Hoeh said the group is already circulating petitions to
Fifty signatures from each of the
got on the ballot.
two congressional districts in the state are required.
Some ol the strength shown for Senator Robert F. Kennedy,
D-N.Y., will be drawn away by McCarthy's announcement,
Hoeh maintained.
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He ndded:
'A
.join McCarLliy

number of their members said

ilioy
"

'

would

.

A drive lo pick up independent votes will
be undertaken
Hoeh said.

'

McCartliy's campaign, Hoeh added, would require
'close
campaigning.
You can't substitute media for effectiveness
of meeting tlie people.'

Hoeh said the group has not yet decided on potential
delegates
He adderl the organization went with pledged rather than
favorable delegates because 'it gives us control over
the structure of the delegation.
We can distribute the
delegates where the votes arc'.
In answer to a question on how McCarthy would do in the
state's two biggest cities— Manchester and Nashua— Hoeh
said:
'There is considerable support, especially in Nashua'.

He said that in Manchester 'there is no special love fcr

Johnson

'

"Manchester is the kind ^f city where McCarthy would
have appeal." Hoeh said.

While covering essentially the same New Hampshire news, Ward Just,

writing in the Wa shington Post

,

reported a capitol view of the story.

McCarthy's aides insisted that the decision to go into New
Hampshire did not represent a change in plans. Last week in
a radio interview the Minnesota Democrat said the primary
was "not a significant test", and indicated privately that he
would avoid it....
Organization Democrats in New Hampshire led by Bernard Boutin...
have virtually dared McCarthy to oppose the President....
In an interview last
would swamp McCarthy
name would be on the
in the President's.

month, Boutin predicted that the President
in the March 12 primary, even though McCarthy's
ballot and voters would be obliged to write
Yesterday, Boutin was unavailable for comment...

"We don't expect a landslide or any thirit?; 1 ike that," said one of
McCartliy's campaign aides yesterday, "but we expect to do well."
Tlie New Hampshire test will be the first direct confrontation
between the President and his critics since the 1964 presidential

election.
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McLarlhy .rides in Washington said that one of
the principal
factors in the Senator's decision to vie
with the President in
New llaiupshire was an optimistic report from
lloeh, and from
McCarthy's national campaign manager, Blair Clark,
who canvassed the state over the New Year's weekend.
Hoeh reported that the President was not popular
in New Hampshire
and that support for the McCarthy candidacy was
growing.
Hoeh
reported some defections from the regular Democratic
organization
but that group was still regarded as solidly
pro-Johnson.
One analysis of McCarthy's decision to enter the
primary turns
on the criticism of his candidacy as 'non-serious.'
Last week
McCarthy confessed himself to be "a little disappointed" with
anti-war Democrats who have refused to support him with 'the
excuse that I am not a serious candidate...."

Political observers here reasoned that if McCarthy did not enter
New Hampshire, with its wide newspaper and television coverage
and opportunity to challenge Lyndon Johnson, the charge of
"Non-seriousness" would grow in currency and plausibility.

A McCarthy aide said yesterday that the fact that a campaign for
Mr. Johnson was being organized was a "major factor" in McCarthy's
decision to add New Hampshire...."

Although Bernard EuuLin was unavailable for comment. Governor John
W.

King, did issue a brief statement concerning the McCarthy announcement.

Senator McCarthy is welcome to bring his campaign into the
New Hampshire primary. While I do not agree with his political
viewpoints, a full discussion of the Issues in the great tradition
of American politics can only be beneficial.
am confident that the vast majority of New Hampshire Democrats
support President Johnson, and his domestic and international
policies justify that support.
I

On March )2, the New Hampshire Democrats will have the opportunity
to conclusively show their support for one of our country's
greatest-,and most successful Presidents, President Lyndon Baines
Johnson.

With King's statement, timed to ride, if possible, with the McCarthy
announcement story, the battle was joined.

The confident Johnson renomination

leadership were sure they could demolish McCarthy in New Hampshire.
would be no question but that there would be
two In N'^w Ha^iipshire.

a

There

direct confrontation between the
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ji^IiLl^£'2111gli±It;_XiLovidcs

Now

tlKiL

the Sta^e

McCarthy had agreed to enter, the McCarthy
loaders could

seriously consider organizing the actual
campaign.

Their preliminary analysis

as reflected in the memorandum of December
22nd was the background plan

but a further evaluation would be necessary
to implement the plan.

As with the ethos of New Hampshire primary elections
which dictated

party organization neutrality, there was a second ethos
concerning presidential
primaries.

Nov;

Hampshire provides the stage, the audience, and frequently,

the principal directors of a campaign.

with money from outside the state.

The production, hov^ever, is paid for

To some, principally the communications

Industry, hotel, motel, and restaurant operators, the New Hampshire Presidential

Primary is an economic boon during the slack winter period.

To others it is

quadrennial entertainment relieving the cabin fever of the long winter.

In their meetings with Lowenstein, Cans, and later McCarthy and Clark,

the Now Hampshire committee had made clear that the state was the stage and
its voters the audience but that

c

aly a small

air.ount

of money could be expected

to be raised from the Nov; Hampshire populace itself for use in the primary

campaign.

Nev;

Hampshire's small population, approximately 700,000 persons in

1968 and low per capita income, $3,023, in 1969, meant that the resources to

support

a

presidential primary campaign had to come from outside the state.

In this ethos there lay a part of the McCarthy strategy.
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HAMPSHIRE DEMOCIUTS AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Knowing the Oppositio n
The New Hampshire Democratic Party leadership had assumed that
It would
be united in its drive to deliver the state to Lyndon B.
Johnson In his

push for renomlnatlon.

most party leaders as

The Danlell-Kennedy write-in activity was viewed by
a

fringe operation that could be easily Isolated.

A rather elaborate campaign plan had been developed by Bernard Boutin
and informally agreed to by the major office holders, principally Governor

King and Senator Mclntyre,

The first public act of the Johnson write-in

campaign was to be the discussion of the campaign at the November 5th
Executive Committee meeting.

Word of Cans visit, the possible McCarthy

candidacy, and additional stirrings prompted several changes in the original
plan.

New Hampshire presidential primaries are frequently politically
perilous times for party leaders and office holders.
is a minefield.

The quadrennial event

For a major office-holder, survival is of ultimate

Importance and to survive being involved in a New Hampshire Presidential

Prlamry without collecting scars is
a

different form

eacl^

time,

a

miracle.

Because the spectacle takes

trying lo figure out which way to move to avoid

political Injury is a chiallenging game.

For King, Mclntyre, and Boutin,

party unity in support of the President was assumed.

As leaders of the

party by virtue of their offices and titles, they

every reason to expect

liad

that what they said would carry weight with a sizable constituency.

167

On the
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oLher side, they were in no position
to
such

a

d

iff or with the President,

since

move wouid he costly in terms of
present political security and

future rewards.

Neutrality under the conditions of late
1967 and early

1968 would not have been an acceptable
alternative either.

In fact,

neutrality for a Governor about to seek
re-election, election to another
office or appointment as a federal judge
would be viewed by the President
as tantamount to desertion.

or against him.

In 1967-68,

one was either for the President

There was no middle ground.

The Democratic Party's leader-

ship in 1968 was no more successful in protecting
itself from the all but

guaranteed surprises of the Presidential Primary than
their Republican

counterparts had been in 1964.

The Boutin Strategy

After a string of appointments that had kept Bernard Boutin in

Washington since the election of John

F.

Kennedy, he had resigned as the

Administrator of the Small Business Administration and returned to New
Hampshire.

His new position was with Sanders Associates, a Nashua eletronics

firm with sizable defense contracts.

Boutin's assignment with S,anders was of

a public relations nature with responsibility for producing the in-house news

letter and related publically unspecified assignments.

several other missions.

Boutin himself had

The first was to return to New Hampshire where his

own political career had stopped with his departure to Washington after his

defeat in the 1960 gubernatorial race.

A frustrated politician on his own,

Boutin souglit to resume his interrupted career by re-establishing himself
in Nevj Hampshire, and capitalizing on his exemplary record of federal service
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\vhcn he rcLurncHl

during Juno. 1%7. to take tho Sanders assJnn.nent,
Houtin

had every intention of running for Governor again, assuming

tliat

three-term

Governor John W. King would either step aside or run for the
United States
Senate.

The mission wliich made the Sanders position possible and prompted

Boutin

t;o

leave the Small Business Administration was his selection by the

President to assume management of the President's renomination efforts in
New Hampshire.

As a major Kennedy operative in the carefully executed

Kennedy primary of 19G0 and now a confidant
was the ideal person for the assignment.

of President Johnson, Boutin

Furthermore, Boutin had recently

assisted in a number of other political ventures for the President including
a project in Texas during the

1966 elections.

Boutin saw the chance to combine the gubernatorial objective with the

Johnson renomination mission.

His success as the manager of the Johnson

campaign would bring him back into the limelight of New Hampshire politics,
identify him v/ith the fortunes of his sure-to-be-re-elected President,

foreshadowing his own gubernatorial candidacy.
to detect,
a

Such a scenario was not hard

and was immediately determined by the Union Leader Corporation in

New H ampshire Sunday News editorial dated as early as May 21, 1967.

At approximately the time of Boutin's return to New Hampshire, the press

carried a series of stories about a mysterious man that President Johnson had
sent to New Hampshire to organize his Presidential Primary.
a

The stories had

peculiar flavor that would be repeated as the Johnson effort went forward.
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It appeared

from

tiho

stories

tliat

soiueliow

Johnson did not trust

li;ls

tor tunes to the leadership of the New Hampshire
Democratic Party.

Manch£St^_r

Ur^

The

interpreted this as a slap at its major office-holders.

The press search* for the mysterious man continued for much
of the summer but

never successfully labelled

a

person who fit the description.

search went on inside the party for the mysterious man, more as

A similar
a

reaction

to the news stories than to evidence tliat someone might actually
have been

assigned to New Hampshire.

Eventually, both the press and the politicians

settled on Boutin as the man, although he steadfastly denied having other
than friendly connections with the White House.

Boutin alleged that he left

federal service to return to New Hampshire because of the challenge of his

new job.

'^

Whether Boutin was commissioned to manage the

Nevj

Hampshire Johnson

campaign or not, he arrived in New Hampshire with the plan for Johnson's
effort in the primary.

Even before he was appointed as the Re-Elect Pre-

sident Jolmson Chairman for New Hampshire, Boutin outlined the Johnson

campaign to party leaders

aiid

probable campaign workers.

The Johnson campaign was to be a total party effort.

During

a

conver-

sation with Sandra Hoeh in August 1967, Boutin sketched out the pyramid that

would be the organizational shape of the Johnson

Nev;

Hampshire campaign.

At

the top of the pyramid were the names of the titular leaders of the

Democratic Party

— King

and Mclntyre.

Within the same segment with King and

Mclntyre was the operating head of the organization, Boutin himself.
Beneath that point then stretched downward an organization that would parallel
the organizational

structure of the New Hampshire Democratic Party.
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There would

bc^

renional leaders similar to the congressional
district

chairmen, county leaders, city leaders, town leaders,
committee members,
and finally, a campaign connection to each of
the 90,000-plus registered

members of the Democratic Party.

Apparently, some time prior to Boutin's return to New Hampshire,
a

decision had been made in the

\/liite

House that Lyndon Johnson would not

become an announced candidate for re-election until late in the
prc-convention
season.

By this decision, Johnson took the cautious, more traditional

route of incumbent Presidents.^

The fiction of non-candidacy would be

maintained as long as possible for whatever purposes would be served by
appearing to be above the political struggle.

The decision left the renominatlon
a single alternative.

leadership in New Hampshire with

Since Johnson would not be an announced candidate, it

would not be possible for his name to be listed on the ballot.

The

alternative, therefore, would be to ask Democratic voters to write-in

Johnson's name on the ballot.

Coiisequently

,

the Johnson campaign organization

first priority was to stimulate New Hampshire Democrats to turn out in

significant numbers and then to write-in the name of Lyndon Johnson.
secoiidary importance in the strategy would be the selection of

delegates.

a

Of

slate of

Boutin planned to solicit as delegate candidates the state's

most prominent political names.

These names alone, Boutin felt would

attract the votes needed to fill the delegation with Johnson supporters.
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Houlin's planning was conditioned by several
Important experiences.
The party reform effort of the 1950'
the party from the leadership;

s

had dislodged the conservative wing of

however, many of those persons still lurked

in the shadows of the party's councils.

To Boutin in 1967, these individuals

still posed the greatest danger to the unity effort which
he had in mind
for the Johnson campaign.

In his conversation with Sandy Hoeh,

that August,

Boutin referred to the names of some of the more obstreperous
pre-ref ormers
as representing that minority who would probably not join the write-in
effort.

When Sandy asked how he viewed the Draft Kennedy effort of Eugene Daniell,

Boutin responded by saying that first, Robert Kennedy would come to New

Hampshire and support the

renomination

of Lyndon B. Johnson, and that second,

Daniell would not be able to generate much support: for his Kennedy write-in
effort.

Only those ancient malcontents and a few "wildeyed" radicals would

even consider challenging the

renomination

campaign of the President in

New Hampshire Boutin concluded.

A second occurrence from Boutin's past which influenced his thinking
was the John

F.

Kennedy primary of 1960,

He clearly painfully recalled

the effort of the party malcontents to abort the election of the full slate
of Kennedy pledged delegates.

Those same shadowy figures appeared to so

occupy Boutin in his planning that he did not recognize the growing opposition
to the President's war policies,

same individuals

Vv'ho

an opposition composed of some of the

had helped Boutin reform the Democratic party in the

late 1950's.

A further blinding political event in Boutin's recollection was the
1964 effort to secure a write-in on that year's presidential primary ballot

for vice lu'esident for Robert F. Kennedy.

That movement had been generated
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In Nc.w Hn,npsl>irc. hy somo of

slaCe In the 1960 primary.

same porsons who had opposed the

tlu-

It

p]

edged

appeared tlmt this effort was designed to

demonstrate a loyalty to the heir Robert Kennedy that
was greater than that
of John Kennedy's 1960 advocates,

like Boutin, who were now Johnson loyalists.

An embarrassing situation was developing for Johnson
and his supporters

early in 1964.

Loyalty to the Kennedy family was being placed in conflict

with loyalty to the Johnson administration.

The conflict left many a Kennedy

loya3ist, now well connected in the Johnson administration, on
extremely

shaky ground. A significant vote for Robert Kennedy for Vice
President could
be embarrassing to President Johnson.

Opposition to the Kennedy candidacy

would be interpreted in New Hampshire as ungracious if not actually disloyal.
Boutin, then in Washington, was caught betv/een the desire of the President
to have a free hand in selecting his Vice President and New Hampshire party

leaders' desire to suppress a re-emergence of the malcontents.

Given the

choice, Mclntyre, King, Dunfey and otner party leaders met and concluded that
the only way to contsm the divisive threat of the Kennedy Vice President

write-in was to join the effort.
the party's leadership,

In a last minute announcement, most of

including the Senator and Governor, enthusiastically

endorsed the write-in for Robert Kennedy as Vice President on the 1964

presidential primary preference ballot.

Only one of the Democratic Party

leadership. Democratic National Gommitteeman

ference for Hubert

H.

,

Hugh Bo\>mes, stated his pre-

Humphrey, the eventual nominee.

Boutin was left to explain the reasons for the Kennedy write-in to
an outraged Lyndon Johnson.

Fortunately, from his point of view, Johnson

secured slightly more write-in votes for President in 1964 than Robert

Kennedy garnered for

tiie

Vice President.

That result and the machinations
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of the 196/, primary forced Bout:xn

t.o

ally himself fully with the fortunes

of Lyndon Johnson and to sever his once
strong ties with the Kennedy family.

There appeared to be no room in Boutin's thinking
for a strategy that
would respond to discontent within the party other
than to isolate that
discontent, as had happened in 1960, or to smother
opposition in
of loyalties as happened in 1964.

a

blanket

Boutin's plans were based on his own

political experiences and confidence that Robert Kennedy would
not allow
his name to be used in a way that would be construed as disruptive
to
the New Hampshire Democratic party organization.

Unfortunately for Boutin, his most recent active campaign experiences
had been at the behest of Lyndon Johnson.

As a highly placed political

operative in the Johnson administration, Boutin had been used by the administration to carry out some its political objectives and had become a part
of the White House political operation headed by the Texan, Marvin Watson.

On several occasions he had been sent into the field, especially in the

south and Texas, to assist in organizing election activities

Johnson supporters.

fo-;

several

What Boutin gained from that experience was an indoct-

rination in unit rule, Texas-style politics.

The unit rule, a Texas tradition, worked to systematically remove
from consideration minority views, minority representation and intra-

party minoirty accommodation.

Complete and unquestioning loyalty to the

party and its leadership was a hallmark of the unit rule process.

The

175

The result was

t

Marvin Wal.sou, and the Texas-orlg.lnntcd Wliite
House

l.aL

political operation,

luid

littlt)

tolerance for another state's experience

with minority inclusion and compromise.
this ethos witliout question.

Boutin had, apparently, assimilated

It can be assumed

that if Boutin had raised

questions with regard to Texas unit rule politics, his loyalty
to Johnson

would have been questioned by the palace guard.

In many respects, Boutin's

own experience in New Hampshire had been similar on the surface to
Texas

unit rule politics.

An obstreporous and destructive element had been

removed from the leadership of the New Hampshire Democratic Party by

Boutin's work in the 1950'
plan

tliat

s.

Boutin, in 1967, could not oppose a renomination

carried such heavy overtones of loyalty to the President.

By the time Boutin arrived in New Hampshire he was fully committed to
a

unity campaign that was designed to prompt allegiance to the renomination

of the President,

The pyramid of interlocking campaign leaders would be

vertically pledged to the support of the President in the same fashion that
Boutin himself was pledged to the political operation of the White House.
Those not supporting the renomination organization would, by implication,
be excluded from the rewards following the re-election.

The organization

of the New Hampshire Democratic Party and the loyalists of the major

elected officials would be unified as one structure.

There would be no

room in Boutin's campaign concept for anything but total loyalty both to

Johnson and to the policies of the administration.

Nev-;

Hampshire Democrats:

Traditions and Ethos

Boutin had been away .from New Hampshire politics for more than seven
years when he returned in the Spring of 1967.

He had lost hJs sensitivity
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in

the political

climale of New llampsliire

.

U

seemed that Boutin tliought

the politics oithe nation had shifted to the
model of the Texas White House,

and that allegiance to the Wiite House and the
Johnson-dominated party

could overpower New Hampshire political traditions of
individuality and

independence.

The campaign that Boutin began to implement for President

Johnson was not one that was in keeping with New Hampshire's
political
traditions.

It

is from this

beginning that the critical weakness of the

New Hampshire Jolnison renomination

It

might appear obvious that

experience would outline

a

a

effort was revealed.

person with Boutin's New Hampshire

campaign responsive to that experience.

fact that may well have been what Boutin did recommend.

In

His experiences with

New Hampshire's state primaries and with disorganization of the maverick
Kefauver efforts of 1952 and 1956 led him to admire the tight organization
of the 1960 John F. Kennedy candidacy.

Boutin's own involvement in the

revltalization of the New Hampshire Democratic Party was closely tied to
the objective of organizing the nomination of a viable Democratic candidate
for governor.

Such success meant that agressive campaigning

an:l

thorough

organization were necessary to pull the strong candidate through the primary
and on to election.

Too often in the past straw candidates and weak candidates closely
tied to the Republican opposition had manipulated the state primary.

ethnic blocs of Democratic voters

played against each other.

wlio

VJeak and

The

voted in the state primaries were
often unknown candidates with appropriate

ethnic surnames were filed to dissipate ethnic voting strengtli that was
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noe^led

lo

nonun.Uo sLroni^ Deumcratic Party candidates.

uo;'cn na.iios were

a

listed on the Democratic primary ballot
offering au

assortment of French^Cnnad ian and Irish surnames.

nominee who

Often, half

Not infrequently the

was produced from such a crowd of candidates
disappeared from

political activity after receiving the nomination.
v7ould go on to win an almost

The Republican candidate

uncontested election.

Boutin himself had been one of the rare Democrats to
survive the process with his candidacy in 1958.

Careful control of the candidate filings,

elimination of straw candidates by demanding adherence to state law
regarding the authenticity of candidacies, and thorough organization gave
Boutin the 1958 gubernatorial nomination by
or 35,391 Democratic primary votes cast.

a

narrow margin of 3,863 out

He went on to run the best race

a Democrat had run against the Republican nominee in over twenty years.

Boutin lost by a mere 6,835 votes out of 206,745 cast.

To Boutin,

therefore, primaries were hazardous affairs.

the desired results, a tight organization would be necessary.

To accomplish

divisive

minorities and vote sapping straw candidates were to be avoided as had been
accomplished in Boutin's 1958 Democratic reform candidacy.

The O pen Pr imary Tradition
There is, however, an important other side to the story.
a state with a long and

engrained primary election tradition.

New Hampshire is
That tradition

has produced a widely accepted ethic regarding the open selection of candidates
that has endured (lespil(; the abuses that ethic was subjected to by some in
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the Republican majority.

During the era of the leadership of Governor
and

then United States Senator, Stylos Bridges, the
nomination of both Republican

candidates and Democratic opponents for major offiecs
were regulated through
his office.

The Democratic primary was carefully orchestrated to
produce

on]y nominal opposition while the Republican primary was
structured to prevent divisive internecine warfare.

During the period from the middle 1930'
a second

varible entered the scene.

to Bridges'

s

death in 1961,

A progressive Republican newspaper, the

Manchester Union Lead er, changed ownership.

William Loeb, the son of Presi-

dent Theodore Roosevelt's secretary, acquired the newspaper from the widow of

Frank Knox, former Secretary of the Navy under President Franklin Roosevelt,
and a former Republican vice-presidential candidate.

As a result, the

editorial tone of the newspaper changed from that of progressive Repub-

licanism to one of virilent conservatism.

The newspaper became an ardent

supporter of Styles Bridges and followed Bridges in his anti-communist
foray into both domestic and foreign policy.

3

Although Bridges exerted considerable influence at the national level
as a result of his leadership positions in Congress, he had not been parti-

cularly

concerned about the progressive Republican bent of the party's

leadership in

Nev;

Hampshire's internal affairs.

VTlien

Loeb entered the scene

he found the liberalism of the University of New Hampshire as a manifestation
of a social and political "softness" that

Concord.

eminated

from the Capitol in

To sell papers and to sell his philosophy, Loeb began to find and

promote candidates for

st.'V^c

office who

were more to his liking.

Loeb's
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basic tacCic, however was to create coiuroversy

Loeb's power In New Hainpslrire rests on his ability
to use his newspaper
to generate controversy that causes some reaction
from the politically

active public.

The tactic is simply one that takes situations,
issues,

groups or individuals and casts on their behavior in either

unfavorable light.

a

favorable or

Those persons and views that Loeb favors are contrasted

with those which he dislikes.

Eventually sufficient controversy revolves

around the situation to either polarize the public's view and to isolate
and, thereby, destroy the effectiveness of the person or the political

usefulness of the issue.

Loeb succeeds in this behavior because New Hampshire does not have

statewide media alternatives to his newspaper.

As he builds his case the

other side, the side that might present and legitimize the opposite view,
is not presented.

To the populace the adage that "Where there is smoke

there is fire" aids Loeb in his effort to politically polarize issues and

isolate through controversy those he dislikes.

Wlicn

Loeb found that he could not penetrate the power structure of the

State Republican Party
tactics, or

liis

Vi/it.h

liis

Conservative philosophy, his bully-boy

alliance with Senator Bridges, he began to chip away at the
To overcome the hazards of

Republican organization with his editorials.

internecine primary contests, the state Republican leadership had organized
to prevent party-destroying primary conflicts

informal mechanism were

a grouj) of

In the capitol city of Concord.

.

The controllers of this

party leaders almost exclusively located

This group had ruled the Republican Party
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t

Pron. esslves.

o im or,ress 1 vc
Jn

l

trad

i

L

ion since the days of

acL many of Llu.se in positions of

1

t

he Bull. Moose

oacI(M-sl,

i

,>

,

formal and

Informal, were descendents of the state's progressive
leadersliip.

obicetcd to the leadership's progressive philosophy.
in defeating Loch's candidate,

I,oe.b

After their success

Senator Robert A. Taft, in the 1952

Nev,7

Hampshire Presidential Primary, Locb hvy.im his attack in earnest
against
wliat

he labeled as

"Concord Gang."

tlu>

The attack focused heavily on the mechanisms that the Republican Party
leadersliip exercised to maintain control.

The key to this control was for

the leadership to elect the strongest potential nominee for the office of

Governor and then to organize the party to support that person with
primary endorsements and praise.

Not falling in step behind the leadership

Implied the opposite as retribution

access to its

— loss

of the governorship and loss of

perquisites.

Since Locb found

candidates

])re-

who

tlie

"Concoird Gang" impenetrable and the moderate

it generated unresponsive co his brand of Republicanism

he began to attack the "Gang" and their tactics of candidate selection and
pre-prir.iary endorsement.

In fact,

on several occasions and out of frustration,

Loeb endorsed and editorially supi)orted candidates of the Democratic Party
V\'ho

were more in keeping with hi

s

ant i-comnnmist:

,

anti-tax, and anti-public

support of social services positions.

Loeb's attack took

election contests.
elections,

a

Fo

I

he

form of re-defining the ethics of primary

him and to the

f

ramers of

th.e

theory of primary

primary was to be an open iirocess unencumbered by the intrusions
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of vested p;n-|y interests.

l.oel,

objected to pre~prtmary endorsements by

party committees or major party officials such as
county chairman, state

committee members, or state party officers.

He objected to the expenditure

of party funds to support the primary candidacies
of those endorsed prior
to primary elections.

He especially objected to efforts by party leaders

to march the rank and file membership of the party
to the polls to vote for

the endorsed can(iidate.

Although Loeb's motives may have been questionable, his tactic touched
an old and responsive nerve in the New Hampshire body politic.

The reforms

of the progressives that led to the enactment of the primary legislation

were founded on the same principles as those which

I.oeb

had begun to espouse.

Pclir.ics prior to the adoption of the primary system had been closed and

dominated by powerful railroad, banking, timber and industrial interests.

These interests selected the major candidates for public office, bought the
legislature and manipulated the conditions of electoral politics.

The early

Twentieth Century reforms the progressives legislated in coalition with
popu.iist Democrats,

had sprung from a perverse, corrupt and exploitative

political environment.

Enacting primary election laws and legislating

the structure of the party organizations had established an ethic of an

open party process and individual citizen participation in the selection
of party candidates.

By reaffirming his commitment to the basic concept

of an open primary Loeh simply reaffirmed and revitalized an ethic that had

not been restated for more than a generation.
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Loeb's motive was to strip away from the
-Concord

Can,>"

the rcspcctabilUy

that shrouded their successful efforts to
regulate the candidate product of
the primary.

Loeb hoped that by forcing the party leadership
to stand back

from primaries and by generating legitimate contests
between candidates,

eventually a person of his liking would win the Republican
Party nomination
and go on to be elected Governor.

By 1958 Loeb was successful.

His candidate

for the Republican nomination for Governor, Wesley
Powell, won the primary

and went on to a narrow victory over Bernard L. Boutin the
Democratic Party
nom1 nee

At the same time that Loeb was struggling to open the candidate selection

process of the Republican Party, he was also looking askance at the Democratic
Party.

In its quest to produce a viable nominee,

the reformers of the

Democratic Party sought to control the primary elections much as had the
"Concord Gang" of the Republican Party,
the Democratic Party in 1956,
the party in order.

Following the minor revolution within

the new and liberal leadersliip began to put

To do this required an organizational effort from the

Democratic leadership to pull

a

strong candidate through the state primary.

In the face of this effort even the slightest aroma of pre-primary organization

for a specific candidate by the party leaders brought down the wrath of

Loeb's editorials on the reformist Democrats.

Since in this case the ends justified the organizational means, in
1958 the reform leadership of the Democratic Party was willing to suffer
tlic

bolts from Loeb's pen in order to secure, through party leadership, the

nomination of the strongest candidate, Bernard
v;as

tlie

L.

Boutin.

Although Boutin

beneficiary of the pre-primary organization and, as such, appreciated

the value of a thorougli effort, tliere was a tendency not to appreciate the
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the sancLity of

the-

opon primary that Loeb

vvay

rc-establlshinv;.

When )5outin

and others of the reform leadership sought to
regulate in a similar way
the campaign for John F. Kennedy, in 1960 New Hampshire
Presidential Primary,

Loeb renewed his assault on tliese Democratic party
leaders.

What Boutin failed to recognize, when he returned to New Hampshire
in
the spring of 1967, was that Loeb had been successful.

been restored.

Primaries were intra-party contests.

The old ethic had

Office-holders of the

party, the party's organization, and the party's treasury were not to be

used to support particular candidates in the primaries.

The strong sense

of fair-play fostered by the chipping process of the Manchester Union Leader

now required that the primaries be open.

Individuals should be encouraged

to participate not by threats, but through an individual desire to respond
to the call of a candidate.

Pressure might be applied to party leaders,

public office-holders, and those needing access to those in power, but such

pressure could not be applied to the mass of a party's membership.

Simply stated, the ethic which the Loeb attacks had revived drew on
the positive attributes that had been ingrained in New Hampshire:

democracy and open political decision-making.

participatory

The premises of this primary

election ethic required the neutrality of party officials during

tlie

primary

contests, the neutrality of the formal committee structure of the party, equal

access to the mechanisms of the party for all candidates, no endorsements
and no funds diverted from party accounts for primary election campaigns.

The

primary was to be an open intra-party contest fought in a manner that would
give no participant a special advantage.

The end being

that after the primary
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the part:y could unite behind the victor.

1-inht:

votes became diflieult to deliver.

The links

As a result of tl,ese premises,
ti>at

had held the Republican

Party together and out of bitter primary fights
disintegrated.

The old re-

formers in the Democratic Party like Boutin began to
feel the sting of the

primary election ethic as they made plans for the renomination
campaign of
President Johnson.

On his return to New Hampshire, Boutin would find
a voting

population that now knew something about primary election ethics.

Loeb's

fair play doctrine, together with several vigorous primary
contests, had

drawn more voters into primary election activity than ever before.

Parti-

cipation, however, was not on the basis of blocs of votes to be delivered
by endorsements from the leadership, but rather, as the result of much

individual decision-making and ad hoc organization.

The Boutin model for

the Johnson New Hampshire primary campaign in 1968, was developed out of his

earlier New Hampshire experiences and his activities outside New Hampshire

while serving the Johnson administration in Washington.

Attempting a

campaign based on those experiences would run contrary to the independent
mood and the primary election ethic now established in Boutin's home state.

The Johnson Campaign Materializes;

Strategy and Co u nter Strategy

From the earliest stage of the Johnson effort in New Ham.pshire there

were rumblings:

first, was there a mysterious man from Washington who had

come to New Hampshire to run the campaign;

second, liow much money had the

Johnson leaders imported to New Hampshire to spend on the campaign; and
tliird,

when would the "heavies" arrive from Texas and Washington to take over

Boutin's operation?

These questions

\-jcre

generated partly by the press and

partly by tliose already upset witli Boutin's strategy of regimenting the
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Party

ic

rln-ou,,h cnulorse.nents of

Johnson.

In reaction,

Boutin

stated a policy that the effort on behalf
of the President would be "home
grown" and "ho,.e financed" and that its
organization, leadership, strategy,
and funding would be the responsibility of
New Hampshire people.^

The vote

in the New Hampshire presidential primary
would be an expression of New

Hampshire gratitude for the accomplishments of President
Johnson,

a gift

to

the President.

By reacting this way, Boutin had again violated an
essential political

ethos.

was obvious that if he and his committee were that concerned
about

It

the impact of outside money, personnel and ideas there had
to be something
to fear.

The reporters and numerous political observers could not all be

wrong about the heavy-handedness of Lyndon Johnson's domestic politics.
Boutin, again, was on the defensive, a position the McCarthy leadership hoped
to nurture.

Tiiey

challenged the use of Democratic State Committee funds

for Johnson renomination activities and hinted that they expected that

large amounts of money smelling strongly of Texas crude oil would start

appearing in the state.

They intimated that they were expectin;, plane

loads of noisy. Stetson-hatted Texans to start appearing at the local airport
and in the local Johnson headquarters.

Both the local and the national

reporters maintained a continuous search for the money and the hats, which
had the effect of keeping both from appearing.

Boutin's only source of manpower, therefore, was that available from
inside

Nev;

Hampshire or through a loan of office staff by Governor King and

Senator McTntyre.

The only source of money for Boutin's effort was to

186

he the New Iknnpshl. c Don.ocral:

I

c

Party's minlsculo cuffers, the pockets
of

Its sustaining contributors and tliose
wl,o could be convinced that
they had

better contribute

if

they wished to maintain favorable
relations with the

sure-to-be re-elected President.

On the other hand,

Hampshire rules.

the McCarthy campaign could play by the usual
New

The money would be imported.

The national campaign office

was expected to provide most of the campaign materials
and media resources
for the effort.
a

Stretching the ethos slightly, they expected to attract

number of outside v^orkers to assist in the actual operation of
the campaign.

Most of this was traditional, seen as good for local business,
and the

campaign's contribution to New Hampshire'

s

econoniy.

There was, of course, a

risk in this strategy, especially when it came to importing volunteers
and

campaign operatives, but for the McCarthy leadership there was no real choice.

If Johnson was to be the issue in New Hampshire the question was asked,

"Why didn't the President allow his name to be on the New Hampshire primary

bailor?"

Boutin answered this in an UPI interview

\s?hen

be a question of equal time on every statement he made.

impossible for him to conduct his office.

"

he said, "It would
It would be just

Boutin then added that he

expected up to 50,000 Democrats to vote and "if he gets 60 or 70 percent of
that he is doing a fantastic job, realizing that on the one hand you have

McCarthy's name on the ballot, and on the other, you write in for President
Johnson.

Just the logistics make it much more difficult for President Johnson,

Johnson would not enter but he would not duck either.
the hands of his political surrogates in Washington

iind

His fate was placed in

New Hampshire.

.1.87

Thoro would

|H>

no lime for politics in the public stmice
of his administralion

during the primary contests nhead-at least as
far as his personal involvement
was concerned.

The polls assured him that his direct participation
would

not be necessary.

Bernard Routin, however, held an important card that the
McCarthy leaders

discovered early in their preliminary planning.

In the name of the Democratic

State Committee, Boutin had blocked, by reservation, the largest
hall in the
state,

the Manchester Armory, for the Thursday, Friday and Saturday evening

of March 6,

7,

and 8.

He would be able to hold this space until a specified

period, approximately 10 days prior to the actual reserved date.
was, how would this space be used?

The question

Would the President be brought out of his

non-participation stance, fly to Mancliester and attempt a dramatic re-creation
of his successful I96h visit?

Or was the reservation just good strategy

on Boutin's part to prevent the Republicans from staging their own political

spectacular, thus completely shutting out
of the New Hampshire primary?

McCarthy forces' tactical joust
aspects of the contest.

tlie

Democrats in the last moments

This would be just the beginning of the
w..th the

Johnson people, but it revealed two

The first was that there would be direct con-

frontation between the campaigns supporting the opposing candidates.
second was a mutual awareness that this was not the ultimate fight.

The

The

ultimate fight was still the one that would pit the nominees of the two
parties against each other in the November election.

As both were Democrats,

the Johnson and McCarthy leadc>rs were constantly looking over their shoulders
to see what was happen irig among the Republicans.
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a

(lie

McC/.rCliy c.nuouncomont also

the important numhers game.

revealed the

Would 60 percent be enough for

Johnson victory or would the result have to be 70
percent in order for

Boutin to claim victory?

mean

a

McCarthy defeat?

mean a "victory?"

What would be the percent of the vote that would

Would more than

5

percent but less than 10 percent

On both sides optimism was necessary in order to
reinforce

efforts at that early stage of the campaign.

Boutin was leading from strength.

He had determined that a posture of invincibility was necessary
to create the

Imnression of a self-fulfilling prophecy of victory while at the
same time

making those who questioned the prophecy seem foolish.

On the other hand,

if the McCarthy strategy had been to talk only in terms of miniscule
per-

centages his leaders would
and raising funds.

liave h.ad

considerable difficulty recruiting workers

The "real" politicians had to sound the call of reasonable

battle, not suicide.

Boutin's error, initially, was
He fell into his own confidence gap.

tliat

he sought to overpower with rhetoric.

Instead of being more modest in his

predictions he tended to project absolute certitude in his high projections.
Less optimistic language that described the maverick traditions of the New

Hampshire Democrats, the difficulty of write-in elections, tied to

tlie

usual

criteria of an elector>-ll "win" of 50 percent plus one vote would have put
Boutin and his candidate in a more defensible position.

Starting with a

"wJn" projection of 60 to 70 i)ercent meant that Boutin had almost nowhere
to go but down.
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To add more onerny to the conr.csu
ca,npai^;n^ was the uso oC

Johnson campaign.

bc.tv>;cen

Llie

Johnson and McCarlhy

Democratic State Committee funds to support
the

Having secured the party's endorsement and
then having

converted the Party organization into the campaign
committee for Johnson, the
Now Hampshire primary ethos of party neutrality
had been fully raised.

At

the McCarthy announcement press conference, D. Frank
O'Neil of the Manchester
Unix|n

Leader asked Hoeh a question concerning the use of the Democratic

Party's funds to run the Johnson campaign.

His newspaper had seen the intra-

party contest between Johnson and McCarthy as an excellent
chance to renew
their assault on the practice of pre-primary endorsements.

The article

recounting Hoeh's reply read:
The decision of the Democratic State Committee to use party
funds to support the "Citizens-f or-Johnson" effort in the
New Hampshire presidential primary vzas under fire from a
second wing of the party yesterday.
(The first "wing" being
Eugene Daniell.)
David C. Hoeh of Hanover, state chairman of the McCarthyf or-President steering committee, told his press conference
at the State House that 'a lot of Democrats are distressed'
by this move on the part of the official party organization.
'Personally, 1 had my name on a $1,000 note for the State
Committee not too many months ago. It's probably spent now.
But I certainly v>7ouldn't like to think this was' being used
for the Johnson primary campaign.
Neither would some other
Democrats who are members of the 100 Club.'

Asked if this could have a serious effect on party efforts
in this state after the primary, Hoeh expressed the opinion
that it would Miave a bad effect' on fund-raising 'later on.'
By opening

tlie

^

issue of the use of party funds, the McCarthy leaders

were further placing the Johnson effort on the defensive.

The press would

be watching for reports of heavy media purchase, billboard reservations or

other evidence of large amounts of money being available to Johnson's
campaign.

Boutin was already sensitive to this concern and was, publicly
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t:o

larj^e oxl ont

in N»-w Hampshire.

pi

ivaLoly, operating on funds generaLed intornally

Hoeh's charge now

uiadc

Committee funds equally controversial.

the use of Democratic State

Boutin would have to run a con-

servative campaign, even if extensive funding were available.

He certainly

could not obligate the Democratic Party of New Hampshire to additional

borrowing while

considerable debt still remained to be repaid as a result

a

of the 1966 campaigns.

probably spend

"ar.

Hoeh had reported that the McCarthy campaign would

least $50,000" in the primary and knew that almost all

of tliat amount would have to come from outside of the state.

Because of

the presidential primary tradition, Hoeh knew that criticism concerning

the external-to-Ne.w Hampshire source of that money would be insignificant.

After all, the McCarthy leaders speculated, what power did Senator McCarthy
and his supporters have in the face of the full force of the President and

his administration?

Draft R.F.K. Reactions

McCarthy's announcement took P2ugene Daniell by surprise as well.
the rest of the nation, Daniell thought that McCarthy would

by-,. ass

Like

New

Hampshire when the RFK organization deadline of December 28th came and passec
Again, Daniell, not one to keep in close touch with his associates, did not

realize that many of

liis

best potential workers were holding back in hopes

that McCarthy would enter New Hampshire.

moves of Daniell

's

organization wore uncertain but "most observers believe

Daniell wilJ continue undaunted."
contest with
a writ(>-in

tlie

Press reaction was that the future

Daniell was in the midst of his court

New Hampshire Attorney General concerning

tlie

legality of

campaign and had not really considered his options if McCarthy

actu.-tliy entered.

Revealing this condition he said "Whatever we do is up

19:

l:o

our ev.eculi.ve conm.UUe.

doJegates.

Hut.

T

know

tliat

Vs-e

wil]

continue with a slate of

The second committee— tlie RFK write-in committee—
will probably

run a write-in effort'.' 9

Danioll reported that he admired McCarthy but that he still
believed
that Robert Kennedy was "the best man for the Job of President

^

°

Daniell

appeared to be weakening under the pressure of his legal battle, a
dissolving

campaign organization, the limitation that his committee was placing on his
own political style and the organizational success of the McCarthy Steering

Committee.

Kis reference to a "slate of RFK delegates" did give the McCarthy

leaders pause.

They had not considered seriously the issue of delegates

before the announcement press conference.

Daniell 's emphasis on the delegate

selection issue made them begin to consider what their interest might be in
the selection of the delegates and, more importantly, what Daniell 's interest
was.

Was it possible that Daniell,

a

previous delegate to several Democratic

conventions, was at least as interested in being a delegate as he was in

pursuing a R.F.K Draft?

weeks ahead.

This would be a question that would reemerge in the

At this time, however,

it seemed

desirable for the McCarthy

leaders to make only oblique, usually complimentary, references to Daniell in

order to avoid a confrontation with him.

As long as Daniell was attacking

the Jolinson organization and raising the more radical of the anti-war charges,
the McCarthy organization benefited by appearing to be

especially

tlie

New Hampshire.

tlie

more reasonable,

more moderate, of the two anti-administration movements in

192

N otes

^Shortly after the 1968 election Boutin left his Sanders Associates job
to become the President of his alma mater, St. Michaels College, Winooski,

Vermon t
2
Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, and Dv;ight D.
Eisenhower avoided decarling their respective renomination candidacies in
the pre-nominating convention primaries.
Party surrogates in the respective
states maiiaged their affairs keeping the incumbent presidents out of such
politics.

^Cash, K.

,

Op.Cit.

^Churchill, V/inston, Coniston

j

(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1906).

^An August 1967 conversation between Bernard Boutin and Sandra U. Hoeh
reported
as
by Sandra U. hoeh.

%nlon L eader (January

4,

1968).

7 Ibid.

^The Boston Globe
^ibid.

lOlbid.

(Ja7.1uc.ry

4,

1968).
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THE llEPUliLICAJ^S

R^.P"M.^cans an d the McCarthy Campaig n
In their December 22nd memorandum to McCarthy, Hoeh and Studds had

suggested:

We are encouraged about the possibility of a write-in effort
for Senator McCa r thy on the Republican ballot (particularly
given the number of Republicans who were willing to change
their registration this month even though Sen. McCarthy was
not yet a candidate in New Hampshire.)
At their first organization meeting after McCarthy announced entry in
the New Hampshire primary,

the Steering Committee decided not to overtly

campaign for either Republican write-in votes or to attract Republican

workers away from those campaigning in New Hampshire for the Republican
nomination.

This decision was based on the New Hampshire political ethic

that one should not muddy another party's pond

—

an ethic v;hlch was

especially revered by those who led the McCarthy campaign. Initially, there

were two major Republican campaigns.

Former Vice President Richard M.

Nixon was engaged in what many observers felt was a "do-or-die" effort to
erase the loser's image which he had acquired after his loss to John F.

subsequent defeat in the gubernatorial campaign of

Kennedy in 1960, and

a

1962 in California.

His principal opponent was then Governor of Michigan,

George Romney.

Both saw New Hampshire as the first Important test and had

spent great time, money, and effort preparing for the contest.

In the wings

New York, Nelson
were two other prominent political figures, the Governor of

Cambridge based
Rockefeller, and former General then head of the prominent

consulting firm of Arthur

D.

Little and Associates, James Gavin.

Harold

ultimately filed on the
Stassen and a clutch of lesser know individuals
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Republican ballot.

—

Jncluding one

iiian

named Herbert Hoover.

Prelude

From the beginning, New Hamprshire looked like an important
bat.Lleground
for the Republican Party.

stroll to renomination.

Observers

assumed

that President Johnson would

But increasing anti-administration feeling, wliether

focussed on the war policy or other aspects of the administration's record,

meant that the nominee of the Republican Party had a chance to defeat the
incumbent President,

Each candidate approached New Hampshire as if engaged

in an artful form of courtship.

Neither Romney nor Nixon wished to be

tainted by previous negative New Hampshire experiences nor to reeuforce

negative perceptions of their current candidacies.

The courtship took as

its first phase attracting supporters to lead their New Hampshire efforts.

First there was a scurrying among those who wanted leadership positions
in the respective campaigns for their oi-m purposes and to be with a "winner"

early in the presidential season.

Then there was the courting of those who

were seen by the candidates as having valuable political skills and/or
followings which would assist the candidates.

Elach step

revealed something

of the image which the candidates wished to project and the style of their

subsequent campaigns.

Nixon, wanting to avoid

tlie

trap which had befallen Goldwater in 1964,

carefully avoided re-establishing his ties with many of New Hampshire's
prominent conservatives and supporters from his other campaigns.

He selected

as his state chairman a young, recently elected state representative from

Hillsborough named David Sterling.

The appointment lent freshness and energy
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l

re-treaded loser.

Tlirouj'.h

wlvich was a direct attempt

to bury Nixon's imap.c as a

the appointiiiont of Sterling Nixon's managers had

succeeded in avoiding being labelled through association with controversial

New Harapsliire figures like Wesley Powell or the taciturn former Speaker of
the New Hampshire General Court Stewart Lamprey.

The new Nixon was alive,

even vital, as projected through the activity of his young, sports car

driving, attorney, popular state representative chairman.

were

tVie

Behind the facade

same grey politicos but to the public the image was comfortably

contemporary

Romney relied heavily on his ties with Governor Rockefeller in his
search for a New Hampshire campaign group.

To many Romney appeared as the

fresh face in the crowd and the one who could most effectively take on

President Johnson in November.

He had taken positions in opposition to the

administration's war policy and had attracted coiisiderable support from the
establishment dissenters in the Republican Party.

Romney was viewed as

a

Republican liberal and attracted as New Hampshire supporters many descendants
of the New Hampshire progressives.
R.

Romney selected as his chairman VJilliam

Johnson, an attorney, member of the State Senate, and recognized leader of

the Republican liberals.

Johnson saw in the Romney candidacy

further his own career through

a

a

chance to

successful Romney campaign in New Hampshire.

Johnson inherited as his organization those local supporters and friends of
Nelson Rockefeller who had campaigned for the

I96^i

nomination, also a

war polici
sizable group who saw Romney as the only viable alternative to the
of Lyndon Johnson's administration.
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i-oporLed under

XPJIK

on November 5,

1967.

in Koene and Coos

Clie

hcndUnc "Presidential Warm-Up"

that "tlie political lines in Manchester and Hanover,

County

(sic) are being dra\^T unusually early this year.

The huge "Nixon for President" banner was up on the south end
of the New

Hampshire Highway Hotel outside Concord, where the Rockefeller bunting
hung
in

196'^,

by mid-October.

"David Sterling.

..

quotes a straw poll that gives the former Vice-Presi-

dent 59 per cent. Governor Reagan 16, Governor Rockefeller of New York 12 and

Governor Romney

6.

"Hard by the gilt-domed colonial Capitol downtown there was an operating

Romney headquarters and a dark untenanted second-floor room that purported
to be the action center of a write-in campaign for Gov. Ronald Reagan of

California.

"Romney spent three days in and out of New Hampshire a week ago, his
"^

first real politiclcing there...

This to the press and most observers would be the main event in New
Hampshiie.

The press follov;ed each campaign closely as the respective

strategies unravelled.

Each campaign had been carefully planned long in advance.

The major

strategies, organizaLlcnal tactics, and logistics were the products of long

periods

of

detailed preparation that had occurred outside of New Hampshire.

Only when the primary season was about to open did the candidates bring
their campaign
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plans to New llamp.UWro. Behind

t.iie

scenes were professional manaj^ers with

extensive experience in political campaign management, media,
scheduling,

promotion and organization.

A manual of operations had been written which

spelled out each detail of the strategy.

The professional managers were

there to guide the local leaders, and to regulate all of the movements
of the

candidate and the organization.
the stage,

New Hampshire was providing the theatre,

the audience and some ushers.

The production was the first stop

of a complete campaign roadshow for both Nixon and Romney.

Nixon in New Hampshire 1968
Nixon had always done well in

Nev;

Hampshire and his nomination organ-

ization fell quickly in step behind the New Hampshire and national leadership
he had selected.

The New Hanipshire local supi)orters knew exactly where

the votes were that had gone to Nixon in the past and were ready to dust off these

votes for

hira

again in 1968.

The media effort became the most prominent part of the Nixon campaign.

Billboards stating "Nixon's the Ore" with the candidate peering into an open
attache case sprang up all over New Hampshire.

Nixon surrogates campaigned

extensively for him in the small towns and exurban neighborhoods where the

Republican vote was scattered.

Nixon's few visits were carefully orchestrated

appearances where the semblance of access and informality were conveyed to
the public, but actual contact with him was totally managed.

On February 1st,

a page one advertisement announced Nixon's campaign beginning with an Open

House
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On

t

he next day Wi

l

l

iam Loob pub] isliod one

editorials endorsing Richard Nixon's candidacy.

oi:

his ramous page one signed

The story that appeared

under a posed photo of Nixon and his family showed how the Union
Leader would

campaign in New Hampshire.
Nixon, no stranger to the New Hampshire hustings, will fire
his opening guns at a noon press conference today at the
Holiday Inn at Manchester, and will remain in the state for
the remainder of the weekend.

Highlight of his first campaign swing will be Saturday night's
testimonial dinner... in Concord where a capacity crowd is
assured for the convention hall. The hall has a capacity
of close to 1,200.
The former presidential standard bearer of the Republican
Party --- he lost out in a "squeaker" to President John F.
Kennedy in 1960
will be accompanied to New Hampshire
by his wife, "Pat" and his two daughters, "Tricia" and Julie....

—

This afternoon from 5 to 7 p.m. the Nixons will be hosts at
a reception for the New Hampshire press and their families
at the N.H. Highway Hotel.
This is billed by the Nixon
committee as a "non news-making" event. There will be no
speeches or press conference at this time.
On Saturday the Nixon family will return to Manchester for
a two-hour public reception at St. Anselm's College, Goffstown,
just outside Manchester.
This will take place from 1:30 to
3:30 p.m.
v?ill go back to the N.H. Highway Hotel in Concor-.i late
Saturd-ay afternoon to prepare for the 7 p.m. Nixon-forProsident dinner at the hotel's convention hall.

They

The former Vice President will stay overnight at the hotel
and is expected to remain there m.ost of Sunday working on
future plans for his campaigning in the Granite State.

There are no public events on Sunday.

Monday morning the party will leave for Manchester where
Nixon is slated to take-off for^Green Bay, Wisconsin and
more campaigning, at 11:50 a.m.
With that kind of press coverage, a background of vigorous earlier

campaigns in New Hampsliire, well covered visits from other members of the
family and surrogates, Nixon needed little else to maintain
a

vigorous contest in the state.

tlie

appearance

199
Tn his short

the

Linage of

ihvcc

clay

c.-nnpainn sv^ing in

an accessible, human,

New Hampshire, Nixon convoyod

thoughtful, yet hard working candidate.

His schedule had been carefully developed to present each
of these facets
and to counter lingering doubts as to his capacity to win
a rough campaign
fight.

Unien

Nixon left New Hampshire that Monday morning, he left behind

clear image of a mature and effective campaigner.

a

Althougli time for a

possible return visit to New Hampshire was reserved in his schedule, Nixon
did not campaign again

—

it was not necessary.

Radio and television

commercials, surrogate campaigners, newspaper advertising, Loeb's aggressive
support and a carefully organized mailing effort carried the campaign for
He was off to more difficult states with the assurance of a percentage

him.
pi

ayer

Romney in

Nevj

Hampshire 1968

Governor George Romney of Michigan, opened his New Hampshire campaign
drive first.

He hired as his campaign planners the

tv;o

persons who had

organized the Henry Cabot Lodge write-in during the 1964 New Hampshire Primary,
John D. Deardourff and David

B.

Goldberg.

Following their surprise success

in 1964, Deardourff and Goldberg had formed a consulting firm named Campaign

Consultants Inc.

Tom Henshaw wrote for the Sunday Herald Traveler

:

The hottest new item on the political shelf in this
presidential year of 1968 is the professional consulting firm wnlch, for a flat fee, will show an
aspiring mayor, governor or even president how Imst to
run his campaign.
CCI specialized in Republican campaigns and had had some successes and

losses but in the process had established a reputation for being effective.
The firm had turned down an offer from Richard Nixon earlier and began working
on the Romney campaign in February
ganli-.ation

1967.'''

They assembled a campaign or-

for New Hampshire which tied back to Romney 's national campaign.
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v;.-re

a

nuir.bor

of campai gnors who had had close tics

either to Nelson Rockeleller directly, to roles in
his administration in

New York State or to liberal Republican candidates
such as John l.indsey,
then

a

Republican and Mayor of

To give Romney

a

tlie

City of New York.

special and early boost in his New Hampshire campaign,

Governor Rockefeller and Governor John Chafee or Rhode Island, came to
New

Hampshire January

2

to meet with New Hampshire Romney supporters and to give

the effort their full support.

In addition to giving Romney support,

the

visit was designed to end contentions that Rockefeller would become a candidate.

In commenting on this, Romney's chairman, William Johnson said, "I

think the people who attended the meeting are convinced that Gov. Rockefeller
is not a candidate and will support Romney."^

the article was the paragraph;

Preceding Johnson's comments

ii

"Rockefeller's appearance in New Hampshire ha

been interpreted by some political observers as

a

move by the Romney campaign

organization to drum support for the flagging Romney primary effort."
Even with the extensive re-planning and methodical organizational effort, the

Romney campaign had not attracted the broad interest it needed in order to
confront Nixon effectively.

With Rockefeller fully in support of Romney and Romney identified as
the ultimate hope of

tlie

moderates of

tlie

Republican Party, the campaign's

managers felt that the Romney energy and personality would attract the suppor
The next step in the plan called for Romney to blitz New Hampsliire in a six
day campaign visit.
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The Ma nchcs uor Union Leader paid special

early weeks.

a

L

Lent: ion

to Romnoy

In

these

Columnist D. Frank O'Neill wrote:

In this case

(referring to the Lodge write-in of 196A)
Republicans voters for Lodge) were "snowedunder" by a cleverly-managed public relations campaign,
one that was master-minded by a couple of people who are
now trying to sell the same "soap-suds" t^pe of campaign
on behaJ.f of Governor Romney of Michigan.
tliey

(N.ll.

Romney's anti-administration position on the war in Vietnam gave the
Union Leader a special opportunity to criticize Romney while he was engaged
in his dawn to dark effort to woo Republican voters.

In a famous visit to

Vietnam Romney had returned as a supporter of the war effort.

Later he

changed his position stating that he felt he had been "brain washed" by the

Pentagon and the Vietnam-based military.
the implications of that phrase.

Romney was never quite able to shake

Many became skeptical of Romney's ability

to make soimd policy judgments and to keep from being swayed by advisors and

briefings.

Senator Eugene McCarthy when asked about Romney's "brainwashed"

statement said that he felt "brainwashed" was an overstatement.
v;as

"All that

needed in the case of George Romney was a light rinse.

The Manchester Union Leader felt that Romney was vulnerable among the

New Hampshire conservative Republicans on both his policy position on the war
and the implications of the "brainwashed" statement.

They also sensed that

the Romney leadership was having difficulty exciting interest in Romney.

Working with both feelings, the editors began to chip away at Romney.

Romney Deals Verbal Cut to Military Effort in Viet.
Headline:
Michigan Gov. George Romney yesterday dealt a
UPl
Concord:
verbal blow to the military in Vietnam while urging the U.S.
and other major powers increase efforts to achieve talks

—
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Front: of

Lho Saigon governiiieut and the National Llberalion

North Vietnam.

Republican presidential hopcfu] told a news conference
general feeling is we have relied tOohe^^vily on search
and destroy rather than clear and hold.'

Ttie

"ray

Romneys' campaign had been labelled a "peace crusade" which had stressed

"peace" and the need for "moral leadership."^

Such words, when placed in

the context of a M anchester Unio n Leader story, conveyed an image of weakness
if not actually traitorous inclinations.

The friendly press had trouble projecting a decisive image for Romney as
well.

The Concord Monitor ran a story headlined:

And Suddenly, Nelson Rocke-

feller ... ROMNEY BEGINS PRIMARY RID, CHALLENGES NIXON TO DEBATE.

The column

titles for the two stories that ran under the headline read, "Defeat Here

Might Bury Romney Bid" and "Candidate Issues Call for Morality."

One

article held out the hope that if Romney failed in New Hampshire this would
"signal, the entry of New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller."

with Romney 's challenge to Nixon to debate "on the issues",
that was never accepted

.

''^^

The other led
a

challenge

The theme of the Romney effort as reported by

the Concord Monit or would be a "new leadership of a new America to discover

the old morality."

From the beginning, the Romney campaign developed incredible problems.
First, they were unable to stimulate much interest.
that did evolve was carelessly managed.

Secondly, the organization

Thirdly, the press situation for

Romney was confusing and those items which the campaign thought would help
often backfired.

Fourthly, Romney himself was badly scheduled.

Instead of
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voters by

liir.

extensive cainpn J j>,n

,

familiarity seemed to breed contempt.

Because of Komney's campaign impact on tbc McCartby effort, it is
important
to recount some of

the details of Romney's New Hampshire failure.

The Romney Orf^anlzatlon

Each campaign tried to create an image for itself that was distinct.
One of the devices to show imagination and professionalism was to find new

ways to organize and attract supporters.

The Romney managers created the

idea of a series of "home headquarters" that would serve as local organizing

centers and provide identity for the candidate at the neighborhood, small
town level.

Opening these "headquarters"

x<;ould

give something for the candidate

to do in pi.aces where there was little opportunity for conventional campaigning

especially in the small towns where the Republican vote resided and during
the winter campaign season.
it had

An excellent concept, except to be successful

to be carefully done.

On his campaign travels Romney rode in a Winnebago vehicle which was

equipped as a headquarters and place to relax between stops.

'•'hen

scheduled

to come into a town an advance group of "Romney Girls," five Colby Junior

College students, all various shades of blonde, wearing red, white and blue

Romney mini dresses would arrive ahead of Romney and warm the audience
(usually in a home headquarters) with several Romney campaign songs.

.,11

On one of these campaign swings Romney logged more than 2,000 miles of small
town stops, plant gate and main street handshaking and home headquarters

openings

—
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The fault; with the "home headquarters"
tions was announced.

cau.e

when a list of these loca-

On the list were a number of
individuals who were not

active in his campaign.

In fact,

the McCarthy leaders screened
the list

carefully and found several active
McCarthy supporters who did have a
Rornney
"home headquarters" or any intention of
opening one,
January 18th Rornney announced that 25
headquarters had been established
In the Concord area, and that these
were the "first of 10,000 that will hope

fully be In existence before the Republican
National Convention next August.
In New Hampshire Rornney forces are nearlng
the end of an effort
to establish 500 home headquarters before
the March 12 primary
At last count, they had sevured more than
400, Rornney officials
said. -"-J

On January 20th, William Johnson began correcting,
publicly, the list of

"home headquarters" he had issued two days earlier.

The public relations

impact of the original announcement dimmed as the
inaccuracies of the list

were revealed.

As McCarthy leaders Hoch and Studds had noted in an organizational

meeting, the idea of the "home lieadquar ters" was good and they suggested
that the McCarthy Committee borrow the concept.

Those communities which

would not be able to find or support a storefront headquarters should be
organized around "home headquarters."

Volunteers would have a place to go,

literature could be distributed from the designated homes, and telephoning
for election day activity could be organized around the headquarters.

They would not, however, be used as Rornney had used them, as the focus of
his own local campaign stops.

took precedence.

For a Democratic candidate other activities

205

The Roiuney campaign schedule was a masterpiece
of how the campalGn

managers thought Romney could storm New Hampshire.
getic

o.nd

personally engaging.

He was known to

bo.

ener-

The managers wished to contrast his access-

ibility, constant energy, enthusiasm, and charisma with the
image of aloof
and impersonal Richard Nixon.

A typical schedule had Romney outside of a

factory greeting workers at 6:30 a.m., an 8:C0 a.m. breakfast
meeting/speech,

mid-morning home headquarters visits, a high school or college speech,
luncheon with

a

a noon

service club, more home headquarters meetings in the after-

noon, street campaigning, a radio interview, a meeting with a local news-

paper editor, perhaps a break from campaigning for dinner or

a

dinner speak-

ing engagement, and often a speech or meeting with workers in the evening.

The campaign day ended for him after 11:00 p.m.

again with the 6:30 a.m. plant gate handshaking.

The next morning began
For six days Romney kept

the sam.e pace.

The Roumey managers wasted their own candidate.

On his first campaign

day he stood outside of a Nashua factory in 20 degree below zero weather
rea:^hing for the hands of workers who were a bit puzzled to see a grown man

standing outside in the biting cold and darkness of the early New Hampshire dawn.

The hands he was reaching for were mostly those of Democrats.

Mixed in the schedule were what the managers felt were the required media
events.
on skis.

New Hampshire skis they thought, thus Romney should be photographed
He did not ski and appeared in a well circulated photograph

awkwardly trying to stand up on skis.

What his managers did not realize was
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that-

people, come Lo New Hampshire to sk

New Hampshire voters didn't.

i

,

hut

,i,ost

of Romney's potent Jal

Romncy, well, knovm for his Jogging, appeared

one afternoon in jogging shorts, sneakers and light shirt
ready to demo-

strate for the curious as well as the photographers along
Concord's

Victorian Main street, the jogging style that had become so well known.

For

some reason he had to wait in the cold for the event to be orchestrated,
lost nis temper, did jog, but the whole exercise lost its meaning,
if there

had been one.
v;as

Romney succeeded in reenforcing only one image and that

not one that lent any particular value to his campaign.

He was energetic

but perliaps it was true that he could be easily led by his managers and

"brainwashed."

He certainly did not cast an image either of identity with

the New Hampshire Republican voter or competence to be the next president
of the United States.

As the schedule proceeded, Romney began to tiro.
up Romney was upset.

Wien problems cropped

He was generally pleased with the response to his

candidacy he had met on the street, but as Governor King pointed out to
Senator McCarthy, "You will find that New Hampshire people are courteous."

With Nixon's carefully staged visit early in February, whatever momentum

Romney had succeeded in building

witVi his

attempted blitz faded by contrast.

Nixon appeared like a person these voters, voters who had supported him in
large numbers before, would like as

tlieir

entertainment, almost a circus except
all,

tliat

president.

Romney's campaign was

he was trying valiantly through it

to say something important about the war policy in Vietnam and the impact

of the Johnson administration on

tlie

national morality.
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Ron]no};^^8_S ccret:
Tlie

Weapon

irony of the Roninoy cnudidacy came in

fiiuil

very expertise

Llio

had surprised New Hampshire in 196A.

tliat

January the Romney leadership revealed

tliat

form of that

Early in

they had the capacity to

prepare 40 personalized letters per minute and had mailed more than
80,000 letters during the same week.

Their "secret weapon" was

a

com-

puter-driven printer capable of producing 1,200 lines of typewriting
per minute,

William Johnson reported that the "names, addresses, telephone

numbers and occupations of 130,000 Republicans have been put on computer
tape, leaving about 15,000 yet to do."^'^

The names had come from

precinct checklists with city and town directories used to match husbands
and wives, and to get occupations.

The Nixon campaign was using

duced 300 letters

a

mechnical letter-writer that pro-

day with a total of 27,000 at that point in the campaign.

a

The battle of the letters was on, and from the early report Romney'

computer-based operation was in the lead.

The Nixon campaign's reaction

to the Romney leaders gleeful report of their sophisticated

and interest matching system

computer in their mailings."

v^as

na;:ie,

letter,

that they "did not consider using a

They were using a hand personalizing method

for their letters wliich took longer and did noc involve a computer.

Mixon running

3

to

1

With

ahead of Romney at that point in the polls, they

were sticking to tried and true methods.

William Johnson had borrowed student help and purchased computer
time

on the computer equipment based at Dartmouth College.

His delight
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at

Lho ability o(

Lids sysU-m to produce letters, iimiutnln
lists, and

sort for special interest

constituencies

was too much for him to contain.

In the midsi: of his candidate's important first
campaign visit to New

Hampshire major press attention was diverted from Romney to
Johnson, his
letters and the computer's capabilities.
giiiuaick of

The computer was the campaign

19G8. William Johnson was the proud father or, more appropriately,

midwife.

Unfortunately, the revelation of the "secret weapon" fell into the
Ulliojl il?iiil£il'

view of the Romney campaign as

a bit too slick,

a bit of

soapselling hucksterism,

sophisticated and unsettling for many New Hampshire

voters who saw the "secret weapon" as a device to manipulate voters.

It

violated the ethic of making an independent choice and raised suspicion.
In reality there was no need for Johnson to crov; about his voter contacting

operation.

If

the letters had been quietly produced, mailed and read,

the impact would tiave been considerably greater than was the fear Johnson

thought he could evoke in the Nixon camp.

The fine art of commercial direct

mail had long possessed the sophistication that Johnson publicly described.

Johnson deflated the

credibility

"secret weapon" to become public.

of his letters when he allowed his

It must also be recalled

that this was

the beginning of a public concern with who was keeping personal records

and why.

When Johnson indicated that he had

to include data on how

liopcd

frequently each Republican goes to the polls the spector of an invasion
of privacy became evident.

with

Johnson's use of the phrase "data bank" coupled
,

a

Concor d Monitor headline which read "Romney

'

s

Race Aided by Secret

CoKiputer," was enough to raise great concern and suspicion.
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Suspicion

incroasc'ci

a>ui

thv

UmUts

considerably less eredibilily.

thai

Romncy

f

wore mailed arrived with
iced controversy at

tlie

ho was trying to establish rapport with New Hampshire
voters.

same

tliat

The

"secret weapon" turned out to be a dud.

VJilliam Loeb focussed the suspicion with one of his front
page

signed editorials which read:
Us Guinea Pigs in New Hampshire

For the last two weeks the campaign managers of Gov. Romney
have told half a dozen national publications
with remarkable
candor
precisely what they are relying on to win the Ne.w
Hampshire primary.

—

—

mainstay of their campaign is not the qualifications or
ability of Gov. Romney to dig himself out of the quicksand
of contradictions where he has been floundering for months.

Tlie

Their "secret weapon," as Warren Beaver of the New York Times
wrote a week ago, "is not even in New Hampshire."
It is a gi a nt computer, an electronic data bank, based In
New York City, that will be work ing overtime to rescue Gov
Romney' s flagging political fortunes

.

.

Into that computer the Romney organizers have fed not only
the voters' lists of all New Hampshire Republicans and Independents, but also as much personal background as they
could dig up in four months of scouring the state.

Inside this "People Bank" in New York City, the voters can
be segmented, in seconds, into Catholics, Protestants, Jews,
married, divorced, single, rich, poor, old, young, union man
and businessman, black and white, male and female, government
and we don't know what else.
worker, home owner, renter

—

this personal data is coupled with analyses of
opinion surveys and behavioral studies, the potential for
manipulating the electorate of New Hampshire is enormous.
VJhen all

The Romncy managers are aware of
about it.

They have b r a gged that with in

a

tliis

potential

—

and frank

ma^tt^er j?j[jj__fev^

iteratu re i n tlie ha nds of
c an _h;w e J l^tnjjjjnLHr^)ieces of
any special interest voting bloc in the st ate
l
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loltm- that j^ics to the young, Roman Catholic, vui Ion
in Manchester can be wholly different than i\at sent
up to the Protestant, small to\^/n, upstate, middle-aged
businessman.

Tlie

work(:!r

t

these letters would be prepared by social scientists
then mass-produced, inserted, stamped by computer, trucked to New Hampshire and mailed.

Eacli of

in New York,

Yet, each of these computer-produced letters would appear to
all th e worl d to be a personalized note written and signed
by _ei^t_h r Mr. Johnson,, or Gov. Romney or Gov. Rockefeller
himsel f

A few years back a rather frightening book was written
entitled "THE 480."
Its theme was that a small group of behavioral scientists,
using a computer and massive personal data on each American
voter, could sub-divide the country into 480 "voting segments,"
and
make "tailored appeals" to each of these segments
elect any man they chose to be President of the United
States.

—

NEW HAMPSHIRE IS TO BE THE TESTING GROUND OF THIS KIND OF X
"PROGRv\MMED POLITICS" AND YOU THE VOTERS OF THIS STATE
ARE TO BE THE GUINEA PIGS.

—

a man almost without comprehension
George Romney
this country faces abroad
crises
the
of
magnitude
of the
voter by a complex of
Hampshire
New
the
can be put across to
will not be lost on
lesson
the
City,
York
data banks in New
ideas.
other men with similar
If Gov.

—

Despite the conf idence of theRomney camp in thei r computer
We hope that you cannot sell
we~don' t" think it will work.
a presidential cand i date the way you sell cigarettes

,

.

The be st defcn^^.e agai n st this so rt o f effort to manipulate
the^elect ora te and exploit the racial, religious, income and
is the basic go od sense of
"region al "dif ferences among u s
New Hampshi re

—

From the Romney camp comes word that the first to be hit with
60.
the special interest mailings will be the voters over
Maybe^ th_i^ edi to rial will h elp tliem
v^ij:_th_e y are g e 1 1 i n
.

,

Signed:

William Locb, publisher
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fell er P r o b 1

In spite of Govcnior Nelson Rockefeller';,
early,

vigorous support for Romney, their remained
in New Hampshire.

a

continuing, and

sizable group of skeptics

When the February 10th closing date had passed,
sixteen

delegate candidates had filed as being "favorable" to
the nomination of
Governor Rockefeller.

By February 18th the New York Times reported that

Prof. John A. Beckett of Durham had been selected
chairman of a delegate

candidate committee which was organized for a write-in campaign
on behalf
of the

Nevi?

York governor.

Announcing the effort one of the members of the committee said:

"they

expected that the write-in would pick up a large portion of the Henry
Cabot Lodge write-in vote cast in 196^." 1
v;as

The basis for the organizing

the fact that many continued to view Romney as a "stand-in" or "stalking

horse" for Rockefeller.

If Romney failed,

then these analysts were sure

that their preferred candidate. Rockefeller, would announce bis candidacy.
If

they could generate a sufficient write-in vote for Rockefeller in the

New Hampshire primary they felt that the demise of the Romney campaign

would result and Rockefeller would consider challenging Nixon for the
nomination.

Until the January 28th release of a Gallup Poll, Rockefeller had been as

much as lA points ahead of President Johnson in these sui-veys.
28th release had Lyndon Johnson running ahead of

eacli of

The January

the four most

popular Republicans with the highest approval, A8 percent, in some time.

Rockefeller remained the candidate supported most frequently by voters
against Johnson.
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Romney,

in

;:i-)M:r

of his agp.resslve New Hampshire campai);n, did not

appear to move either xn

tlie

straw polls in New Hainpshi.re or in his

standing among other Republicans mentioned as possible candidates nationally.
He was not able to attract Rockefeller's strong liberal and moderate Republican

interest;

nor had he been able to show the national strength among all voters

that would attract support for his nomination against President Jobnson.

The Rockefeller v;rite-in organizers perceived this weakness and began actively
to hold out hope for a Rockefeller nomination.

February 28th, Governor Romney declared that he was withdrawing from the
New Ham.pshire presidential primary.

Several hours before, he had been given

the results of the latest private poll conducted by his campaign

vv/hich

showed

that he not only seriously trailed in his campaign against Richard Nixon but

that his position relative to Nixon was approximately the same as it had

been before he began campaigning.

His campaign had failed to generate the

momentum that v/ould bring him sufficiently close to Nixon so that even

if ho

did lose he could claim a victory, of sorts, in the narrowness of the Nixon
max.

gin.

The demise of the Romney campaign released volunteers and local moderate/

liberal Republican energy to work on the McCarthy effort.

"Republicans for

were circulated
McCarthy" committees were organized, letters supporting McCarthy
to former Romney activists,

advertisements urging Republicans concerned about

placed by these committees
the policies of the Johnson administration were
and fund raising began.

Isolated and frustrated Republican liberals began

express their support for him.
to appear at McCarthy campaign stops and
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lils

campaign,

some, of

the media Llioui;hL the iuteresting

part of the New llampsliiro primary was over for 1968.

CBS and ABC cancelled

their hotel and motel spaces, stopped preparing extensive election eve
coverage
and left New Hampshire.

Other news gatliering organizations and several of

the major newspapers greatly reduced their coverage of the remaining campaigns.

The indications were that Nixon would win easily over the write-in effort
for Rockefeller and that Johnson was at least a three-to-one leader in the

campaign with McCarthy.

Given that prospect, a fait accompli

coul(]

easily

be reported by a few local stringers and the budget rich National Broadcasting

Corporation.

By nibbling at the edges of the Romney campaign, the McCarthy organization

was able to feed rather well.

weakness as a candidate,

tlie

Until Romney showed his final and considerable

McCarthy workers had hoped that he would succeed

with his anti-war position against Richard Nixon.

When he failed they were

ready to absorb as much of the anti-war anti-Johnson administration

sentiment as was likely to move from Republican ranks to
sor

L

a

Democrat of any
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CA>1PAIGN, THE McCARTHY CAMl'AIGN

:

C0NTPJ^ST1NG STYLES

Knowing the Opposition
The John:;on campaign devclopGd according to the plan that
Bernard
Boutin had outlined to Sandra Hoeh during their August 1967
meeting.

L.

Following

the Democratic Stal;e Committee's endorsement of the Johnson
renominatlon bid

November 19th, other local and county committees and prominent Democratic
Party leaders and officials began endorsing the renominatlon of the President
as

v.'ell.

Each of the significant endorsements received the attention of a

press release from the Democratic State Committee headquarters and local or

statewide media distribution.

In carefully orchestrated succession the

Johnson campaign leadership began filing for the delegate places.

Again, each

of the principal and approved filings was accompanied by a press release that

kept the efforts of the committee before the public on almost a daily basis.
On January 22nd Governor John W. King and Bernard L, Boutin filed their

delegate candidacies while the story that covered the filing indicated that
U.S. Senator Thomas H. Mclntyre was expected to file later.

The stream was

properly staggered to insure that the LBJ campaign would gain some press

attention even though

tlie

major focus was almost entirely on

tlie

Republican

contest.

Shortly before Senator McCarthy was to make his first campaign visit
to New Hampshire,

Rowland Evans, the nationally syndicated columnist,

called the McCarthy state headquarters Inviting Hoeh and Studds to join him
for dinncn-.

Evans had been spending the day with Bernard Boutin and other

members of the LBJ committee and now wanted to contrast his experience with
the McCarthy leaders' view of the contest.
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Evans was impressed by whaL liouLlu had told

bin,

of the Jolmson campaign

plan and the extensive list oi endorsements which
Boutin

liad

n.itihcred.

lloeh

responded that he felt if someone were asked for an
endorsement that is what
would be given.
do.

If someone was asked to work then that is what
they would

In the case of the Johnson campaign,

Hoeh said that he felt endorsements

were contrary to the non-endorsement ethic in New Hampshire and might
well
hurt the Jolmson effort rather than help.

As for the campaign plan, Hoeh

responded that ho did not see it as being particularly unique.

It still rested

on the hard work of volunteers, who did not seem to be volunteering, and
on the backs of those who had endorsed the renoraination

little else.

effort but had done

To Hoeh and Studds it appeared as if the endorsers were

busier congratulating each other over the endorsements and predicting how
badly McCarthy would be beaten than actually stirring up

a

Johnson vote.

An

air of self-assurance about the "3 to 1" defeat of McCarthy and the ultimate

success of Johnson, not only in New Hampshire but in November as well,
energy and volunteer levels low in the Johnson camp.

the

To Hoeh and Studds,

the Johnson campaign seemed narrowly based and over confident.

were actually at work in the campaign.

kei)t

Few persons

The reasons for each of these con-

clusions they carefully explained to Evans.

They began by reviewing how rapidly the McCarthy organization had
developv^d before McCarthy announced;

liow

it had sustained itself before

McCarthy entered the New Hampshire primary;
January 3rd announcement;

hc^w

how it had grown since the

dedicated and effective the volunteers had become;

the extensive press attention the campaign had already received;

that a substantial flow of outside volunteers was beginning.

and reported
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January

?.r)t li,

ca!npai;;n visit.

t

lu.'

day bcforo McCarthy arrived for

The headline read "LBJ Turns on

Heat to Roast McCarthy," and went on:

—

Concord, N.H.
The real surprise in the campaign for the
March 12 Democratic presidential primary is not the disorganized nature of Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign but
how the much-maligned regular party organization here is
building a well-oiled macliine to support President Johnson.
On tlic eve of McCarthy's first campaign visit here Friday for
his battle against Mr. Johnson, the state of the senator's
campaign is easily depicted:
not until this week did his
campaign headquarters in Washington send a single advanceman
to survey New Hampshire and confer with McCarthy's original
supporter and now the manager on the scene, Dartmouth College public affairs man David Iloeh (sic).
In contrast, McCarthy, the only name on the ballot, faces
what looks to be the most formidable and highly organized
campaign ever fielded in this state, promoting the v/rite-in
of Mr. Johnson's name against McCarthy.
Headed by Nashua
businessman and former Washington bureaucrat Bernard Boutin
(who handled Sen. Estes Kefauver's winning primary campaign
in 1936 and John F. Kennedy's in 1960) the Johnson organization
is developing a campaign concept based on careful organization
wholly new to New Hampshire.
If successful, it will undermine the habitual primary campaign
approach of non-organization Democrats like Kefauver, who
conducted hamlet-to-hamlet, handshaking tours that overwlielmed
the voters.

But Kefauver's stunning upset of Harry Truman in 1952 came
against the backdrop of a weak, almost non-existent Democratic
Kefauver filled a power vacuum by going
Party organization.
directly to the voters with little if any resistance from tlie

regular s
however, the Democrats not only have the governorship
They are breaking
and one U.S. senator but are also organized.
down the state's 87,bOO registered Democrats into 2000 neighborEvery Democratic voter
hoods, witli one coordinator for each.
blank addressed
detachable
with
a
card,
pledge
a
will be handed
the voter will
why
Johnson
President
telling
to the White House
12.
Mar.
write in liis. name on
Nov;,

But if
yeldc.m live up to advance billing.
as his
well
as
half
does
King,
Boutin,' backed by Gov. John
annihilation
to
close
defeat
a
blueprint, McCarthy will be facing

Campaign

pl.u-ss

Evans' column

a |)po;u-od

January

23t;li, tlie

his first New Hampshire campaign visit.

day before McCarthy arrived

f

The headline read "LBJ Turns on

Heat to Roast McCarthy," and went on:

—

Concord, N.H.
The real surprise in the campaign for the
March 12 Democratic presidential primary is not the disorganized nature of Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign but
how the much-maligned regular party organization here is
building a well-oiled machine to support President Johnson.
On the eve of McCarthy's first campaign visit here Friday for
his battle against Mr. Johnson, the state of the senator's
campaign is easily depicted: not until this week did his
campaign headquarters in Washington send a single advanceman
to survey New Hampsliire and confer with McCarthy's original
supporter and now the manager on the scene, Dartmouth College public affairs man David Hoeh (sic)
In contrast, McCarthy, the only name on the ballot, faces
what looks to be the most formidable and highly organized
campaign ever fielded in this state, promoting the write-in
of Mr. Johnson's name against McCarthy.
Headed by Nashua
businessman and former Washington bureaucrat Bernard Boutin
(who handled Sen. Estes Kefauver's winning primary campaign
in 19!36 and John F. Kennedy's in 1960) the Johnson organization
is developing a campaign concept based on careful organization
wholly new to New Hampshire.

successful, it will undermine the habitual primary campaign
approach of non-organization Democrats like Kefauver, who
conducted hamlet-to-hamlet, handshaking tours that overwhelmed
the voters.
If

But Kefauver's stunning upset of Harry Truman in 1952 came
against the backdrop of a weak, almost non-existent Democratic
Kefauver filled a power vacuum by going
Party organization.
directly to the voters with little if any resistance from the

regulars
Now, however, the Democrats not only have the governorship
and one U.S. senator but are also organized. They are breaking
down the state's 87,500 registered Democrats into 2000 neighborEvery Democratic voter
hoods, witli one coordinator for each.
will be handed a pledge card, with a detachable blank addressed
to the Wliite House telling President Johnson why the voter will
v;rite in his name on Mar.

12.

Campaign plans seldom live up to advance billing. But if
Boutin, backed by Gov. John King, does half as well as his
blueprint, McCarthy will be facing a defeat close to annihilatio
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He concluded his coUunn:

The one brii'la spot since his entry is that the chance for
a large write-in for non-candidate Sen. Robert F. Kennedy,
has sharply declined.
Eugene Danieil... is still running
several candidates for convention delegates pledged to
Kennedy.
But Danieil is now planning to vote for McCarthy in
the preferential primary.

That will help McCarthy, but not enough.
A McCarthy vote
of nore than 20 percent would be a surprise, and a total
of less would be an undisguised disaster. ^

Reading the coluuva the McCarthy leaders feared that on the day before

McCarthy's first visit the conclusions of a major national columnist would
seriously undercut the fledgling campaign

.

They felt the campaign was fragile,

subject to easy destruction either from the outside or through reactions of
those working within New Hampshire.

does not circulate widely in

Nev7

Fortunately, Evans' and Novak's column

Hampshire.

As Hoch and Studds had tried to poiiit out to Evans that while

Viis

image

of the national headquarters and a centrally directed campaign might be

correct, his image of what was developing for McCarthy at the state level was
not.

What had impressed Evans about the Johnson New Hampshire campaign were

the very attributes of that campaign that held the greatest opportunity for

McCarthy's success.

A tightly controlled, centrally managed campaign or-

ganization highlighted the same negative attributes of the Johnson administration that people at the "grass roots" had begun to fear.

Hoeh and Studds

sensed a basic alienation from and distrust of the Johnson dominated national

government.
people.

The giant personality of Johnson himself seemed to frighten

His style and his real or imagined ability to overpower

tlie

institutions

created a considerable
of the federal government and to stifle opposition had

reaction.

In the early stages of the campaign,

this reaction was neither wide

•
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spread nor Jocusscd.

Unfortunately for the Johnson can.paign leadership,
the

very structure of their campaign helped to gather
the reaction into

political force

—

a

a

political force that could be exploited against Lyndon

Johnson.

Evans mentioned several details of the Johnson campaign that
intrigued
Hoeh and Studds.

The first was the organizational concept of Boutin's

effort which was to depend on "2000 neighborhoods, with one coordinator
for
Boutin, Hoeh recalled, was dusting off a page from the 1960

eacli."

Kennedy campaign which avoided senseless local struggles over titles in
the campaign, e.g.

the John Kennedy organizers used the label "Kennedy

Secretary" as the means of identifying the local organizer.
by this

tViat

Boutin

revealed

he expected difficulty in getting his campaign job done by

using only the local Democratic Party organizations

—

something that Evans

did not appreciate when he wrote his column.

Secondly, Boutin had taken the idea generated by the Lodge write-in

campaign of 1964 of a "pledge" ca/d.

The impact of Lodge's surprise

victory in the 196A Republican presidential primary had conditioned the
organization of ail of the 1968 primary campaigns

—

Republican and Dcmocrati

Although the McCarthy leaders were not surprised by Boutin's use of

a

"pledge

card they were interested in what form this effort would take.

A basic element of any political campaign is to know what the opposition
is doing.

task.

In the case of the Johnson campaign,

this became a relatively easy

First, in their self-confidence the leadership was not reluctant to

discuss the organizational concept of the campaign with the press.

Boutin
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done this with Kowhnul Evans.

had been

buiU

Secondly, close ties and friendships

up over the years between the McCarthy leaders
and those

working on the Johnson campaign.

This friendship had long preceded

politics and would continue after March 12th.

1968 's

Dissension within the Johnson

camp kept information flowing to the McCarthy camp.

The organizational manual for the Johnson campaign had been developed
by Boutin while still in Washington.

Wien he returned to New Hampshire he

adopted a rather inflexible leadership role that allowed for little dis-

agreement with his concept of the campaign.

Late in January, the first rumblings of dissension began to come to
the McCarthy leaders. Boutin's leadership was demanding, heavy-handed, and
in a style tiiat seemed to those v;ho witnessed it to come less from his

New Hampshire origin than from too many years in Washington close to Lyndon
B.

Johnson.

Boutin expected all of those who had endorsed Johnson to fall

into line behind him and the top leadership of the Johnson effort in New

Hampshire.

Criticism was viewed by Boutin as

a

him there were 90,000 Democrats out in the state

form of disloyalty.

To

who had to be reached and

told how to support their president by writing-in his name.

A New Hampshire

success for Boutin's campaign concept would prope] Boutin to the national

leadership of Johnson's campaign and bestow on Boutin's new campaign concept
the mark of genius.

The personal investment for Boutin was enormous.

Winning was the only acceptable result.

To others winning was important

but keeping the New Hampshire Democratic Party alive and friendships viable

after the primary was at least as important.

Boutin was becoming

a

drill
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sergeant in his olfort to extort production and
unquestioning loyalty.

Shortly after Evans' column appeared,

Iloeh and

Studds were given a

package of the Jolinson campaign's organizational materials.

One of their

volunteers had been given the kit by a disgruntled Johnson supporter.
The kit contained a sixteen page mimeographed document titled,
"New Hampshire

Citizens for Johnson Campaign Checklist for the President Johnson 'Write-In'
Campaign, New Hampshire - March 12,

1967

(sic)."

With the document were ten

attractively presented pictorial brochures titled, "A Strong Man in

Tough

a

Job," five green and white vinyl bumper strips which read "I Support President

Johnson," along with a mimeographed slip which said, "Bumper

roust be

clean before attaching;" four pre~addressed and stamped enevelopes;

wiped
a one

page item titled, "Notabi.e Accomplishments of the Vice President, Hubert

H.

Humphrey;" and twenty, serially numbered three part wallet sized cards.

The

first part of the card read, "N.H. Democrats Are 90,000 Strong,

I

have

pledged my support to President Johnson, and though he is not an announced
candidate,

am writing his name

I

a.n

on my ballot in the March 12th New

Hampshire Presidential Preference Primary,"
tVie

voter's signature.

Part

and read "President Johnson,

tv^70

1

witli

space under the pledge for

of the card was titled "White House Copy"

pledge my support to you and will WF,ITE-IN

your name on my ballot in the March 12th New Hampshire Presidential Preference
Primary, Name
two boxes:

(print clearly)

Democrat or Independent,

Address

^Tel.

No.

and

(As an expression of your support this

card will be forwarded tc President Jclmson at the White House in Washington,

D.C.)."
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Port:

Cillcd "ikMdquar ters Copy" rcpoatoci

t'.u-oG

U-leplioP.o number,

vo'.er status,

note space

.for

name, address,

tin-

services needed such as

"transportation, baby sitter, and remarks," and, as with the other two
parts,
the serial numer was repeated.

The pre-addressed and stamped enevelopes

were for the return of these last two coupons to the Johnson headquarters
in Manchester.

The whole package was carefully developed and well presented.

brochure folded out to a sheet of high grade paper with

a

The

sample ballot on

one side with graphic instructions for writing in the President's name and
on the otlier a selection of pictures with President Johnson in his "Tough

Job."

Johnson was sViowi quietly in his office, meeting with Senate leaders

Mansfield and Dirksen, with Dean Rusk in

a

cabinet meeting, a face-to-face

conversation with Premier Kosigin of the Soviet Union and listening to a
General in some military field situation.

The photographs portrayed the

burdens of the Presidency and Johnson's thoughtful leadership in that
job.

The brief text read:

There is no tougher job in the world than being Pres.' dent
and never has it been tougher than
of the United States

—

it is now.

You, along with 200 million other Americans, look to him
for decisive action as we face the most serious challenges
ever to confront our nation and the world.

avoid backing
An effective President must avoid weakness
down when tlie going gets tough... and he must forego the
impulse to let loose... because as the leader of the most
powerful nation on earth, he can trigger the destruction
he must follow the
of civilization with a single word.
of the peaceniks
wailings
the
enduring
responsible course...
surrender.
and those who would
.

.

.

He must be a map of dedicated strength and President Johnson
is

.

.

.

A STRONG MAN IN A TOUGH JOB
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The job is made lougliei" because the emi raj;eovis course
is never easy.
He assummed office under tlie most trying
circumstances... and besides carrying out, to tlie letter,
every one of President Kennedy's pi-ograms, he has gone
beyond as he strives for an ever better America.
It is
not easy for a President to crusade for expanded opportunities for all Americans ... when most Americans are already living better than any people in history.
President Johnson is a tireless worker.
He has done a remarkable job ... and with our support he
will continue as one of our greatest Presidents. Your
endorsement will bolster President Johnson's determination.

Both he and the country look to New Hampshire as the first
state in the nation to reaffirm its unflinching devotion
to convictions of honor.
Your write-in vote can set the pace for the entire nation
as an overwhelming endorsem.ent of this strong man in a
tough -job.
Your vote is both the source, and measure,
of his strength.

The theme had been carefully chosen to attract feelings sympathetic
to a President in a difficult position.

The campaign concept from brochure

to Instructions to pledge cards was one of unifying behind the President
to provide security,

and national solidarity against potentially destructive

forces outside and inside the nation.

To defeat such a strategy would

mean that the McCarthy leaders would have to pick it apart.

The instructions

circulated with the campaign materials began to give Hoeh and Studds some
help in countering the Johnson strategy.

The introduction to the instructions read:
On March 12th New Hampshire will vote 50,000 strong for
President byndon B. Johnson.
Tliere are over 87,000 registertul Democrats and over 127,000
witli hard work.
The goal is attainable
"Indepentlonts".

—
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That then, is the p,oal for our cnmpaif;n - by March
12th N.H,
will have 50,000 write-in votes pledRcd to the President.!.!^

The instructions went on to explain that because of the
"equal time pro-

vision which requires the news media to give equal time to
other candidatesit olten appears

"advantageous for potential candidates who hold public

office at that Lime to delay announcing their actual candidacy until
later

"

essary.

To accomplish a "write-in" the instructions stated that it would

For this reason the "write-in" for President Johnson was nec-

be necessary to "educate" the voter as to "wliat is required and then get

him to the polls to vote."
hold that

tlie

The name rules for write-ins in New Hampshire

"voters intent must be clear" so the instructions advised

writing in "Lyndon

Johnson."

Instructions on the delegate selection

portion of the ballot were included and referenced to the enclosed sample
ballot printed on the Johnson brochure.

In a section titled "Tips for Organization" was written:

aware that

tlie

"We are

situation varies somewhat from town to town and ward to ward.

We leave to your sound

judi'.iiicnt

any variations in the suggestions but that

you consider the fact that the suggestions are not our own but are based upon
long experience connected with the various campaigns."
to vary the framework,

tlie

instructions

tlien

properly warned not

outlined the campaign structure.

The backbone of the entire
The Neighborliood Coordinator:
1.
In most cases these
campaign is the Nei gliborhood Coordinator.
coordinators will be women although there is no real preference....
Each "N.C." will have responsibility only for liis or her neighborhood, consisting of a street or streets assigned by tht^ Town or
Ward coordinator.
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"N.C." was oxpecUxl to contacL all Democrats and
Independents .living

wltliin the assigned area.

Each was responsible for from 35-50 voters.

The

"single most important activity of the entire campaign will
be the PledgeCard Drive.

This will be handled by the Neighborhood Coordinator... and...

will be his to£ £ri_or i_tx project prior to Primary Day,"

The instructions

wont on to discuss the otlier roles in the campaign including the
"Town or Ward Coordinator,
5.

3.

The Check List Committee,

Finance Committee,
Committee.

8.

the City Coordinator, 4.
6.

the

(2.

The County Coordinator,

The Transportation Committee,

The Baby Sitter Committee, and 9.

Item 10 called for "Weekly Progress Reports"

7,

The

The Publicity
to be filed from

the "County, City, & Town" on an attached report form.

The instructions outlined the responsibilities of each position in
the campaign structure and covered eacli step in the expected campaign even
to the point of including separate telephone messages to be read when

contacting a registered Democrat or an Independent voter.

The Publicity

"
Chairman was advised that he mus t" be responsible for the following:

1.

Prepare releases on strictly local activities and
local committee appointments.

2.

Invite rei>orters and photographers, well in advance,
to all major events in the area.

3.

Recommend procedures to State Headquarters in
working with newspapers and radio in your area.

A.

Encourage letters to the Editor by people in your area.

5.

Organize people to call in to "open mike" shows, in
support of President Johnson.

6.

Organize people to participate in "talk shows" and
interview programs on behalf of President,
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The last page of

tl,e

InstrucLions was titled "Conauittce Roster"
which had

spaces for listing the city, town, and ward,
coordinator's name, and the names
of the con.n)ittee mer.bers.

This was to be sent to the Manchester Johnson
cam-

paign headquarters.
The most intriguing position of the instructions
was the page devoted to
"The Pledge-Card Drive."

The pledge card drive gave the organization an
acti-

vity that would substitute for the fact that there
would not be a live candidate

travelling in New Hampshire.

Circulating pledge cards and getting signatures

would be the principal campaign activity and the cards
themselves would be the
basis for the election day get-out-the-vote effort.

Harry Makris, Executive Director of the Democratic State Committee,
began

distributing the kits late in January through county and city organizational
meetings.

Each meeting scuglic to fill in the pyramid of coordiaatoi s

,

stimu-

late interest in the campaign, and disr.ribuue the neighborhood coordinator kits.
It was at the Berlin meeting that a McCarthy volunteer received a kit

from a Democratic party worker.

The worker took the kit to avoid being dis-

courteous but planned to throw it away.

pledging people to vote in a certain way.
and should be kept that way.

He said he didn't like the idea of

He felt such decisions were private

He especially didn't like having copies of the

pledge being sent to the Wliite House or even to Manchester.

He also felt it

would easy enough to sign the pledge and then vote differently.

From this

conversation with their Berlin worker, Hoeh and Studds began to see
turn the slick new Boutin campaign against itself.

a

way to
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Look

tlic

Johnson caniixn

(.'.n

into

llio

f

ield as a technician

explaining the campaign concept, recruiting volunteers, and instructing
coordinators.

Others, principally Governor Johm W. King and Bernard L.

Boutin took a different tack.

Given that Johnson was viewed by most as

being miles ahead of McCarthy, it was difficult to stimulate much interest
in doing the hard work of contacting voters, getting pledge cards signed,

or even attending many of the organizational meetings.

To drum up interest

Governor King and, occasionally, Bernard Boutin, began to stump for the

Johnson effort.

As early as January 12th, the McCarthy leaders found it necessary to

respond to King's statements.

In a January Ilth press conference King

had asserted that there was strong support for President Johnson in New

Hampshire because it was the "patriotic" thing to do in the midst of
"This sounds corny to some people, but

I

a war.

think New Hampshire voters are

patriotic," King said when asked what he thought McCarthy's chances were
in the New Hampshire primary.

In the same press conference Governor King

said he planned a "person-to-per: on" campaign for the President in which he

would stump the state.

In a press release responding to King's remarks

Hoeh asked if Governor King finds it unpatriotic to support Senator Mc-

Carthy," noting that members of the McCarthy committee had campaigned
for John F. Kennedy in 1960 and Lyndon Johnson in 196A.

for Eugene McCarthy.

"We are now fighting

Does the governor find this unpatriotic?"

not had
King's allusion to what constituted "patriotism" and what did
an immediate reaction in the McCarthy campaign.

If this was to be the style

this style were in any way
of the New Hampshire Johnson campaign and if
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authori:.ucl or connected to ieclin,;s In the
White House then somethina other

than the policy concerning the war in Vietnam was at
stake.

Senator McCarthy responded to the same theme when speaking
in Athens,
Georgia, January 24th when he said:
"The administration's tendency to equate loyalty to its
policies with loyalty to the country is dangerous and selfserving.
The Johnson administration's efforts to discourage
dissent at home in order to bring false unity has not been
successful.
Effort to quell dissent is dangerous because
it obscures the real military and political cause to give
doubtful policies undeserved immunity from democratic debate,
and it tries to use American armed forces as a shield for
our policy makers against their critics."
"It is proof not of weakness but of democratic vitality that
our people reject the contention that debate must end and vze
must all rally to the struggle regardless of its causes, objectives and consequences. There are differences between one
war and another and betvreen one issue and another. The essence
of intelligent policy-making is to discriminate among those
according to their effects upon our country's interests and
values.
I intend to do what I can in this election year to
make these distinctions clear. "^

Instead of attempting to clarify these distinctions, the Johnson administration
itself and through its surrogates at the state level, sought to cloud the differences and to compel unquestioning loyalty.

Governor King speaking January

30th before a group of Sullivan County Democrats urged that McCarthy be rejected
and that they unite solidly behind President Johnson:

"How vjould President Johnson face the parents of our Vietnam
veterans should we pull out? To dishonor our commitment would
be to dislionor the memory of those who have given their lives
Wliat people anywhere in the v7orld v^ould believe
in Vietnam.
in our will to protect them against communist aggression if we
show that we back dovna when the going gets tough? The honor of
America and safety of the Free World are at stake in this elecDespite a campaign of vilification and abuse that is
tion.
without precedent in our history President Johnson had continued
In spite of faint hearts and carping critics, Presito lead.
is keeping faith to our commitments in Southeast
Jolmson
dent
Asia."''
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response

Inr,

t

lie

meet ing were a nunilier of McCarthy supporters.

Iloeh chr.rged

that King, "is clearly frightened."

In

He noted that

King was speaking beiore a meeting of Sullivan County Democrats
for the
first time in his six years in office and was doing so "not only
to line
up LBJ support but to pose as a foreign policy expert.

In the process,

Governor King had willfully and irresponsibly distorted and slandered the
position of Sen. Eugene

J.

McCarthy and the thousands of loyal citizens

of New Hampshire who agree with him.

For six years he (King) has failed

to address a Democratic meeting in Sullivan County which is additional

evidence chat the governor is obediently jumping through hoops held by
LBJ."

g

The Claremont Eagle had headlined the story on King's speech,

"Gov. King Rides 'Shotgun'

for LBJ at Newport:," while carrying on the same

page the Concord datlined response from the McCarthy campaign headlined,

"McCarthy Aide Declares King 'Is Frightened!"

At the same meeting, Makris distributed the Johnson Write-in Campaign
Kits, gave instructions, and then, with the Governor, was forced to respond
to (jUestioiis

.

The most embarassing concerned whether state committee

Makris said, "Money

funds were being used to advance Johnson's candidacy.

spent on the Johnson drive was raised separately from state committee funds
and donors had clearly earmarked their contributions to be used for LBJ."

The Newport meeting set a pattern which kept the LBJ campaign at
least neutralized if not actually on the defensive in each of these organizing

sessions.

The media coverage carried both sides of

tlie

story, often in the

same article, and the LBJ organizers faced increasingly severe questioning as
time went on.

Tlie

press saw King's state-wide "stumping" for LBJ as an

effort to "bolst or LBJ

'

s

wavering image and shoot down some doves in party
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Speaking

his
In

f ru::^tr.U

Dovcm-

Jon Covornor King began to escnlate his rhetoric.

beloro anotlior gatlioring of Democrats, King said, "Our

President is under violent personal attack and because he is the champion
of the free world.

That means the time has come for every true Democrat

to stand up and be counted

field we accept battle.

—

or from now on, to be counted out.

His friends are our friends.

enemies and we meet all comers -- inside and out.

On this

His enemies are our

The battle begins here

and we will carry it forward to a great victory next fall.^^

When asked in a radio interview, if he agreed with Governor King's conclusion, U.S. Senator Tom Mclntyre Co-Chairman with King of the New Hampshire
LBJ Committee said, "Oh, no,

picked up the comment, issued

think John went a little far there."

I

a

Hoeh

press release in which he said, "Senator

McTntyre repudiated the unprecedented way in which Governor King threatened
New Hampshire Democrats..,. We thank the Senator for disassociating himself
from the Governor's remarks and this aspect of intimidation and distortion
New Hampshire's

which has characterized the Johiison campaign in New Hampshire.

Democrats now await an apology from John King himself."

12

As with Mclntyre, other Democrats were beginning to resent the tactics of
the Johnson campaign and the vaguely veiled threats coming from King and

others who were aggressively supporting the write-in effort.

Symbolic of the

effort to line up the Democratic Party behind the write-in effort was the

pledge card»

the same pledge card that

the write-in organizing effort.

v;as

the "top priority project" of

The effort and what it began to symbolize

pro(hiccd a major campaign opportunity for the McCarthy campaign.

Not only

among
was the reaction severe outside the Jolmson campaign it was growing
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sup|,(,,-u>rs.

Divide and conquer becam(>

surnri^.o buL ofrccLive

n

McCarLliy slrai.ogy.

As Governor King's speeches became more intense
the Johnson campaign heightened.

tb.e

dissension inside

As Senator McTntyre alluded to in his

mild effort to disassociate himself from the Governor's
vigorous attacks,
the survival of the Democratic Party in

Nev^

Hampshire was more important

than the success or failure of the write-in drive.

The ability of the

party to close ranks after the primary and to elect Democratic candidates
for New Hampshire offices was,
of

Llie

to him,

the top priority.

President's political future was one thing;

Vigorous support

quite another was

accomplishing that by driving from the party the very people who had made it
possible for

a

Democrat to sit in the Governor's chair for the first time in

forty years and for a Democrat to represent the state in VJashington for
the first time in twenty years.

McCarirhy;

Nour ishing a Campa ign

.

A Special Style

At some point: early in the campaign, Senator McCarthy was asked how he

expected to run a successful campaign against all that could be mustered

against him by an incumbent administration of his

owii

party.

Was there a

secret which he possessed or did he have some basic strategy which would
])rove irivincible as the

campaign year began to unfold?

responded that no, he did not possess

a secret

To this McCarthy

formula for success but that

he did have a basic faith in the goodness of the American voting public and
that he intended to survive by "feeding off the land."

The image of a

foraging army or swarm of locusts came to mind immediately, wliich is not

exactly an improper image as things turned out.

But what McCarthy had in
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mhu]

hi.s

could not

l)o

oxm capacit.y Lo make political hay of evcnCs

and limes that

foreseen.

To a considerable extent, McCarthy felt that history was made
by

events and that history did not just occur.
a

His political career had been

demonstration of his ability to reap benefits from events that were not

entirely of his making.

His campaigns had been successful as the result of

individuals being stimulated to work for him, to create advantages for him,
and his own ability to grasp a moment and create from it a positive political

event.

McCarthy had established himself as

a

formidable national political

force when he did what no other congressman of his era would do and that

was to confront the Junior Senator from V'Jisconsin, Joseph McCarthy.
22,

On June

1952, wlien Joseph McCarthy was at the peak of his national power, the

D.ittle known two-term congressm.an from Minnesota, Eugene McCarthy,

to meet the Senator from Wisconsin in a one half hour,

on the prominent AMERICAN FORUM OF THE AIR.

agreed

televised debate

In so doing, Eugene McCarthy

became the first member of Congress to oppose Senator McCarthy in a public
^
aebaUe.
,

13

While there is no evidence to suggest that the debate marked the

beginning of Joseph McCarthy's eventual decline, at least one observer felt
it was the first time anyone had shown that

successfully debated.

the Wisconsin senator could be

"The fallacy of Senator McCarthy's invincibility in

debate was exploded on Ted Granik's AMERICAN FORUM OF THE AIR."

Harry

MacArthur, television critic for the Wash.ington Ev ening Star wrote afterwards.
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To nn extent
McCartliy

in

nc,t

fully understood by those who had come to
know Senator

the short time prior to his announced
presidential candidacy,

Senator McCarthy would build his campaign from the
opportunities that occurred
as the campaign developed.

The New Hampshire campaigners began to understand

this during McCarthy'^ early campaigning, but it was
other evidence that began
to reenforce the purpose of the campaign.

viduals would on their own.

McCarthy liked to see what indi-

He had become a candidate to "test" the

administration concerning the war policy.

McCarthy would be the focus, the

personification of the "test," but the effort would have to be made by others
in the ways v^hich they perceived the "test" could best be made
in their own

jurisdict ioi^is

The earliest 1968 McCarthy successes came as "tests" conceived and

managed by those who welcomed the opportunity to focus their opposition to
the war policy througli the political system.

There were often spontaneous

efforts to use McCarthy as the reason for the challenge, but the challenge
was

theirs to make and manage.

Early Campaign Operations
In a speech before graduates of

tlie

Amos Tuck School of Business

Administration of Dartmouth College in the Spring of 1968, Hoeh said:
Since the art of politics has not become a structured form,
despite the attempts of num.erous political scientists and the
Kennedys;
it is possible to continue the process as a "freeIn
form" almost as varied as the totality of human response.
other words, each campaign has its own conception, birth, life,
a data producing incident, unique in the history
and death
That, for the unrestrained mind, is what makes
of man.
politics fascinating and alluring.

—
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...You will rind Ihc special, art of canipa:i};n
mauap^enunit
more like an infectious disease than an occupational
attraction.
If you once become involved and the spirit
of competition, desire to influence history, or
simply a
fascination with the political game gets under your skin
from tha^^time on your life may well be colored by the
disease.

Politics may be "free-form" but also political events, especially

campaigns have a "stream of consciousness" aspect that requires special
understanding.

Studds and Hoeh felt that they had identified the limits

of the political consciousness for the McCarthy effort and had described

these in the December 22nd memorandum to McCarthy.

Bringing

into operation would require less encompassing concepts.

a

campaign

The campaign was

born with the January 3rd press conference announcing McCarthy's entry into
the New Hampshire primary.

walk, and

v,/alk

Now that campaign had to crawl before it could

before it could run.

movements were awkward.

Tliey

As witli human development, the earliest

could see more than they could grasp.

plishing the first priorities was the ultimate frustration.

Accom-

From the

loftiness of a press conference that drew international attention, they had
to find a place for a headquarters,

find furnisliings, order telephones, and

make a home for the campaign.

The first major decision they faced was in what city a headquarters
should be located.

Traditionally, Democratic presidential primary candidates

have centered their campaigns in Manchester

number of Democratic Party registrants.

tlie

city containting the largest

The Republicans usually selected

Concord which was closer to the center of their constituency.

The McCarthy leaders were concerned about
the campaign.

liven at

tlie

outward appearance of

this early stage they antic i])ated that a number of
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youn;\ pcr^;on.s vjou.ld

be

lie.liiful

to

tlie

involvecl and

McCarthy

:i.maj;e.

that their appearance would not always

Long hair, beards, short skirts, and

other recently evolved symbols of the "youth culture" they felt might pro-

vide the Manchester Union Le ader and Manchester's less tolerant public

officials with

to embarrass the campaign \v7ithout facing the real

a v;ay

campaign issues.

Concord seemed to be a ^nore tolerant city for the McCarthy

headquarters

In contrast to Manchester's more conservative partisaii Democrats,

Concord's role as the State Capitol and local progressive Republican climate
made it appear as a more favorable location for the McCarthy headquarters
than Manchester. Given these social/political realities, tied to the fact that
the V7ire services were located there. Concord was selected.

are casual decisions in successful campaigns.

Few decisions

Even such a simple decision as

the location of a headquarters involved the full strategy of

tlie

campaign.

headquarters
It took Gercy Studds more than a wekk to actually locate a
site and then what he found appe.--red to be far from ideal.

Wliat

he found was

Extension.
the recently vacated electrical supply store on Pleasant Street
had been a busy
In the heydey of the railroad, Pleasant Street Extension

new shopping
thoroughfare. Now it served only as an automobile route to a
and rail yards.
center located on the site of the old railroad station

The

bo passing by.
store was away from Main Street, few pedestrians would

There

little else to make it
would be some parking for campaign workers, but

location attractive.

wretched condit ion.

.

Inside,

to quote Gerry Studds,

"It was in absolutely

commotion
.There are two to three inches of electrical
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nil over

tin.

place.

Thore. were wires hanging out ot

like a medieval, torture chamber, and it was too big.
the hell

to do with it.

There

i,;as

the wall.

It looked

We didn't know what

fuH -length basement and an enormous

a

room behind (the showroom in the front)."!^

There was no furniture, plenty

of wires and parts of electrical fixtures but few lights.

It was dark,

dingy

dusty, and dirty.

With McCarthy's January 3rd announcement the New Hampshire campaign
began receiving a number of small checks and offers of help from across the
country.

The offers and contributions were reassuring, but the money did

not constitute an amount sufficient to meet even early bills.

Within a

little more than a week, two checks arrived each for $2,500 made out to the
N.H. McCarthy for President Campaign.

and the second by Martin Peretz.

1

The first was signed by Blair Clark

Both were drawn on their respective

personal checkii:ig accounts.

Developing Strategy
Wanting desperately to get the campaign into as many hands as possible,
the McCarthy leaders called a meeting of the New Hampshire Committee for

Sunday evening, January 7th.

The announcement read:

We now have the chance to pave the way for Senator McCarthy
This effort, and our work
in his cam.paign for the Presidency.
the
course of history. We,
in tliC next fe\>7 weeks, may change
accepted a considerable
have
individually, and as a committee,
We must now organize to pursue our goals
responsibility.
effectively and efficiently.
Our first step is to put our state organization in order so that
we can begin to fully structure the campaign. To do this, the
Steering Committee asks tliat those receiving this notice attend
a meeting... at the home of Dr. and Mrs. Warren Eberhart, 110
School Street, Concord, N.H.
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The purpose of ho iiioctin}', is to discuss in ilet-iil the steps
that must be token between now and March l?th.
An agenda for
the meeting will be prepared so that all the important items
are covered and that a full perspective on the campaign is
made clear to all.
l

Items needing attention now and/or should be considered by you
before attending the meeting:
1.

Circulate the nominating petitions as soon as possible.
Completed petitions should be forwarded to me.

2.

Compile lists of tliose interested in forming a local McCarthy
for President Committee or county committee.

3.

We need money
further instructions on the specifics of
fundraising will follow but preliminary contact now will
bring better results later.

4.

Take a look at a calendar of events for the next ten weeks
noting those days when Senator McCarthy could fill a good
campaign day in your area. This early work will background
the kind of scheduling that will make the best use of the
Senator's limited campaign time.

5.

Compile lists of volunteers willing to participate in the
ca?ipaign.
Be sure the list is complete with addresses and
telephone numbers.
This will make it possible for us to
move the campaign quickly when the telephoning and mailings
must be handled.

6.

Look for a good locations for headquarters in the larger
towns and cities.
Be prepared to staff and support headquarters with volunteers.

—

—

We are engaged in a rough fight, with people who
A REMINDER
We must be careful in our
are skilled in the profession.
activities not to open ourselves to criticisms that will isolate
We must, howus from being able to wage an effective campaign.
ever, keep our eyes open and be willing to speak out when the
wrong strings are pulled.
Signed:
Tlie

David C. Hoeh, Temporary Chairman

notice was circulated to more than those of the original Steering Committee

membership.

The time had come to expand the organization as much as possible.

Copies were scut to persons in each of the major primary vote producing cities
and tovms who had expressed
Iloeh and

an

interest in McCarthy.

With the announcement

Studds had reason to expect that individual and group anti-war
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ac-l

ivif

.Lcf>

to support

could

be-

broui'JiL

under

l.lio

loadersliip of the Steering Committee

the McCarthy campaign.

The greatest uncertainty of a New Hampshire campaign is the weather.
For outsiders the weather often makes New Hampshire impossible
to get to and impossible to leave

of life to be enjoyed or overcome.

—

—

impossible

but for residents the weather is a fact

The first organizational meeting of the

New Hampshire McCarthy campaign, Sunday evening, January 7th, found people
overcoming.

Despite

a

snowstorm contingents of three or four arrived from

Nashua, Manchester, Keene, Portsmouth, Durham, Laconia, Hanover, and several

others until almost thirty persons were gathered in the Eberhart living room.
An agenda was circulated.
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N.H. McCarth y for Prosldont ConimJ t:^e

l/V/68

AGENDA

Establishment of Store -front HQ in Top 12 Cities

Nashua
Keene
Concord (State HQ)
Portsmouth
Laconia
Dover
-

-

Soniersworth

Claremont
Rochester
Salem

Assignment of Responsibility
A)
Opening of HQ
B)
Formation of local committee
C)
Responsibilities of local committee

Establishment of Home HQ in Other Important Towns
1st

CD.

Hud son
Pembroke
Gof f stown
New Market
Allenstov>7i"i

Derry
Pelham
Hooks et
Hampton
Plaistow
Exeter
Merrimack
Rollinsf ord
Bedford
Epping
Seabrook
Tilton
Fannington
Londonderry
Meredith
Pittsf ield
Durham
Milton
-

Manchester
Berlin

2nd
n T*l

CD.
U 1

"1

7*1

Newport
Milford
Lebanon
Gorham
Greenvile
Hanover
Northumberland
Lincoln
Jaf f rey
Wilton
Littleton
Winchester
Peterborough
New Ipswich
Lancaster
Swanzey
Ashland
Troy
Hinsdale
Andover
Hillsborough

Assignment of Responsibility
Designation of Home
A)
Formation of local committee
B)
Responsibilities of local committee (See separate sheet.)
C)
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stop was

t:o

t.\w

inc'Pt ini;

CL-(ati.

responsibilities of the
the localities.

to ordor and began to go through the agenda.

The

an organization tluit would asKume the state-wide
ca;r,paign,

the candidate schedule and organization of

Studds and lloeh had given this problem their attention

earlier and came to the meeting with

a

series of specific proposals.

Contrary

to their argument favoring McCarthy's New Hampshire entry which stated
that

an organization was "ready and waiting", when the moment of his announcement

actually came Lhey realized that the organization they then had and the organization they v;ould need to run
different beings.

a

successful campaign were two distinctly

On January 7th they realized how much had to be done, how

short the time was, and how thin their organizational base really was.

UTiat

they did have were good contacts in almost all of the crucial vote producing

cities and the larger to\ms.

If properly managed this resource could be

expanded into local organizations capable of carrying on a variety of campaign
tasks

Drawing on the scheduling list which he had prepared for the December
22nd memorandum to McCarthy, Studds stated that they should at; empt to

establish headquarters in the twelve cities,
po})ulatxon and voter turn-out,

then,

the larger towns.

in descending order of

In some cases Hoeh and

Studds advised forming area headquarters to support activities in several

cities and the surrounding towns.

In the case of the smaller towns, but

ones with high voter participation they advised establishing a "home"

headquarters borrowing a page from Romney's campaign manual.

A local organization, would have to be created;
find,

staff, and fund the local headquarters.

objective for

tliesc headcjuar tor s

then it would have to

Coupled with the organizatior

was also a caiiipaign schedu] ing priority.

2hl

They oxpoctcd

t.lKi..

two or tliree weeks.

Sonaun- McCarthy would be visiting New Uau.psliirc
wit.bin
The campaign's top organizing priority then had to

be the cities where McCarthy could campaign without time
lost to travel and

where the broadest media coverage would be possible.

Hoeh and Studds used

the folJ owing analysis of the most recent presidential preference
primary,

196

to determine the cities and towns that would receive their highest
priority

attention.

The first priority would be the opening and staffing of a state

campaign headquarters.

The committee agreed with the decision to locate

the headquarters in Concord.

all but

tlie

The next priorities were the cities which, in

case of Franklin, had populations in excess of the towns.

Then

they selected those towns having a population of 2,000 persons or more and

ranked them according to their respective size and ratio
participation.

of Democratic voter

The organizational task was to begin moving do\m the list of

cities from Manchester to Franklin and through the list of

towTis

from Salem

to the smallest incorporated community in New Hampshire, Waterville Valley.

(Tables 7-1 and 7-2 contain the data to rank the organizing priorities.)
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Tabic 7.01:

City Demncratic Vote Rank Ordered"'-^

Population
City

County

1960

Democratic
Pres. Primary
Vote 1964

Dcmoc rat ic
Vote as

Names on

% of

Clieckl ist

Checklist

1964

KancnGstor

(Hillsborough)

88,282

8,900

18.8%

47,298

Nashua

(Hillsborough)

39,096

3,486

14.8

23,517

Concord

(Merrimack)

28,991

760

4.7

15,148

Portsmouth

(Rockingham)

25,833

442

3.7

11,800

Dover

(Stafford)

19,131

1,760

16.7

10,506

Berlin

(Cooc)

17,821

3,306

30.0

10,985

Keene

(Cheshire)

17,562

777

8.5

9,118

Rochester

(Strafford)

15,927

681

7.8

8,722

Laconia

(Belknap

15,288

769

9.2

8,328

Claremont

(Sullivan)

13,563

757

10.0

7,498

Lebanon

(Grafton)

9,299

251

5.6

4,457

Soricrswor th

(Stafford)

8,529

861

15.2

5,645

Franklin

(Merrimack)

6,742

398

9.7

4,077

*

CITY TOTAL:

>'<54.9%

306,064

23,148

13.7%

168,099

STATE TOTAL:

*57.6%

606,921

41,436

11.8%

349,667

Percent of city population registered to vote.

7M3

Table

7.02: County/Large

Tow

Democratic Vote Rank Order

Population

Towns (Pop.

2.(lQOjO_

Belknap Co.

^(GO.A^o)

Belmont
Gilford
Meredith
Til ton

Carrol]

Co._ ''-(72.1%)

*Convjay

Wolf eboro

Chesir c Co. *(54.A%)

Hinsdale
*Jaf f rey
*Swanzey
Walpole
Winchester
Coos Co.

.

*(55.3%)

Enfield
*Hanover
Haverhill
*Littleton
^Plymouth

HHls borough

C o.

Amherst
^Bedford
*Gof f stown
Hillsborough
''Hudson

+Merrimack
''^Milf ord

Pel ham
H-Peterborough

Wilton
HGrccnvi] le

*

'^57.1%)

Checklist

Number of
Names on
Checklist 1964

_8._6%

17,483

% of

1,509

1,953
2,043
2,434
2,137

86
67
138
109

15,829
4,298
2,689

469
89
74

3.2
3.8

43,342

2,29 0

9.6

23,621

2, 187

116
256
113

206

10.0
13.4
6.5
4.6
16.6

1,159
1,900
1,737
1,663
1,239

37,140

4,883

22.9

21 ,321

2,389
3,039
3,138
2,586

114

318
163
376

10.8
18.5
9.0
26.8

1,046
1,710
1,794
1,400

48,857

2,125

1,867
7,329
3,127
5,003
3,210

90
289
63
228
109

8.3
10.4
3.7
6.6
6.0

1,072
2,762
1,570
3,450
1,787

i?8jiAl

16,789

16.4

101,895

2,051
3,636
7,230
2,310
5,876
2,989
4,863
2,605
2,963
2,025
1,385

67

229
664
95
761
291
413
400
180
175
338

5.2
10.4
16.0
6.9

1,288
2,199
4,148
1,367
3,285
1,825
3,497
1,614
1,924
1,215
760

3,626
2,825
2,411

Col cbrook
Gorham
Lancaster
Nor thcumber land

Democratic
Vote as

28,912

3, 154

A (57. 4%)

Gr afton Co

1960

Democratic
Pres. Primary
Vote 1964

20

77

Percent of county population registered to vote.

7.6
4.8
8.5
7.6

1,119
1,385
1,619
1,420
11 ,416
"

752
1,918

2",

27,021

23.

15.9
11.8
24.7
9.3
14.4

A4.4
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TABLE

Population
Toj^ns

(Po p.

2,000+)

1960

Merrima ck Co. *(59.9)
*Bo£Jcaweri

*HookseLt
Hopkinton
^Pembroke
Pit tsf ield
''tAlleiistown

Rockingham Co.

*

(

58

.

1

%

''Derry
F.pping

*Exeter
''Hampton

Londonderry
Newmarket
Plaistow
Rye

*Salem
Seabrook
Straf ford Co. *(55.2%)
' Durham

Farniington
Rollinsf ord

Sullivan Co. '-(55.2%)
Char] estown
*Newport

*

Percent of county populati

7.02 (Cont.)

Democratic
Pres. Primary
Vote 19e

67,785
2,181
3,713
2,225
3,514
2,419
1,789

3,339

99,029
6,987
2,006
7,243
5,379
2,457
3,153
2,915
3,244
9,210
2,209

5,422
390

59,799
5,504
3,287
1,935

3,097

28,067
2,576
5,458

1,513

104
264
107
625
129

240

211

284
288
180
424
307
76
1 ,

104
197

124
193
237

52

411

registered to vote.

Democratic
Vote as
of

Checklist
8.2%
9.2
10. J

6.7
22.9
10.1
20.4
9. .4

9.2
16.6
6.6
7.7
11.6
23.8
15.6
4.1
15.5
13.8

Number of
Names on
Checklist 1964
40,665
1,126
2,547
1,594
2,720

'

1,271
1,174

57,613
4,224
1,266
4,267
3,712
1,544
1,779
1,963
1,833
7,082
1,422

9.3
7.2
9.3
20.3

33^040
1,710
2,070
1,162

9.7
3.9
13.5

15,592
1,325
3,044
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simply reading the name of the key
city or

as field orfir.ni7.ers those in the room

v;ho

Strong leads existed in many conununities

;

to^^.

they were able to list

were willing to begin the work.
there were organizations in a few,

the nucleus of organizations in others, but
almost nothing in the largest city

Manchester, and in three strongly Democratic cities,
Rochester, Somersworth.
and Dover.

There was no contact for Berlin.

V/liat

they had was the name of

a state representative from neighboring Gorham
but not a single name from

Berlin itself.
Democratic.

Berlin, the northernmost city in New Hampshire, was
strongly

Isolated by the barrier of the

VJlii r.e

Mountains from the populous

southern part of the otate, Berlin had grown up as a paper-moking
wood-process
ing city.

A tradiLion

of strong union organization, bread and butter Demo-

cratic Party allegiance, and a population composed mostly of French
speaking

Canadians made Berlin unique among

Nev;

Hampshire's cities.

Realizing that the campaign had to be developed rapidly in order to
work, Hoeh and Studds outlined what was ahead.

primary day March 12th.
accompj.ished.

Ten weeks remained before

During that time many tasks would have to be

The first would be to identify local supporters

priority/important Democratic vote producing coraiDunities.

.:n

each of the

The second would

be to identify or organize events that would be appropriate for Senator

McCarthy

Co attend,

A "shelf" of possible campaign activities had to be

inventoried for each of the key cities and towns.

would be responsible for maintaining this "shelf."

The local organizations
They, Hoeh advised,

should be able to suggest on short notice activities that could be arranged
as an effective schedule for the candidate.

2^6

The third lmportnr.t.

loca:i

they .ould be assigned.

local efforts.

T],.

rosponslb

i

1

.{

ty wns

l:o

fund the activities

ean,paign had to be a confederation of
separate

Each of these local efforts would require

which would be a miniature campaign.

a

local organization

There would have to be fund raisers,

schedulers, headquarters staff, publicists, and
most of the other accoutennent
of the statewide campaign.

Too much had to be accomplished in too short

a

time to permit centralized management and control
of all of the campaign's
es.c:cntial

activities.

Furthermore Hoeh and Studds felt that without

large

a

central campaign staff capable of organizing and advancing
each activity of
the campaign, it was necessary to rely heavily on the
ingenuity of the local

activists.

Both baa developed an appreciation for the effectiveness of
the

local groups in the early stages and were impressed by the sensitivity
of the

local groups to both the needs of a national candidacy and the political

traditions of their own communities.

The campaign, therefore, had to be created as a confederation of local

operating committees tied by the need for mutual communication and by

a

common objective to the state and national structure of the McCarthy candidacy
At this stage it should be noted that the local organizations in many states

number of New Hampshire communities were further developed than were

and in

a

either

llie

state or the national McCarthy organization.

felt Ihcy could support
a telc]ihone,

a

If a local committee

headcjuarters they were advised to find one,

put up a sign and

go

from tliere.

install

They should not expect the

state or the national caiapaign to be of much assistance with eitiier money
or advice.

2A7

As

..n

exa.,.i.U>

Lho Kceno aron commiff:cc was roady to
proceed.

wanted to know was wl>ether they should

;;o

constructive, how they should relate to

alu-ad,

tlie

t

Hey

whether their plans were

statewide effort

there would be financial assistance for their
headquarters.
In their efforts than most other communities,

All,

and whether

Further advanced

the Keene committee set a

pattern that would be followed in almost all of the
local efforts of the
campaign.
from either

The local committee could expect little or no financial
assistance
tlie

state or the national offices.

The local committees were

encouraged to do what they thouglit they could do effectively and

wliat

they

could sustain with locally raised money and locally recruited
volunteers.

Hoeh and Studds advised tliose attending not to commit themselves either
in terms of activity or expenses to more than they thought they could sustain.

Secondly, they warned against careless press statements, speaking for

Senator McCarthy, or representing

In'm

or the campaign with respect to issue

positions or activities other than their o\m.

Any state or national campaign

policy questions or issue positions should be directed to the state headquarter

The meeting ended with several priorities clearly in mind.

was to return to

tlieir

communities and begin organizing for

first major task for some

second
.local

wa.s

Vs^ould

a campaign.

be to j^repare campaign schedules.

to find workers, money,

objectives for the campaign.

a place to work,

The first

The

and to outline appropriate

The meeting ended

with, a

mild sense of con-

fidence, but with an even stronger feeling of the Importance of the tasks

ahead

The
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At host

camiKn;.ns Uavc difi iculu .-arly pc-rJods.

Often the

problems are reduced through lengthy preliminary
meetings
code major political ventures.

start: up
'

tliat

usually pre-

During the usual pre-campaign preparation

scores of tasks have to be accomplished which
prepare the participants for
the campaign while at the same time providing
a testing period.
the McCarthy campaign had had extensive
preparation.

planning had been underway for years.

All but

For Nixon and Romney

Even the Jolinson campaign had been

carefully developed over months before Boutin arrived in
New Hampshire.

For the national McCarthy campaign or the New Hampshire
effort no

such preparation time was available.

Given this circumstance the campaign

had to develop rapidly on a number of fronts without the planning,
the testing,
or the caution that precedes similar events.

Ten weeks was an incredibly

short period in whicli to organize an effective campaign for Senator McCarthy,

With

a

little advice and some cautions, the McCarthy leaders released the

local campaigners.

Although their experience warned against such loose

management, they felt

th.at

the bond between the selfless objectives of

McCartliy's effort, concern about the war, and a certain desire to be professional

would somehow keep the locally based campaigns under control.

If the local

loadershi]) had trouble, or needed to check an activity or wanted to report

something, they were advised to call Hoeh or Studds.

They were advised

especially to call before acting if there was a question.
quixi>ti(:

nature of the effort, few

if

liecause of the

any of the New Hampshire committee

members, state or local, viewed the campaign as in any way enhancing their
ovm personal or politica]

futures, unlike some persons involved in other campaigns,

2A9

rosaU

As a

of this basic difference, cooperation
and comnmnical Ion were

tho watchwords.

No one sou!;ht to establish an independent
role for oneself

at the expense of the campaign or the
candidacy.

The reward, if there was to

be a reward, haunted the shadows of something
that could only come from

selflessness, joint effort, and careful consideration
of each individual
action.

There were no stars, major personages, or special
leaders to flatter

or to be dealt with with special deferance.

It was a campaign of equals,

equally stressed, equally responsible, and equally entitled
to taste the
success.

With

tluit

feeling the tone of the campaign was set.

In spite of the early coheslveness of the campaign, the first
several

weeks moved ponderously.

The meeting at the Eberhart home on January 7th was

the first and only organizational meeting of the state campaign.

There would

be other meetings much later in the campaign but these would be used to present

information about
organization.

a

campaign objective rather than to bring together an

New Hampshire winter weather and distances make statewide

meetings difficult and, in this campaign, such meetings were seen as a waste
of valuable time and energy.

Within the first two struggling weeks of the campaign Hoeh and Studds had
been successful in giving the effort its own cliaracter and vitality.

Part of

this success cam.c from McCarthy's own unique political posture and part from
tlie

growing frustration of the voting public with things as they were early in

1968.

But, undeniably,

the growing McCartliy campaign in New Hampshire, and

nationally was lively news, even optimistic news.
trast to the jiondorous

nev^^s

of

tVic

It was

appealing

in con-

LBJ administration and the depressing news

from Vjetriani and the American cities.

250
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Tin.
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its pJace in

tlu.
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coniini'
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1

i

fo In

Now Hampshire.

public's stream of consciousness.

Tlie

It wns boglnning

art form of

campaign politics require that a campaign organi.-ation
project consistency
with the public image of the candidate, respond to the ability
of the voter to
tolerate issue contents, and to adapt to the particular political
climate of
a

jurisdiction.

fully observed.

To be successful, each of these constraints had to be care-

Since this campaign began differently, had different objectives,

and sought different methods in a time v/hen conformance was becoming

oppressive, it started by bending if not actually breaking many of the conventions of political activity.

Its success could be insured by continuing to

be distinct and continuing to find different ways to organize, and to gain the

allegiance of the New Hampshire voters.
Nev7

The importance of the biography of

tlie

Hampshire campaign is that the leaders were able to calculate the risks

and then reach out to the voters in a manner that produced the desired results.

Electorial politics is at best a chance.
situation the odds are even.

When there is a competitive

As a result most campaigns are conservative,

seek to avoid risks, minimize exposure and attempt to control events.

To

outward appearances, campaigns are often boring, narrow, lack imagination,

concentrate on accepted or acceptable societal standards and fail to strain
either

tlie

mental or institutional capacities of the population.

Under the

best of circum5- tances campaigns create excitement through images, hoopla,
stylo, rhetoric and method, but rarely through serious debate or constructive

dialogue.

To accomplish anything with

the McCarthy leaders realized

lessons of

tlieir own

tliat

tlie

McCarthy candidacy in New Hampshire,

many of the rules of campaigns and the

campaign experiences would have to be quickly and carefully

examined and new rules created in order to

m:ike

the McCarthy candidacy work.
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EAKLY STATE CAMl'AIGM OPlvRATIONS

Mailing _and Vol u n

V. c.

e i:

In the December 1967 memorandum to Senator McCarthy, Koeh and
Studds

wrote;

—

We envision a massive mailing effor t
and extent of the Lodge effort in 1S64
Democrats and Independents.

of the quality and
to all registered

—

Coupled with this promise was an assuanption also stated in the December
mejuorandum:

We have already acquired the voting list s for the entire
state (All registrants: Democratic, Unaffiliated, and
Republican.
Acquiring the lists and making such lists into something uyable for mailings
\7cre

tX'JO

quite distinct tasks as Studds and Hoeh found out shortly after the

State headquarters opened in Concord.

Both assumed that the lists would be

readily trannf erable to mailing labels.

Wiat they found was that the lists

were anything but orderly, most omitted proper addresses, and some important
communities were totally missing.
The plan called for

tv70

distinct mailings.

One V70uld be sent to the

registered Democrats and the other to the unaffiliated or Independent voters.
Therefore, each checklist had to be reviewed twice to produce labels for each
class of voters.

The major problem was that many New HaDipshire coiiauunities

do not record the address of the voter on the checklist.

This meant that

reverse telephone directories, roealar telephone directories, or city directories had to be used to

fiiid

a problem not anticipated by

the correct address for each voter.
r.he

McCarthy leaders.
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This was

25^

When the firrt volunteers began struggling
with

was

fell.:

in the young

c.-impc.igu.

tl,e

lists a deep shudder

Approximately 110.000 names had to be taken

from the voting lists to construct the mailing
file of the campaign.
was expected co be boring but a routine job.

were examined and

t)w.

This

As soon as the first checklists

first label sheets put in a volunteer's
portable type-

writer, a telephone call

vjas

made to Studds.

What they thought would be a

simple task vanished in chaos.

Much of the campaign had been predicated on the Lodge write-in
model.
The variation of the model which Hoeh and Studds felt would succeed
for

McCarthy

wa?:

that,

in addition to the registered Democrats, they expected

to attract a significant number of i-ndependents into the Denocratic column
to vote for Senator McCarthy.

appeal had to be made.

To have this happen

a

direct personalized

The independent voters had to receive a letter from

Senator McCarthy urging them to vote for him.

The appeal to the Democrats

was almost the same as that which had been directed to the registered Repub-

licans by the organizers of the Lodge effort in 1964.
tive to Lyndon

B.

There was an alterna-

Johnson and there were substantial reasons for considering

a vote for McCarthy,

In fact, at the planning stage, Hoeh and Studds serious-

ly considered Including a return postage paid card with the letter.

card had been included with the Lodge mailing.

A similar

It had produced the early

indication that there was substantial support for the Ambassador among

Nev;

Hampshire Republicans.
The mailing was essential and it had to be personally addressed.

If

addresses had been included v;ith the names on the checklists then the job
would be manageable.

Without addresses the job became something far beyond

the capacity of the campaign as originally conceived.

The manpower needed to
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sort throutJi the lists, the directories, and to prepare labels exceeded
the
optireistic view of lloeh and Studds and presented the campaign with its
first

serious problem.

Weighing alternatives, the McCarthy leaders considered scrapping the

mailing as a direct appeal and blanket mailing to the critical cities and
tovms instead.

Such a blanket mailing could be accomplished by using a com-

mercial direct mail house.
and impersonal.

The effect would be of a blanket, but indiscrete

The message could not be specific.

same for both Democrats and Independents.

It would have to be the

It would also arrive at Republican

homes who might be irritated by being so carelessly addressed.

Any appearance

of professionalism on behalf of Senator McCarthy would be lost by such a

broadcast approach.

Somehow the mailing problem had to be solved and the

way seemed to be to use manpower.

oxily

At this point the New Hampshire McCarthy

Campaign made its first appeal for help to the national McCarthy headquarters.

Previously an appeal for a manager and an advance person had been made, but
not

a

request for volunteers.

Obviously there would be a risk.

A broadcast call to V/ashington for

volunteer help to carry out New Hampshire based campaign tasks could present
the New Hampshire campaign with some serious problems.

The risk

V7as

not

having control over who would be sent to New Hampshire and now knowing how
they might behave.

Secondly, the logistical problem of supporting volunteers

with housing, transportation, and m.eals would confront the fragile New Hampshire effort with demands that it was not then equipped to handle.

period in national politics the peace protests were at their height.
Students for

a

At this

The

Democratic Society (SDS) had created a seriously negative
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imase for student activists, and New Hampshire's
latent xenophobia seemed

both real end virulent to the New Hampshire
McCarthy leadership.
The risk had to be taken or the carapaign would
be unable to mall to its

targeted voters.
teers.

Hoeh established several guidelines for
out-of-state volun-

The firct was that they should contact him or
Studds before coming to

New Hampshire so that at least a telephone introduction
would be made.
Secondly, before doing anything else in the campaign, a
volunteer should

check In with either Hoeh or Studds at the state
headquarters.

Both these

coiiditions made it possible to, first, establish in the mind of
the volunteer

the direction of the campaign and from whom their work v7ould be
coming and,

secondly, it would give Hoeh and Studds the opportunity to acquaint the
person

with the political and social sensitivities or, perhaps more appropriately,
paranoia of the McCarthy effort.
teers had begun.

By late January the first trickle of volun-

The mailing label job was still proceeding at a ponderously

slow pace, but between the dedication of local volunteers and the vitality of

those willing to come to New Hampshire to help, the right mood for the miserable job was set.

Delegate Selection Strategy

ALnost the furthest thing from the leaders' minds was the possibility
that delegates would be elected representing McCarthy.

The campaign concept

was to dent the political armor of Lyndon Johnson by showing that a significant

segment of his party was willing to vote against him when given the opportunity.
There was no question in the minds of any of those involved in the campaign
that if Lyndon Johnson wanted the nomination he had it.

From ali of the evi-
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dence i. Now Ilnmpr.hire, Johnson not only
wanted to be

renominated,

also wanted a vote of approval for his
policy in Vietnam.

but he

Johnson, it appear-

ed, would only be vulnerable on the
presidential preference side of the two

part New Hampshire ballot, and this is where
the McCarthy leadership would

focus the campaign.

On January

7.

1969 the NEW YORK TIMES published the following
editorial

which reminded the New Hampshire campaigners of
the importance of the delegate portion of the ballot:

McCarthy in new hai^shire
Early in 1952 President Truman had privately made up his
mind to retire, but organization Democrats in New Hampshire
persuaded hJju to enter his name in the state's primary.
Otherwise, they argued, a slate of political unknoxms
pledged to Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee would win
by default.
"If the boss doesn't win that primary," one
TruHian aide remarked at the time, "those New Hampshire
fellov7S better now shov7 their faces around the VJhite House."
The unexpected happened.
Senator Kefauver, with his coonskin cap and tireless handshake, routed the better-kno^^m
Truman delegation.

Senator Eugene McCarthy can take some comfort from this
history.
President Johnson today has the backing of the
Democratic party organization and of most of the leaders.
But party organizations do not count for much in New
Hampshire, and leaders can often deliver nobody's vote but
their own.
Under these circumstances. Senator McCarthy v;as
well advised to change his mind and enter the New Hampshire
primary.

President Johnson, taking care to avoid the fiasco that befell President Truman, has refused to authorize the use of
his name in Nevj Hampshire.
As a result, his supporters are
running as delegates "favorable" rather than "pledged" to
him and are seeking r^^-rite-in votes for him on the preferential side of the ballot since his name will not be listed.
This cautious approach will enable Mr. Johnson to claim all
the credit for a victory and to blur the significance of a
defeat.
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Hw

i^opubllcan primary voting in New
Hampshire Is
lictcwi.e encouraging to Gov. George
Romney, the G.O.P. underdog.
In 1952 In the Republican primary,
General Eise;ho"er
absent .n Paris, defeated Senator Robert
A. Taft. who cam!

paigncd vigorously.
Four years ago a write-in campaign
for
Henry Cabot Lodge swamped the two
Republican front-runners.

Against this background of insurgency and
independent thinking there is no reason to suppose that
New Hampshire voters
are particularly conservative or hawkish.
Governor Rcmney
can thus afford to discount the polls
that show him running
tar behind former Vice President Nixon
and to rely upon his
own formidable talent for man-to-man persuasion.
New Hainpshxre is not going to decide the nomination
in either party
but no one should underestimate its capacity
to manufacture*
political surprises.-^

Given this reminder, Hoeh and Studds concluded that
a slate of delegates
had to be filed in order to show the seriousness
of the New Hampshire McCarthy

campaign.

Without delegates the campaign would be criticized as
being just an

effort to embarrass the President and to assist the Republican
Party win the

election in November.
At the same time, the LBJ leadership was filing its slate of delegates.
The Democratic State Conmittae Chairman, William Craig, announced to the
New

Hampshire press that he

v/as

filing as

a

delegate "favorable" to the nomina-

tion of Lyndon Johnson, January 5, 1968.^

With this followed

e

series of

carefully orchestrated delegate filings of prominent New Hampshire Democratic

Party leaders.
Not faT,\iliar with the political importance of the delegate filing process, Koeh called former Democratic National Committeeman William L. Dunfey
to ask his advice.

Hoeh's question concerned how Dunfey perceived the diffe-

rence between the two classes of delegates

"favorable."

—

those "pledged" and those

Hoeh and Studds knew the legal difference, but

of the political advantages.

V7ere not

aware

Dunfey explained that filing a delegation
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••pledged" to the McCarthy nomination
would give those making the slate
complete

control over the immbor of delegate candidates
that would be filed under
label.

thai:

Each "pledged" delegate had to have written
authorization from the

candidate before being permitted to file with the
label "pledged."

He pointed

out that anyone could file as a "favorable"
delegate candidate by simply paying the $10.00 filing fee.

were so

r.uro

He also noted that the Johnson vn.-ite-in
leaders

of their candidate's vote-getting power
that they did not plan

to control the number of individuals filing for
the delegate and alternate

delegate slots.

Dunfey then went on to recount

a bit of

Kew Hampshire's poli-

tical history telling Hoeh that in 1952 the same situation
had existed.

The

Kefauver supporters had filed a slate of "pledged" delegates and
alternates
in just the number of available slots.

The Truman supporters had allowed

their slates of "favorable" candidates to exceed the num.ber of slots
by a

ccnslderable number.
while the

Triimar.

As a result the Kefauver delegate vote was concentrated

vote was diluted by being spread over the list of candidates.

A "pledged" Kefauver delegation represented New Hampshire at the 1952 Democratic National Convention.
VJith thi£i

advice Hoeh and Studds adopted the "pledged" delegate strategy

and agreed to control the number of candidates.
hov/ever,

th.ey

To make this strategy work,

had to discourage individuals from filing as delegate candidates

"favorable" to the nomination of Senator McCarthy.' Unfortunately, even before
this decision
(Keene area)

h.ad

h^ad

been made, two McCarthy supporters from Cheshire County
already filed as "Favorable" to McCarthy.

To operate a dele-

gate strategy they had to discourage McCarthy supporters from filing on their
own as "favorable" delegate candidates, and at the same time, construct

a

full
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of caudidatCB for both delegates
and altcrnnte delegates pledged
to

8lnt:<.:

8upi.iort

McCarthy in the

Cii.-'.cago

Convention.

Eugene Daniell. leader of the Draft Robert
Kennedy effort, had already

promised to file delegates favorable to the
nomination of Kennedy.
had been one of the mavericks

Daniell

elected as a Kefauver delegate in the 1952

election.

He appreciated the possibility that the
magic of the Kennedy name

might send

hira to

another convention.

His persistence in not only filing him-

Relf as a delegate candidate but getting several
others of the Kennedy group
to file, gave lloeh and Stvdds aiiother problem.

After Hoeh's conversation with William Dunfey, he and Studds
concluded
that they had to develop a full slate of candidates.

The delegates and alter-

nates were assigned to New Hampshire in accord with the rules of the
Democratic

National Comiittec whicli meant first, delegates were to be elected by congressional diRtrictr, and second, since New Hampshire had been carried by the

Democratic candidate in the previous election (1964)
reward

—

,

it was entitled to a

an increase in the total size of the delegation.

The number of

slots in each of the state's two congressional districts were twelve delegates
and twelve aJ.tcrnates, a total of forty-eight candidate openings.

Gerry Studds agreed to make it his job to fill the forty-eight spots.
The strategy thay adopted was to attract attention to the McCarthy New Hamp-

shire effort by awarding places on the ballot on the basis of geographical

distribution.

The usual strategy, the one used in the John Kennedy delegate

selection fight of 1960, was to select delegate candidates on the basis of

prominence and location.

The latter criteria meant that most of the first

congressio!ial district candidates came from Manchester, the largest Democratic

261

Party city, and from Nashua and Berlin,
the second congressional district's
largest Democratic vote producing centers.

Hoeh and Stadds concluded that the likelihood
of electing any delegates
was remote, so instead of geographically
concentrating delegate candidates
from a few of the most populous cities of
a district, they decided to seek

candidates in a manner that x^ould geographically
disperse the campaign.

They

also sought to reward with delegate positions,
the prominent who had come out
in support of Senator McCarthy.

With forty-eight places to fill, Studds had assumed a
considerable task.
His first

telephone calls brought strange responses.

Instead of immediately

saying yes or no to his request, many responded by saying
they would have to

check their plans for the coming

suraiiier.

They said they would not become

candidates unless they wers iree to attend the convention scheduled for
August.
It had not occurred to Studds or Hoeh that more than a delegate or
two would

be elected.

The campaign had not become sufficiently strong state-wide to

have supporters v/here Studds and Hoeh felt the delegate candidates should
reside.

As a result, the job of filling the slate became one of convincing

supporters of their value to the slate to allow Studds to add their names to
his list.

According to New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated Chapter 57, Section
53:5 "The name of a candidate shall not be printed upon any such ballot unless
not more than sixty nor less than thirty days before the primary he files with
the secretary of state a declaration of candidacy.

.

.V

The thirty day filing

period be^an January 13th and would close Saturday, February 10th at 5:00 p.m.
Studds kept the names of the campaign leaders in reserve and contacted geo-

graphically
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dispersed campaign workers.
in the list.

Again ho faced the problc. of having
serious voids

These reflected weaknesses in the state-wide
organization.

Principally, these voids appeared in the
southeastern area of the state, Rochester,
Someri.worth

aod Dover, and in the north, Berlin and
Gorham.

With the state-wide organization paper thin
and time slipping by, Studds

roughed out a slate from these who were willing
to run.
that building the ideal slate would take more
time than

It became obvious too
vras

justified.

Conse-

quently, Studds began assigning places in the slate
to the leadership, including his ovm name, Hoeh's and that of David Hoeh's
wife, Sandra, as an alternate.

There still remained a number of slots unfilled.

A second problem then occurred.

The "pledged" delegate candidacy re-

quired the written consent of the candidate for president and
that consent had
to be filed prior to the expiration date of the filing period
on February 10th.

McCarthy was scheduled to visit New Hampshire late in January and probably
would not return to
date.

th-^i

state again until after the expiration of the filing

This meant that either the slate would have to be completed before

McCarthy's late January visit or some means of getting the slate approved would
be needed.

Koeh aad Studds gave this problem considerable thought and con-

cluded that it would not be possible to complete the slate before McCarthy's
late January visit.

Getting the final slate to McCarthy for signing prior to

the February 10th deadline would be chancy, given the Senator's possible inter-

national travel plans and the vagaries of New Hampshire weather.

Hoeh proposed

that a blank statement be prepared v;lth space for forty-eight names.

An appro-

priate consent statement and space for Senator McCarthy's signature were added.
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Durinfi the aaine time as the Johnson
conm^lttec wa. aTuun-ncJuc Mk" nau,c» of

the ,>t-omincnt New Hampshire De.uocratic
Party leaders who were fllinf. an dele-

Cate candidates

"1 avoraI,l.e"

to the renominatlon of ITesldent
Johr.on, a larfie

number of r.poataneous filings occurred.
wou1<l he twenty-Lilx

Ry the end of the fillnr, P-m

IcuI,

tlu-re

Johnson delegate candidatcr, in the first congressional
dis-

trict and nineteen in the second congresBioual
district for the twelve allocated alots for each district.

Di ssolution of the RFK W rl tc-Tn Campaig n
]'.y

tlie

letter dated January

Nov Hampshire Kennedy

v/r:!

2,

196^1,

addreaced to Kugene Dnniell, loader of

te-ln cffc^rt, Robert

"cease your efforts In my behalf."

.
i

rig

"

'

tliat

the reciuoiU

"The Kennedy name and what it stands for Is

either you or me," nanJcll said while stating
effort

KcniKuly asked nan iell to

DanJe.ll's reaction to what he sa:ld was the

lirst commun.i cation received from Kennedy, was

changed anyth

]'.

tliat

"liad

not

blgj-.er

tlian

he was "undaunted" In his

to llle dolegntcs "favorable" to the nomination of the New York Senator

and to solicit a write-in vote for

tlie

.Senator on the March

}2l:l\

presidential

primary ballot.
At

th.e

iiame time-

activities on his
neutrai

in

tlit;

boliai

that Robert Kenmtrly wrote Danlell asking him to "cease"
f

I)(MnocxatIc

not think he \vOuid

in New llampslii r e

,

he stati-d that he wouid "remain

Presidential primaries.

'Jurther

thi>

Kennedy stated that he

cause' of peace in Vietnam by throwinj; hi»

('id

26A

support to Senator Eugene J. McCarthy."

In the saine state.ruent Kennedy reaf-

firP.ed his contentJon th.t "Mr.
McCarthy's entry into the Presidential
race was

a healthy influence, because it helped
channel protest within the limits of

the d-emocratic process.

He went on to note that a majority of
perhaps only 25

percent of the population backed his position
on Vietnam.

That in the last

analysis, his responsibility was to try to be
effective in convincing a majo-

rity of more thar 50

percent."''-^

This equivocation on the part of Kennedy presented
serious problems for
the New Hampshire and the national McCarthy campaigns.

McCarthy himself had

expected that when he took the first step to focus protest toward
the political system he would receive the support of his congressional
colleagues who
had been outspoken in their opposition to the war in Vietnam.

As late as his

entry in the New Hampshire primary, not one member of the Senate had come for-

ward to support his position.

Especially distressing to him and to the evolv-

ing McCarthy organization was the fact that Robert Kennedy continued to play a

coy game in the political wings of both those opposing the war and those

supporting the renomination of Lyndon Johnson.
In a column published January 8, 1968, Mary McGrory alluded to the dilemma
of this frustratioii when she wrote:

Since November 30, when he (McCarthy) announced his intention to challenge the President, McCarthy has been accused
by the Johnson forces of being a stalking horse for Sen.
Robert F. Kennedy. The RFK followers, coniplainl...: of
McCarthy's inertia, have begun to call McCarthy "a stalkinghorse for Lyndon Johnson.^

Daniell's efforts in New Hampshire perpetuated both sides of this reaction.
First the McCarthy announcement had failed to bring with it re-enforcement

through the endorsement of prominent congressional leaders in the anti-war
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effort which reflected uncertainty on their
part as to McCarthy's effoctivenes
is
no the protest focus.

Secondly, without direct Kennedy support,
the option of

KcTincdy as the ultimate candidate would
remain should McCarthy fail.

the McCarthy leaders tried to i^^nore Daniell's
efforts and avoided

IsThile

direct conflict with him, his activity remained a
problem in their effort to

unify opposition to Jchnsou.

The same situation occurred nationally and
slowed

the movement of money and endorsements to McCarthy
during those important early

weeks following his announcement.

Until McCarthy's decision to enter the New

Hampshire primary the flow of both money and endorsements had
dried to a trickle.
No major endorsements had occurred and the campaign was being
run out of the

pockets of McCarthy's old liberal allies and

a few

wealthy nouveau political

activists who saw McCarthy as the only possibility for political protest.

In

the four primaries wiiich McCarthy had said he would enter all were almost

totally dependent on funds raised locally to support the McCarthy effort.

Kennedy's impact diverted attention from McCarthy as a serious candidate
toward his possible role as an RFK stalking horse.

During the early weeks of

1968, the influential New Yor k Time s concentrated its attention on the prospect
of a Kennedy candidacy to the point of all but excluding coverage of McCarthy's

budding

c^iiiipaign.

The secondary impact of the Times coverage was to distort

other media interest in McCarthy and especially the McCaxthy effort in New
Hampshire.

The

'rime.s

editorial and reportorial emphasis tends to have an impor-

tant ripple effect in the regional media of northern

Nev?

England.

A number of

daily newspapers and many weekly papers carry Times news service items and arc
edited by
shifts in

f

a

the paper.

Consequently,

V7he:a

the Times coverage

particular direction, then local daily and v'sekly newspapers tend
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to respond

:L„

tho.

r.au,e

.mnuor.

Since staff

i:o

cover anything but local, events

and an occasional stata event are severely
limited in most instances, the

regional preso takes its cues from as reliable a
source as it can find.

Beyond

that news conditioning was the fact that Robert
Kennedy was of special regional

news interest.

While perhaps not significant to the casual observer
of New Hampshire
politics, the nall>: Partmouth

,

the student run newspaper of Dartmouth College,

played a particularly interesting role in the New Hampshire
McCarthy campaign.

Mentioned earlier was the fact that the Daily Dartmouth was sponsoring
a series
of candidate forums during the primary seasons to which all
of the candidates

had been Invited.

In addition to the forum was the role the paper played

within the campus community.
newspapers

—

The student community is served by two daily

the Dail y Da rtmouth and the New York Time s.

The

IDa^ilj/

Da rtmouth

plcl-ed up the editorial inclination of the New York Times from the beginning.

As a result, the Daily Darumou th speculated as to the impact of McCarthy's New

Hampshire announcement on the possible candidacy of Robert Kennedy.

In their

first interview with David Hoeh immediately following the McCarthy's New Hampshire announcement, the Daily Dartmouth headlined the story, "Can McCarthy Lure

RFK Backers?"

The lead read:

David C. Hoeh.
.head of the McCarthy-f or-President movement in New Hampshire, predicted yesterday that support for
Robert Kennedy in the state primary will "dry-up" in the
v;ake of Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy's announcement.
.

.

A

The article went on to note that two Hanover area RFK supporters. History Pro-

fessor F. Dav;ld Roberto and Rev. Malcolm J. Grobe, had notified Daniell that
they were resigning from the RFK effort.

Otherwise the article quoted Daniell

as say Jug that the New Hampshire RFK committee remained intact.

:!G7

Tlu;

illusion

Lluir

Kennedy miy,hi become, a candidate appeared
especially

Ftronn to those readers ot the l)ally Dartniouth

listeners of the popular proGramming of

WDCi:

the New York Timea and the

.

the student radio station.

,

On.ly

the few faculty, residents and students who
strayed from Hanover to become in-

volved in various 1968 protest or political events
were attracted to the

McCarthy activity.
On January 16th, Daniell filed himself and five others
as delegate candi-

dates favorable to

r^FK.

In

tlie

following weeks additional delegate and alter-

nate candidates filed as Danicll tried to keep the write-in effort
alive by

emphasizing the importance of the delegate filings.

There was, however, no

substantive organi::ing on the part of the RFK committee.
Early in February, Theodore C. Sorenson,
President John
commit tee.

a

former top policy aide of

Kennedy, asked to meet with the members of Daniell's RFK

F.

The session was scheduled for February 7th at the Sheraton Wayfarer

Motel, Bedford.

candidates for

At that time, Daniell had been successful in filing fifteen
tlie

delegate slots favorable to the nomination of Robert Kennedy.

Sorenson came accompanied by William

L.

Dunfey, former Democratic National

Conmiitteoman and a close associate of the Kennedy family.

Dunfey had arraiiged the meeting in hopes of discouraging the Daniell group
from continuing their unauthorized efforts on behalf ol Robert Kennedy.

He felt

that bringing someone like Sorenson to New Hampshire would deliver the message
in irrefutable terms.

Sorenson met with the group and urged them to "cease and

desist" in their efforts to secure a write-in vote for RFK.
the mooting with a press conference in
to Daniell's committee.

vdiicli

Sorenson followed

he described tho message he gave
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Sorensou described himself as "friend,
lawyer, and unofficial advisor"
to
Senator Kennedy.
hia press conference he explained,
"New Hampshire Democrats will have . cho.ce in next month's
primary between two real candidates,

m

U.S.

Senator Eugene J, McCarthy and President
Johnson."

one ballot for a non-candidate is a
wasted vote.

He noted that "to cast

Therefore, if even one vote

is cast for him (RFK) in the New
Hampshire primary the Senator will regard
it
as one vote too many."

Fc concluded by saying. "Senator Kennedy
wanted me to

persuade everyone supporting him in this drive
that they are performing

disservice to the senator, his beliefs, and the
Democratic Party."

a grave

With this

Sorenson reaffirmed Kennedy's non-candidacy by
repeating Kennedy's statement,
"I will not be a candidate againsc President
Johnson this year under any

foreseeable circumstances "^
.

Dan.tell's reaction to the instructions from RFK's
personal emissary was
to say that he vjould, "press on" with the effort.^

Sorenson'

s

visit had its intended impact.

Front page coverage illustrated

Kennedy's reluctance to be identified with the New Hampshire write-in effort.

Dunfey had carefully assessed the situation.

Robert Kennedy's political future

could be seriously harmed by Daniell's poorly organized effort in New Hampshire.

Sorenson

vras

the chosen messenger with authority to speak for the Senator.

Kennedy was not running in

Nev/

Hampshire and no authorization, direct, indirect,

by omission or commission could legitimize the use of his name by Daniell and
his group.

Daniell

serious doubts.

lield

his "press on" position but his group began to have
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Altbounh nanioll never had a large organization,
he began to receive calls
from his supporters and even from several
of those who had filed as delegate
candidates favorable to RFK.
ir.sued a statement Friday,

With this pressure and Sorenson's visit,
Daniell

February 9th. one day before the close of the
dele-

gate filing period.
In deference to his (Kennedy's) request we
encourage all his
many loyal friends and sympathizers not to write-in
his name
in the coming presidential primary, but as
the best means of
giving support to his views and in particular those
concerning Vief-nam, \je unanimously endorse and will actively
work
for the present campaign in this state of Senator
Eugene
McCarthy. ...

Ee concluded:
We offer our services in any capacity and are united in our
complete opposition to Lyndon B. Johnson.

Approved by unanimous vote.
Chairman.

Signed: Eugene

S.

Daniell, Jr.,

An event of significant political proportions to the fledgling McCarthy
effort had transpired.

A potentially divisive companion effort had been eli-

minated without acrimony.

The pressure to end the RFK write-in had come from

Robert Kennedy himself which could be interpreted in

tv70

ways.

The first,

and least apparent, was that he wished to protect himself from a weak and

potentially damaging surrogate-managed political event.

But secondly, and of

greater Importance, was the appearance of support for the New Hampshire McCarthy
effort that could be read from Kennedy's request.

Kennedy was a prominent critic of the Johnson administration's Vietnam

policy whose early statements had encouraged those organizing the McCarthy
effort.

Soienson's only reference to the McCartliy campaign during his New

Hampshire visit was that "it speaks for itself."-'-^

Reacting to Daniell 's an-

nouncement, David Hoeh Issued a brief statement dated February 11th, which read:
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We are dclirJir-cd with Mils dcve.l opmcMit
It. unices uil
those in Nev^ IIainp£;hirc who with both Sen.
Kennedy and
Sen. McCarthy take strong issue with the
manner in which
Lyndon Johnson has broken the pledges he made to the
Democratic I'arty and to the American people in 196/.
.

The campaign had now developed sufficient strength
not only to draw attention but to capitalize on events that were external to
the campaign.

On the

other hand, the Johnson campaign suffered at least two
critical blows during
the period.

The first was that Robert Kennedy was clearly assuming a
"hands

off" position.

He would not come to New Hampshire to campaign for the re-

nomination of Lyndon Johnson as Bernard Boutin had contended he would eight
roonths earlier.

Boutin's trump card vanished.

He could not expect help from

the most popular political name in New Hampsliire.

At the same time Boutin

also lost the potentially divisive activity, to the McCarthy campaign, of

Daniell and

liis

v/rite-in effort.

The dissenting forces in New Hampshire were

now joined behind Senator McCarthy and under the leader sliip not of the maverick

Daniell but of respected Democratic Party workers and established local, county
and state leaders.

The Mc Carthy Dele g ate Slate is Filed

Daniell announced that he was ending the RFK write-in effort February 9th.
The filing period for delegate candidates closed Saturday, Februaiy 10th at
5:00
2-^1

]>.ir).

St.udda had been feverishly trying to complete the McCarthy slate of

delegate and 2^ alternate delegate candidates as the deadline approached.

Two serious problems remained as the last week of the filing period began to
close.

The first was that, in spite of his best efforts, the slate did not

contain names from either Manchester or Berlin.

Secondly, in order to file for
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deIoj>.;teG each

canaJdatc had

t.o

incBont hiinsolf or herself personally nl
the

office of the Secretary of State in the
State Capitol. Concord.

Individual

schedules and po.ssihle bad weather made this
requirement a serious hurdle.
Studd...

ai.i

Iloeh had

been successful in getting two persons who
had filed

on their own as favorable McCarthy delegate
candidates to withdraw with one

subsequently being included in the pledged McCarthy
slate.

Otherwise, the

record of McCarthy delegate candidate filings was clear
of all names except
those approved by Studds and included in the pledged slate.
the week caroe near an end,

Studds still lacked

willing to file as candidates.

a

Unfortunately, as

sufficient list of persons

Several stil] were holding back because of

potential schedule conflicts with the Chicago Democratic National Convention
dates, and others had not yet made the trip from their homes to fi]e in
person
as required by state law.

In the last seventy- two hours before the filing period closed, Sorenson

had come to New Hampshire.

Daniell hedged on whether to end the RFK write-in.

Studds needed delegate candidates and
effort as amicably as possible.

Iloeh

wanted to seal the end of the RFK

Daniell had long expressed his interest in the

delegate selection portion of the primary rather than the "beauty contest."
Iloeh

suggested to Studds that perhaps Daniel] could be encouraged to fold the

RFK tent if he and some of those who had already filed as RFK delegate candidates

were offered places on the slate of "pledged" McCartliy delegates.

In addition,

Daniell had flliJ as delegate ciindidates persons who resided in Manchestei and
Berlin.

If

tliese

filings could be swltclied to McCartliy, the geographical dis-

tribution objective of the McCarthy slate would be accomplished.
by Studds, Daniel.! was favorable,

lie

agreed to withdraw as

a

When contacted

favorable delegate
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candidate for RFK and re-fl]<> as a pledged delegate
for McCarthy.

vould al8o call each of those who were filed as

lU-K

He sold he

delegate candidates asking

them to withdraw and to offer those residing in areas
where the McCarthy slate
was deficient the chance to re-file either as delegate
or alternate candidates

pledged to McCarthy.
With Daniell's blessing and full cooperation, Studds now
contacted those

Daniell suggested would want to re--file and offered to help them through
the
procedures of the Secretary of State.

Several were able to make the change

Friday, February 9th but the last five or so slots could not be filed
until
Saturday.

All was moving smoothly until Studds awoke Saturday morning to find

that it was beginning to snow.

serious storm.

Roads

v/ere

By noon New Hampshire was in the midst of a

hazardous and the predictions

snow and freezing conditions.

As late as noon several of those

to make the trip to Concord had not arrived.

late filers were on the road.

delegate slate had filed.

v;ere for

increasing

v/ho

had promised

Studds called and found all the

By approximately 4:00 p.m., the last of the

Studds completed the listing of the delegate and

alternate names on the signed authorization from McCarthy and filed that too

with the Secretary of State.

Forty-eight names, no more and no less, were

filed for the forty-eiglit slots

oti

the McCarthy slate.

No attempt had been

made either to cross file favorable McCarthy candidates for delegate positions
or to remove the over filed names on the part of the Johnson organization.

The coup was coiTjplete.

The RFK effort had been successfully folded into the

McCarthy organization and symbolically sealed with the additional gesture of
filing their geographically prominent candidates for McCarthy.
hand,

On the other

the Johnson organization, unwilling to control delegate candidate filings.
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wa« now stuck with lists ol favorable candidates
far in excess of the slots
available.

The strategy had worked better than the McCarthy
leaders could

have expected.

Early Scheduling and Field Operations
Senator McCarthy's first campaign visit to New Hampshire
was scheduled
for Friday, January 26th and Saturday, January 27th.

Scheduling and related

logistics are always a challenge in a campaign but especially in a New
Hampshire presidential primary.

This results from the fact that both the national

campaign and the state organization are usually inexperienced.

Campaigns that

had extensive preparation, such as that of John Kennedy in 1960, and which had
the resources to employ experienced workers tended to move a bit more smoothly
in early campaign going, but all must face the test In the field.

Furthermore,

there is nothing quite like a presidential primary campaign to tax the capacities and capabilities of individuals, organizations, and candidates.

Even

large state senatorial or gubernatorial campaigns do not match the stakes that
are on the block as a presidential candidate begins in New Hampshire.

Beyond the inexperience and nervousness of a usual campaign, venturing
into New Hampshire attracts, for the serious candidate, great press and elec-

tronic media attention.

New Hampshire is the first.

Consequently, there is

little else for the reporters and columnists to talk about except New Hampshire,
As the McCarthy leaders learned when McCarthy arrived for the
Deceiuber 1967 lecture visit,

the reporters were attracted to New Hampshire and

could not be discouraged from visiting even with an unannounced candidate.
Once a candidate had announced and was scheduled to visit New Hampshire, the
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had to consider the modia as a factor in its
plans and niakc every

attempt to iiiaximize the positive news.

Also the campaign had to understand

that almost every step, statement and activity would be
under the probing

scrutiny of the reporters.

Schedules must include transportation, rooms, commu-

nications and plans to meet deadlines.

The campaign needed a full scale press

operation to provide copies of campaign schedules, press statements,
advanced
copy of speeches, and photographs in order to be sure that the media
coverage

would be adequate and, hopefully, positive.
The media seemed to respond to what had become kno\vm as media events.

These were either regular campaign activities which attracted attention or
staged episodes of human interest value that could be easily encapsulated for

television viewing.
campaigns.

By 1968 such events had become a

fetish

of most national

The medic\ had come to expect, if not actually demand, that the can-

didate take every opportunity to provide the reporters V7ith these homey, if

occasionally foolish, profiles.

These had become what amounts to

a gray area

in many presidential campaigns between what is a legitimate means of attracting

public attention and a circus act.

The temptation to perform in the center

ring of the traveling show of a presidential campaign is strong.

dates resist, others succumb.

Some candi-

Some succeed by resisting, others by succumbing.

All have to reveal their humanity in these media rites or risk being labeled
"aloof" or "detached" or "not down-to-earth."
is tremendous upon all involved:

the media.

and

tlie

The pull to contrive and perform

candidates, campaign leaders, workers and even

New Hampshire is the stage.

The stars, the production, the audience

bit jjlayers are conveniently homogenized into a statewide road show that

shifts its focus from the stage to the background in one continually flowing
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ecricB of events.

The question which caiupaicn managers have to
consider is:

what would be viewed as a legitimate news event?

What could be contrived to

capture media attention?

Relying on the spontaneous would not necessarily pro-

duce a noteworthy event.

Contriving events, as the Romney managers did. would

not always cast the candidate in the proper light.

For the McCarthy leadership

there was alvmys the seriousness of the underlying reasons for the
McCarthy

candidacy.

It may have been,

or even be now, appropriate for some candidates

to run for the highest office of the land in the middle of a travelling circus,

but from what McCarthy's managers in New Hampshire had seen of McCarthy this

was not his stylo.

Nor did they sense that he would succumb to the siren's

call of that show.

With only the barest of exposure to McCarthy in Chicago and during his

non-candidate visit to New Hampshire, Rtudds and Hoeh had had no experience

with McCarthy as

a

candidate.

They assumed that the contemporary model of the

1960 Kennedy campaign with which both were familiar and which was then the

organizational model to be followed for success, would be used to shape the

McCarthy organization and campaign.
The

NeX'^

Hampshire leaders wanted to show McCarthy as

a

candidate in the

Kennedy tradition of well-organized, fast moving, diverse and street-level

campaign activity.

That model meant beginning the campaign day early, v/orking

constantly through the day and ending late in the evening.
a series of activities that V70uld make news, be

humanity and reveal his intellectual capacities.

It meant finding

symbolic, shov/ the candidate's

The spectrum had to be set

in a schedule that would both reflect the qualities of the candidate while

responding to the political ethos of New Hampshire.

With little to guide them,
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and SLudda relied on their Now llampohiro. experience
and political judgments

to buJ.ld the Bchedule lor the first day of the
campaiau.

Hooh recalled that John F. Kennedy bccan his 1960
presidential drive with
a prefis

conference at the City Hall in Nashua on January

earlier.

John

F.

2.5,

Just eii;ht years

For a campaign that felt its antecedent to be the lost
spirit of

Kennedy, no better symbolic place to becin the McCarthy drive
could

be found.

Tlie

Nashua committee couJd schedule the appropriate greetinc before

the statue of the late President near the City llnll steps, a press
conference

opening the campaign could follow and then, perhaps,

a

main street hand shaking

tour followed by a neighborhood coffee reception.
The populous spine of New Hampshire runs from Nashua on the border with

Massachusetts to Manchester, approximately 15 miles north of Nashua, to Concord
approximately 20 miles north of Manchester.

A convincing first day of cam-

paigning had to cover each of the three principal New Hnrapshire cities.
doing this the

niaxiiuum

By

an-state media impact would be available and with the

Nashua stop, some Boston television and press coverage would also be attracted.
VJhile Hoeh and Studds were confident of the scheduling abilities of those

in Nashua and Concord, Manchester had not yet developed its own McCarthy committee.

Without an organization to build

a full

to Concord before the end of the work day,

schedule and with the need to get

to file McCarthy's candidacy peti-

tions, Studds and Hoch decided to shorten the Manchester visit to the "visible"

luncheon,

a

brief block or two Elm Street hand shaking tour, and then to catch

a shift change at one of the plants in the Amoskeag Millyard.
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Following the candidacy filing In Concord and a

briei:

headquar tcrr. recep-

tion. McCarthy would return to Manchester where
a major policy speech was

scheduled at St. Anselm's College.

Studds and Hoeh were pleased that a college

site was available because there would be fewer audience
problems.

Also, the

conservative Catholic school would be an excellent backdrop for
McCarthy's
policy criticisms.
was not

tlie

The speech would end the campaign day.

A Friday evening

best time to schedule a political speech, but again the risk had

to be taken in order to strengthen McCarthy's image.

Both felt a reasonably good schedule had been created for McCarthy for
his first campaign day.

There was an open question concerning possible cam-

paigning on the next day, Saturday, January 27th, but this remained uncertain
in Washington.

paign.

A Saturday schedule would be difficult this early in the cam-

Winter Saturdays are difficult days.

Most campaigning happens during

the week when factories are operating, children are in school, and coffee

klatchcs can be arranged.

Visits to shopping centers, a winter carnival, ski

area, hockey rink, or outdoor recreation activity are possibilities but sche-

dules are heavily dependent on favorable weather, careful advance work and

considerable dead time in travelling.

The major outdoor winter attractions

draw more out-of-staters than New llampshirites and while this would help

McCarthy with the upcoming Massachusetts primary, it was not particularly
valuable for the New Hampshire effort.

Furthermore, a candidate was expected

to try out the sport or activity on show.

McCarthy skated, Hoeh and Studds

learned, and had been a good hockey player, but to put him on skis would have

made him a part of a circus act rather than a campaign.
was

k(!pt

open but without a specific schedule.

Saturday, the 27th,
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Adynnci n}], the First Campnif^,n Day

The hailnK.rk of the modern campaicn Is advance
work.

The advance person

i« the scout who is supposed to check all of
a campaign day's details, adjust

the Gchedule to meet the personal needs of the
candidate, provide opportunities
for the media and synchronize both the ethos of
the campaign and the campaign

locality.

It is a demanding and often thankless job.

A good campaign day is

a work of art which occurs as much by chance as by design,
but Is always

subject to a critical review.

The critics are the candidate, the media, the

local committee and virtually all others who have a hand in making the events
that occupy the candidate's time and project the campaign's message.

The best

laid plans of the schedulers and advance workers do not always guarantee re-

sults.

Too often it is the unexpected that will make or break a campaign day,

and it is quite often the unexpected that receives the attention of the media
to the exclusion of the pre-planned message.

The New Hampshire leaders knew the importance of both good schedules and
good advance work.

The rough outline that they had developed for McCarthy's

first day in New Hampshire would have to be timed, pre-run, checked and adjusted.

They suffered in this task from having only brief exposure to McCarthy as a

person and even less to him as a candidate.

They had no idea how fast or slow

McCarthy would work, what kind of reaction he would receive or what activities
were his favorites.

They knew he had worked hard in his Minnesota election

contests and that Minnesota and New Hampshire contained much the same mix of
rural small town and urban industrial centers as did New Hampshire.

They could

only assume that McCarthy would do as well in New Hampshire as he had in

Minnesota seizing upon those political opportunities which each state offered.
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Since In-state media, especially television, was
insignificant, McCarthy would

have to meet the voters on the street, in their places of
work, in their homes
and where they gathered.

He would have to handshake his way through a schedule

and find a way to communicate his issues and his qualifications
through these

informal contacts.

McCarthy's schedules had to be less what he might like to

do in a campaign and more of what New Hampshire required of a campaigner.

In

other states he might be able to pick and choose, but in New Hampshire their
was little choice and for a Democrat running during the winter, the choices

were even fewer.
Studds and Hoeh expected that now McCarthy had announced and a major national campaign

v;as

in progress, a full blown advance operation would descend

on the fledgling New Hampshire campaign before McCarthy's January 26th visit.

Again they relied on their only previous national campaign model, that of
John

F.

Kennedy in 1960 and Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey's visits during

the 1964 presidential campaign.

Several days before McCarthy

v/as

to arrive Studds received a call from

New York that Sandy Fraucher V70uld be arriving to advance the Senator's visit.

A check

v:ith

Blair Clark assured Studds that Sandy Fraucher was an experienced

advance person and, while young, had developed a considerable reputation advancing John Lindsey's campaign in New York City.

Sandy Fraucher arrived in Concord late in the afternoon of the Wednesday

before McCarthy's scheduled Friday arrival.

He left his shirts for Studds to

have cleaned, called the New Hampshire contacts he was given, and set up

several meetings to go through the schedule the next morning.

He made some

of the local connections but the day was gone before he had been able to
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The First Campal)>n

During the night the snow

Gtorni ended.

D.r^

New Ilampshlre road crews are famous

for being able to clear the state's main highways
to almost bare pavement within
a few hours after the end of a storm.

About six inches of white, fluffy snow

lay on the ground and hung from the branches of the hardwoods
and in blankets

on the evergreens.

The key was that deep, cloudless blue that only follows the

air cleansing of the day after a storm.

The temperature was in the upper

twenties but with the intense sun the air felt warm, almost with a touch of
spring

—

a day that would begin the maple sugar harvester thinking about
pre-

paring to tap his trees.
Hoeh and Studds were elated with the changed weather when they met early
that morning at the Concord Headquarters.

waiting.

The cars for the motorcade were

With them were two new faces who had come into town the night before

to help v;ith the campaign.

ing problem.

Studds and Hoeh vzere now confronted with a wrench-

Both of the new young men were neatly dressed, sport coat and tie

according to some perceived dress code, but one had a lengthy beard and the
other long hair.

Both were about to jump into a car to follow along during the

day's activity helping to drive, hand out materials or do vjhatever was needed.
Both Hoeh and Studds had been working with the concerned and serious students

who

were involved in the anti-war efforts and knew appearances were only a

small part of what the generation of the late nineteen sixties was experiencing.

Appearances did not particularly bother either of them as long as individuals

worked hard and behaved in a way that lent credit to the effort.

McCarthy's first day in New Hampshire.

But this was

Hoeh and Studds were particularly sen-

sitive to the fact that the oniy television image that might be projected from

282

New

Ilar.p^hirc-.

would be of bearded, long-halrcd, mini-skirted,
anti-establisloment

appearing young people.
explained the situation.

This could not be allowed.

Studds took both aside and

As much as he hated the task it had to be done
and to

the credit of the two young men involved they understood.

Studds' request not to come that day was,

help McCarthy not to hurt him.

Their response to

they had come to New Hampshire to

If Studds felt that their appearance would

hurt McCarthy during this campaign day they would not travel.

In fact, Studds

asked that they not even come close to the campaign that day.

He suggested

that they remain in Concord, help with preparations for McCarthy's visit later
in the day, and when McCarthy arrived, to get out of sight.
the toughest job Studds had to do during the whole campaign.

sary for either Studds or Hoeh to mention appearance again.

This was probably
It was not neces-

Like the New

Hampshire political history lesson which became required reading during the
campaign, volunteers were either "clean cut" and out front or they accepted

back room, invisible assignments.
McCarthy's car arrived in Nashua on time followed closely by the press
bus.

A group of perhaps fifty had gathered anticipating his arrival on the

plaza in front of Nashua's City Hall.
early for the shoppers.

It was a bit after 9:00 a.m., a little

But the activity and especially the sight of newsreel

cameras, light men, reporters, and sound crews began to swell the crowd.

CBS

had sent Roger Mudd, the Boston stations had sent reporters well known to

Nashua residents and the wire services had sent in their top reporters.
Studds and Hoeh greeted Senator McCarthy and directed him to the place
v/here the bust of President Kennedy stood on a pedestal just in front of the

City Hall rteps.

McCarthy gazed rather solecnily, reading the inscription

engraved in gold on the face of the black granite pedestal to himself:
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IN MKMORIAM

PRESIDENT
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
ON JANUARY 25, 1960,
THIS CITY HALL PLAZA
WAS JOHN F. KENNEDY'S
FIRST CAMPAIGN STOP
IN THE NATION FOR
THE PRESIDENCY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Still and nev7sreel photographers clicked and ground away as the
message of

that precedent became obvious.

Then McCarthy shook hands with those who had

gathered, exchanged friendly greetings and informal words of welcome.

Then

he entered City Hall.

The press conference had been scheduled for 9:30 a.m. when McCarthy

entered the City Hall auditorium at 9:15 a.m. the camera crews were still

struggling to assemble their microphones, lights and cameras, and the audience
was almost entirely composed of empty chairs.

candidate

Almost no one had experienced a

who arrived on time much less one who

was early.

John Kennedy's

campaign was notoriously late as v;ere most others that the political observers
could recall.

There were some awkward moments as the chairs begin to fill,

the stragglers from outside found their places. Hoeh and Studds went to find

the Mayor

v^ho

was scheduled to greet the Senator.

The New Hampshire press office had released a schedule for the day earlier
and copies were available for the press, and Hoeh and Studds expected that an

advance release of the Senator's remarks would be available for distribution.
The national advance man, Sandy Fraucher, appeared but he had no advance text
nor did he have a copy of the schedule for the day.

looking for their own advance man who
Nashua.

v/as

Hoeh and Studds were also

to meet them as they arrived in

He was expected to guide them through the day.
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The Mayor, Dennis Sullivan, finally arrived
saying that he had been ill and
had just come from his bed for the occasion.

In a few words Sullivan extended

the welcome of the city but did not offer
further encouragement.

sponded briefly and without text.

McCarthy re-

He called the Granite State primary a

special challenge, as he put it, "the primary has
the reputation of being the

harshest political judgment in the country."

He went on to note that "some of

New Hampshire's Democratic leaders have said the state is
so well organized
and disciplined that there wasn't any sense in his coming to
the state."

"Some

say that all New Hampshire people are hawks" and his anti-war
stand wouldn't

win him any votes.

He said he wanted the people to deny all those "base

rumors. "il

McCarthy set the theme of his campaign through his response to reporters'
questions.

One asked,

"l-Jhy

aren't you conducting a more forceful campaign?"

"I don't intend to shout at people around the country,
in New Hampshire V7ant to be shouted at.

The issues

I

I

don't think the people

want to get cut are not

best served by table thumping," he responded. 12

The press asked how his campaign was going so far, to which McCarthy replied, "All right."

Some one asked him to be more enthusiastic but he repeated,

"I think all right is an honest statement.

We haven't despaired yet.

haven't folded up our equipment and left the room."

We

He concluded the press

conference by noting that the prediction was that he would be lucky to get ten
or tv;elve percent of the vote on March 12th.

He said that he expected the figure

to be far more than what people supporting him say to expect.

run to win, that's all.''^^

"We're going to
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McCarthy, now well ahead of the scheduled

tinie

for the end of

tlie

press

conference, visited several City Hall offices to
handshake and chat with city
employees, then

out:

to the street,

greeting a few more of the early shoppers.

A nearby coffee shop had been scouted by the Nashua committee
as being the
place where McCarthy might meet voters on their mid-morning
coffee break.

The

entourage of reporters, camera men and the local committee jammed
in around
the surprised customers perched on their stools waiting to hear
the reaction
of these locals to the likes of Senator McCarthy.

For some reason the press

had expected McCarthy to receive a hostile reaction from New Hampshire voters.

They spent most of that first day quizzing those who shook hands with the
Senator and those who were present during his various appearances.

In the

coffee shop McCarthy quietly introduced himself, excused his interruption,
and moved easily from patron to patron.

The owner working behind the counter

had several opinions about the war which he expressed in a friendly way.

He

was a supporter of the nation and therefore the war, but he didn't care much
for the Johnson administration or its handling of the war.
In spite of the unscheduled tour of City Hall offices and the visits on

Main Street, McCarthy was still running ahead of schedule and few people remained on the sidewalks whom McCarthy had not already met.

It was time to move

on to the next stop, another example of the New Hampshire tradition of campaigning, a coffee party in a local home.

The entourage now numbering ten to fifteen

cars and the press bus vjound through Nashua's residential area arriving at the
home.

The reporters were anxious to see how McCarthy performed in this domestic

setting and proceeded to almost crovjd out the neighbors who had come to hear
and question Senator McCarthy.

Hoeh and Studds did not want the coffee to be
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an extension of the press conf erciice

,

nor did they want the presence, of the

reporters to repress the neighbors.

They had to make a decision between media

access to McCarthy or voter access.

They decided on the side of the voter and

quietly asked the press to adjourn to the kitchen and hold their questions

until McCarthy had had his chance to meet voters and respond to their questions.

During the session Koeh and Studds became a bit concerned with the pace
that

u^as

set during the day.

ahead of the schedule.

Iloeh

McCarthy was running as much as one-half hour
made a quick telephone call ahead to Manchester

to see if the New Hampshire advance man had arrived and to warn tliat Senator

McCarthy would be arriving in Manchester approximately fifteen minutes earlier
than planned.

Hoeh said he would stall as long as he could both in Nashua and

on the road, but too slow a pace would be obvious to the reporters and also

stretch the coffee beyond the reasonable patience of those who had come.

McCarthy recorded and filmed several interviews for the Boston television
stations that were following him that morning.

The Boston reporters and crews

then left the campaign just before noon in order to process their film and prepare for late afternoon deadlines.

Hoeh then asked that the Senator's car be

brought to the house in preparation for the trip to Manchester.
later the driver returned saying he could not find the keys.
v/as

called in and led

tlie

A few moments

A reserve car

entourage safely out of Nashua.

In spite of the delay and slow driving, the campaign arrived at the Manches
ter restaurant fifteen minutes early as predicted.

One Manchester supporter was

there to greet McCarthy but he whispered to Hoeh that the others he had Invited
to join in the luncheon had not yet arrived.

Again people assumed that campaign

always run late and for them to be on time, certainly not early, would be enough
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StuddG crabbed Senator McCarthy'

h

arm and began about a one block impromptu

handshaking tour of the Elm Street sidev^alk.

The press tagged along to check

on the local residents' reactions to McCarthy in this,
the most hostile of New

Hampshire territory.

Most people were startled, did not recognize McCarthy,

but when introduced were friendly, usually wishing him "good luck."

Using approximately ten of the extra fifteen minutes in the street tour,

McCarthy returned to the restaurant and, followed by the somewhat smaller press
corps, was ushered to his table through the main floor to the rear of the
crowded

second level of the restaurant.

Hoeh and Studds had expected that he would

move slowly through the restaurant shaking hands and Introducing himself or

being introduced by the Manchester supporters.

It became quickly obvious that

McCarthy, unlike uiany other politicians, did not enjoy interrupting people as
they were eating.

Hoeh tried to get McCarthy to appreciate that in this res-

taurant and at noon time, people were there to be interrupted and that in a

certain

v/ay

they expected that McCarthy would pass among the tables and booths

greeting each of them.

Apparently, this was not McCarthy's style.

The luncheon

went well but faster than scheduled since McCarthy had not tarried on entering
the restaurant nor did he change his ways when leaving.

He greeted a few of

the other patrons but mostly persons introduced to him by those who had joined
hira

for lunch.

The major disaster of the day was about to occur.

In his account of the

day Studds recorded the following:
.was a
McCarthy's first campaign visit to the state.
adlocal
hired
a
.had
and
I.
David (Hoeh)
nightmare.
character
of
a
some
kind
be
vance man who turned out to
who never showed up and that trip was advanced 20 minutes
ahead of the Senator's arrival (at each stop) by David
I never want to live through anything like
and myse]f.
.

.

that againl^*^
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Tha telephone calling Hoch and Studda began in
Nashua now rapidly Increased

when they arrived in Manchester.

No advance man had appeared and the next
stops

on the schedule called for McCarthy to be in
the Amoskeag Millyard to shake

hands with workers changing shifts.

been confirmed.

A time for this was listed but it had not

Holland and the other Manchester local supporters had
thought

these details had been checked by the advance man.

In

addition to the need to

check the exact shift change time, Hoeh now wanted to add
something into the

schedule in order to pick up the pace and fill in the extra time that
was
available
Studds and Hoeh bounced in and out of the dining room making desperate

telephone calls to confirm the shift change mentioned in the schedule, and
second, to try to add another event, possibly a plant tour or another shift

change.

The situation was desperate.

taurant for his next stop.

McCarthy was about to leave the res-

Originally, Hoeh and Studds wanted to have McCarthy

campaign along Elm Street to the newly rented store front that was to be the

McCarthy Manchester campaign headquarters.

But shortly after the lease was

signed and a day or so before McCarthy was to arrive the ceiling of the main

room fell in leaving the place a mess and a hazard.

In addition, the young

out-of-state volunteer, who Hoeh and Studds had sent to Manchester to set up
the headquarters and work with the local committee, was having trouble v/ith
the building inspectors' office over the sign that was to be placed over the

store front.

Apparently he did not realize that to place a sign on the front

of a building a permit was needed.

these events,

a

As a consequence of the combination of

headquarters opening in Manchester was out of the question.
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McCarthy

war.

now out on the street with Hoeh and Studds, still
not quite

sure what would happen next,

lloeh

began a hand shaking walking tour with

McCarthy north along the east side of Elm Street while Studds
and Manchester
supporters went to telephone booths to call in search of more definite
shift
change tiraes.

Although it was reasonably warm and sunny there were not many

people on the streets during an early Friday afternoon, so Hoeh began
taking

McCarthy into several of the larger stores and circulating among the customers.
To make sure that no incidents occurred, Hoeh sent a campaign workers ahead
to

check with the store manager to be sure that he would welcome McCarthy's campaigning.
parlors.

McCarthy also made knovm his preference.
"Wom.en," he said,

No campaigning in beauty

"did not like being seen by strangers when under

a dryer or wrapped up in towels."

He also cautioned about barber shops as

being places of strong opinion with little likelihood of being able to counter
the barber's view.

"It's as hard to argue with a man holding scissors or a

razor as it is to talk while in a dentist's chair," he quipped, and the cam-

paign passed by the beauty parlors and the barber shop on this first Manchester
hand shaking

tour.-'-^

The west side of Elm Street was in the shade, with even fewer people on
the street and smaller shops.

McCarthy moved quickly making his way back to

the place v;here the cars were waiting to take him to the next campaign stop

in the Millyard.

Studds was almost sure of the shift change time but still had not been
able to confirm it or make another change to his satisfaction.

The place, the

Brookshire Knitting Mills, was in the middle of the Millyard along a narrow
street that had been designed for rail and horse-drawn wagon service.

The
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care could enter but not the bus.

McCarthy arrived, the press ran to catch up

with him from the bus that was parked outside, and all
stood in eager expectation for the flood of workers to stream down the steps,
past the Senator's out-

stretched hand.
lloeh and

They waited for ten, then fifteen, then twenty minutes,
while

Studds nervously tried to find out what had gone wrong in
their

scheduling.

The Brookshire Mills were owned by the Sidores, a prominent Demo-

cratic family, and under this management were assumed to be friendly.

Hoeh and

Studds had also assumed that their advance man had been in touch with a member
of the family to arrange the visit.

with the Brookshire

As they soon found out

no one had checked

raanagement, they asked if the shift were about to change

and were told that part of the shift would change soon but that the largest

number of the workers had left approximately five minutes before McCarthy had
arrived.

Quickly Hoeh tried to arrange an in-plant tour but found that per-

mission to do this had to be secured well in advance.
At this inopportune time, one of the lost advance men, Sandy Fraucher,

arrived complaining loudly that McCarthy was standing outside of
factory about to greet non-union workers.
to write about and began taking notes.

a

non-union

The reporters finally had something

Hoeh grabbed Fraucher by the sleeve

and took him aside explaining in a stage whisper, that John F. Kennedy had

toured this factory in 1960 and that the Sidore family offered their workers

benefits

tliat

most textile union contracts had not even begun to include.

Through it all McCarthy chatted with reporters, remained calm, and greeted
the few workers who straggled out the door.
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Up until this point the day had gone well to
the outsiders.

The schedule

and the logistics seemed professionally handled and
what few problems had deve-

loped were known only to Studds and Hoeh.

Now the campaign was lodged on a rock

in the Millyard with little or nothing to do but wait.
As Studds recalled:
We made the famous mistake there.
We got him five minutes
late to a factory gate and he had just missed the bulk of
people which all the national press picked up to show how
bad the organization in New Hampshire was.

The organization in New Hampshire had been naively assuming that a candidate for the Presidency of the United
States would be preceded by some advance men. Some of us
had worked on Kennedy campaigns before and we had some
disillusioning still to go.
But we learned after that point that if there was going to
be advance work we were going to do it.
.

The doorstep of the Brookshire Mills became a symbol of a low point in the
campaign.
least

c.

Every story about McCarthy's first visit to New Hampshire carried at

paragraph about the doorstep and the key theme of the next two days

coverage of the campaign focused on the doorstep either in words or in film.
As an example one reporter wrote:
It also became clear early in the day that McCarthy's New
Hampshire organization has a long way to go to take on a
patina of professionalism.

Item:
McCarthy is scheduled to have dinner in a busy
downtown Manchester restaurant, where well-heeled business types eat, with a small group of supporters.

The dining rooms, upper and lower, are filled with people.

McCarthy has lunch, shakes hands with one or two people
who come to his table, then walks out without visiting one
single table or shaking another hand.
Explains his aide when asked by a reporter what the man is
We're behind schedule."
doing:
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Item:
McCarthy ir. scheduled to visit a textile plant at
3:00 p.m. to shake hands as the workers get off their shift.
He arrives at the plant slightly before 3:00 p.m.

But the shift got out at 2:A5 p.m.
So, he stands in the cold and slush, or in the plant
entry
waiting for another shift to get out half an hour later.

—

The result
about 30 minutes spent waiting to shake the
hands of less than 20 women who were obviously in a big
hurry to go home.-^''

Another caught the same scene but found something in the event that revealed

McCarthy's character.
At Manchester's Brookshire Knitting Mills, a schedule mixup found the campaigners arriving 10 minutes after a large
2:A5 p.m. shift let out.
The next flov; of vrorkers was to occur at 3:15 p.m. McCarthy
and his staff spent the time between the millyard, where
heavy slush from the day's traffic mingled with ruts carved
from ice, and the front lobby, where the weather was more
clement.

Then only about 15 women came out.
"I'm sorry, Senator," an aide confided.
wrong information about this."

"Our man fed the

"That's all right."
Later travelling between Manchester and Concord.
.McCarthy
"Yes, it has been a good day.
V7ell planned. "-^^
noted:
.

McCarthy was not easily ruffled by miscues or schedule mix-ups.

Hoeh and

Studds were demolished by the disaster in Manchester, but since McCarthy had

been so forgiving they promised each other that nothing like that would happen
again if they could control it in any way.

Other candidates, even several

then working in New Hampshire had become notorious for their intolerance of

mistakes.

Their outrages, while not often seen in public, had become part of
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the underfiround information of that campaicn year.

To see how McCarthy re-

sponded when faced with a debacle was refreshing but more
importantly, stimulated complete dedication to insure future perfection.
Quietly, McCarthy said, "Let's go," to Hoeh and Studds.

Sensing that the

press was let down by the stand in the cold, McCarthy climbed aboard
the press
bus to ride with the reporters to Concord.

Hoeh and Studds riding in the lead

car again slowed the pace as the campaign was still ahead of its
scheduled

arrival in Concord,

\sTiile

fumbling in the front office of the Brookshire

Knitting Mills, Hoeh had called ahead to Concord to warn them of an early arrival at the State House.

The well organized Concord Committee quickly made

the appropriate calls to the local reporters and photographers so that they

would be on hand for McCarthy's filing and to local supporters who could be

expected to attend the headquarters opening.

Both McCarthy and the reporters who had ridden with him on the bus came
off in a jovial mood as if nothing had happened during the previous stop.

McCarthy entered the State House, went directly to the Secretary of State'
office where Hoeh and Studds produced the appropriately signed petitions and
forms necessary to make the filing official.

The reporters asked the number

of signatures and the reply from Hoeh was, "Just the number required.

not attempt to produce more than this number."

We did

The filing was official, no

questions were asked concerning the names, nor problems encountered in the
exercise.

McCarthy then went to Governor John
call.

W.

King's office to pay a courtesy

The Boston Globe account of the meeting read:
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It was a courtesy call on the governor, the kind visiting
high-level politicians make when on someone else's home
ground.
The chat between Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy and Gov.
John W. King was brief.

"Is this your official start?" King small-talked as they
sat on a black leather couch In his office.
"Yes," said

McCarthy.

"You will find the people here will treat you courteously.
You will like campaigning here.
I did; I wouldn't have
done it three times otherwise.
I hope you will say what
a beautiful state we have here,"
said King.
"Yes, it is, I have already said how it reminds me of
Minnesota," said McCarthy.

Then, Friday afternoon, the two men shook hands, probably
.19
for the last time until March 12.
.

Follovzing the official filing and the meeting with the Governor, McCarthy

seemed to catch the spirit of the campaign.

His ride from Manchester to

Concord in the press bus had been stimulating and his reception in Concord
reassuring.

headquarters.

Nov/

he left the State House to walk the three blocks to the state

On his way he greeted people on the sidewalk.

tion was more cordial than it had been since Nashua.

Here the recep-

As he rounded the corner

from the State House to Main Street he was met by Vincent Dunn, Jr., the eight
year old son of the New Hampshire's Banking Commissioner, who was holding a

copy of McCarthy's book The Limits of Power

autograph the book.

.

The boy asked the Senator to

Hoeh then took the opportunity to usher McCarthy into

the offices of the Banking Commission and to introduce him to Vincent Dunn, Sr.

Dunn and his wife

v/ere

becoming increasingly helpful to the McCarthy effort

and V70uld become heavily involved before the end.
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As was usual for Lho

clay,

McCarthy arrived at the headquarters

a bit

ahead of schedule which meant that things were not
completely ready for the

reception nor had all the people gathered.
filled the room.

Before he left about fifty persons

Speaking briefly, McCarthy thanked them for their
interest

and commented on his first day:
If what I have seen in the three tov,ms I have been
in is
indicative of a general response, we'll settle for 55
percent of the vote.
I have never had as encouraging a response, even in my
own state.
And in spite of the "mischievous" New Hampshire voter, I might have a chance to win.

I want you to know the burden you bear, and thank you
for working in this conmion cause.

He made a point of greeting and talking with each person in the head-

quarters and promised to return again before the end of the campaign in order
to meet those who had not arrived before he had to leave for his next stop, a

5:45 p.m. reception, part of the annual meeting of the New Hampshire Bar

Association.

Hoeh and Studds delivered their candidate to several members of the New
Hampchirc Bar who escorted McCarthy to the private reception being held at
the Wayfarer Convention Center in Bedford.

The press was not included and

would not rejoin McCarthy until his speaking date at 8:00 p.m. at St. Anselm's
College.

McCarthy's Second Manchester Speech
On January 12, 1968, William Loeb, the controversial editor and publisher
of the Manches ter U nion header printed one of his famous front page editorials

titled, ADDRESSED TO DEMOCRATS ONLY.

It read:

It is cood news to all patriotic Democrats
that Senator
Eugene McCarthy has announced that he will
authorize a
write-in (sic) candidacy for himself in New Hampshire.

HERE IS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EVERY PATRIOTIC.
SENSIBLE
DEMOCRAT IN THE STATE OF GEN. STARK TO INDICATE
JUST HOW
LITTLE HE THINKS OF AN-YONE \mO GOES APvOUND GIVING
SPEECHES
V7IIICH SERVE TO PROLONG THE WAR, AS SEN.
MCCARTHY IS DOING
BY ATTACKING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ANT) THIS NATION'S
COMMITMENT TO THE DEFENSE OF FREEDOM IN VIETNAM.
Dissent, of course, is the right of every American.
But
carping dissent in V7ar time, with the enemy at our throats
and killing our boys in Vietnam, is NOT a right.
IT IS A DISGRACE

!

It is difficult for this newspaper to believe that Sen.
McCarthy doesn't understand that every speech he makes
in favor of our withdrawal from Vietnam, in favor of what
amounts
no matter how carefully disguised
to surrender to Communist aggression, costs the lives of many
American boys.

—

—

WIH'THER SEN. McC.\PvTHY KllOWS IT OR NOT, THOSE SPEECHES OF
HIS ARE VJRITTEN IN BLOOD
NOT HIS BLOOD, BUT THE ELOOD

—

OF AI>1ERICAN BOYS WHO ARE KILLED BECAUSE THIS WAR IS PROLONGlffl BY THOSE SPEECHES.

When the rulers in Hanoi hear a speech by McCarthy, or
Bobby Kennedy, or all the other chickens who want to pull
out of Vietnam, who want to run home with their tails
between their legs like so many licked yellovj curs, they
say:
"All we have to do is to wait long enough and those
crazy Americans will be fighting among themselves so hard
they won't bo able to beat us."
EDITORIALS VJON'T BEAT SEN. McCARTHY OR THE WIIOLE BARNYARD
OF CRAZY CHICKENS, BUT THE PATRIOTIC, SOUITO DEMOCRATS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE HAVE A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY IN THIS ELECTION
TO SUPPORT OVERWHELMINGLY
THOSE DELEGATES PLEDGED TO
PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND GIVE SEN. McCARTHY AS FEW WRITE-INS
AS IS HUMANH.Y POSSIBLE.

~

LET NEW IIA>n\SHIRE, THE STATE W!OSE MOTTO IS "LIVE FREE OR
DIE," ONCE AGAIN SHOW THl^ NATION THAT, DEMOCRATS, OR REPUBLICANS, WE ARE EAGLES AND NOT PLUCKED CHICKENS.
(Signed) William Loeb, Publisher
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The question which the McCarthy organii^crs
faced was what impact such

statements would have on the turn-out for the St, Anselni's
speech, and secondly,
what impact would this rhetoric have on the Manchester
voter.
crowd for the St. Anselm's speech?

Would there be a

Would the crowd be friendly or hostile?

Would the air of controversy which the Union Leader had
introduced with its

editorial make attending the speech a personally and reputationally
inadvisable
thing to do?

These were the concerns which the McCarthy leaders had as
they

arrived at St. Anselm's to check the arrangements for the speech.

Studds had gambled in favor of holding the speech in the large gymnasium
of the College rather than in some smaller but easier to fill space.

He felt

the risk had to be taken, even though a political speech on a Friday night was

not likely to attract a large audience.

larger space, Studds sent out the

v/ord

After making the decision to use the
to the nearby cities of Nashua and Con-

cord and even to the vrell organized Keene committee some distance away.

These

committees were urged to contact as many of their allies as possible and encourage them to help fill the St. Anselm's hall.
To their relief, some time before the scheduled 8:00 p.m. speech the crowd

assembled.

By the time McCarthy arrived most of the seats were filled and some

people were standing to the sides and sitting on the floor.

This was not to be

a lecture but rather it was billed as a major foreign policy address.

Hoeh and

Studds also wanted it to be a campaign speech if not in fact, then at least the

candidate would be received and treated like he was campaigning.

They asked

the knovm McCarthy supporters to disperse in small groups throughout the crowd

and to be responsive.

"McCarthy," they said, "will not shout nor become ani-

mated in his presentation.

He will make subtle references that should draw a
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response and he will draw important illustrations
that will be understated.

When those occur, they said, the audience
should respond.
McCarthy's supporters to lead that response.

It will be up to

And when McCarthy enters, stand

and clap and whistle to provide him with as
warm a reception as possible.

In those days, before Secret Service protection
of presidential candidates

Hoeh and Studds were also concerned about possible
hecklers and disrupters.

They asked their dispersed supporters to be ready for
trouble if something
should happen.

McCarthy entered as scheduled, the audience rose, clapped
and some cheered
He was introduced by the head of the monastic order which
operates St. Anselm's

College, with references to McCarthy's own strong Catholic background.

There

had been little need to prepare the audience for McCarthy on this
evening.

He

quickly brought them close to him and carried them through a speech that was

deeply serious but laced with humor and referenced with illustratioDS dravm
from his o\m understanding of monastic orders, the rites and traditions of
the Roman Catholic Church.

The speech ended vjith a standing ovation that sent supporters and the

curious away with a renewed dedication and interest in his campaign.

The only

two notes of dissent V7ere a banner over the podium that read "Go Hawk Go" but

this referred to the St. Anselm's College basketball team, and one older priest

who left the room.

Hoeh and Studds had planned the event to happen

question period following the address^

v-jithout a

They did not want to open the floor to

potential harassment which would be the news of the evening rather than the
content of the speech.

299

There hud been no advanced text of the speech.

Hoch and Studds had ex-

pected that copies of the speech would be available from the McCarthy
national
office cither to be distributed by

thein

for release prior to the speech or to

be given to the New Hampshire campaign's press person for distribution.

occurred and the reporters, long used to following

a

Neither

speech line by line in a

text, noting departures from the text, and marking the text for use in their

stories, had to cover the speech as a news event.
Bill Cardoso, the New Hampshire reporter for the Boston Globe complained
that McCarthy hadn't said anything new that night.

"I couldn't stop the

presses on this speech and make them break into the type with a new story.
I've already missed my deadline.

There were no early press releases available."

Cardoso expressed the frustration of his colleagues in the press who look for
the advanced texts and press released excerpts of speeches to help them make
their deadlines.

The comment frequently heard among the reporters around presidential cam-

paigns is that the candidate didn't say anything, or if they are charitable,

much that

vjas

new in his speech.

The comment reflects the fact that the

reporters hear most of a candidate's speeches, read a great deal about the
candidate, and are in many vays better informed as to the manner and style of
the candidate than is almost any one else in the public.

This creates a cyni-

cism that comes from familiarity, a cynicism that tends to be reflected in
what they feel is important to report or how they perform their job when there
is little fresh to report.

300

On the other side of this coin is the candidate and
nn unwritten rule
that repetition creates positions, issues and
ultimately an image which provides
the candidate with recognition and identity.

Candidates are constantly search-

ing for themes, ways of using the language to create
a response, to convey their

thoughts, to reveal their personal qualities.

Once those vignettes of an issue,

a position on the issue and the style of the candidate
have been found to at-

tract audience response they are repeated.

Unlike the reporters, each audience

is new and each audience wants to be given the opportunity to
take full measure
of the candidate.

Consequently, audiences come not only to expect to hear what

they have read that a candidate has said, but also hope that he

\-7±ll

use the

same phrasing, the same illustrative passages to make the points of his message.

There appears to be some element of reinforcement, credibility, in such repetition which gives each medium its particular impact.

If the listener has heard

and seen the candidate make a particularly valid point on a television inter-

view or speech excerpt, that viewer, when part of the candidate's audience,
wants to hear that statement again and, preferably, with the same phrasing,
intonation, and emphasis that stimulated interest from the other medium.
the continual displeasure of the reporter,

about

v.'hen

v/ho

must find other things to

To
\-nrite

candidates repeat and repeat their speeches, the requirement to

repeat remains.

VThat

is refreshing about covering the New Hampshire primary

is that the candidates are groping to find those themes, phrases and the pace

of delivery v/hich v/ill distinguish them from the others.

McCarthy was in the

process of establishing his style while the reporters were trying to fit him
into some familiar mold of what a candidate should be, say and do.
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Following the

spcc.cl.

McCarthy returned to his downtown
Manchester Hotel

room where Hoeh, Studds, and the recently
arrived
day with the Senator.

Blair Clark reviewed the

McCarthy was genuinely pleased with his
reception.

Hoeh and Studds were happy that the day
had only one serious problem, and
the
speech had not only drawn a respectable
audience but the Senator had been

exceptionally well received.

They were also delighted with the
relationship

that was beginning to develop between them and
the candidate.

Their schedule

had been a test for themselves but more importantly
a test for McCarthy.

If

their earlier perception of McCarthy as being able
to campaign effectively in

New Hampshire were confirmed by his day of activity,
then they felt assured
that if their own organijcational efforts succeeded,
McCarthy had a chance in
the primary.

Hoeh and Studds learned that McCarthy could work hard, sustain
enthusiasm
through a long campaign day, that he was effective in press conferences,
hand
shaking on the street, in stores, at a factory door; that his presence was
commanding, that he suffered mistakes without visible irritation, that he
could make something out of the unplanned and unexpected; that he was flexible,
and that he could stimulate an audience.
right.

In short, they felt they had been

McCarthy would be an exceptional candidate in New Hampshire.

He did

not create or attract hostility and when he encountered opposition, he turned
it comfortably to his advantage.

In response to Blair Clark's questions concerning their view of the day,

Hoeh and Studds reviewed their reaction to each event, apologized for the
error at the factory, but felt the day had gone better than either had expected.

McCarthy felt the name way and at that point showed how he had prepared for
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New Hmupshire.

He rolled up

hlr.

pant leg to show the bottom of a pair
of long

underwear which had kept him warm while moving
through Hoeh and Studds' mine
field of a schedule.

Hoeh outlined

a

possible schedule for the next day, warned that
it was

not well advanced, and that he was not sure that
the local contacts were

sufficiently experienced with campaigning to check out the
details.

In other

words, he felt it v;ould be risky to attempt to create a
day of activity from

what he had available.

McCarthy made clear that some time in the campaign he would like
to skate
and even piny some hockey.

With that he suggested that the day be cleared and

that he would return to Washington to prepare for a Sunday trip to St.
Louis,
Mo.

He felt it would be better to end the day on the positive note of his

speech and the reception he had received in the three cities visited rather
than risk a potentially awkward schedule.

Evaluating the First Day and Field Operations:

The Impact

Uoeh and Studds began their review by checking to see

reacted to McCarthy's first New Hampshire visit.

hov; the

press had

The word from Washington was

that as far as the national television was concerned the big story had been
the mistake at the factory gate.

This, according to those who were observing,

had been the major image that the nation had seen as a result of McCarthy's

first New Hampshire campaign visit.

The timing of the mistake had made it

even worse because it happened just prior to the evening and weekend deadlines
for the networks, a number of the major newspapers and news services.

This

was the stcry that they could use; everything else that happened that day
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happened too late for their deadlines.

And not having an advance of McCarthy'

speech meant that it was also omitted from
the lead stories.

A sample of newspaper headlines read:
"McCarthy Roams in Granite State" sub-head:
"Low-keyed
Approach as Senator Kicks Off Anti-LBJ Drive."
(Rutland
Herald 1/27/68)
-

,

||McCarthy Leaves N.H.

Romney Still Plugging" sub-head:
McCarthy Bases Hope on Voter Independence" (Boston
Herald 1/27/68)
;

.

"N.H.

'Courteous' McCarthy Told" sub-head:
Seen for McCarthy" ( Boston Globe. 1/28/68)

"3-1 Defeat

,

"N.H. Race V/arms Up, McCarthy Meets the Governor" (Boston
Globe, 1/28/68)

"McCarthy Moves Through N.H. with the Slow Step of a
Priest" (Wash ington Post, 1/28/68)
"McCarthy Runs Genteel Campaign" (V7ashington Post, 1/28/68)
"McCarthy Launches 'Challenge' to LBJ"
Leader 1/27/68)

(

Manchest er Union

"McCarthy Keeps at N.H. Voters" (Christian Science Monitor,
1/27/68)
"Dove Candidate Warns of Growing Militarism"
Herald, 1/27/68)

(

Rutland

"McCarthy Stumps in New Hampshire" (New York Times
Beloxj the

,

headlines an interesting story began to emerge.

1/27/68)

The reporters

were trying to figure out who this man was and how he would fare in New Hampshire.

At first they were looking for signs of hostility toward the "dove"

candidate from those he met on the streets.

In Nashua, practically everyone

McCarthy met as he walked was interviewed for their reaction.
wrote:

One reporter
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McCarthy is a tall, well-built man with silver
hair.
He
dresses in conservative banker-lawyer greys,
complete with
buttoned vest
There is no question he is a handsome man, and
he did make
a hit with many of the people, especially
the women, as he
strode the slush-laden sidewalks.

"Ooooooh," was the reaction from Mrs. Ida Levesque,
a late
sixty ish widow from Manchester who immigrated years
ago to
this country from St. Clement, Que.
I'll vote for him," she said, after he had passed
"It was a pleasure to shake his hand."

"Sure^,

by.

She added that she was a Democrat, didn't know much about
what he stood for, but that he had a "nice personality,"
and she liked the "way he looks."
In Manchester, one woman who shook his land later said she
had no idea who he was
"I've never met him before"
that she, too, vvrould vote for him. 22

—

—

Even under some rather intense grilling in front of network sound cameras,
Roger Mudd was unable to get a negative response from those who had just met

McCarthy.

Not many knew him or had heard of him but what they experienced as

McCarthy met them on the street was positive.
hostility toward this man

Xv/ho

The reporters could not find

had come to challenge an incumbent Democratic

administration and a war.

A point that did give

lloeh

and Studds some concern was that several report-

ers attempted to lump the Romney campaign together with McCarthy and to contrast

their campaign styles.

Romney had just ended

a

six day tour of the state a week

earlier and was scheduled to return for a two day swing Saturday and Sunday of

January 27-28.

Romney was attempting to take New Hampshire by storm.

A high

pressure, professional campaign had been organized for him which had him working
long days, travelling extensively, and always acting the booster.

manner was forceful, quick, and aggressive.

His street

He thrust himself into virtually
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every situation to the delight of the following
reporters and photogrophers and
commanded broad interest and extensive coverage.
He was viewed as the candidate most likely to succeed with the issue of an
alternative to the Johnson

administration's policies in Vietnam.

He attracted attention wherever he went

in the state and was seen as the man to watch during
the 1968 New Hampshire

campaign season.

Consequently, everything that McCarthy did or failed to
do

in New Hampshire was contrasted with Governor Romney and
what the press felt

were Romney 's strengths as

a

campaigner.

Under the heading "McCarthy in New Hampshire," the Rutland Herald
editorialized

:

Judging from reports coming from the frozen Connecticut
River, Sen. Eugene McCarthy is running a real risk of
being mistaken for a Republican, or perhaps just a
Minnesota Farm-Labor candidate. This unkind assessment
of a loyal Democrat's young presidential primary campaign
is based on the facts he is follov/ing the Romney trail
around New Hampshire (v;ithout the folksy Romney touch)
and is "opposing" a rival who isn't even entered in the
race but whose supporters include the cream of the state's
Democratic organization.

McCarthy isn't running against Romney, but it is evident
from newspaper and television reports that if the two men
were selling vacuum cleaners, Romney would probably sell
out before McCarthy made his first sale.
Romney has glad-handed factory workers and farmers
and regaled affluent middle-class New Hampshire with his
manly charm over tea cups, McCarthy has opened his campaign with nothing more than polite, professional phrases
aiid a somewhat wan smile.
Since both men have hopes of
winning some of the state's registered Independent voters,
they are in fact rivals.
Wliile

It seems doubtful McCarthy can rally enough support from
the Hanover intellectuals and other groups opposing the
Johnson war policy to make even a dent in the state's
Democratic cheering section led by the Johnson trio of
Gov. John W. King, Sen. Thomas J. Mclntyre, and former
General Services Administrator, Bernard Boutin.
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The editorial went on to concede that McCarthy had
made an interesting point in
his St. Anselin's speech, "when he
in American foreign policy.

.

i,;arned

his audience of a growing militarism

..He even cited former Republican President

Eisenhower's recent warning that the military establishment was
growing too
powerful.

..."

But concluded:

It wasn't McCarthy's fault that he stepped into New Hampshire in the shadow of the Pueblo incident.
But one

wonders if that shadow makes much difference. His campaign seems to be a little shadowy anyTi,?i^y, and his "opponent" is only a write-in shadow. 2j
The story that led to the editorial had picked up the contrast in styles be-

tween McCarthy and Romney but had mis-read the reaction.
It became clear early in the day that the senator is going to run a down-style campaign, free of the usual

flowery oratory and Araerican-way-of-lif e speeches.
The McCarthy approach is low-keyed, intellectual, reasoned
in a word, amateurish when compared to (the) style of
campaigning the public is accustomed to.

—

He's not forceful when handshaking on the street, if he is
compared to Michigan Governor George Romney, who excels in
the thrust~pump-and- smile technique. '^'^

The contrasting styles presented a problem for the McCarthy leaders in their

early campaign management but they had been pleased with what they had seen in

McCarthy as a campaigner and were skeptical of the reporters' reaction to Romney.
To them McCarthy showed quiet confidence, strength, and resolve.

Something that

would make It possible around which to build an effective campaign organization.
Ward Just, writing in the Washington Post

campaign would be.

,

had caught a bit of what the
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There will be fivo more trips like this
one before the
presidential primary March 12, trips with
journalists
laughing and asking repetitive questions to
which they
will receive repetitive answers at the state
press conferences, awkward dialogues in living rooms,
and meetings with moneymon who will insist on computers
to
"profile" the vote by ethnic group and religion.
In
New Hampshire McCarthy will say yes, no, temporize
a
little, back, fill, and finally decide: No. He
will
surely say no to the professionals.
"You can't package
religion and politics" he says.
Of course, he is wrong.
You can. Kennedy did.
has the wrong kind of cool for 1968.25

McCarthy

But his conclusion showed that Ward Just was trying to
fit McCarthy into a

convenient mold as well.

After the one day, Hoeh and Studds knew that McCarth]

would not tolerate packaging.

His theme, which slowly began to emerge during

that day, was the word, "reconciliation."

The New Hampshire McCarthy campaigners now had an experiential basis from
v.'hich

to make changes in their view of the campaign.

Kennedy, dependent upon a staff of

advance persons and managers.

\^^:iters,

McCarthy was not a

researchers, press officers,

He was independent and remarkably self-reliant.

The national campaign had not only failed to provide personnel to support his
visit, but it seemed to Hoeh and Studds that they now knew McCarthy's campaign

style as well as anyone else, at least as he had shown it in New Hampshire.

On this basis they would adjust.
Since there would, probably, not be advanced texts of McCarthy's speeches

each j;peech would have to be recorded and transcribed for the press.

advance operation had failed both in

Nev;

Since th

Hampshire and from the national cam-

paign, Hoeh assigned that job to his new volunteer corps.

vance work would be based and directed from New Hampshire.

All subsequent ad-
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The first day schedule had depended on the
work of the two best organized
local committees
people.

iti

the state at that

tii,)e.

the Nashua and Concord McCarthy

The mistake had been In Manchester where the
committee was new, inex-

perienced and thin on members.

All subsequent scheduling would be handled

through Sandra Hoeh from her home in Hanover.

She would coordinate the inte-

rests of the national campaign, McCarthy's senatorial
office, local committees
and the state campaign in building the remaining campaign
days for the Senator

Blair Clark had still not been able to assign someone to fill
the full
time manager position for the New Hampshire campaign.

Hoeh and Studds were

desperate for this assistance as items requiring attention began to
pile up.
Organization, other scheduling, media preparation, canvassing and support

activities were all beginning to reach the point in the campaign where attention

v;as

required.
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chapter
McCarthy feeds from

ix
ti^k

land

To date with no evidence that the national campaign had
staff that they

vould

::end

to New Hampshire to carry out the scheduling clioro,
Sandy Hoeh

was asked hy
knew

Ncv/

a good

i:ha

New

]!a:iipshire

leaders to prepare McCarthy's schedules.

Hampshire's politics and

schedule.

v^as

She

familiar with the requirements of

Her only liability was that she lived in Hanover, had

a

young family and would not be able to work from the Concord Headquarters.

With

a

UAIS telephone line installed in her dining room,

on the V7all,

t.ho

a

calendar posted

priority places explained to her and both Senator McCarthy's

office and lUair Clark's home telephone numbers ported with the calendar, she
was in business.
Sandy

nov^

Other aspects of the scheduling task were less easily resolved,

stood between the national campaign, the Senator's Washington office

and the state and local campaign in New Hampshire.
eacii v;ou.1d

Tliese four

organizations

play an importanl: role in the scheduling activity.

Hoeh and Studds

liad

assumed

that the national campaign and the Senator's

congressional office staff would be working as one or at least closely together.
As Sandy tried to fix dates on the New Hampshire campaign calendar

often more

tl\an

slic

found that

physical distance between Capitol Hill and the national head-

quarters in downtown Washington separated the activities.

Initially, she would

talk with r.lair Clark who, when she was first assigned to the task, said
he should be the principal scheduling contact.

tViat

Eventually she found that

McCarthy would work through both Clark and his personal secretary in his
CapJtol Hill office, .Jean Stack.

It depended on who was available at the time

that person
that McCarthy was ready to discuss his schedule and most frequently
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w;is

t^ecretary, Jean Slack.

Ills

Following the campaign Sandy Hoeh recorded her scheduling
problems in
an interview.
There, were a couple of problems.

The first was that we very
rarely had enough warning, absolute dates....

Originally Blair Clark had promised, he said we'll give you these
dates and you'll work with them. But it was more a matter
of the Senator coming up and then they'd decide when he'd
come again, how long.
So this made it difficult.
The other thing was not having a national advance person, which
really turned out in some cases, to be disastrous.
Instead of the promised series of definite campaign dates for

McCarthy in

New Hampshire, Sandy found herself in the middle of a series of negotiations.

McCarthy was negotiating with Clark and the campaign with a trip to France and
possibly South Vietnam in mind. Sandy was negotiating with Clark for definite
dates from -which to build a schedule.

with Sandy about

v/hen

The local committees were negotiating

McCarthy would visit their areas and what he would do when

he arrived.

A

]

ead time of at least a week and

would give Sandy a series of dates.

preferably more was desirable.

Clark

She would notify the local committees.

They would suggest activities pre-existing or of their own creation that might

occupy the Senator's

tim.e.

Sandy would begin sorting these according to the

expected time of arrival, length of the visit and options for his arrival.

When she had
it

a

preliminary draft of the schedule ready she would attempt to check

with staff in the national headquarters or with Clark himself.

the flow became confusing.

At this point

What she had thought were firm and workable dates

often were a];proxlmate dates.

Until definite times for travel to New Hampshire
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had been set by the SennUor himself, a schedule vas a proposal.

frustrating for Sandy who

v;as

This was

familiar with siinJlar probloins in other campaigns,

but alnost totally disruptive to those at the local level who did not
understand
the complications.

VJhat

each of the actors in the scheduling process had to learn was basic

communication.

What had been the Senator's office staff procedure for the

Senator's schedule could not be followed in a campaign, especially
of the short duration of

tlie

one in New Hampshire.

a

campaign

Their experience with the

Senator's Minnesotn campaigning or other national speaking activity could not
be duplicated in a state as difficult to schedule as is New Hampshire.

Blair

Clark had not been able to get the definite time commitments he had hoped because of the competition for the Senator's time.

Instead of saying that this

was a fact of life and that those scheduling the Senator in New Hampshire would
have to work within a floating series of time slots, he continued to assert
that he would produce definite dates for the

tvx?clve

days.

Sandy in communicating

with local committees relayed what she thought was definite information and
the local people began their work with specific days and times in mind.

After

some serious gnashing of teeth and a lost temper or two as dates and times
changed, Sandy and the local organizations began to learn that a good schedule

was a flexible schedule, one that could be changed, expanded or contracted

without losing the appearance of being professionally planned

in advance.

when
A part of the scheduling lesson came during the first campaign day
as little
Hoeh and Studds found that they were advancing the Senator's activity

as fifteen minutes ahead of him.

They learned that it was possible to make

contacts were
adjustments in the schedule with such short notice if their local

firm and understood why the schedule had to be adjusted.

To accomplish such

3U
chan5;oG on a rcy^ulur basis required initiating
local workers ahead of time,
sov.K.thi,^R

neither

Ihat in

lloeh nor

Ll.o

early stages of the campaign was difficult to
do.

Further,

Studds realized that such quick adjustments would
be necessary

once they had organized proper scheduling and advance functions
in the campaign.

Where they had experienced people working at the local level, people
who have
been involved in other campaigns, the importance of being able to
respond
quickly to changes in schedules was understood.

new workers who broke their hearts creating

The difficulty was with the

a local

schedule only to get

a call

from Sandy Hoeh that the date of the visit had been changed or certain activities

were not appropriate.

Early in the campaign

lloeh had

circulated a memorandum outlining what might

be included in a campaign schedule. Under the title "A Day of Campaigning," he
advised:
Note:

The following are items that should be considered by
you when planning for a visit to your area by Senator
Eugene J. McCarthy. This list is not inclusive.

Please add those particular events that are of special
importance in your community.
*

Visit local newspaper offices.

*

Schedule short local radio and TV Interviews if possible.

*

Coffee parties, open house parties, evening socials,

*

Communion, breakfasts, other similar gatherings.

*

Tours of factories, handshaking at factory gates during shift changes.

*

Visits to places where Democrats gather

*

Supermarkets, shopping centers, etc.

*

Opportunities for speeches before local audiences regardless of
political composition - preferably Democrats and Independents.

*

Headquarters openings, receptions, etc.

*

Special community events.

-

etc..

clubs, etc.
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With the closing aduionition:
VTliilo

"Don't forget to invite the Independents

the above list of items to include in a schedule
was relevant in any

season, campaigning In New Hampshire in the winter required
even more demanding

scheduling.

New Hampshire's usual campaign season is during the summer
and fall

leading to the September primary and November general elections.

During these

months there are numerous outdoor spectacles such as fairs, old home days,
festivals and sports events which lend themselves to campaigning.

In the winter an

event must compete with chancy weather conditions and the cold.

People leave

their home for the necessities of shopping and work but since the advent of tele-

vision, social or recreational gatherings have much less appeal.

To substitute

for the fact that people were not often out during the winter nor could they be

easily lured to special political events, the campaign had to go where the

people were when they did go out, or go to their homes, or use ways of reaching
people in their homes.

Other than scheduled activities which would be amplified

by the media, the scheduler had to send the candidate to the places where people

worked, shopped and went to school.
One activity that was especially important for McCarthy in the winter was

going to schools.

In the days before eighteen year olds were franchised, speak-

ing in schools seemed of little political value.

New Hampshire's colleges and

universities have large non-resident populations but guaranteed an audience for a
speech.

To most candidates speaking to groups of elementary and secondary school

children had little more than educational value.

During the winter of a presiden-

tial primary New Hampshire public schools extend invitations to candidates to ad-

dress assemblies and to meet with classes.

In the larger cities the candidates

often accept these opportunities to speak because few other opportunities
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to address groups exist.
cluincf

to show his

If press coverage is allowed the candidate
has the

mettle in

speeches were considered as

a

different setting.

a good civic

Without press coverage such

gesture to be done if nothing else could

be found to fill a scliedule.

Hoeh. and

Studds perceived an additional benefit to be derived from scheduling

McCarthy before school groups.

As educators, they knew that the young people

often were better informed about contemporary issues than were their preoccupied
parents.

Tliey also felt

that since most other means of reaching parents as

voters were limited, during the winter, a message from

a

youngster returning

home after having heard Senator McCarthy speak or having asked him a question
'would probably be the subject of the evening's dinner table conversation.

There

was also a certain sophistication on the part of many students in secondary

schools especially if their school had been visited by more than one of that

year's crop of candidates.

Without exception a school invitation to speak

required that the candidate respond to questions.

Often classes prepared their

questions ahead of the guest's visit and would use the same questions for each
visitor.

A favorably impressed youn;-ster returning home became an ambassador

for the candidate of the highest credibility.

To buttress their decision to accept invitations to speak in the schools
and include these in McCarthy's schedule, Hoeh recalled that former Democratic

National Chairman John Bailey of Connecticut contended that the most accurate
students.
poll that can be conducted close to an election was that of high school

During his years of political activity Bailey had found

tliat

high school students

election day
reflect accurately what would be the vote of their parents on

asked

a poll question.

New Hampshire

liigh

when

schools often conduct polls before

attention.
elections and the results receive considerable local newspaper

Hoeh
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and Studds wanted McCarthy to do well in these
polls.

McCarrJjx:s_Ea£l^^

A Case Study of a CampalRn Schedule

After a considerable struggle, Sandy Hoeh was able
to get a definite com-

mitment from both Blair Clark and Senator McCarthy's office
that the Senator

would campaign In New Hampshire February

6,

7,

and

8.

Plans for a Europe-

Vietnam trip had been cancelled in favor of having McCarthy
spend more time campaigning directly rather than through uncertain press coverage of
journey.

a

foreign

A three day schedule would test the capacity of the New Hampshire

organization and give the Senator

a

chance to demonstrate to the reporters whe-

ther his candidacy could get a response in New Hampshire.

Since his first visit had been in the south central part of the state,

Hoeh and Studds felt he should begin in the west and move back across to the
center where he could generate statewide media coverage, swing to the northeast
city of Laconia, and leave from there.

In their minds Hoeh and Studds hoped that

they could have McCarthy fly directly to New Hampshire and be welcomed there by a
local group rather than landing in Boston to struggle into some meeting point
in New Hampshire.

Laconia.

There was air service to Keene, Manchester, Lebanon, and

Keene offered adequate connections and the local committee would be

capable of meeting McCarthy on arrival.
At least once during each visit Hoeh and Studds wanted McCarthy scheduled
to address a large group.

This would be his only opportunity to discuss the is-

sued of his candidacy in hiw own way and in a widely accepted format.

would

V

There

of course, be numerous other chances for brief talks and press sessions,

3.18

but it was the major address that would attract media
attention beyond that of

strictly

a

local or state-wide nature.

were the best sites for major speeches.

The larger cities and the college campuses

Since Manchester had been used twice,

other cities had to be selected.

From Concord there were telephone calls clamoring for the
Senator to appear there, as Concord had only one full day of
campaigning alloted to it. A strong organization had been
started but it needed the Senator's appearance to keep up the
momentum. Too many people needed another chance to evaluate
him.
Competition was strong from the liberal Republican
candidate, George Romney, who seemed to be operating a smooth
and successful campaign out of home headquarters.
The most
impressive thing about Romney was that he was willing to
stand up and answer the voter's questions in a sincere and
direct way.
The Concord committee was handicapped by the
lack of time to have a series of home gatherings, but they
could schedule one big meeting, where everyone vjould attend
at the same time.
The traditional place for such a political
gathering was the Concord Community Center.
.

.

.

Understandably, both David and Sandra Hoeh had visions of
a McCarthy speech at the Concord community center turning into
They visualized the press attending a
an utter fiasco.
speech by the Senator to which no audience appeared.
It was
a horrible spectre.
Concord, said David Hoeh, was known in Democratic circles
as a political graveyard. T^o one ever came out in an evening
to hear a candidate speak, particularly i^ February, if it's
cold and the roads are icy and dangerous.

Hoeh had lived in Concord for four years prior to moving to Hanover and had
watched as Concord struggled to keep its Democratic Committee alive.

Concord

and surrounding Merrimack county had long been strong Republican territory.

Only Ward One, the French Canadian area of Penacook, had been successful in
electing Democrats to either city or state offices.

Furthermore, Concord could not count on students to fill up
Gerry Studds had promised St. Paul's
the bulk of empty seats.
itself
School that the Seantor would speak there. The school prided
In
campus.
in having every serious candidate come to tlieir
'
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addition the headmaster said he would orcn the meetlnr,
to members of
the press and outside Ruests.
(Since some at St. Paul's were
crJtlcal of Studds activity and felt he was neglecting
his duties
he had to schedule the Senator for the School as token
compensation.)
The local high school had also been promised the Senator,
but
allow neither the press nor the public. For this reason
the Concord committee argued to break the arrangements with
the
local high school aiid ask the public school students to come
to
tlie community center speech.

\JOuld

Others argued against this by declaring that more would
be lost than gained in refusing the local high school a chance to
have their own political speech
There would be friction caused
in town if the private school boys were allowed to hear the Senator
in their own school and public school children were not.

This left the Concord Committee the problem of rounding up
an audience made up almost entirely of adult voters in a Republican
city for a Democratic candidate whose reputation was hardly known.
Wliilt noted

for its Republicanism, the Concord committee argued that Concord

residents tended to be political activists who could be attracted to
event.

a political

The Vietnam War issue, they contended, was crossing party lines and

McCarthy was beginning to appear as the most effective spokesman against the
administration's policies.

Sandra Hoeh nervously, and V7ith some misgivings relented and scheduled
the Senator for February 6th, Concord Community Center, 7:30 P.M.

Where local committees were well organized and willing to accept risks
in their schedule, negotiations, such as those described above, were frequent.

The Concord Committee had organizational depth and political experience which

meant that they would not suggest activities which they themselves were uncertain
about or were not willing to work exceptionally hard to make a success.

In

other comiiMinitJes, frequently the local McCarthy organization had much less
experience, deptli or understanding of their own local situation.

Many of these
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conunituees wore newly formed from well
intentioned residents who had little
or

no previous political

,

much less campaign, experience.

Sandy Hoeh knew where the

McCarthy organization had local depth and where it
did not and she attempted
protect the schedule as best she could from weak efforts.

to

Unfortunately, a

totally effective scheduling effort depended upon
extensive advance work, checking and double checking.

One advance person and Sandy's telephones were
not suf-

ficient to make up for the inexperience of some local
organizations or the difficult communications between New Hampshire and Washington.

schedule illustrates

Arrival

tbi;-;

McCarthy's three day

poinc well.

:

McCarthy was scheduled to fly through New York City connecting with
"flight to Keene's municipal airport, arriving early in the evening.

a

He would

then be driven to Claremont where his campaign would begin at 6:40 A.M. with

McCarthy greeting workers at the gate of Joy Manufacturing Co., Clareraont's
largest employer.

Since this would be McCarthy's first airport arrival in New

Hampshire, Hoeh called the Keeue McCarthy committee to see if they could arrange
a presL conference for McCarthy at the airport.

If they had the time and in-

clination, Hoeh suggested that they miglit arrange an airport welcome for McCarthy.

Like the porposed speech in Concord, airport welcomes or campaign "whistle stops"
at airports have not been particularly successful in New Hampshire.

People

will step out of their stores or home to v/elcome a prominent figure in the downtown of a city but few will take the time to gether at an airport to see a candidate.

John

F.

Kennedy scheduled an airport in Manchester just after he captured

the Democratic Party nomination in 1960 but the crov^d was disappointing.

Since

then, few have tried the approach although, occasionally, there will be a small

welccnin. cow..
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Hoeh was not opti.i.tic
about attracting a crowd In

Ko^

but felt that the Keene Connnittee,
perhaps the best organized in
the state,
should have the chance to do so.ethin,
directly for McCarthy since he
was it

scheduled to be in Keene until a
later campaign tour.

As part of the scheduling job,
Sandra Hoeh booked reservations in
a motel
outside of Claremont for the Senator and
those travelling with him.
His

schedule was typical of what was possible
in a small New Hampshire city
during
a morning.
The local committee, composed of few
who had previous political
experience, had worked closely with Sandy and
their community contacts to

complete as effective a campaign morning as
possible.

Because of other demands

on his time and with assurances from the
Claremont workers this portion of the

schedule was not advanced.

Schedu.l e:

Tuesday, February

6,

1968

Time

Place

Function

6:A0 a.m.

Claremont

Greet workers outside Joy Mfg. Co.

8:00 a.m.

Claremont

Breakfast at Pleasant Restaurant

9:00 a.m.

Claremont

Tour Claremont Paper Co.

9:30 a

Claremont

Claremont Daily Eagle (newspaper)

10:00 a.m.

Claremont

WTSV radio interview

10:30 a m

Claremont

Coffee at home of Mr. & Mrs. John
Moloney, 95 Winter Street

11:00

a.m..

Claremont

Tour Main Street

12:00 a.m.

Claremont

Address Claremont Rotary, Moody Hotel

1:00 p.m.

Claremont

Drive to Newport

.

in

.
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A note nL tho bottom of the schedule said. "Press
Bus Starts in Clareniont."

A bus had been hired by the campaign to provide
reporters with transportation
when McCarthy was campaigning.

M cCarthy Arrives February 5th
Having made an exceptional effort to avoid incidents such as
the Manchester
shift change mistake all

liad

visit would move as planned.

every reason to expect that the schedule for this

McCarthy arrived in Keene to one of the largest

airport gatherings in recent memory.

The Keene McCarthy committee had v^rked

for days preparing signs, placards, and slogans, recruiting people to come
to the airport and even had a small band.

The airplane touched down in a

light snow shower, taxied to the gate, disembarked a crowd of national reporters,
and then a startled McCarthy to a cheering throng.

The press conference in

the small terminal building went well with the Senator responding to questions,
coramenting on his surprise at the reception and making several radio tapes

that were played througliout the next day in the area.

He was then directed

to the car which would take McCarthy to Claremont to his motel.

Arriving at the motel was the first tip off that things might not go
as V7ell in Claremont as had been expected.

Sandy Hoeh described the events:

We knew that the national press was coming. No one told
me that the national press like to have their own rooms.
So we put them into rooms together and .they were very
nice abgut it, but some of the Senator's people were quite
upset.

There was even some confusion concerning the Senator's reservations which had
been pre-reglstered
limited English.

Jerry

.

The owner of the motel, of French-Canadian descent, spoke

When the herd of press, the Senator and McCarthy's aide

EHcr appeared

out of the snow and dark in his lobby to be registered and

assigned their rooms, the man lost his ability to cope. Eventually the proprietor
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calmed down and registered the crowd,
probably more business than his motel
had ever experienced in so few minutes.

Disaster struck early the next morning.

Sandy Hoeh recalled:

The next morning he went to a factory gate,
which someone
supposedly had advanced, but he got there a few
minutes late
and missed almost everyone.
With him were the national press.

Then he went to a hotel to eat breakfast and no
one told us
that the hotel did not usually serve breakfast.
The hotel
management said they did serve but did not make clear
that
it was not part of their regular operation.
They then went to a restaurant to meet people who were
supposed to be there for breakfast but the place was empty.
I remember getting a telephone call in the middle of
the
morning from one McCarthy staff person, who said the morning
had been a disaster.
I had had only three hours of sleep
and the call absolutely shattered me.
I called David (Hoeh)
and said get someone else, it's not going to work. He said,
oh yes it will.
And things did begin to improve.,..

....I kept saying, the Kennedy's wouldn't go any place without national advance, it was the only campaign I could compare with from what I'd heard.
Up here people who knew the
kind of thing you advance, what you look for, there had to
be split second timing (which had not been learned by the
local schedulers or those who had checked the schedule).
T.
don't know who was responsible for the advancing, but I
was after the first morning.
I remember shaking.
I was too
tired to even take a nap and I rushed over to Newport.^

Certainly the press could not avoid writing a whole series of new stories
concerning the problems of McCarthy's campaign in New Hampshire.

Sandy re-

ported that Jerry Eiler was furious with embarrassment over the incident and
the subsequent problems that occurred in the schedule that morning.

As it was

reported back while others, including McCarthy were making the best of the
situations, Eller kept the discomfort high, especially for the hard working,

novice New Hampshire volunteers.
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Toward the niiddlo of the morning things began
was expected.

l:o

click closer to what

McCarthy's habit of running ahead of the schedule
caused problcns,

but the interviews went well as did the coffee at
the Moloney home.

hour allotted for

a

main street tour

v^as

too much time.

The one

There were few people

on the streets or in the shops and Claremont is not
a large city, but the

major event turned out to be the address at the Claremont
Rotary Club.

Again

the advance work that should have uncovered a preference
and, perliaps, have

avoided an incident had not been done.

unusual impact.

The oversight produced an incident with

Tom Wicker wrote the first story about the campaign in New

Hampshire that received national attention.
the Nation:

Under his column heading, "In

Luncheon at the Rotary Club," Wicker wrote:

Claremont, N.H. - This is an apt state for Senator Eugene
McCarthy's kind of campaigning. Not far from here, along
one of the narrow roads that thread New Hampshire's hills,
an old, white clapboard house has been restored and
painted and a vntty weekend resident has placed a sign out
front that reads:
"The Old Values."
That is the kind of rebuke that Gene McCarthy might make
to those who talk glibly about getting back to an earlier
simpler way of life that New England somehow is supposed
to exemplify.
In this postcard state with its frozen
lakes and huts of fishermen standing blackly on the ice,
1: is too easy to believe that there really are old values
to which we all go back.
It is something about the farms,
the hills, the white churches in their serenity.

The Birch-White Hills
In fact, most of the old villages with their church steeples

nad their beautifully proportioned white houses and their
empty red brick mills are angling for tourists and skiers
these days, and the garish supermarkets and sprawling motels
with their blo;'k parking lots lie on the land like a pox;
the birch-white hills, tinged with the faint rays of sunlight on winter leaves, rise above polluted streams, intrusive highways and the creeping urban litter of the
twentieth century.
Still men have to believe something and no doubt that was
why there seemed to be a special quality at the
luncheon of the Rotary Club of Claremont In the Hotel
^

Moody hero

(:lu> other day.
Boncath i:hc four j-lass chandeliers
and the st.'.lned p,lass panels of the windows,
the Rotnrians
bad galliercd to liear Senator McCartliy, who
is running for
President in the New Hampshire Democratic primary.

The first thing that happened was that President
Rodney
Brock ordered the television cameras out of the room.
He
explained that his club was nonpolitical that Senator
McCarthy had come to discuss public affairs, not politics,
and that he was not going to have the club meeting
exploited
either for television or politics.
,

A solidly built man, with a quick, nervous smile and sparse,
sandy hair, President Brock encountered enough argument
to make his chin tremble with tension.
But he stood by his
simple defiance of the television networks, which is something
no President of the United States ever has been known to do,
and in the end the cameras were packed up and taken out.

After that, the club sang, "L'il Liza Jane" and "Smile,
and the World Smiles With You" conducted its regular business,
and settled back to hear McCarthy.
Apparently untroubled by
the absence of television, before which most politicians bow
and scrape like valets, the Senator spoke in his relaxed manner
and with his corrosive wit ("We don't declare war any more, we
declare national defense") and gave the Rotarians
if not
much of a show, by Ronald Reagan standards
a clear picture
of himself.

—

—

It was a picture of a man who had set out to discuss what he
called "two or three questions of vital importance" and who
was deeply earnest about the need for the nation to "turn
aside from the war in order to attend to the most pressing
problems at home"
which he defined as the rebellion of
Negroes against any longer being "a kind of colonial people in
our country."

—

He was unemotional, undramatic and nothing about his speech or
his manner was hoked up for cheap applause or eiithusiasm. He
even treated his audience as though it would understand his
point and allusions, and respond sensibly to his ideas. He
said what he had to say, witli some eloquence but no particular
flourish, and then \\e sat do\m.
Self, Not an Image
It is possible that Rod.icy Brock was legally off base in turning
out the cameras, and it is possible that Gene McCarthy is wrong
Some might question Brock's judgment and
in his stand on the war.
others challenge McCartliy's motives, but during luncheon at the

Rotary Club nobody could accuse either of showing an image rather
than a self.

is i)rob;!bly not p,ood polUJcs;
all the. pros will tell
you that.
But in an age when tlic image is the idol, the
old values are inspected by avid tourists, and the flagrant
falsities and pretension of American life deride verity, two
men stubbornly being themselves must be worth something!^
Th.-iL

Every newspaper that carried the New York Times news service and many that
did not, published Wicker's column. Somehow through the haze of scheduling

probl ems, conflicts and even a substantial incident at
a setting,

tlie

expense of television

accidental in fact, had been created that illustrated the strengths

of two individuals.

Once away from Claremont the scheduling problem began to disappear.

Eller regained his composure.

Jerry

Senator McCarthy chortled over the difficulties

of the often pretentious television crews and enjoyed a visit with the urbane

editor of Nev/port's weekly newspaper, Edward DeCourcy.
Sandra

Hoel^i's

By early afternoon

telephone carried a distinctly different message from that she

had lieard in the morning.

The remainder of the day's scliedule read:

1:30 p.m.

Newport

WCNL Radio interview

2: 15

p.m.

Newport

Tour Door Woolen Co.

3: 10

p.m.

Newport

Meet Newport High School faculty

3:35 p.m.

Newport

Argu s Champion (meet Editor DeCourceytour plant)

A: 00 p.m.

Newport

Tour main street

4 5 p.m.

Newport

Drive to Concord

5:45 p.m.

Concord

Arrive

7:30 p.m.

Concord

Address at Concord Community Center

A

:

Nil

Highway Hotel

carefully timed.
The Newport to Concord portion of the schedule had been

schedule clicked.

The

organization
The reporters saw that the New Hampshire McCarthy

the entourage arrived in
could create an effective schedule and by the time

Concord, there was

a

feeling that it had been a good day.
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By the end oT ihaL evenlnp, dn Concord, a major divide iu

would

l)c.

crossctl.

The risks that

liad

tlio

campai-n

been taken In preparing >k-Carthy's

campaign schedule produced the first positive results.

was the first indication of the change.

Tom Wicker's column

The sense of change would be further

strengthen(Kl by the response McCartliy received that evening.

As will be

discussed later.

McCarthy's T'ebruary 6th Evening In Concord
Of the days that McCarthy campaigned in New Hampshire, Febraury 6th

was decisive.

From the visit the campaign organization learned

campaigned best,

liow

liow

McCarthy

the organi^iation could better support his efforts, wliat

schedules would bring out his personal and political qualities, and how
effective McCarthy could be in making issues from the environment of the
campaign.

McCarthy was beginning to have an impact.

The brief stop at the Keene

airport, February 5th, produced the first front page photographs of McCarthy

campaigning before an enthusiastic placard waving crowd.

Newspaper and radio

coverage in each of the cities and towns he visited was extensive.

The

travelling reporters of the national press and wire services began to feel the
spirit as the candidate progressed comfortably through the schedule.

premier event, which made McCarthy

a

The

political force to be contended with, was

his scheduled speech in Concord on the evening of February 6th.

committee promised
The speech was scheduled because the Concord McCarthy

extraordinary efforts to

mak.e

it a success.

To insure that the event was well

physically drag people to
attended the Concord Commit tee did everything except
the Community Center itself.

In trylnr, to get ovit an nmlicncc for
McCarthy's speech
the Concord committee made Ward Seven and the
other
central Concord wards their prime target.
Every registered
Democratic or independent voter was called on the
telephone
inviting them to attend. Advertisements were placed
in
the newspapers and on the radio.
The entire membership list
of the League of Women Voters was called personally,
as
was the entire faculty list at St. Paul's School.

If the people were Republicans an appeal was made
to their
civic pride.
"Imagine how Concord, New Hampshire will look
in a big picture by Life magazine showing rows and rows
of
empty seats at a speech by a member of the United States
Senate," they said.

Posters advertising the speech were put up wherever tliey
were accepted; however, on Main Street most of the
merchants refused to take them. McCarthy was too controversial a figure; he might be bad for business. One
stroke of good fortune came at a new little Victorian-styled
ice cream parlor called MacKenzie's, located on the corner
of School and Main Streets.
It was in the center of town...
The manager came from the Midwest.
Ke was a Democrat and
knew McCarthy. He was willing to put up four posters in
his windows advertising the speech. The posters also
invited peoi)le to comCgin and join the Senator for breakfast
the following morning.

The site and arrangements for the address were carefully advanced.

speaker's platform would face out toward the main door.
pulled out for an audience along the far right.

Bleachers could be

The press should be accommo-

dated by long tables, stretching along the length of the far left.

cameras should be kept on the left side.
set up.

In the middle,

from the speaker's platform.

a

wide aisle.

Young people were asked to sit up front on the
The senator was at his

best before a young audience, .md liked to have them around.
10

The chairs

The chairs would bo set back

floor between the speaker and the first row of chairs.

good in press pliotos.

All TV

chairs should be

Only lAO were to be used in case the evening was a flop.

were set up so that they provided

The

And it would look
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The cvcninc unfoided as envisioned.
tables,

J-.ho

The reporters occupied the long

television crews set up to the left of the platform, and then
a

group of girls from Concord High School took positions near the door ready
to pass out campaign literature to the audience as they entered.

Then came

the audience.

There were enough people so that all the chairs and
bleachers were filled. Those who arrived late stood
in the rear of the auditorium. David and Sandra Hoeh
had driven do^m from Hanover and they smiled in relief
at the turnout.
Some 150 people was all that had been
hoped for; Instead, more than AOO were showing up.H
The Senator arrived to be joined by the McCarthy Concord Co-Chairman.

A nervous sense of expectation seized the Concord
McCarthy Committee. Would the audience stand for
McCarthy? Would they boo or would they clap? The
Concord chairman escorted the Senator, who looked
tall and distinguished, down a wide aisle between
scores of standing, cheering and applauding voters.
Even the press hoted the power of suggestion. Here
was a tribute to a potential president. 12
Someone recalled that McCarthy had described his campaigning to

magazine reporter as, "fighting from a low crouch.
develop."

a Time

You wait for events to

His speech that evening demonstrated how effective a fighter he was.

The story of the LRJ cainpaign strategy and principally the use of their pledge
cards had broken several days earlier.

McCarthy had seen these clippings dur-

ing his earlier campaigning had picked up coimnents on the street that gave him
the feeling that

tlie

pledge card idea might backfire.

Hc'unpshire State News Service

Frank

B.

Merrick, New

writer and Time magazine stringer, had written

3rd:
in his column distributed widely in New Hampshire on February

A more public move that smacks of potential arm-twisting was initiated this week when Citizens for Johnson
kicked off n three or four-week campaign to get Democrats publicly coimnitted to Johnson.
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The

bcj^m d str ibuL iug "pledge cards" to
l)cinocr\'it-.s and
ndependents, asking them to pi edge
tlieir r.upport to Johnson and state their intention
of writing in Iris name on the primary ballot.
CDiiiir,

i

L);ci.'

i

I

The cards are in three parts:
one to be signed and
retain(Hi by the voter "as a record of his endorsement
of the President," one to be sent to the White House in
a "shower of support" and the third to be kept on file
by the state Johnsonitcs.

The cards arc numbered (the one sent to us bore the
number 29998) on all three sections, so it should not
be liard for the Johnson Democrats
keep track of who
was and wlio was not on their side.

The pledge card issue was smoldering near the surface in the campaign but
no one

liad

quite yet been able to frame it as an issue.

McCarthy entered the

hall to a standing crowd and quickly began his speech with

a

brief summary of

his reaction to New Hampshire campaigning.
I have been campaigning two days in New Hampshire, today
and one day about a week and one-half ago, and unless you're
more mischievous than I have been led to believe, I've
had a very good response....

If the response has been genuine in these two days and, if
anything, it may have led me to be a little overconfident
about my campaign for the nomination of the Democratic Party.

He

tlien

went on into a discussion of political parties and specifically the

the Democratic Party.

He first chided the state for its peculiar treatment

of Independent voters which may have been prompted by an editorial he read

before coming to the Community Center.

The editorial appeared in the Concor d

Monitor and was a speculation on how Richard Nixon expected to win the

Republican primary by attracting the Independent voter.

The section of interest

to McCarthy read:

Democrats can't vote in the Republican primaries. Independents
past
can stay home in the primaries, as they have done in the
or they
to maintain their, independence of political parties,
other.
the
or
one
with
can clioo5;e to identify
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Tndependonts may participate in the New Hampshire
primaries
but probably not in large numbers.
There is little reason
to believe tliat those who do will vote for Nixon.
Two motives may cause Independents to join in the primaries.
One is anti-war sentiment, which is more likely to cause
them to vote Democratic, for Senator McCarthy.

The other is desire for a change, and that would cause them
to vote Republican, but probably. for the most electable
Republican, Nelson Rockefeller.

McCarthy picked up the theme of the dilemma of the Independent when he
said
I know some of you are Republicans, I assume that, and some
of you are Independents, and that in New Hampshire, you lead
a rather strange life.
As Independents,
once you commit

yourselves, you're committed either to the party vv?hich you
identify with or to the other, which is a terrible prospect,
it seems to me.
If you decide to be Democrats, you ought to have some other
choice than to becom.e Republicans if you want to change.
I
hope we could work something out on that matter, as a matter^^,
of a new civil rights bill, I think, which we could take up.

With this brief analysis McCarthy touched a point of inequity in the New
Hampsliire primary system.

problem before.

Few had been concerned about the Independent's

Prior to the 1972 presidential primary the registration law

would be changed to allow a voter to recover Independent status.

But of special concern to McCarthy was what had become of the institution
of

the Ameri.'^an political party.

A political party is really the essential element of
American politics, and it is important for us... in presidential
election years... to give some thought to what a party is. We're
and I think quite properly,... ridicule them and
inclined to
to joke about them most of the time, but there are occasions
when we ought to give some thought to what their real purpose is
and how they ought to function and what role they play in
determining policy for the United States.

—

would suggest, first, that we ought to be clear about what a
It is certainly not a club, not a kind
political party is not.
for those
of last-man club or something set up to ensure jobs
who liold tliem by patronage or by other devices.
I
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It's not really a labor union or an extension of the
labor movement.... It should not be looked upon as an
instrument ot" propaganda because it has a role beyond
that.
it has a role to propagandize some and to
educate some, but it has a practical political purpose
beyond propaganda, and if that was all that I was concerned about or that you were concerned about, the
Democrats here, why, we could be off with a third party
movement of some kind... and there are some people who
seem to want to do that, in this country, with the
issue of the war in Vietnam... who would, as I've said,
rather light bonfires on the hill, instead of coming
do\<m into the valley where the real political action...
and the real political fight must be carried out.

A political party is not even an organization, and we
Democrats know that to be true, but it shouldn't be
an organization.
This is the point.
It ought to be
organic.
It's not something to be taken over and controlled and directed but it's something which must be
alive andj^yhich must grow and which must have its own
vitality.
,

lie

then looked around the room a moment before illvistrating his point saying

that he hoped he did not offend any Republicans but "back in Minnesota, we

say that the Republican Party is like the lowest form of plant and animal
life.

We give them credit for being alive, but like moss on

a rock.

It

doesn't have much vitality at its highest point, but on the other hand,

never dies out, and

,"

he concluded

"we credit

it

it

with having some organic

existence and some organic purpose.

"A party," he noted,

"

is really set up to develop the issues,

consider

the problems of the country and to pick candidates, and then to go on from

that to gain control over the government of the country, and that's not a

very modest objective in these United States
in mind is that once you gain control,
of

The important thing to keep

it's not supposed to rule for the good

to rule for
the majority but by the determination of that majority, but

the good of all."^'-^

Hore he revealed the essence of his philosophy toward

purpose of his campaign.
the role of the political party and his view of the
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our party, M,o D.MnocraUc Party,
Ll.rough the years, we've
been able to put top.ethor what seemed to
be comp3ete
contradictions
We were the party that supposedly
represented
the country and, also, the city.
We claimed that we couJd
represent labor and, also, agriculture.
In

We said that we could represent both the North
and the Southwe could represent the Baptists and, also, the
Catholics
who were supposed to be beyond any kind of mixing,
but all
of these, somehow, put together in the party,
each one a
kind of separate minority, each one having a position
which
was antagonistic in some ways, if they pursued only
their
self-interest... taken all together, this kind of majority,
made up of all these different groups and different forces
and different interests, could make determinations which
would
be good for the country as a whole.
I tliink, really the basis upon which great things
have been
achieved in this, the 20th century, by the Democratic Party—
V7e were the party which gloried in dissent and
in disagreement

McCarthy then recalled the bitter civil rights battle within the Democratic
party during the 1948 National Convention, as

a time

when the issue was one

of "great moral significance" but one that threatened to "tear the party
to pieces."

The party "did take a chance," McCarthy noted, "and... the Nation

and the party, both, were well-served, in consequence of that decision."'7 1

Taking the analogy further McCarthy asked,' "But where do we find our
party today?

What is the position of the Democratic Party leadership in

Washington and,

I

might say. New Hampshire, on the matter of dissent?

generally, they say,
on the record,

'let us have no dissent.'

in our party,

The cry is for unity.

Well,
I

think,

the request for unity usually comes about the

last day of the National Convention and sometimes, not until two or three

weeks after."

"But to be out, as Democrats," McCarthy chided, "saying in

January and Fcbraury, that we ought to have unity on an issue of vital moral
significance, even before we've gone through any primaries, and even before

weVe

anticipated a convention... is, I'd say, contrary to every tradition of

the Democratic party, and really, contrary to the tradition of politics in
the United States."
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Hun

MrCnrtlu'
Nov./

Hau.i.sliirr,

rhallenj.od his audionce, "1

tl,ink it all

Lhat you make the lirst stand, Democrats,

important, horr

in

Independents, and

Republicans, insofar as you can help, to stand against that
suggestion and to
prevent the establishment of what might develop into a wholly
undesirable

tradition in American politics."

He then began feeding from the New Hampshire

political landscape to frame an issue that illustrated what was happening
to

t:he

democracy of the political party.

I was somewhat surprised to find out what devices the Democratic
Parry organization here is proposing to use in order to ensure
a write-in for the candidate of the party's choice
a matter
of assigning numbers in triplicate so that they know who has the
number and who gave it to you and, supposedly, where you go with
the number.

—

If this were to be carried out, it would seem to me, it would
really tend to destroy the whole reputation that this state
has in the Democratic Party for free and open primary elections.

This proposal, with the numbered pledges comes closest, I think,
to denying people the right of a secret ballot in a primary,
of any suggestion that l' ve seen or heard of in the c^i^ntry,
and I b.ope that you will all stand boldly against it.
,

The audience exploded with applause.

Surprisingly the cheerleaders were the

reporters seated at the press table.

Hoeh and Studds, standing at the back of

the room grinned like the proverbial Cheshire cats knowing that not only did

they have a candidate of substance, but they now had an important issue which

could frame in the context of the New Hampshire politics.

create

tlic

With it they could

sort of political effort that would put the Johnson campaign on

the defensive by embarrassing the leaders un the central strategy of their

campaign and make controversial

tlie

symbol of that strategy, the pledge card.

McCarth.y went on to note that in Wisconsin a similar effort had been

made and it
effort

w.:is

had been rejected.

Although a pledge card was not used, an

before
made to have all of the party officials declare themselves

the prc3i(iential primary.

The State Central Committee of Wisconsin he reported,
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"votpci down llie proposition.

here... but

I

You evidently don't havo

do hope that you will keep it

towards the primary."

:in

n

chance, to do that

mind, as you go along

tl»e

way

2A

Since McCarthy had hit a responsive chord in his audience, he did not
let the subject die until he had added one of his favorite illustrative themes

It's more or less as though the whole Democratic Party in
this country were being asked to submit to rather - a kind
of single identification, as though we were all to bear a
particular brand and there was to be no independence of
spirit, no independence of judgment, and no independence
of action.
Out in the Midwest, and I might say, also Texas, it helps
some in understanding the administration in critizing it,
to have som.e knowledge of how cattle are handled.
It creeps into the language of the administration, these
figures of speech and the metaphors of the administration,
things like 'cut and run.'

'cut and run,' if you're dealing with cattle, is a
It's
pretty good thing to do, if you're being stampeded.
if
being
stampeded
you're
the only way you can get out, and
over tlie cliff or into the shipping yards, why, the best
thing to do is to 'cut and run.'

VJell,

We make a distinction out home, also, with reference to
particular kinds of brands which, I think, ought to be
explained to you.

They h.ave what you call a 'hair brand' and, also a 'hide
Now, if it's a hair brand, it doesn't really get
brand."
T hope most
It grows out in one season.
into the hide.
of you have no more than that, as Democrats, and that
it will grow out before the next primary comes along,
and you can vote as independent Democrats. You haven't been
burned into the hide and, therefore, committed to a
particular purpose or to a particular program, as it has
been suggested by some of your party leaders here in New
Hampshire. 25

campaign and
McCarthy then made the transition to the essence of his
tlie

serious concerns of those who had come to consider him.

of course,

"Taken all together

yield to this kind of
the Issues are too important for any of us to

-
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it 's

not i-c.aUy compulyion,

kin.l

of pre.c.s„re, a kind of move to limit the
freedom of choice and the

in the strict sense of the word,
but it's a

freedom of action, on the part of the electorate in
this state and, beyond
it.

I

think all of you know, what

I

think are the important issues, basically

the question of the war in Vietnam. "26

McCarthy approached the issue of the war by not discussing the facts
of
the war Itself but by discussing the consequences of the war.

His first concern

was that the issues be adequately presented and discussed "in such context
that they (the people) can make a judgment on it," not simply a debate by
the United States Senate or plank in the platform of the Democratic National

Convention, but to take the issue directly to the people and to let them respond
in the primaries.

questions about

a

He saw little validity to the notions that "if you raise

military policy, you're unpatriotic," and "that patriotism

stops at the water's edge."

A concept "which we cannot accept because the

obligation to be patriotic and a loyal critic of national policy applies
to domestic programs;
Pentafc,on and to tlie

it applies to international programs;

it applies to the

Central Intelligence Agency and to the State Department,

just as it does to the Treasury Department or the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, or the Department of Agriculture or Labor. "27

His second concern related to the consequence of the war as it distracted
the nation from its "pressing domestic problems','" but the issues which he was
to discuss in detail that evening was, what he considered of "almost equal

importance... of even more importance and that is the growing militarization of

American foreign policy, the growing influence of our military establishment

The audionce visibly relaxed as McCarthy
conLinuc-d not
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v-ith a

strident Utany

of the horrors and atrocities of the way
but with a carefully developed thesis
of how war had grown as the consequences
of post-World War II foreign policy

and

International strategy.

well.

McCarthy had anticipated the

niood of

his audience

There would be little tolerance for militant
dissent or verbal pictures

of the ugliness of war.

Probably no one in the audience liked war, but few

would say that they would not support

a

war if it was necessary and just.

What

had brought them to hear McCarthy that evening was questions
not yet fully formed
or capable of articulation.

insecurity and even

a

Questions that revealed skepticism, uncertainty,

fear that for the first time in many of their lives they

were not committed to what their national government had pledged them.

understood the nature and even the scope of this concern.
thirs

McCarthy

He understood that

was a new concern, something unfamiliar and personally disturbing.

It

tended to disrupt not only a person's view toward the government but also

relations with friends, neighbors and even more distressingly, one's own family.

To have talked about the field operations of the war, its civilian and

milit: ry leadership, its consequence at home with specifics of draft resistance
or street protest, McCarthy would have made his audience uncomfortable, even

hostile.

audience.

What he did instead was establish a dialogue between himself and his
His discussion was slightly abstract, tied to times, events and

personalities, not immediate, but through logical connections to illustrations
that could be supplied in the listener's mind.

He was reassuring with respect

to his faith that the nation's political institutions could be made to work;

he challenged his listeners to act through these institutions, and he outlined

the rewards.

closing words:

He concluded his quiet dialogue breaking the spell only with his
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see It, is the total complex and context of Issues
wUi\ which we have to deal in the year 1968, and I hesitate
to say that this is a most critical year, or the most
critical year for American politics. There may have been times
in the past in the early history of this country, or at
the time of the Civil War when the decisions which were
made were more significant when the threat of some kind of
deterioration and collapse of the Republic were more pressing
than they are now.
TliJ.s,

,-)s

1

But I do think that this is a most important campaign because
Am.erica is on the verge of becoming a great world leader.
The question that we have to decide, at least in part, is
whether we will give direction to that leadership by continuing
a kind of militaristic policy, which now seems to be in the
ascendency, or whether we will attempt to blunt that thrust.
To suggest
and
not to suggest
but to m.ake a reality
by injecting into American politics and into American government
the acceptance that this nation is not to make its record in the
history of the world as a military power, but by demonstration
all of those things which we claim for ourselves. The right to
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and a basic belief
in a non-military approach, and a basic belief in freedom
and self determination, that these are the real strength of America
and theit these are the gifts that we have to offer the rest of the
world 29

—

—

—

—

.

McCarthy's

arguTiient,

his language and his tone worked with his audience much

like the measured beat of a pendulum.

With each swing it punctuated a point

and with each point the swing of the argument or the illustration became

ever-so-slightly more forceful'.

With each speech after the Concord address,

McCarthy found his audience willing to accept more of the national policy
critique, until toward the end of the campaign, they had accepted much of
his indictment, wanted more and stated in ever stronger language.

where the
An open question session followed Senator McCarthy's address

enthusiasm grew.

The questions showed that McCarthy had tapped the deeper

specifics of issues which
concerns of his audience and would now deal with the

were on their minds.

were often
His answers were thoughtful yet precise and

of relief, even gratitude
followed by prolonged applause as if an expression

and deserving of their attention.
that there was, at last, someone believable
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The

(d'il^iir^ li^"'ML9.n

1'^^^'

carried a letter to the editor that day

whJ.cli

when read al"terv;ards captured the spirit of the evening.

Sir:
1 .submit the following recipe for your readers:
Take one
middle-agc'l, lukewarm Republican
get him thinking about the
war in Vietnam until he is worried sick; cause him to be
vitally concerned for the survival of mankind; deny him an
acceptable presidential candidate in his o\m party
leave
him groping in a twilight zone of confusion without safe or
sound leadership
expose him to the Democratic presidential
hopeful. Senator Eugene McCartliy
let simmer until March Ilth.

—

—

—

Elanine

D,

Finch

----

—

llenniker30

To end this extraordinary campaign day, Senator McCarthy would then play

hockey for twenty minutec.

Hockey is

tlie

sport of many New Hampshire people.

It is the big

school

boy winter sport and is especially popular among the strongly Democratic French

Canadian populations of most of New Hampshire's cities.

In fact, Berlin,

New Hampshire, calls itself "Hockey Town USA."

The New Hampshire leaders had now had enough experience with McCarthy's

schedules to know that something like skating could not be confirmed ahead of
time but if the option where open then McCartliy might do it if he was in the

mood

That night
arena.

a

Concord "Old Timers" game was scheduled in the local skating

Two of the Senator's Concord supporters regularly played with the team.

When asked whether McCarthy could join the game if he wished, they consulted
the other team members who said

equipment.

yes and also said they could provide suitable

Obviously plea.cd by hi» reception during
the long day of campaigning and
by the reaction to his speech, Senator
McCarthy would now demonstrate a
further
facet of his character, one that would
not lose in comparison to George Romney.
lie

would not only skate but he would don
protective gear and play hockey,

^^at

none seemed to know was that the "Old Timers"
team was made up of "old timers"

mostly under thirty who had played hockey in high
school and college, with a few

having played semi-prof essionally as well.

When McCarthy came on the ice he was

treated like another member of the opposition.

He beat the opponent in face offs,

was checked, skated hard, handled the puck well, and fell
to the ice in the tumble
of the play.

After about twenty minutes of the game McCarthy left the
ice, but

not before the few reporters and photographers who had followed
him to the arena

had recorded the event.

T he Impact of February 6th

For

the;

reporters and for McCarthy observers outside New Hampshire, February

6th marked the first day of substantial campaigning.

In the space of fourteen

hours McCarthy bad successfully eliminated any further comparisons with the cam-

paign style of ex-Governor George Romney.
ness as a diverse campaigner.
on the street, at factory gates,

clubs and before

a

McCarthy had shovm his own effective-

He was capable of eliciting favorable responses
inside the plants, from conservative service

sizable civic audience.

He showed the ability to handle dif-

ficult and polarizing issues, in a manner that carried both insight and challenge

without being provocative or disruptive.
For his New Hampshire campaigners, McCarthy had shown his ability to pro-

vide them
paign.

vjith

both the issues and the style of a potentially successful cam-

McCarthy had sensed what the political ethos of New Hampshire required.

Personal sincerity,

a calm,

restrained, yet confident presence, a quick wit,

and ready smile, wlieu personified by McCarthy's tall, rather gray, presidential

3U
nvninc'i-

;;ec-inod

ualurally to brlnp, ]^oop\c to

that often accompanies

a

hlin.

Instead of the

tc.ns:i(
si on

political campaign, McCarthy had the ability to

relax and then to engage those he met.

In addition McCarthy now showed

that he was willing to work very hard in New Hampshire, even
play hockey
the end of a long day

—

knew he could skate well.

at

not just to produce news but because he wanted to and
He gave his campaign an important issue when he

framed in his speech the potential hazard to the vote which was implied by
the Jolmson campaign's "pledge card."

the brief comments on

tlie

Both the twenty minutes of hockey and

"pledge card" gave the New Hampshire campaign and,

especially the reporters items that were uniquely representative of the New
Hampslrire campaign, and ones that could be used as symbols of McCarthy's

energy and political intelligence.

Those who would have liked to write

McCarthy off as an "intellectual," or "aloof," or "professorial" now had
to contend with an image of McCarthy shown slipping slightly on the ice of

a Claremont doorstep then playing a rough game of hockey.

From these images

reporters wrote their stories and supporters began to perk up not only in New

Hampshire but across the nation.

A national Associated Press story datelined, "Concord, N.H.," led:
At a time when presidential aspirants like to show the
voters their skill at sports, Sen. Eugene McCarthy has
taking part in a rough
set a now athletic standard
game of ice hockey.

—

In a yellow sweatshirt, black trousers, a red helmet and
challenging
borrowed skates the Minnesota Democrat

—

—

President Johnson's Vietnam war policies in primaries
skated out onto the ice rink here Tuesday night to join in
a game of hockey.
.

.

—

a favorite sport
Before swinging into the hockey game
McCarthy took a shot at the
with New Hampshire voters
regular Democratic party in New Hampshire, which has not
welcomed his challenge of President Johnson

—
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The Sonntor r.ook oxccpLiou... to a card circulated
in New Hampsliire under the label of the Democratic
-"^l
state coirjiiittee.
.

.

.

In every story carried of the day's activities, playing hockey was
an

important part, and was especially prominent in the New Hampshire coverage
of the story.

The Foster's Daily Democrat of Dover, New Hampshire headlined

their story, "McCarthy Plays Hockey in N.H. Campaign Trip. "32

Newsweek and

Time magazines carried the rare photograph of McCarthy scrambling after the
puck.

His first campaign coverage in these weeklies.

its picture, "Senator McCarthy:

Newswe ek captioned

Hawkish on Ice," and led its story with the

phrase, "The Iceman Runneth. "33 Time magazine'

s

story led, "On Thin Ice,"

with a picture caption which read, "Time for the Face Off."3'^

McCarthy playing liockey, or at least a candidate capable of playing hockey,
was a valuable symbol for the New Hampshire campaign.

The photograph with an

appropriate caption would appear in almost every piece of campaign material
designed for circulation in New Hampshire.

McCarthy's attack on the Johnson campaign's pledge card provided the New
Hampshire leaders with their best piece of ammunition.

His remarks during the

Concord speech and in subsequent press conferences started a political brush
fire that could not be controlled by the New Hampshire Johnson committee.

Desperately in need of some campaign literature that reflected

a

New Hampshire

aspect to McCarthy's campaign, a flyer was printed that attacked the Johnson

campaign's "pledge card."
ballot?"

The flyer read:

"What ever happened to the secret

Then displayed a photograph of one of the serial numbered, in

anything to vote for
triplicate, pledge cards, with "You don't have to sign

Senator F.ugone McCarthy.
for President."

On March 12, let Lyndon Johnson know it.

McCarthy
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T he Press
Tlie

aiul

the PloJ p. e Ca rd

LBJ Conimiutee's i)ledge card was an issue ready
made for the press.

All Senator McCarthy had to do was niention it, provide
a context for the reporter
to evaluate it,

and then almost not mention the subject again
except when asked.

Thursday, February 8th the Boston ]lerald_wrote an early
editorial titled,
"Clieck-Off List for LBJ."

which in its lead read:

Voting in a party primary ought to be as sacrosanct as
voting in an election, with no interference, pressure or
cajoling to confound the voters.
That principal doesn't seem to prevail in New Hampshire,
however, where the Democratic organization is baldly
soliciting party members for pledges that they will write
in votes for Lyndon Baines Johnson in the March 12.... Sen.
Eugene McCartliy ... likens the roundup of pledges to cattle
herding » although he says the gimmick may be merely a local
inspiration to demonstrate loyalty to Lyndon Johnson....

There is nothing illegal about the pledges, though they
certainly seem presumptuous and meddling. One would think
the regular Democrats would be confident of putting down
Sen. McCarthy's challenge to the president without soliciting
reassurance beforehand. \'7hy should a Democrat enrolled in
New HampGhirc be asked directly to pledge his vote to any
candidate?
If a Democrat fails to sign and return his pledge
or refuses to do so on principle, will he be considered disloyal
to Lyndon Johnson or to the regular Democratic organization?
I'ew Hampshire Democrats would be wise to discard their scheme
of pledges to the President and to spend their energies persuading fellow Democrats that the President's pledge to the
nation are worth unsubscribed write-in votes. 35

The C oncord Monitor columnist, Jack Hubbard, began stirring

tlie

pledge card issue in New Hampshire with an approach which was pursued frequently by other reporters.

He began calling both Johnson and McCarthy

supporters for their reaction to the use of the pledge card scheme.

In his

column dated February 8th he wrote, "The Johnson Democrat's pledge card cam-

paign could backfire."

Tlien

of Nashua, Jean Wallin,

v^/llo

he quoted State Representative and McCarthy support
said, "I think you are signing' your right away
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m.ikc

tlio

just

decision in the voting

.1

cards.
tlio

I

bootli.

It in the people wlio refuse to sign

am not saying anything will happen to those people... it is

idea."

Rep. VJallln went on, "It Is a great campaign on paper.

They say they

have 82 workers in Nashua (where there are 8,000 Democrats), but a lot of
these people won't work."

Hubbard concluded his column with references to

the structure of the scheme as reported by the Johnson Committee, then wrote,
"But this idea couJd be lost in the verbal battle over whether LBJ is twisting

arms in New Hampshire's primary.'

In an article on the New Hampshire Independent voter and various candidates'

strategies to "woo" that vote, a New Hampshire State News Service

reporter quoted Bernard Boutin, Johnson Campaign Director, who said, "Attempts
have been made in past primaries to attract independent voters" but he did
not knov; how successful they had been.

"We'll have a better indication this

time than ever before because of the 'pledge' cards being distributed to
Deraoc-.ats and independents."-^'^

he
In a report Boutin prepared for a meeting of the LBJ campaign leaders

after
said that the pledge card campaign was producing "excellent results"
the first week of operation.

In

tlie

news story on his report Boutin said

mailed to President
that large quantities of the numbered cards were being
the President
Johnson in what Bo.itin called "a concrete sign of the support

has here in New Hampshire." 38

3/(5

Kich:,ru W.

Lho hr.ulline,

Daly wriLinr,

"l,Ikl

in

t-he

Ik^stpn

ILcra]_cl

Tr^^^

Vchvuavy 9th under

Forces Running Out of Gimmicks," said:

"The teapot tempest in New Hampshire over the
crude maneuver
oy backers of President Johnson to solicit
loyalty pledges
from voters illustrates once again the difficulties
inherent
campaigning without a candidate
Most significant,
they are numbered.
It is as if some aspiring Big Brother
impatient for 198A plans to pinpoint just who is faithful
and who is not, lest some future postmastership
fall into the
wrong hands.

m

.

.

In tlie Cjijistian Science Monitor

Eugene

J.

,

Edgar M. Mills, wrote that "Sen.

McCarthy is attempting to transform

a

Johnson pledge card, write-in

drive in New Hampshire into a political backlash for his own presidential

candidacy

W.J. McCarthy writing a column datelined Laconia, N.H., for

the Ho St on Herald of the same day, picked up the same theme.

John H. Fenton

New England reporter for the New York Times wrote an article February 9th

which began to uncover the attitude of the Johnson campaign toward their
pledge card effort now that it was becoming controversial.

Fenton

reported:

The first reaction to information kits that are being
distributed among Democratic ward and town chairmen
is that the White House is engaged in an arm-tv;isting
campaign.
Senator McCarthy... commented with a chuckle:
"if there is a difference of one vote between the
number of pledges and the number of registered voters,

then all are traitors and all must die."
...But the cries of anguish were being heard among
some rank-and-file Democrats over a three-section pledge
card that each voter is asked to sign....
'Are we supposed to go to confession in public?' asked
one Democrat who has already filed as a delegate favorable
to the nomination of Mr. Jolinson....

But Richard Weston, of Gov. John W. King's staff at the
State House, said the purpose of the numbering was to
make sure that local chairmen and other coordinators
distributed tlie cards....
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Ak Koon as the Individual votov';; naiiiG has been
returned to headquarters, ho. will be sent an
acknowledgement that his pledge is being forwarded
'with thanks and deep appreciation' to the Uliite
House.
The acknowledgement is signed by Governor
King and by Senator Thomas J. Mclntyre
A party leader in Hanover, who said he had heard
about the pledge cards but had not yet received
one* said
'I think I am going to write Hubert Humphrey
in for
President, what the hell. 41

When

E.

W.

"Ned" Kenworthy, a New Y ork Times reporter, was travelling with

McCarthy in New Hampshire during

a

factory tour, he found that the LBJ pledge

card was already stirring a negative reaction.

Kenworthy wrote:

"There was

evidence (that the pledge card goes against the grain of New Hampshire politics)
vjhen Mr.

McCarthy visited the plant of the Cott Bottling Company

in Manchester.

As he approached one worker with hand outstretched, a cry went up from several

employees, who pointed at the worker and said, "Look out, that's Johnson's

Communist."

"Robert Bergeron, one of those who raised the cry, explained later that
the man approached was Robert Durocher, a ward leader who had been distributing

pledge cards.

"Mr.
I

Bergeron told reporters:

think the pledge is phony.

out what it's all about."

I

'I

only got a seventh grade education.

got a kid brother in Vietnam.

I

But

want to find

"Resentment over the pledao cards, some observers said, had

bccni com-

pounded by a recent liLaLement by Governor King that it would be
"unpatriotic"
for Democrats not to vote for President Johnson.

""^-^

The Sunday edition of the Boston He rald Traveler carried

a

major story

on the New Hampshire presidential primary which contained a reproduction of
the serially numbered pledge card.'^^

Hampshire newspapers began to print

letters-to-the-editor critical of the "pledge card" to an extent where it seemed
that there was little else of interest in the campaign.

The local leaders of

the McCarthy campaign kept the pot boiling with a steady stream of well publiciiied

attacks of the "pledge cards" including one \diere the Laconia McCarthy

chairman expressed the "hope that those Democrats who feel compelled to sign
the pledge cards for political or personal reasons will still exercise the

right of free choice once they are in the voting booth.
In her nationally syndicated column, Mary McGrory

"'^''"*

v^;as

also captured by

the pledge card issue when under the headiiig, "McCarthy Thrives on LBJ

'Pledges,'" she wrote, "Sen. Eugene McCarthy said enigmatically

a

month ago

that he expected to "live off the land" in New Hampshire, nobody paid much

attention.
"But lately, thanks to an issue provided by his opposition, he has been

doing just that, and thriving."

She then recounted that when signed, it would

bring the signer not only "an engraved thank you" from Governor King and
Senator Tom Mclntrye, but also a "photograph of President and Mrs. Johnson

standing on the steps of Air Force I."
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Mary McLhory took Lhe story back to

tlie

WhLto House where the Prosiacnt's

Press Secretary, George Christian was asked whether Governor

Klnfi had

spoken as

"an agent of President Joh.nson," when the Governor had called
McCarthy "an

advocate of

api>easeiiient"

card characterization.

in a counter-attack on McCarthy's successful pledge-

McGrory reported that Christian, "professed ignorance

of the governor's remarks...

ceded that

tlie

but elsewhere in the administration, it was con-

pledge cards were 'a minor tactical error.'"

She concluded her

report with a summary that caught the meaning of both the pledge card issue
and McCarthy's campaign to that point.

The violent reaction of the President's managers tells
McCarthy that he has struck a raw nerve in opening up
the question of presidential coercion.
As a critic
of the war McCarthy had been tagged "a one-issue candidate."
Now he is letting events speak for themselves in Vietnam,
and effectively calling on the voters of New Hampshire
not to let themselves be pushed around. '^5

In spite of wliat appeared to observers as a picture of rats fleeing

the sinking ship of the pledge card campaign, Boutin persisted.

Keene, Boutin

nov;

Speaking in

"termed the use of the numbered pledge cards as a 'petition

to Pr:;sident Johrisori to run again,'" contending "the use of the cards was

consistent with the First Amendment which allows petition to the government "46
.

On the same day Senator Tom Mclntyre spoke at a kick-off session of "Pledge
to Johnson Week," at a Nashua motel.

be fooled by

tlie

Boutin, also attending, said, "Do not

phony issue being raised by the other candidate when he pro-

claims we are invading the secrecy of the ballot with our pledge card campaign.
The pledge card campaign was no more of an invasion of privacy than when our
strips
opponent asks his supporters to wear his campaign buttons or attach bumper
to their cars."^-^
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Now almoct t.oLally on the defensive concerning the
pledge card
tlioy

a.ui

what

had come to ropref.eut for many, the Johnr,on
campaign faced a series of

hlghJy

editor jals which renewed the assault.

critioa.1.

The Portsmouth Herald

said, "There is growing evidence that New Ilampchire's
Democratic "party bosses"

may have -overp] ayed their hand in their eagerness to promote
write-in jjupport
for President Johnson

Mclntyre, whom

tt)e

"

The editorial went on to suggest that Senator

paper had supported, would do well to disassociate himself

from Governor Kin[; in his attacks on Senator McCarthy.

The result, they con-

tended, was H-iving McCar.:uy "underdog status" which will "surely win him
syaipathy
^'^^^

cratic

"'^^'^
.

News

VAJ-l'-y

P,-;rty

L;!iared

the Herald 's sentiments but added, "Wlien the Demo-

can no longer tolerate dissent within its ranks in a primary, it

no longer deijerves to wxn elections ....

"'^^

To make things even worse for the Johnson organizers, the McCarthy workers,

then engaged in

a

docr-to-door canvass of registered Democrats and Independents,

had four.d that some peopj.e who had signed the pledge card were under the impres-

sion that this

v;as

tion quietly to

a nfiw

way of voting.

thero.selvG.s

In glee, they kept this bit of informa-

but it was eventually reported in the press.

lined "Lebanon, K.ll." with a column lieading, "The Lady Voted

—

On Pledge Card,"

the story read;

twist in the pledge card campaign for President
Johnson ccime to light here yesterday, posing a new problem for regu-lar Democrats supporting the President.
A

nev>;

A door~to~door campaign workers for Sen. Eugene McCarthy
said she liad asked a lady if she might talk about her
vote in tomorrow's Presidential Primary.
I've alreatiy voted," said the lady.
card and sent it back."^^

Date-

"I signed the pledge
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InfaluaLcul witi. the pledge card issue,

Its serious reportorial business.

Llic

press did neglect

so.ne of

This lack was detected early on when

a

woman wrote criticizing the Concord MonJ^tor for not covering
"the major subject
of his (February 6th)

complex

speech

—

the growth and power of the military-industrial

Your failure to do so in reporting the Senator's talk smacks
of

editorializing

a

news item.

Also,

I

am rapidly tiring of the tendency on your

part and that of the other media of presenting McCarthy as simply anti-Johnson
and anti-Vietnam without giving him credit for creativity or constructiveness

Signed:

Diana Anderson ."

Ey the end of February the pledge card issue faded as the Johnson leaders

shifted Ho an aggressive attack on McCarthy's Vietnam policies and the implications
of those poJicies.

Ry then even Bernard Boutin appeared to hope that the

pledge cards were forgotten and for almost

a two v^eek

period they were gone as

the stream-of -consciousness of a political campaign moved on.

But on March

7th, Marc Drogin, a reporter for the C oncord Monitor made a series of telephone

calls that produced one of the funny stories of the campaign.

It began when

Governor King was asked how many of the cards had been sent to Washington and
he said that more than "25,000 pledge cards had been sent to the White House."

As they come in, the New Hampshire Democrats for
Johnson keep sending 'em on down.

And the

V/liite

House keeps mailing 'em back.

If that sounds confusing, it's an improvement
over Monday when the Governor's office said they
weren't being mailed out, the Director of
Democrats for Johnson said they had been for the
past week, and the White House said it didn't know
anything about it.

Now it seems it does.
Asst. Press Secretary Robert Fleming told the
few of
Monitj)^r yesterday afternoon that 'there were a
tliat
are
instructions
7lu)se cards around' and that
they 'go back to Mr. Boutin.'

At the la Lost, count, that's 25,000 little pledge
cards golnp, hither and thither.

The Democrats for Johnson know about the hither
but the word is yet to get around about the
thither

Democratic Campaign Headquarters in Manchester....
said Gov. King was right about the cards going out.
In fact, said a young lady, 'they're addressed to
Mr. W. Marvin Watson... special assistant to the

President

.

Could she explain why the
them?

l^Jhite

House was returning

'They're mailing back all the cards?'
She couldn't.
Neither could John Barker, a Johnson campaign aide
in Manchester.
He explained that, 'Hmm.mm, that's
a surprise
.

Not just surprised but angry are New Hampshireites
who have discovered that somebody else has been
signing their names to the pledge cards.

Earlier this week Eugene S. Daniell Jr. complained
aloud that half tlie pledge cards in Franklin were
forgeries and that counterfeits were cropping up all
over the countryside.
At least

tv>7o

were found in Concord yesterday.

The assumption on the part of those not for Johnson.,,
was that local cjimpaigners found it easier to sit
home and sign other people's names to pledge cards
than to go out and solicit genuine signatures.

William Craig, head of the State Democratic Committee,
had replied that such might be the case in part, but
he was checking it out and not overlooking the
possibility that the pledge card peculiarities could
have been a ploy by the McCarthy supporters.
He didn't consider it a laughing matter.

A number of other persons do.
The business of pledge cards, good and bad, being
mailed to here and gone, is "most humorous" to McCarthy
Headquarters.

McCarthy's
'It seems a little bit strange,' David Hoeh,
Campaign Manager told the Monitor as he broke into
anoth<:;r

guffaw.

.

.

.
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'We're anuised by tlio great dlfficuUies they're hnvinr,...
we thinlc the confusion reflects the inability ol the
Jolmson campaign to register with any substance in the
electorate.

—

Meanwhile, back at the White House
why is President
Johnson's staff mailing back the pledge cards as quick
as they come in?
The White House says because its instructions are to return them to Boutin.

The Monitor asked Boutin this morning why the White
House has such instructions.
"They don't have," Boutin said.

Boutin sounded angry:

"Ask George Christian about

that!

Christian was tied up.
But his assistant Fleming, who wasn't, sounded just
a shade annoyed by nov^7:
'The only people we could find who seemed to know anything about it, said they go back to Boutin.'

Fleming then referred the Monito r reporter to the Democratic National Committee

which said that they did not know anything about the pledge cards and, anyway,
they don't get involved in primary elections?'^

The great pledge case mystery

There

ended with the voters entering New Hampshire voting booths Marth 12th.

was never a satisfactory answer as to what actually happened to the White

House part of the signed cards.

Sclieduling Lessons Learned

As

tlie

campaign developed, the scheduling became more sophisticated.

would not be another time like the morning of February 6th in Claremont.

McCarthy's habit of completing activities ahead of the time allowed in
schedule caused
ways of coping.

a

There
While

a

develop
few problems, the drivers or travelling staff began to
quickly
It became possible to call ahead and add something

visit to a small town, a
or change the route slightly to Include a brief
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campaign hcndquar tor s or shopp ing area.

As lloch had sungested durlnj; the

earliest campaign vneeting, the local committees developed

campaign activities from which they could draw
The Salem headquarters

x,;ould

a

a

"shelf" of potential

schedule on very short notice.

put together a three hour schedule, including
a

headquarters full of people, with less than two hours notice on the
last day
of the campaign.

In addition to the tools of the telephone, a fledgling

advance activity, iocal contacts, and the twelve day strategy, Sandy Hoeh
had
lists of manufacturing establishments that could be contacted for in-plant
tours or meeting shift changes; lists of service clubs that might need
fast or noontime speaker;

a

break-

newspapers, radio and television stations for inter-

views;

schedules of special events that the campaign could join or greet

crowd;

airports where the candidate could arrive or leave without having to

a

come through Boston, and a special notebook in which she could rough out a
schedule.

The most serious problem other than not having firm dates for

McCarthy's visits

v/as

to create schedules with good activities within a

geograplii cally reasonable area.

..'bile

the distances are not great by comparison with other states, the

only travel option is the automobile for intra-state campaigning.
a

candidate will f3y from

an exception.

Occasionally

southern to northern New Hampshire, but this is

The scheduler had the choice of either building

a

schedule from

one or two strong events, filled in with less useful activities in one area, or

having the candidate chase prime events in often widely separated locales.

remaining two days of McCarthy February

6,

7,

8,

schedule reflected the problem

the
of filling time, responding to opportunities, broadening the impact of

campaign, and finding

covered ground.

a

The

place to depart without having to repeat previously
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Time

Plcice

Function

7:00 a.m.

Concord

Greet workers outside factories

7:20 a.m.

Concord

Great Rumford Press workers outside
Rumford Press

8:05 a.m.

Concord

Breakfast, McKenzie's Restaurant,
Main Street

8:30 a.m.

Concord

Address assembly and question and
answer at Concord High School

9:00 a.m.

Concord

Tour of Concord Moni tor building and
informal press conference

30 a

Concord

Coffee V7ith resident of JFK apartments
(Housing for elderly)

10: ]5 a.m.

Concord

Address at St. Paul's School and
question and answer period.

11: 15

Concord

Greeted by Mayor Gove at City Hall and
introduction to city employees

9:

. ivi

a.Tii.

1:

00 p.m.

Manchester

Address at Central High School

1:

35 p.m.

Manchester

Tour Cott Beverage Co.

Manchester

Coffee at home of Mr.
1015 Chestnut St.

Manchester

Tour shopping center

Manchester

Drive to Concord

Concord

Dinner in Concord

Concord

Drive to Laconia

Laconia

Laconia Tavern

3: 15 p . m

A:

00 p.m.

A: 30 p
6:

,

m

30 p . in

8: 30

10: 00 p.m.

&

Mrs. Robert Eschoo

The McCarthy leaders felt that each campaign visit should have at least
part of its schedule in Manchester.

As the largest city and the hub of

Hillsborough County with its lieavy Democratic voter registration, McCarthy had
to do well in uhe county if he was to succeed statewide.

local campaign organi/.ation was weak.

Unfortunately, the

From the beginning many of those attracted
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McCartl.y

Mvrd outside

the city or had had little previous campaign
oxporlonco,

Their contacts werv^ limited, and their understanding, of
the political dynamics
of the city was less than adequate to crack the community's
tough political

shell.

While Hoeh and Studds were determined to have McCarthy campaign
in

Manchester once each visit, to do so always strained the best efforts of
the
state campaign and a shy local committee.

In contrast as sho\,m by the detail

of the February 7th Concord schedule, a well connected, hardworking, politically

sophisticated local McCarthy committee made campaigning in Concord a pleasure
not only for McCarthy but for those scheduling his campaign.

In fact,

the

local person who scheduled McCarthy for the Concord Committee, would check
eacli

time and detail of the schedule personally then re-run as much as possible

with the advance person.

To avoid another plant gate miscue the local scheduler

was out in front of the Rumford Press plant early one morning to check
of v;/orkers and the shift change times.

tlie

flow

He pre-ran each travel link, checked the

table location for McCarthy at the restaurant, and made sure that every other
event in that morning schedule would work without having McCarthy late or

awkwardly standing if he completed an activity too soon.

The Laconia committee possessed much of the same ability as the Concord
Somewhat younger and broader based in the community, the Laconia

people.

Committee's youth and enthusiasm made their city an attractive campaign stop
and one

wliicli

would be used on a number of occasions when an activity was needed

tor some of those who came later to campaign for McCarthy.

Hoeh and Studds

used Laconia almost as a "test market" for celebrity visits because they were
confidvMii.

of the Laconia committee's ability to arrange events and then evaluate

how a celebrity miglit

be?

used elsewhere in the campaign.

for the third day, February 8th, illustrated their skill.

The Laconia schedule

356
Scl^cHlule:

Time

Thursda y February

8,

1968 ^ ^

Place

Function

6:30 a.m.

Laconia

Greet workers outside Scott-Williams
Manufacturing Co,

7:30 a.m.

Laconia

Address Laconia Chamber of Commerce
Breakfast (An obligatory performance
for all presidential primary candidates)

9:00 a.m.

Laconia

WLNH radio interview

9:30 a.m.

Laconia

McCarthy for President Headquarters

9:A5 a.m.

Laconia

WEMJ radio interview

10:30 a.m.

Laconia

Coffee at home of Mr. & Mrs. Ron
O'Callahan, 42 Gilford Street

11: 30 a.m.

Laconia

Leave Laconia for Lebanon

12: 30 p.m.

Lebanon

Address Rotary, Landers Restaurant

A5 p.m.

Lebanon

Main Street tour

p.m.

Lebanon

Interview:

3: 10 p.m.

Lebanon

Leave Lebanon airport for Boston.

1:

2: 15

Valley News

Because it was possible for McCarthy to leave New Hampshire from the

Lebanon Airport and connect with
was added which took advantage of

a flight
a

to Washington,

the Lebanon schedule

newsworthy speech before the Rotary Club

and McCarthy's fir^t campaigning in New Hampshire's "North Country."

To do

this meant that McCarthy had to be driven more than sixty miles across New

Hampshire, over

a

winding, low speed road

—

not that comfortable an experience

durin<; the beginning of New Hampshire's frost heavy season.
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To overcome

souiti

of the conmunications problems between
New Hampshire and

the national campaign, Grace Bassett, a friend of the
McCarthy family, came to

New Hampshire to help Sandy Hoeh with the next schedule and also
to organize
activities for Mrs. McCarthy.

An effective political organizer in her own

right, Abigail McCarthy agreed to help in her husband's campaign by
coming to

New Hampshire.

Her role in previous campaigns had been largely as a behind the

scenes organizer and only occasionally as an active campaigner.

Now that their

family vas older, she and daughter Mary, a Radcliffe sophomore were scheduled
for a visit February lA and 15 with the Senator who was coming for three days,

February 13, 14, 15, the scheduling task doubled.

The same care in preparation

was needed for Mrs. McCarthy as was required for Senator McCarthy, including
advancii'g,

transportation and provisions for several reporters.

Although much

of Mrs. McCarthy's schedule would be arranged by local committees, Grace Bassett

provided the important interpretation of what
and the Senator's office.

v/as

scheduled to both Mrs. McCarthy

With Grace Bassett in New Hampshire, date and sche-

dule couf irn)ation through Washington greatly improved.

Building Momentum

Each campaign succeeds or fails on the basis of its ability to attract
voters' interest and, ultimately, their votes.

A campaign is effective if it

has been able to create a sense of progress, excitement, movement, momentum.

Campaigns have been said to "peak" too early or "peak" too late or fail to
"peak" at all.

The chemistry of a campaign contains many variables which, when

in harmony, seem to produce the attraction.

The variables multiply as the

campaign proceeds and their interaction, importance, and identity vary greatly
from moment to moment.

To. assign and assess each,

then to test and evaluate

is permissible
would require the ability to control evaluation beyond that which

in cuch a socially dynamic event.

The totality of the campaign becomes greater
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tiian

tlu'

sum of its parts.

To sort

tlie

McCarthy campaign into its constituent

attribute to ore or the other

a

elements and to

reason for its vitality vould be misleading.

Of great importance, of course, were the candidate, the
issues, the times,

the management,

the workers,

the strategy, the funding, the media attention,

the place, the timing, the opponents' mistakes and many other
individual,

group actions and inactions
a few

that created the momentum.

There were, however,

identifiable activities and responses that represented

a difference.

The difference was that after a number of weeks of uncertainty, hard work,
and

frustration the campaign seemed to come to life.

The work was no less, nor

the uncertainty, but there was a spirit, a sense of accomplishment, a feeling
that attention was shifting toward the McCarthy candidacy.

Evidence of this

shift came through the media, from the field activities, from the canvassing,

from issue targeting, from the interest of celebrities, from the reaction to
McCartliy public relations,

candidate.

In that time,

the i-roperty of the many.

to the treasury, and in the commitment of the

the campaign left the management of a few and became
It had become greater in its pulsing energy than

individual direction could contain or candidate charisma could sustain.

The

McCarthy campaign had become what the students in New Ham.pshire sensed was
a happening.

The Reporters
In spite of the best laid plans of campaign managers and political

strategists, excitement in a campaign is bestowed, alm.ost as a gift.

People

meeting in living rooms and discussing candidates, issues, and campaigns
cannot of themselves have much impact.

It

is only when the rumblings have
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Ix^at

pr ick

can be heard.

t

he ears of an ii.qu

i

s

J

t:

ivo reporter or two that a l^eart

More often than not the beat fades before

There

lonp,.

were four names printed on the New Hainpshire ballot in
1968 and only one was
that of Senator McCarthy.

Also on the ballot was a place for the write-in
vote.

That space could have drawn the attention of other possible
candidates not just

Lyndon Johnson.

Robert Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, John Lindsey, or

a

local

favorite son such as Governor King or Senator Mclntyre, might
have been the
recipient of a surprise vote.

Robert Kennedy received a substantial surprise

write-in vote for Vice President in the 1964 New Hampshire presidential primary
as did Henry Cabot Lodge.

If protest was the single objective of the 1968

presidential primary then a vote cast for almost anyone, whether listed on the
ballot or not might well have conveyed the message, especially if the non-

Johnson vote equalled or exceeded the number who wrote in the President's name.
For a multiplicity of reasons

scattering of votes.

such alternatives did not produce more than a

The contest became one between the President and the

Senator from Minnesota, but for many weeks it was seen by the populace,

through the eyes and ears of the reporters, as being no contest at all.

What Hoeh and Studds found was a certain herd instinct on the part of
the reporters.

This was especially noticeable when they began meeting members

of the national press on the early McCarthy visits to New Hampshire.

national reporters arrived as

a

herd> moved as a herd, responded as a herd, and

not infrequently reported as a herd.
of

tlie

The

The New Hampshire and national leadership

McCarthy campaign found that the herd Instinct also tended to prevail

among the editors of the major national newspapers.
front of

tiic

herd.

Few wished to be much in

Whether this observation can be raised to the level of a

media would
theory purjvjrting to describe the dynamics of the naltonal political
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,

but

I

he observations of the New Hampshire leaders,
as they watched

media attention change, may have significance in explaining how
campaigns are
covered.

The analogy to the herd relates effectively to the fact that within
a

large herd there are sub-groups, families, individuals and mavericks.

The

news gathering and reporting echelons tend to form and follow in much the same
manner.

The local New Hampshire reporters, so few in number that they could

hardly be labelled
Jolinson,

a herd,

pro-McCarthy

found the the local hot spots of anti-war, anti-

sentiments, stirred among the few who were contemplating

an alternative for the New Hampshire voters, and fanned the heat into a fire of

public curiosity.

For most of the period between the first mentioning of

Cans October visit and McCarthy's announcement January 4th, it was the state

reporters for United Press International
the possi-bility

and the Associated Press who kept

of McCarthy before the New Hampshire public.

To a certain

extent they were also repsonsible for what little national coverage the McCarthy

organization received.

If it is possible to describe a small state like New Hampshire in terms

of media markets then the coverage of the early New Hampshire McCarthy activity

was carried most heavily in Manchester and Concord where newspapers existed

with their own capital city reporters;

secondarily in the cities of Portsmouth,

Laconia, Keene, Claremont, Lebanon, with newspapers that carried one or both of
the wire services and the State News Service reports;
and Dover which carried only wire service items.

coverage was by the weekly newspapers.

and thirdly,

in Nashua

A fourth level of press

A number subscribed to the State News

state
Service summary, others would write their own summary of significant

politicaJ events especially if

a

local angle could be developed for the coverage,
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A frw concent ral

cvl

thcJr reporting, torally on local events.

In l.hose cases

almost the only way for the McCarthy campaign to rccclvo
notice was to have

either a ]ocal person do something worthy of publication or
create a local
event that the weekly miglit cover.

Beyond the newspaper attention there was also the role of the electronic
media.

For all intents and purposes the only electronic media capable of

covering New Hampshire news events were the radio stations of the larger
communities.

The one television channel, IMUR-TV located in Manchester, was

not financially strong enough to support continuous news coverage using video
or film inputs.

Their one reporter would have to drive considerable distances

to cover events outside Manchester, return to the station, develop his own

soundless film, write a story Lo accompany the film, and then read the story

during the evening

nevvrscast

with the film running as

a background.

Needless

to say an event had to be of major proportions to justify that reporter's

exertion.

Most television news, therefore, was of the "rip and read" variety

taken from the teletype machines of the wire service carried by the television
station.

Radio reporting was far more important.

Local radio stations had often

established as their competitive hallmark their respective ability to either
get to the heart of a story or to add vitality to their newscasts.

Using

tape recordings, toJeplione interviews, and follow-up reports, many stations
had become proficient in expanding significantly the stories they received

from the wire services.

It was this activity,

as much as any other,

gave eaily life to the New Hampsliire McCarthy campaign.

that
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•

I

Press Internal
in

tl>(<

call

wire service.

news depart

luul

iiu-nts

carried Lhc

lln

1

1

c.l

As soDn as a wire siM-vIce story arrived

quoted New Hampshire source for either

or expanded commentary.

receive

a

for

wire.

tlie

1

that

news of rice of a radio st:at:ion the most ajigresslve of the news staffs
would

Ll\e

tairin);

icnia

sl.ition:;

6:00 -

6: 30

a.m.

Often during

call from

IJefore 7:00 a.m.

tlie

In-gan

llo(di

radio news reiJorters for ac tiialit ies

lll'l

.

Tlie

repeat of the story for

a

llie

campaign David

reporter

wlio

would

lloeh

would writ

e

a

story

receiving telephone calls from
thirst for state news items using

actuality recordings to validate the account had become

a fine art.

Each of

the stations in the major marl<cts would cover the news in this way.

Keporting New Hampshire events was much less
a

process of gleaning from

number of significant events all competing for scarce newspaper space or

air time, than it was an effort to generate news

available.
of

a

tlie

Thc<

tliat

was wortliy of the space

McCarthy story was attractive and captured the early attention

reporters and media news staffs.

accessible and straight-forward

in

The people involved were cjuotable,

their responses.

For many the "home-grown"

nature of the McCarthy effort was an attractive contrast to the contrived image
of the Now Hampshire dolmson activity and the usual dismal accounts of New

Hampshire's governmental events.

editorial
The interest generated by the reporters was expanded by early

attention.

concerned
The Concord, Tortsmouth, Keenc and Lebanon newspapers,

gave editorial attention
about the dlrecLion of the administration's war policy,
to McCartl>y campaig.n events.

The Manche s t er Unjc^

and the Dover newspaper,

attention.
.supporters of the war policy, also gave editorial

That attention.
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however, vas

While

a

not.

uni.forn,ly against

McCarthy or Iho Now Hn,„pshirc supporters.

minor herd instinct does prevail among the editors
of the anti-Loeb

press on certain state issues, when issues separate
from the anti-Loeb stance
then the editors tend to be quite independent in their
analyses.

If a herd

is to be labelled then the editors of the Portsmouth,
Concord, Keene and

Lebanon newspapers were its members.

The Laconia newspaper did not editorialize,

and the Dover, Nashua and Claremont newspapers were not
predictable in their

editorial reactions to the McCarthy activity.

The fact that a broad spectrum of news gathering and disseminating people
in New Hampshire found the McCarthy activity to be vjorthy of early attention

was important to the success of the campaign.

On its

o\vrn

and strictly within

the confines of New Hampshire media, the campaign received better than usual

coverage and editorial attention.

Because New Hampshire is almost entirely under the media shadow of
Boston, what has to be described as
to the McCarthy campaign.

a

regional media activity was also important

The Bos ion television stations, recognizing that

their market extends deeply into New Hampshire, frequently cover major events
there.

During several of McCarthy's campaign visits Boston television film

crews followed him and carried reports of his campaigning in their news broadcasts.

Perhaps as important, however, was that fact that when McCarthy campaigned in

Massachusetts or when he landed at Boston's Logan International Airport for
Nev7

Hampshire campaigning, he was well covered by the Boston television stations.

For them it was less expensive to catch McCarthy in an airport arrival and inter-

view

th.an

it was to follow him to the remote corners of New Hampshire.
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Boston

'r,

throe major newspapers, the Boston Globe, The
Record-American,

and the ILcrald T.:ave3_or, as well as the Christian
Science Monitor maintained

constant touch with the campaign.

The Monitor 's New England political reporter,

Edgar Mills, ran a circuit of uhe New Hampshire campaigns that
meant almost a
\7eekly article summarizing the activities for his paper.

The Globe

,

struggling

to become the dominant publication in the Boston market and committed
to

improved coverage of New Hampshire events, was the most aggressive.

The Globe

management had re-oriented the rather bland format of the paper toward
stronger editorial and reportorlal image.
much of the circulation of the Boston Post
and buiJt on tliat economic base.

a

They had been successful in absorbing
,

which closed late in the 1950's,

The management had sensed the political

direction which Massachusetts was taking and became an independent Democratic

publication editorially.

Their reasons for giving attention to New Hampshire

activities came from both economic and editorial motivation.

Southern and

especially southeastern New Hampshire was grov7lng as rapidly as any region in
the nation.

Many of those living in that part of New Hampshire had migrated

to the state from Massachusetts but still retained employment,

shopping habits,

and social orientations toward Massachusetts.

Editorially, the Globe was offended by the practices and opinions of the

Manche ster Union Leader and its publisher William Loeb.
difficulties In Boston the Manchester

During labor management

Union L eader would increase its press

runs and even prepare special editions of the newspaper for circulation in Boston.

Trying to exploit the problems of other newspapers in their own market was
not popular with the Globe management.

This was but one of

a

number of instances

and
where Loeb offended New England's newspaper owners with his practices

eccentricities.

While not taking the M anchester Union Leader on directly, the

•
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its circulation in those parts

daily newspaper vacuums and among the residents

of the southeastern part of the state where it would be economically important
to develop an £idvertising market.

New Hampshire news.

The Globe employed a full-time reporter for

New Hampshire-circulated daily papers carried expanded

New Hampshire political news especially, and the Sunday edition contained a
special section for regional

i^iews

with

a lieavy

emphasis on New Hampshire items

of broader interest.

The H erald-Traveler

struggle for survival.

,

Boston's independent Republican newspaper, was in a

The paper had failed to attract much of the old Post

ireadership and with the changing political and economic orientation of Massa-

chusetts, the H erald was losing readers, advertising and was about to lose
the television station that had bolstered its economic position for many years.

The Heral d had

a

sizable circulation among New Hampshire Republicans especially

for its Sunday edition.

Since the Globe was now challenging the Herald at home

and in Nev7 Hampshire, the Herald sought to improve its New Hampshire coverage
as w.ll.

H erald reporters regularly travelled with the senator on his visits

and then stayed to report campaign activities.

The Re cord -American,

a

publication of the Hearst chain, had been in con-

tinuing economic difficulty for a number of years.

A tabloid with a high cir-

the number
culation, cho paper was read by those most interested in race results,

and sports.

Massachusetts
Its political coverage was confined almost entirely to

with only occasional items of regional interest.
its wa>

New Hampshire politics found

of the nationally
into the paper's summary columns, under the by-lines

distributed beyond New Hampshire.
syndicated writers or from wire service stories
was the most important to the McCarthy
Of the four Boston newspapers the Globe

candidacy.
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The Globe's political desk was staffed by a
group of "young Turk" reporters,

led by Robert Healy, who reflected the
changing guard in Masshacusetts

political leaders and its orientation toward liberal,
effective, efficient and

corruption free government. In

laany

respects, John Kennedy's election to the

Presidency in 1960 had stimulated this broad spectrum of
political and institutional reform.

Before his election Boston's and Massachusetts' political
prob-

lems were an embarrassment only to those few in the state who
cared.

chusetts became the home state of

a

When Massa-

President, a provincial embarrassment became

intolerable to many civic, business and institutional leaders. Remarkably,
an
Important part of that change was the re-constitution of a newspaper into a for-

midable civic institution.

The leadership which the Globe exerted upon the re-

form of Massachusetts politics during the 1960s, was reflected in a concern about
the policies of the Johnson administration in 1967 and 1968. To them something
of the heritage that John Kennedy had left had been lost. The energy for construc-

tive good that had been released by his presidency and v/hich had revived the

publication itself, was now being wasted in Vietnam. The Globe's editors were
early advocates of changing Vietnam policy and when their efforts failed, rhey

sensed the importance of what might be accomplished if President Johnson's political nerve were tapped. The New Hampshire presidential primary offered that
opportuxTity in their view and its pages were turned to that end.

Unlike others

of the nationa.l press that were slow to recognize the New Hampshire McCarthy ef-

fort, the Globe threw caution to the winds and vigorously reported the campaign.

Their performance was much closer to that of New Hampshire's own daily press
than it

v:a3

to the major national papers.

Wiiat lloeh and

Studds had predicted in their December memorandum to McCarthy

came true beyond their expectations.

Because there was a strong McCarthy organi-

7.aliou in Massachusetts, McCarthy's name had been listed on the April
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Mass)rhusoLt;s presid.nvlal primary bal

Massachusetts Democrat
in the primary,

ic

l.oL,

party as to how

and because of confusion

tlie

iho

:In

President would be represented

Boston's newspapers were filled with McCarthy
news.

This

was a reversal of what the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders
had expected.

They

had assummed that New Hampshire McCarthy activity would
be reported in

Massachusetts helping to build support for him in the later primary.

By the

time the New Hampsliire primary was held the decision in Massachusetts
had already

been made.
a

Johnson's name would not appear on the ballot nor would their be

stand-in or effort to secure write-in votes.

The contest then became one of

selecting national convention delegates by congressional districts
that was

conceded

Committee.

i.o

—

a contest

McCarthy by the Johnson controlled Democratic State

This series of events released the Boston political writers from

having to cover Massachusetts.

They came to New Hampshire.

Unlike the local or the regional reporters, the McCarthy leaders observed,
the natJonal press performed much like a herd.
as a group,

They arrived in a group, moved

separated only occasionally to gather news, returned to digest

their gatherings as a group, and tended to confirm their perceptions as a group.

There was social, jr,tellectual
herd.

Tli.ls

,

and status re-enforcement by being a part of the

led to preconceptions of New Hampshire politics and heavy reliance on

contacts developed and shared from previous quadrennial

New Hampshire visits.

In their early contacts with the travelling national press Hoeh and Studds found

the situation both disillusioning and frustrating.

In awe of the names they

had read for years in the prominent national press Hoeh and Studds had to

struggle first, to overcome reticence

and then to attempt to get the herd to

shift its attention toward the McCartliy c.impaign in New Hampshire.

recognized

tiial

unless they were able to convince national reporters

Both
tliat
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somethiui; was

luipi'^-n iu,;

ouCsld,^ iho srato.

in New

Hampshire Lhe campaign would

liave

no impact

Without that recognition the money necessary
to sustain the

candidacy would not Mow.

For the combined reasons of money and
impact the

New Hampshire leaders spent a great deal of their time
accommodating reporters
in hopes that before March 12th the story of what
was happening in New

Hampshire would reach the larger national audience.

Willie they had had

moderate success in getting attention prior to McCarthy's

entry in the New Hampshire primary, af ter the initial burst of his January
Ath

release attention dropped to almost zero.

Often Hoeh would make special trips from Hanover to Concord or Manchester
to meet v/ith a national reporter, columnist or for a network interview.

The

results were almost uniformly disappointing as either the questions or the
subsequent story offered only skepticism.

The New Hampshire spokesman had

difficulty breaking through the pre-conceptions the national press cadre brought

with them when they came to New Hampshire.

Skepticism came from their view of

the yaCarthy cam.paign from their normal Washington base.
the campaign had caused

l^.ardly a

ripple.

There it appeared that

By comparison with other presidential

efforts, McCarthy was poorly organized, financed, staffed, headquartered, led
and without allies.

It was inconceivable that such an organization couid manage

a meaningful national candidacy much less dent the political hide of an incumbent

president.
it

Since there was so little to interest them from the Washington base

was hard to believe that field operations would be any better.

arrived in New Hampshire to be greeted by what was, in their view,

leadership surrounded by unknown local volunteers and
but naive college kids.

a

The reporters
a

rookie

number of pleasant

When they went to check the local sources they had

developed during earlier New Hampshire visits they found that these prominent
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pol if.icnl lenclc-rs were (^Jihcr commltUH]
JohP..son or

rel ired

McCartlr/ crowd.

from tho action.

l:o

the ronomi nat i on of Prcsid-nt

There was hardly

Certainly there was no one

witli the

fnudllar

a

face in the

elected stature of Governor

John King or Senator Tom Mclntyre or the political
recognition of William Dunfey
or William Craig.

Bernard Boutin, the Johnson manager, had a respected
record

as a high Kennedy and Johnson administrator as well as
a previous record as a

New Hampshire political leader.

Hoeh and Studds were unknown outside of New

Hampshire and untried in the view of the national press.

For

all of January and through the early weeks of February the national

press remained a herd united in its skepticism and assured that a campaign

developed as the McCarthy candidacy had developed could not assault the
incumbent president.
to Romney.

McCarthy's first several visits were assessed in contrast

Scheduling and advancing problems, small crowds and McCarthy's

quiet approach were seen as

confirmations of the early assessment.

continuing irritation of campaign workers

To the

who were attempting to improve the

early advancing difficulties, the reporters kept referring to errors.

On one

occasion a comj)licated route for a series of evening coffee parties in Manchester
was advanced by carefully pre-running and timing the route several days earlier.
On the evening of the parties the lead driver missed
in the dark and

.led

a

turn

lie

did not recognize

his small motorcade down a deadend street.

David Shomacher

of CBS-TV was in one of the cars that had to back up and turn around in order
to re-discover the correct route.

repeated radio

This mis-cue became the theme of his often

and television reports of the campaign's status.

Being taken

down a deadend street was too much for him to resist in his analogy of the

progress or non-progress he felt the campaign was making in New Hampshire.
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All

other aspects of the schodulo had gone well and
McCarthy's reception had

been Letter

tl.an

anyone had expected but

tlio

story from New Hampshire from that

reporter was about the "ainateurisin" of the advance work.

To tlieir continuing

frustration the Hampshire leaders could not break the image
which the national
press had created of them.

Witli

change.

McCarthy's second visit February

6,

7,

and 8, the stories began to

Tom Wicker did write his refreshing column concerning the Claremont

Rotary Club's exclusion of the electronic media but the New York Times
news columns continued to carry only bits of reports and little that would

indicate

anything important was happening in New Hampshire.

E.

Kenv7orthy enjoyed McCarthy's wit, use of language and openness.

M.

He,

"Ned"
like others

of the herd began to sense that McCarthy was beginning to get through to the

New Hampshire voter and that for some reason, yet to be understood, the campaign
was beginning to work.
fee-lj

On several occasions he wrote what he was beginning to

but the copy failed to get into the newspaper.

The McCarthy leaders were

understandably upset that the Times was not carrying stories that had been

written that were favorable to the Senator.

Kenworthy would

show them the copy

he had telephoned to New York expecting that the coming edition would contain

his report.

VJhen

were worried.

it didn't

both the New Hampshire and the Washington headquarters

It appeared as if a news block at the Times was somehow in

operation that prevented news of the New Hampshire campaign from appearing in
New York.

News in the Times in New York meant both money and volunteers for

the campaign.

Without coverage the campaign slowly began to starve.

that
BlaJr Clark found, through social contacts with the Times editors,

McCarthy was viewed by them not as
candidate."

a

presidential candidate but as an "issue

presidency
Since in their view, McCarthy was not running for the
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but .un,Unn only

t:o

raise .he Vie.na.n Wa. Issue,
he

wouM

coverage In the Tijncs which they
normally allocated to

a

not bo accorded the

presidential candidate.

In outrage that such a conclusion
was possible, Clark through .any
of the san,e

prominent social and political contacts
in New York, got the editors
to recognize
the absurdity of their conclusion.
Kenworthy's reports were printed and
the
editorial page of the T_ln^ began to
recognize the McCarthy candidacy.

What this experience denionstrated to the
McCarthy leaders was the peculiar

behavior of the national press establishment.

They found that the reporters

tended to accept the established versions of the
campaign

accounts of the burdgeoning McCarthy effort.

and to view skeptically

Their early reports from New Hampshir.

tended to be cautious, reflect the problem.s. and convey
the image of a "David and

Goliath" contest with David deprived of a weapon and missing
his marbles.

When

the theme changed and David was seen as being at least
competent, the editors

were reluctant to support their reporters' accounts
campaign

.

McCarthy and his amateur

were scoring forcefully in New Hampshire long before the editors of

the major nationally regarded newspapers took much notice.

The stories that

were printed were buried and without editorial recognition.

McCarthy's progress

which was being confirmed not just by the reporters but by canvassing evidence
and growing voter reaction was not receiving editorial recognition.

reporters had changed their views, the editors, members of

a

While the

higher herd, were

unwilling to say that McCarthy was doing well in New Hampshire until there was
a

recognized, establislied source.

If

the Times had written editorially that

McCarthy was campaigning effectively then the Washington Post, the
Post Dis patch, the Atlanta Const itut ion

,

Louis

the Los An gele s Times and one or two

other prominent publications would follow.
to break from the herd.

S^t.

The problem was getting the first
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FortunaL-oly Lhere Is an importantindependent source of analysis.

some extent this role is filled by the
syndicated columinsts.

To

They, like the

editors and the reporters, usually like to
forecast with assurity.

Robert

Evans wrote an early negative column which
conditioned many reporters

what they experienced in New Hampshire for a
considerable time.
to open the circle a bit with his refreshing
Claremont tale.

about

Tom Wicker began

Most of the other

columnists tended to remain a part of the herd until it
began to shift from

skepticism to

belief that something was happening in New Hampshire.

The

important exception was Mary McGrory whose widely read and
respected column gave

both reporters and editors the source they needed to change their
cautious
stance.

Unfortunately her columns came relatively late and had the effect of

confirming the work of an earlier and exceptionally important writer, Paul
Wieck.

Wieck represented an important but perhaps less clearly understood part
of the national press,

basically

a

the independent journals of news and opinion.

Wieck,

free-lance writer, was then working for the New Republic and

covering for them the presidential campaigns.

He had first met the New

Hampshire McCarthy leaders at the Chicago meeting of the Conference of
Concerned Democrats and had kept in touch with them since that December meeting.
He had caught the flavor of the McCarthy activity in its early days.

Without

the inhibitions of the national press and writing for a publication that

prided itself on being out in front of events, he could take seriously the

optimism that came from those involved in the McCarthy campaign.

While Wieck

travelled with the national press, he had found threads of credibility in

McCarthy's campaign that had not been reported by the others.

His stories
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reflected this anticipation putting his
evaluations far ahead of his colleagues.
While Wieck's speculation nude the news
reporters uncomfortable, they were not

willing to include his advanced opinions in
their own writings until they had
more confirmation.
To a degree the independent journal of
opinion does serve to lead the

larger press establishment.

Publications like the New Republic have wide

readership among the reporters and editors.

Stories often receive preliminary

coverage in such publications and through the leads that
are revealed, the

reporters pursue subjects for their own papers.

As an important investigative

journalistic outlet, stories are tested that in several weeks often become
the
objective of wide-spread interest.

The independent journals are much like

scouts ahead of the herd ranging acorss the terrain in search of new routes
and meaningful objectives.

They might also be considered as a picket line

which tends to draw the early fire.

In truth, the early fire may inflect

wounds that would be damaging to the credibility of larger publications.

An

independent journal is expected to be at the edge and is respected according
to its ability to both direct reporters toward new subjects and to shape opi-

nion of events.
Paul Wieck performed both roles exceptionally well in 1968.

He sensed

the flow of events and because he had anticipated well, his evaluations gained

high respect as the political year unfolded.

Wieck followed McCarthy to New Hampshire during the Senator's February
14 and 15 visit.

13,

He carefully evaluated McCarthy's performance, the response,

the status of his organization and the competence of the opposition.

Wlien he

left New Hampshire he carried an opinion of the campaign that was not widely

shared by his press colleagues.

Some may have agreed with his assessment but
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were unwlllun^ to put in print what they felt
and certainly their editors wouid.
not tolerate fantasies.

Wleck's article titled, "McCarthy:

Alive and Well in

New Hampshire," appeared in the edition of the
New Republic dated March
Daiielliied Nashua,

2,

1968.

N.H, Wieck wrote:

Here, in the snow-covered hills Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy'
is finding his identity as a presidential
candidate as
he moves unhurriedly in and out of the endless and
often
depressing shoe factories, jokes with his supporters at
coffee hours, speaks in town halls and on college campuses.
He is winning friends.
In return he commits more of
himself each day.
His wit is more incisive, his speeches
stronger .55

Since this was the New Republic

's

first major story on the New Hampshire

campaign, Wieck went on to review how the Johnson managers had committed the

"classic goof" with their pledge card scheme and how the tactic had "backfired
so badly it left the state's Democratic organization demoralized."

McCarthy's own effectiveness as

a

But it was

campaigner that brought Wieck to his

conclusions
Simultaneously, (with the pledge card mistake) McCarthy's
own performance began to improve.
On his first trip to
the state in December, he had delivered a dull, academic
lecture.
Wlien he returned January 26, his supporters were
low
at a
])oint.
Then, he stirred a crowd of some 700
at St. Anselm' s just outside Manchester to repeated bursts
of appJause, and by mid-February, he had succeeded in
drawing a sharp contrast between his o\m style and that of
Instead of rhetorical excesses,
the pro-Johnson hierarchy.
he insisted he would "not shout at the voters of New
Hampshire" ( and that he hadn't found any who wanted him) .56
He reported that he had seen McCarthy move effectively among people at

their jobs, in

sraalJ

groups, before large audiences and on the street.

He

noted that McCartliy refused to "demagogue" the issues in spite of the fact that
there were clear opportunities to do so.

He used the example of Bernard Boutin

to illustrate McCarthy's ability to move through the thicket of inter-acting

voter concerns and still maintain the basic concerns of his campaign.
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Boutin
and

a

left-

the federal service to vriuru to Now
Hampshire

position with Sanders Associates, a major
employer

in Nasliua and a rapidly r>rowinR firm
largely dependent on
defense contracts
$125 million of its current $1A0
million gross, according to Pentagon figures. But many

—

of New Hampshire's white- and blue-collar vwrkers
earn
their paychecks from firms with defense contracts and
a
heated attack upon "the complex," pleasing though it might
be to McCarthy's academic following, could cost hundreds,
even thousands of votes.
So, when the question came up at a coffee hour, he dealt
with specific solutions after sizing up the Pentagon as
"about the third or fourth largest nation" in the world.
His solutions to bring the CIA under control, as he and
some of his Senate colleagues have tried to do;
to put
some strings on the Pentagon's sale of arms abroad, as
they've also tried to do; and to take all nonmilitary
procurement (he estimated this would amount to $30 billion
of nearly $80 billion in Department of Defense expenditures)
out of DOD, a m.ovc that could also save billions in that
civilian procurement officers would be allowed to wipe out
some of the endless duplication in military procurement -57
.

He found during his tour that New Hampshire was still "Nixon country" and
that Nixon's cautious approach to the state had the "nation's first presidential

primary pretty well nailed dovm."

But in contrast, Wieck felt the "Democratic

race is wide open," a conclusion that was not widely shared by his fellow

national reporters at the time he wrote it.

To suggest, at this point, that McCarthy could win would
But it no longer
be on the daring side of the ledger.
McCarthy wears well. His insistence
seems impossible.
oi\ rational discussion is in line with New Hampshire
tradition, which was summed up by Bill Cardoso of the
"The quiet, reasoned man
Boston Globe's bureau here:
At the same time, he
is always the first selectman."
is showing no relutance to jump on a genuine issue, such
as the pledge card.

This is in contrast to LBJ, who has suffered not only in
New Hampshire but nationally from too much exposure. On
the plane en route to New Hampshire, a young businessman
who sat across the aisle from me said he is a McCarthy
He explained that his "exposure to
supporter this season.
that his "exposure to Johnson
but
McCarthy is "limited"
^
will do well in his Concord suburb.McCarthy
Isn't." He predicts
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Wiock also found

organization itself.

basis for his optimism in the New Hampshire
McCarlhy

While other reporters had tended cither to dismiss
the

organization as amateur and inexperienced or to have neglected
to consider
the organi^^ation as important to the effort Wieck wrote:

—

A rapport had developed between McCarthy's supporters
as a group, they are bright, young (in their twenties
and thirties), attractive and basically uncomplicated
people who are thrilled just to have an alternative to
LBJ
and the candidate.
There is an active statewide
committee of 300 backed up by at least 250 college
students from inside and outside the state. Dave Hoeh,
the McCarthy chairman, believes it is as strong as any
committee he has seen in his 10 years of New Hampshire
politics.
They have set up headquarters in 10 towns in
addition to many neighborhood headquarters in private homes. 59

—

He contrasted Vvhat he found in the McCarthy headquarters with the diffi-

culties the Johnson organij'.at ion was having both. in its operations and in its effort
to maintain control over a party that had long been proud of its independent

behavior.

Against Boutin's portrayal of a unified Democratic Party supporting

the incumbent president, Wieck recounted the names of a number of local party

leaders who were not only supporting McCarthy but were actively involved in
the campaign.

In communities where "newcomers" to politics madc' up the

committees, Wieck reported that "they are showing indefatigable spirit," with
the workers "amazed by the friendly response."

To a picture

t!iat

seemed to good to be true, Wieck added:

"One interesting

facet is the amount of Republican support McCarthy is attracting.

In several

towns, registered Republicans are actively urging a write-in on the GOP ticket."

To a woman, a registered Republican who said she might have to choose between

Nixon and Johnson in the November election, Wieck reported that McCarthy

said

As Wieck
"That's like clioosing between vulgarity and obscenity, isn't it."60

and in New
pointed out that might be the November choice, but in February
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McCarthy was becomlni; an attractive altcrnativo net
just for dis-

,';nnU-]od Deniocrats but

also for disfranchised Republicans.

In fairness Wieck also recounted some of the problems that
had kept his

press colleagues from embracing the McCarthy campaign as he did
in his article.
He noted the "immobilizing" affect of Robert Kennedy's "agonizing"
on many

potential McCarthy supporters.
Kennedy's people

liad

He felt it was an important sign that most of

become active in McCarthy's campaign.

His second concern

was the fact that the McCarthy campaign had had as its goal to win "only a
'psychological' victory rather than New Hampshire's 26 delegates."

He wrote,

"None of his supporters could bring themselves to talk about a clear-cut

victory," but he concluded, "this should be corrected by McCarthy's own decision
to go for broke.

It could be the very thing needed to maintain momentum at a

critical point in the campaign, and if it works, the timing would be brilliant."

In his final assessment before making his prediction, Wieck wrote:

There are two additional factors working against McCarthy.
'We're trying to do
One is time.
As Dave Hoeh...
put it:
in eight to ten weeks what we should have had six months to
,

do.'

The second is his major issue. McCarthy has been wise
enough not to frighten the shoe factory workers by
shouting 'brutality' and 'immorality' at them. But he
is asking them, in his own words, to make "a harsh
historical judgment," to say to the country's leaders
in lives,
via tlie ballot box that Vietnam is costing
gained, that
be
far more than can
money and moral energy
good
even
a
the decision to make a stand there is not
our
military judgment... that we aren't fulfilling
goal of 'building a nation' but doing just the opposite
and that we should summon the moral courage to negotiate
for a coalition government that would include the National
Liberation Front (NI^F) and, if the South Vietnamese government resists tliis, proceed to deescalate until they're

—

agreeable.

—
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That is

to .'isk of a shoe worker, long
ahuseci hy the jingoif^tic language of the cold war,
conditioned to respond to all tb.e cliches about the
'threat of international communism.'
Nevertheless,
a linotype operator in one of the plants McCarthy
.-1

I

(It

visited told a reporter that he plans to vote for him
and added that, at the American Legion club, where he
does his social drinking, they were beginning to 'talk
McCarthy. '62

After their weeks of trying to get the message through to the many
reporters they had talked with, the McCarthy leaders finally read the complete
story as they felt it should be told.

Wieck had independently found what they

had felt during the six weeks since McCarthy's New Hampshire announcement.

campaign was reaching voters;

McCarthy was skillfully developing his positions

and his rapport with New Hampshire;
a

The

the problems were being overcome, and

noticeable change from a candidacy of protest to a candidacy for the office

was in the offing.

report

v;hat

No other reporters or columnists had been so bold as to

Wieck had reported.

It would have been enough to have left his

conclusions as they were, considering the questions that still hung over the
campaign, but Wieck was willing to walk to the end of his own journalistic plank.
It would be inaccurate to say the votes for Senator McCarthy
He might be lucky to get 30
were there in mid-Februax.-y
But the write-in votes weren't
or 35 percent of the vote.
there for LBJ either. On the whole, the press appears ready
to award McCarthy a major psychological victory if he gets
AO percent of the vote, which is very possible. ^-^
.

Both percentages were virtually unspoken by the reporters or by McCarthy workers.

The reporters were reluctant to predict what McCarthy might have or to project

what he would need for the result to be considered "significant."

leadership refused to play the numbers game with the reporters.
above the

3

The McCarthy

Anything

enough to
to 5 percent figure quoted by Senator Mclntyre would be

show the folly of Johnson's policies.

If the reporters had concluded

that

neither saying nor writing
McCarthy needed to got 35 percent of the vote they were

379
it.

r„r publj.c;.tion.

For W.icck to suggest

t:l>at

/,()

percent: was the

figure and

to go on to say that such a vote result was
"possible" exlemled everyone's

thinking far beyond the reality about
which they felt reasonably sure.

The significance of Wieck's prediction was that he wrote
a number and by
implication attached his assessment of the reality of the McCarthy
candidacy to
that percentage.

In this way he challenged his colleagues to either agree
or

disagree with his prediction.

The numbers game was out in the open.

Wieck

had made his evaluation, picked a number and was ready to stand by it.

Since

the number was much higher than the McCarthy leaders expected, the confidence

which VJieck placed in the prediction became contagious.

The herd shifted

direction and began to write in much the same manner as had Paul Wieck.

The article gave the campaign leaders renewed confidence.

They had begun

to doubt their own evaluations and to feel isolated from a reality which the

press reported in spite of their best efforts to the contrary.
in the direction of the herd came new re-enforcement.
Ne^v

I-.e

With the shift

The optimism that the

public story conveyed radiated to those who had been skeptical during
Money loosened up and offers of important volunteer

the earlier weeks.

assistance came.

An excitement that had been a part of the campaign from the

beginning now seemed to roll across New Hampshire and outside.

As the herd shifted it also dispersed.

quarters,

Reporters visited local head-

followed canvassers, accompanied celebrities, visited with volunteers,

attended meetings and assessed voter opinions across the state.

Beyond a

political campaign the reporters found numerous human interest stories.
worte about

the.

They

candidate's family, the campaign leadership, the volunteers,

the local activists,

the campaign's l(^gistics and many otlicr subjects wliich

concerned with
then found their way into sections of the newspapers not usually
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politics.

The impact: of this attention was considerable.

which strengthened the campaign itself.

With it came re-enforcement

A cycle of recognition, adding to credi-

bility, adding to excitement, attracting more
attention, expanded the reach of
the campaign, which further increased its recogniMon,
which made the campaign

formidable with national and international significance.

The excitement

mounted so rapidly after the publication of Wieck's article,
that one network

which had withdravm from covering New Hampshire after Governor
Romney withdrew,
rushed back, with

aJ.l

it could muster,

several days before the election.

Theodore Wlilte who had all but neglected the McCarthy campaign, also hurried

back in an effort to catch up with the ten weeks of activity he had missed.
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^'For the first six weeks of the New Hampshire campaign,
Hoeh and Studds
were surprised to find greater interest on the part of the
international reporters in their activities than the national media.
London Times reporters
Lewis Chester and Bruce Page were frequent visitors. Claus
Toksvig of Danish
national television, interviewed Hoeh on sound film on several
occasions for
re-play in Denmark. A team of Japanese reporters visited the Concord
headquarters to report the election returns by wire directly to Tokyo.
Occasionally, the international reporters would travel with the press entourage
but
usually they travelled by themselves finding their ovm way to the political
contacts and stories.
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CAMPAIGN VOLUNTEERS

The Kids
During
1968

caini)aip,n

liis

first vJsif to New Hampshire Al Lowenstein promised that the

vould attract

tlie

wide interest of young people and that they

could he expected to help with the McCarthy candidacy.

While hoth Hoeh and

Studds shared this feeling, which came from their own work

\<!ith.

college and

prep sc1k)o1 students, they were not sure that Kew Hampshire possessed

tlie

student resources to effectively staff a full presidential primary campaign.

The colleges, in most instances, were too far away from the city campaign

headquarters to permit the off-hour hetween classes participation that college
students enjoy.

Tn their strategy, Fioch and Studd'^ hpd encouraged the widely Iield

view that the Johnson renoninat ion effort might well be dominated by people
and resources fvo.n outside of New i;amj->shire

.

Realizing that th2 Johnson

image of a large, powerful, even omnipotent Texan capable of submerging friends
and enemies alike, was not well received in New Hampshire, Berna.-d Boutin

liad

promised to run the Johnson primary cnmpaign totally with New Hampshire

people and New Hampshire money.

Neither Texan nor non-New Hampshire Johnson

worker ventured openly, or from all accounts, privately, into New Hampshire
during the campaign.
the help.
of

trie

Bernard Boutin was in charge and did not feel he needed

Given the reaction to his pledge card scheme and its representation

would
long hand of Johnson, outside involvement in the Johnson effort

only have exacerbated Boutin's prohlem.s.

His campaign pian and strategy were

who Boutin had assum.med
set and both depended on local New Hampshire Democrats

would

for their President.
jump at the chance to demonstrate their support

3B3
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His concept- of tho

caiii|i,i ijui

intar-pers.:-uai cont.;.fcts.

exchange.

V/hen

his approach.

v^iy

Thi>

(.nt

.niy

cleptuulcnl;

on the veracity of these

"pledge card" was the medium of the ro-enforcing

the tactic failed it was already too late for Boutin to change

The only notables whom he felt comfortable reaching for were

the major governmental or political officeholders of New Hampshire

King, Senator Mclntyre, and Party Chairman Craig

Johnson administration.

—

iic

Governor

not imports from the

Boutin was on the defensive

personnel and monetary resources

—

vjith

respect to what

could muster for the President.

On the

other side, the McCiirthy leaders knew that both personnel and resources had to
be imported or there would not be a meaningful campaign.
to work on

a

Importing people

campaign would require care, especially when the public image

of protesting youth was far from favorable in New Hampshire.

With caution Hoeh and Studds began to suggest that volunteers would
be welcome in New Hampshire.

outsiders

vjas

They clearly feared that

a

sudden flood of

possible and that it could destroy their efforts.

the flow of outsiders became an important early task.

To their relief an

early flood of hairy, mini-skirted, disestablishment, anti-war,

youth did not materialize.

Perhaps if it had been

a

Managing

ictivist

different season than

winter or if New Hampshire projected a greater tolerance of alternative
life styles, the flow might have been greater.

What Hoeh and Studds came

to understand was that those most anti-establishment in their views,

behavior, and actions had been turued off toward politics much earlier.

Those

who had been
who began arriving were typical of those of other generations
societal
attracted to politics as a moans of adjusting inequities in their

surrounding or as

a

vehicle of upward mobility and personal identity.
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Couiilod with these paitrcrns was, assuredly, a deeper than usual concern

directed toward the Johnson administration's handling of

tlie

Vietnam war and

the impact that policy was having on their lives and the values they held

Prompted by personal frustration and certain despair, the

toward society.

few volunteers who

arrived early in January came simply to help.

There was

little to attract them to what must have appeared to be a cold and bleak

situation except that there was a campaign.

The first few volunteers to arrive in New Hampshire were either students

who could take time away from their studies, graduate or undergraduate, or

pre-career aduits who were between school, or work of an interim activity like
the Peace Corps.

What was not represented was the volunteer who, while older,

was able to leave a job or profession to spend time in New Hampshire-

These who came later were at least ten years older than the students who
came first, and were willing to spend both their time and money to be involved
in the effort.

The flow of volunteers, at least in the beginning was less than
spontaneous.

The few who

were sent to New Hampshire were directed to Concord

early in the national
through contacts with Lowenstein, Cans or those involved

campaign.

meeting with
John Teague who had been involved in the December

Holyoke, his own
Senator McCarthy recruited student volunteers at Smith,

college Ameherst, and the University of Massachusetts.

He arranged a regular

later became
shuttle of cars to New Hampshire on weekends which

a

chartered bus

primary voter's behavior that
Robert Craig wrote in his study of the
a

headquarters dated January
schedule for the Dover, New Hampshire

read:

-11:00 a.m. opened headquarters,

5

10,

guys from Harvard arrived,

1

1968,

girl
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from

lior.Lon,

6

typowrlLers goinp,, finlshGcl Wards 1,2,3, closed at

As his recollection shows there were a few student volunteers who

9

p.m."^
at

v,7orked

the campaign's earliest area headquarters, but with the exceptions of Dover,

Keene, Nashua and Manchester, cities near the large Massachusetts student

population, the volunteers trickled to Concord and were kept

tViere.

Beside the early arrivals sent from national campaign headquarters.

Concord area students returning home for between-semester vacations got caught
in the contagion of the campaign.

As an example one worker had a Connecticut

College friend from Concord, who when she arrived home called the headquarters
about the cam.paign.

It was suggested that she attend McCarthy's January

26th speech and help with activities of McCarthy's first day in New Hampshire.

With her sister, a Concord High School senior, and several others from Connecticu
College and Concord High School, plans for

a

skiing vacation evaporated as

they all spent the next six days in the Concord headquarters typing address

labels and sorting lists.

Her parents, who had expected her to ski and didn't

care much for McCarthy's politics at that time, were happy to provide meals and

beds for their daughter's college friends, and to watch their daughters quickly

mature as workers in a campaign.
me why

I

Her reaction was, "People were always asking

didn't do something more important in the peace movement rather than

going around marching in protest, but

I

neven knew what else to do.

I

never

knew anyone in politics until Senator McCarthy came along."

New Hampshire
The week before and week after McCarthy's January 26th
arrived in New
visit were periods when college semesters ended and students

Hampshire to work.

headquarters
To the doliglit of the McCarthy committee the

bustled with activity.

The work on the mailing labels progressed.

At last
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there were

onoui;!^

people iirouml to take on the variety of

taskij

that had

to be accomplished either to prepare for McCarthy's visit or to sustain
daily

work after the visit.

Recruiting

liad

been successful in attracting enough students to

New Hampshire during the last week of January and the first week of February to
build the campaign to a high energy level.

campaign

a

It was the first period of the

time during which the McCarthy leaders were reassured of the success

of their plnnning, amazed that vacationing college students would,
to New Hampshire,

first come

and then stick out a week of boring work in the dismal

surroundings of the old electric supply store.

In her account Barbara Underwood noted:
If Greek architecture can be divided into three periods depending
on the decoration on the tops of its columns, so the McCarthy
campaign can be divided into three periods depending upon the
decoration on the walls of its Concord Headquarters.

In the early period, the decoration of the walls was stark
and simple, broken only by a few newspaper clippings and
the sketches of children made while their mothers (local
volunteers) typed or answered the telephone.
the walls were devoted to what might
be calJed college humor. There were sayings tacked up like:
"Strange Politics Makes Bedfellows" or in Yiddish the Avis
car rental slogan, "We Try Harder" or in German, French, and
Spanish, "No Smoking or Spitting."
In the middle period,

In the last period, the walls were covered with elaborate
election charts, containing percentages and previous precinct
They covered all available
results for the entire state.
space wich the ^xeeption of that covered by one huge picture
of Paul Newman.

While students were involved in all three periods of the campaign
that involvement
not until the late January semester break that the tone of
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became somethiiAj; different.

Before, and in many previous campaigns, younp,

people have helped but most had been occasional local volimteers workini; in
local headquarters, doing routine tasks without either great responsibility
ar.

Influence in the direction of the campaign.

The phenomenon that howenstein

predicted and that the New Hampshire campaign began to experience was that of
selfless, almost total commitment, to a political adventure where the symbol

was the war issue as remotely personified by McCarthy, the candidate.

In the beginning the students were as they had been in previous campaigns,

the workers.

The between-semester break saw a headquarters busy with what

appeared as twenty-five or thirty nameless blurs typing, sorting, organizing

headquarters space without complaint or protest.

Their task masters were the

the earlier
Concord area local volunteers who kept track of the work flow, and

volunteers who had begun to assume leadership roles in the campaign.

Toward

some of those who had
the end of the second week of the inter-session when
the typing.
come earlier returned again, a murmer seemed to stir
.week and,

in some cases,

After a

even more of typing address labels from almost

that this was a peculiar way
unreadable voting lists, it had occurred to them
to end the war.

than type labels,
They had come not expecting to do much more

week or more of the endless drudgery
stuff, and seal envelopes but now after a
their work fit into the concept of
they wanted to know what it was for, how

their contribution.
the campaign, and the importance of

When the unrest was

the
the work, gathered everyone in
reported to Hoeh and Studds, they stopped
themselves and explained. They
front rooTn of the headquarters, introduced
able to mail
and the importance of being
discussed the strategy of the campaign
state.
and Independent voter in the
directly to each registered Democratic
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They

in perspoct

iiur.

!.ve

the iiiLserable typing task and expressed their regret

that there was no oilier way to do the job and that they, bright and valued
as volunteers, could make no greater contribution to McCarthy's New Hampshire

candidacy than to prepare labels.

Following several questions about the

carapaign, McCarthy's positions and New Hampshire politics,

to their typewriters,

if not

the crew returned

with renewed commitment, at least resigned to

continue.

The brief meeting accomplished.! subtle change in the attitude of the
volunteers.

Before they had worked without a sense of context and tended to

proceed almost blindly as their individual energy and ability to concentrate
allowed.

After the meeting they sensed that preparing the labels was their

job and as such they should become responsible for its organization and

efficiency.

With the help of several of the long-term volunteers they began to

organize the job into separable tasks which could be understood and controlled

while at the same time being susceptable to changing personnel as volunteers
came and went.

Gradually as the students organized, the local volunteers

began to lose touch with the work.

Their own irregular schedules and other

demands on their time made it increasingly difficult for them to keep on top
of the schedule and flow of work in the headquarters.
a sense that

In this gradual shift was

the campaign itself had come alive.

had its
Like any organization that is growing, the McCarthy campaign

pains.

with the
Symptomatic of this struggle was the lack of identification

with Hoeh and Studds,
campaign that the volunteers felt before their meeting
had in finding things for
but another symptom was the difficulty the leaders

volunteers to do.

given the
While this might sound like a contradiction
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enormi ty of

t

he

t

ask ahe.ul

,

I

echelon can employ only those

Jko nny activity of the scale of a campalp.n, each
foi-

whom there is support.

Keeping the flow of

work and the flow of volunteers balanced was difficult throughout the campaign
but
especially so in the early stages.
at the end of January,

Barbara Underwood reported, "One weekend

the Concord Chairman stopped into the headquarters and

was appalled by the number of college girls who were there for one or two
days and had no particular work assigned to them.

He called his wife, asked

her to get a babysitter, then go to the headquarters and start immediately

organizing the students into something productive."

A

What she did was send

several girls out on Concord's Main Street to hand out flyers announcing

McCarthy's up-coming speech, others went to

a

shopping center to do the same,

while still others were assigned to telephones and made calls inviting area
residents to hear McCarthy.

For this she received criticism from two sides.

"One particularly attractive girl from Smith College felt she was wasting

her intelligence in coming all the way from Northampton and not being assigned
a more useful role in the cam.paign, while another complaint came from a

member of the local committee who commented on what she had seen on Main Street.
She thought it 'looked dreadful.'"^

Between the two criticisms vis the fact

that the arrival of the voluneers was not expected and the system was not

prepared to orient and absorb the sudden arrivals.
tables,

There were not enough

typewriters, chairs or lights and without these the priority work

could not be done.

And beyond that there was almost no one in the headquarters

or
at the time the volunteers arrived who could provide either the tools

product.
the assignments that would turn the potential energy into a campaign

The local

leadei's initiative in sending kids to hand out leaflets was a

volunteer energy
pood ploy for the moment but hardly the best way to apply
to the machinery of the campaign.

No wonder, as was reported to Barbara Underwood,
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tlie

girls

i-.nioklng."^^

oil

Main Strcot "wore v^alking around looking tired, bored, and were
Tl\ey had

ncjthor been oriented to the campaign nor welcomed to it.

They had simply been given a task to busy tliemselves without knowing how to

behave while accomplishing that task.

Without much method, the McCarthy leaders squeaked through the two

week inter-session ilood of volunteers letting assignments and events evolve.
WTiile serious v;ork was accomplished,

lark,

it was more an adventure,

possibly

a

for the young men and women who came to New Hampshire those two weeks.

To succeed both the leaders of the campaign and the long term volunteers

realized that special attention had to be given to accommodating, orienting,

assigning and even, occasionally, de-briefing volunteers in order to gain the
full potential from the short-term visits.

One of the reasons Hoeh insisted that volunteers who expected to stay
in New Hampshire for more than a day or two clieck in with him, was his desire
to provide a basic orientation to the political ethos of New Hampshire and to

establish direct communication with che individual.

I^Jhen

that person then

left for an assignment, either at an area headquarters or to a specific task
in the state headquarters,

the person knew who to contact if questions arose.

When assigned to a local office the person had the responsibility of working
closely with the local committee and responding to their suggestions.

While this

some
dual responsibility to the state campaign and to the local campaign created

tension it was necessary.

Both statewide campaign needs and candidate preference

campaigns
dictated that the priority response had to be to the state and national
but without being insensitive to local needs.

.

394

The riork of vol uate.crs who
.

January
'.^70uld

r.nd

ear.ly Februciry

came to Now Haini)shire during late

received almost no media attention.

Studds and

lloeh

sit in their office looking out on the main room of the Concord
head-

quarters, and comment to each otlier that the room full of volunteers from

Amherst, Holyoke, Smith, Connecticut College, Yale, Harvard, MIT and other

universities was the important story of the campaign at that moment.

In

spite of their best efforts to get the media to report the story attention was

minute.

The first story to appear was written by a UPI Concord reporter who

met seven of the college volunteers.

His interviews picked up some of the

reasons for the visits to New Hampshire.

'A lot of young people
of the war,
Christine
V/omen said.
'At first
been working for him I

began campaigning for McCarthy because
Howells from Connecticut College for
he was just a syrribol, but since I've
now think of him as a president.'

These students try to tell you that McCarthy is more than just
'If people would read the speeches
an opponent of the war,
would
realize McCarthy isn't a one
McCarthy has given they
man,'
Peter
of
Harvard
issue
Sturgis
said ," 'He points out
the symptoms, using Vietnam as his focus.'
:

for
.... Susan Solenberger from Smith feels 'the important thing
McCarthy is a declared
this nation is to have an alternative.
'It would be a sicker country if McCarthy
sl^e added.
candidate.'
wasn t around
'

'

The reporters had met these students while traveling with McCarthy during
his visit to Laconia February 8th.

Neither he nor had others visited the

headquarters to see the activity there.

These early contacts, first with

the local reporters and gradually with the national reporters sparked their

curiosity.
a

As one reporter described:

"...

in New Hampshire it's sometimes

pretty lonf^ly business campaigning for McCarthy.

cars and

a

The caravan of two staff

reporter's car headed out of Concord for Laconia into the dark
,,8

territory.
New Hampshire night, looking like a convoy heading into enemy
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locals to interview

students,

their reasons for

their backgrounds.

on those rides the reporters came to knovj the
coniinr,

to New Hampshire,

their expectations and

It was something to do and something to report until
the

caravan arrived at a rendezvous point where the local guides took charge.
It was

during these early journeys that the reporters met a few students

who gave them the flavor of the campaign that was evolving.

It would be sometime

later before the reporters discovered the headquarters activity and learned
that New Hampshire

\;as

becoming

a

mecca for

a

new volunteer force in American

politics,

Perliaps the reason this discovery took so long in spite of the efforts

of the McCarthy leaders was a coincidence in timing which found Roger Mudd

and his CRS film crew in an almost deserted Concord office late in January.

Mudd had come to New Hampshire to prepare a special report on the primary

election and had come to Concord to interview Governor King and visit the

McCarthy headquarters.

He and his crew arrived at the McCarthy headquarters

at noon when botli local and student volunteers had left for lunch.

one volunteer was in the otherwise deserted building.

Only

Sensing that CBS was

about to carry a film story of an empty headquarters decorated only with a few

maps and children's drawings the volunteer frantically telephoned
home where some volunteers had gone for lunch.

a local

The attempt to get the head-

quarters activity up failed as Mudd interviewed the Concord chairman, who

happened by, while the film crew photographed his three year old son drawing
another picture to be added to those already decorating the walls.

hardly the image oE

a

9

It was

vigorous campaign organizing to challenge the nomination

of an incumliciit president.
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Just ns siuldenly as the flock of students arrived at the
beginning of
tlieir

semester recess, they left.

By Monday, February 12th only the few

long-termers remained and even the ranks of these had dwindled.
when

lloeh

That evening

joined Studds in Concord, the headquarters was almost empty.

V/here there had been almost two weeks of constant activity that began early
and

ended late in the evening, only a typewriter or two clicked and unfinished

stacks of checklists remained to be scanned for mailing label addresses.

Once

again the trightenlng sense of loneliness and despair that the New Hampshire
leaders faced following the McCarthy's New Hampshire candidacy announcement
returned.

The campaign that had been moving with groat speed until then lay

dead in the water.

Fortunately it was

a

Monday.

The press had left New

Hampshire with McCarthy, local reporters were catching up on other news and
few noticed that the headquarters of the New Hampshire McCarthy campaign was
deserted.

Even the simplest

tasks of answering a telephone, finding some notes

or determining the next priority seemed overpowering.

For more than an hour

they stumbled around their small office, roamed the empty work room and tried
to figure out hovj they would resolve their predicament.

they concluded, was a national campaign.

McCarthy's candidacy,

To that moment, with the exception

of a trickle of money, little national support had arrived.

for help.

They called

First to Blair Clark, then to the people they had come to know

before McCarthy entered, such as Curtis Cans and Allard Lowenstein.
they called those they had constantly pestered
at the national headquarters.

the previous weeks was gone.

Then

for materials and assistance

The sense of confidence which had gro\m during

Their own desperation became urgent pleas for

new volunteers, long-term staff people and an assurance of adequate financial
support.

With

tlioir plea

was a reminder that unless McCarthy succeeded in

would
Now Hanipsliire his Ci^mpaign and the test which his candidacy represented
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be lost.

Tlie

McCarthy leaders were not willing to hide their predicament.

They desperateJy needed

lielp.

Tlie

election was, they reminded those they called,

exactly one month from that February 12th date.

Logistics and Volunteers
While it was uncomfortable for Hoeh and Studds to have the February 12th
break,

it was important for the future development of the campaign.

them and the continuing volunteers

a

It gave

chance to assess what could and could

not be accomplished with volunteer help, to VThat stage the campaign had developed,
and to manage the next

wave of activity.

mailing labels several other tasks had evolved.

In addition to preparing the

Students were traveling with

the Senator, helping to advance his visits, working with local committees,

aiding the press activity, receiving visitors, preparing campaign materials,

doing research

aiid

generally performing a multiplicity of tasks that were

not always at the direction of either the state or the local leaders.

Their

initiative was especially engaging and something that Hoeh and Studds found
could be used.

With only brief instructions and an outline of what had to be done, the
students would develop an assignment fully, come back to the leaders to check
their plans and then go ahead with the project.

This performance led Hoeh and

Studds to conclude that future management of the campaign's day-to-day operations

could be turned over to the volunteers as long as they understood that when

questions arose they were to check with either Studds or Hoeh before changing
an activity.

What evolved was a series of departments within the campaign

organ I'^ed around particular tasks.

The departments were almost autonomous

their own
having their own organization, their ovm means of communication and

links to otlier departments which might share an objective.

Hints of this
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eventu;)]
fu.l)

orKanlznl ion

advantage of

the.

Ivul

aniuvirod eaillei- but now

tl.c

campaign loaders

tool,

opportunity.

Volunte^^rs needed places to sleep, eat and ways to travel.

When the

flow was one or two volunteer arrivals every few days, local friends
of the

campaign made room in their homes for volunteers.

Even in the days of the

semester-recess migration local homes absorbed most of the arrivals.

Stretching the

VN/alls

of homes went only so far especially in cities like

Manchester were the McCarthy locals were few and far between.

In desperation,

those who were responsible for housing volunteers began contacting churches

where a pastor was sympathetic to McCarthy's anti-war position.

In Manchester,

Nashua, Concord and several other cities where major volunteer campaigning was

needed, church basements and activity rooms became weekend dormitories for

literally hundreds of kids

—

older, student or not,

came to New Ham.pshire to work for Senator McCarthy.

'who

a term

which came to describe anyone, young or

The first effort to have the kids arrive ready to work and survive in

New Hampshire was a vork-of-mouth instruction.

Each should bring a sleeping

bag and if they had a portable typewriter to bring that as well.

Transportation

was much less of a problem since most arrived in groups with their own cars
nut, occasionally, as with the Amherst shuttle, a bus was hired.

such charters were paid for by those making the trip.

In all cases

399

With

weekend no

i:l)e

oxoeptlon of those who came and stayed for more th^n

expenrfcis

were paJd.

Occasionally

a

a

starving student would turn

up who could not find money for a meal and the headquarters
petty cash would
be tapped for a transfusion.

bus or

would raise money locally to sustain the volunteers during their

tv;o

journey.

In some cases those sponsoring cars and even a

The long term volunteers received a modest per diem which covered

the cost of meals, car operation if one were used and housing in the case of

those who had to rent accommodations.

With the exception of

a few of

the

national staff who eventually came to work in New Hampshire and two secretaries,
no other campaign workers V7ere paid.

Beyond keeping a "straight-laced" even puritanical image for the
campaign,
a

tb.e

McCarthy leaders were concerned that New Hampshire might become

haven for those wishing to escape school and parental authority.

They

feared that someone might report to the press that their son or daughter had

been lured away to the campaign much as a legendary circus run-away.

Unlike

the circus, which enjoys its reputation as an over powering attraction, the

campaign could not afford such
insisted that each person

\-jho

a charge.

To avoid the possibility, they

arrived to work in New Hampshire register through

the state headquarters or at the local headquarters.

A printed card containing

space for the person's name, school, home address, person to contact in case
of emergency, home and school telephone, campaign assignment, and where they

were staying while in New Hampshire, had to be filled out by each volunteer
on arrival.

These cards were kept in

a

master file in the state headquarters
to demonstrate to any who

to be used in case of emergency but as importantly,

asked that the campaign knew its volunteers,

^^^-len

a

volunteer returned to the

then placed
state for other visits the card was pulled, the visit recorded, and

In a special

tile of those then working In the campaign .^^

Althoi:{;h no one

made the charge which was feared, the file was used

to find volunteers in emergencies and also to keep track
of persons who, be-

cause

tliey

returned frequently, could handle more difficult jobs.

The whole

process of registering and then assigning volunteers to jobs became thorough
and sophisticated.

Since volunteers came for short periods, usually weekends,

they did not want to wait long to be put to work nor did the campaign want

them to wait.

After the confusion of the semester recess time the housing

department in the campaign became the conduit through which requests for

volunteers came not only to staff the state headquarters but also to staff
the local offices.

Where in the beginning almost all volunteers would arrive in

Concord and then be assigned elsewhere, the volunteer operation began to

anticipate how many people would be needed for the local headquarters and then
contact the kids directing them to a local work place.

especially we]

1

This approach worked

when groups of volunteers returned after a first visit.

They

had become familiar with the campaign, their job, and could be sent directly
to a local headquarters without having to be oriented or having to learn an

assignment.

In a short time these returnees had become professionals.

knew what had to be done, how to do

it

They

and how to behave while visiting New

Hampshire.

The registration process bec£me a curiosity to reporters because in

addition to assignments by skills there was also
The campaign had inside jobs and outside jobs.
that is either with

tlie

candidate,

a

sorting by appearance.

Those who wished to work outside,

or representing the campaign, had to be

conservative in dress and appearance.

In that time long hair male or female,

of protest.
facial hair, short skirts or funky clothing were viewed as symbols
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Those arriving with trimmed hair, clean faces, conservative
clothing and neat

appearances were assigned the outside jobs.

Those who were more casual in

their appearance were assigned to the less visable jobs
even, on occasion,

totally out of sight.

With the exception of Studds' order to two bearded

men that they not associate with the campaign on McCarthy's
first campaign
visit, peer pressure prevailed.
and a fact of the campaign.

volunteer leaders.
to help and

if

To be "Neat and Clean for Gene" was the slogan

Enforcement of the slogan rested with the

Their code was stiff.

It was,

in their view,

a privilege

appearance or behavior did not meet the image they had set

then the alternative was simple.

Stay out of sight, leave New Hampsliire or

change appearance.

On ce the criteria had been accepted by the earliest arrivals, the rite
of passage into the campaign was often more stringent than would have been

applied if the local leaders had enforced the code.

At first there were a

number of hair cuts, beard shavings and hair combings around the headquarters,
but as the first v/eeks passed most volunteers arrived well groomed and often

bit ever dressed for comfort in the New Hampshire winter.

a

Sport coats,

even ties and dress shirts replaced sweaters, turtlenecks and army jackets.

The Second

V^Jave

As Barbara Underwood noted in her account, there were three periods in
the evolution of the student volunteers' participation in the campaign.

The

first was marked by the surprise arrival of students during the semester

recess and departure v/hen they returned to their schools during the first

week of February.
when,

The second period began during the second week of February

in response to lioch and Studds plea for help, a new stream of volunteers
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began.

Like many others there were Ben and Rosann Stavis.

spend more time than a weekend in New Hampshire.

They plauned to

In the Stavis'

s

account of

their experiences he wrote, "...at the beginning of February,
Rosann and
a

block of free time.

I

I

had

had just passed my oral examinations and could leave

campus and studies for awhile.

Rosann was working on her dissertation in home

economics education at New York University and could also leave New
York.

So

on February 14th, St. Valentine's Day, we took a bus to Boston and,
next morning, another one to Concord, New Hampshire

Hampshire primary.

—

almost four weeks before the New

We walked into the headquarters about 10:30 a.m., suit-

cases in hand."-^-^

Special Projects
Stavis and others, functioned as

vassing might be accomplished.

a

small task force to research how can-

The McCarthy leaders admitted that they knew

little about the mechanics of door--to-door canvassing.

They needed a full

exploration of the subject before trying it in New Hampshire.

Some canvass-

ing efforts had been tried in an effort to reach voters with the anti-Vietnam

war

ir<;ssage

but most of these door-to-door contacts had been concentrated in

academic communities such as Cambridge, Massachusetts; Berkley, California;
Ann Arbor, Michigan; or Madison, Wisconsin.

Canvassing had not been used in

any previous New Hampshire campaign that could be recalled.

The work of the

task force led to forming a canvassing strategy and an important campaign activity.

A Boston recruit,

a

thirty-year-old lawyer, John Grace, who had been

attracted to McCarthy through the activities of the Massachusetts McCarthy
Committee made

a

unique contribution to the campaign.

After
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McCnrlhy
tl!G

sk;]t(-d

in

evunt in a way

Concord, February 6th, lloeh and Studds wanted to capture

would tic McCarthy to New Hampshire's hockey mania.

tiiat

Grace thouglit an ice scraper might be designed to look like
have printed on it McCarthy's name and a slogan.

a

hockey stick and

Grace found that it would

bo expensive to create a new scraper shape and would take too long, but an

alternative could be to print
of an available scraper.

a

picture of a skater and slogan on the handle

Grace placed an immediate order for about 5,000

of the scrapers each carrying the slogan "McCarthy Cuts the Ice

for President."

—

McCarthy

Most were distributed in Manchester and where local organization

was weakest.

Another recruit for the New Hampshire campaign was a recently returned

wounded veteran of the Vietnam war, Carl Rogers.
complete, Rogers arrived wanting to help.

His convalescence almost

To use him as a regular volunteer

seemed to not quite fit his political potential.

When he arrived Hoeh and

Studds discussed with him what he might do which would illustrate that the

war was not opposed just by the "peace-niks" "weak-kneed" or "lily-livered,"
as they had been variously characterized, but the war was also opposed by the

veterans who had fought it.

Rogers speculated

a

bit then concluded that he could speak on campuses

to help recruit volunteers;

and

lie

speak before local groups and service clubs,

could bring together a new organization of Vietnam Veterans Against the

War, sometliing that had already begun.

On the latter point he felt an

obligation to his fellow service men both those in and out of the military.
the latter,
Hoeh and Studds felt that of the three the most helpful would be

organizing anti-war opposition among Vietnam Veterans.

For Rogers to do this

^04
mc-nU-

e:;t.ab].Ir,lvjnp,

some distanco. between the McCarthy campaign and

the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

cliat

of

Wliile coordination was Important,

for the Veterans to act independently of the campaign would give
them greater

impact and credibility.

Rogers agreed that speaking before church groups, service clubs and in
the schools would be useful but he wanted to do more.

recruit

a

He felt that he could

number of Vietnam veterans who would welcome the chance to come to

Mew Hampshire to help end the war, and that many of these young men would want
to do more than speak occasionally.

His idea was to develop a special piece

of literature which stated the veterans'

then distribute this themselves.

reasons for opposing the war, and

While the New Hampshire leaders were con-

cerned about having separate groups use the campaign for special interest

advocacy,

to

them if any group had earned the right to state a separate

position it was the war's veterans.

Regardless of what they did in stating

their position it would be difficult to discredit them or to tie the

McCarthy campaign to them in a way that would be damaging.

In fact, Hoeh

and Studds felt chat even if the public reaction to the veterans' activity

was negative, the fact that a significant number of the war's veterans were

willing to take the time to work against the war would be unsettling to the
New Hampshire voter at the worst.

While not strictly "kids" in the usual definition of the word as defined
by the McCarthy campaign,

the Vietnam veterans were contemporaries of the

college students but contemporaries
apart.

whose experiences in Vietnam set them

There was klnsliip between the vets and the other kids but

a

kinship

ACS
that. V7as

distinct when the vets began their efforts
at anti-war political

education.

The public perceived that the vets had paid
dues, the others had

not, nnd, therefore, deserved a certain respect.

For this reason, the Vietnam

veto were able to do things which would have been
poorly received, given the

climate of the time, by their college student peers.
In addition to speaking and campus organizing, the
veterans decided to

hand out their brochure on the streets and attempt to get
passersby to discuss
the war.

On weekends, during heavy shopping times, and during
pleasant v^ea-

ther, the vets occupied street corners carrying a sign which
identified them
as a Vietnam veteran.

There they politely distributed the flyers, talked

with people and urged them to support Senator McCarthy's candidacy.
in their old uniforms they had a startling effect on those

contact with the war.

wlio

Dressed

had no direct

During the last three weeks of the campaign the ranks

of the veterans swelled from a few leaders like Carl Rogers, to forty or fifty

men.

Since Manchester was the problem city for McCarthy and the one with the

largest Democratic vote, Rogers concentrated his fellow veterans there.

On

practically every corner of the city's main thoroughfare, Elm Street, there
stood a veteran with his sign, flyers and a cluster of curious persons questioning and listening.
rans.

Of the group that came to New Hampshire, many were not vete-

John Fitzgerald,

a

captain recovering from wounds received in action, was

at the end of convalescent leave.

He and a number of others found ways to come

to New Hampshire to support the veterans'

stage of discharge or active duty.

activity while still either in some

For those with time yet to serve, coming

to New Hampshire in uniform to protest the war carried serious penalties if

reported.

Rogers' veterans seemed to melt in and out of the state when needed.
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From

those,

who iirrived in the second wave of volunteers came
the princi-

pal leaders and organizers of the major activities of the
last weeks of the

campaign.

Each department in the headquarters

;^as

staffed and often led by

volunteers who had either come earlier and stayed, or had arrived early
in
February prepared to remain.

Direct mail preparation, press relations, sche-

duling, canvassing, candidate support, volunteer recruiting and support,
head-

quarters management, media preparation, materials distribution, special group
contacts, speakers scheduling and many other activities were staffed with in-

dividuals who had little or no previous political experience.

From the v/eekend volunteers came the workers who carried out the projects
that v/ere organized and planned during the week.

weekend after weekend to

vjork.

Often students would return

Since the source of help became reliable,

those leading the various departments tended to keep track of their own volunteers and plan projects for them.

An informal hierarchy evolved which placed

people according to how long they had been with the New Hampshire campaign,

how long they could spend during a given visit and how frequently they could
promise to return.

At the bottom of the scale were those nevj arrivals who had

not been involved in the New Ilaaipshire campaign before and might not be able
to return.

In addition to the organizational change of the second period was a

change in the relationship of the early leaders to those who came later.

Ben

Stavis recounted his impressions from the perspective of a volunteer arriving,

being assigned to a task and observing from that task the campaign he found.

.
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The Nrv ll;i.iiip.sh ire staff included very few Now lK-impsl\i.r I tcs
We did hire a mature local woman to be fvill-tiine receptionist;
slie could say "McCarthy" with the proper New England
nasal twang.
Furthermore, she helped us find our way
around tov^n and the state.
The local radical, a seventy-eightyear-old woman who went to world fellowship conferences
all around the world, came to stuff envelopes.
The Concord
co-chairman was Marcie Macey, a young housewife.
(The other
co-chairman, a doctor, was vacationing in the Bahamas
during the last weeks of the campaign.)

...Another staff member from Concord v/as a boy of twelve
who built tables, desks, sleeping bag lockers, and telephone
The state chairman, David Hoeh,
tables with booths.
thirty years old and an administrator at Dartmouth College,
came by from time to time with his wife Sandi (sic). They
were concerned with the media, with the Senator's schedule,
and with their own relationship with the state Democratic
These broad responsibilities meant that neither
Party.
could supervise the hourly crises in the headquarters.
And since they were from Dartmouth, the staff they
recruited worked in Hanover. The state headquarters, then,
as it developed campaigns both in ^^ncord and in the entire
state, was dominated by outsiders.

Stavis had arrived in Concord just at the point when the transition from local

operation of the state campaign to operation by the imported volunteers had
occurred.

In the early weeks the Concord McCarthy supporters had filled many

of the state campaign jobs as their personal schedules would allow.

No one

a
from New Hampshire had been able to devote full time to the campaign as

volunteer.

As the tasks of the statewide effort grew, the local committee

they, could
members tended to recede to those local tasks that they, and only

accomplish.

of his
These usually concerned scheduling Senator McCarthy, members

local events, meetings and
family, special speakers and visitors with rounds of

publicity.

organization to
They also were concerned with expanding the local

with special groups and making
Included the ward and precinct level, working

election day preparations.

that what
What Stavis did not see nor understand was

on behalf of McCarthy's candidacy
had once been a small statewide organization

Kad now become

a

federated campaign.

AOS

The Press Discovers the Kids
At;

(loteniiincd as

the Now Hampshire leaders had been to get the story
of

the student volunteers told, it was not until the activity had
been going
for several weeks that the reporters finally became interested.

both

In fact

and Studds were concerned that if the influx was not discussed by

IJoch

the press that it might be attacked by the Johnson Committee in a way that

could be embarassing.

They felt that there was

a

point at which an incident

coming from the student activity, might be picked up by either the Johnson

Committee or the Manchester Union Leader

.

Either could have re-cast the

positive Impression which Hoeh and Studds felt the students projected into

something akin to an invasion of New Hampshire's sacred political rite,
an invasion by the same crowd that

vjas

then protesting in the streets and

occupying university administration buildings.
role

liad

Once the student's positive

been established by the press, then it would be difficult to change.

Hoeh especially feared the Manchester Union Leader

's

ability to destroy efforts

they opposed by raising the activity to one of public controversy.

If having

students come to New Hampshire to work for McCarthy had been described by the

Union Leader as controversial before either the other state media or the
national media had had a chance to review the activity for themselves then, Hoeh
contended, the old adage "where there is smoke there must be fire" could have
prevailed.

Instead of being warmly received in the communities as the notoriety

of the student activity grew, there might well have been hostility.

The campaign

would not only have lost its manpower, but also the attributes of energy, charm
and sincerity which the students infused.

alone would have been

WhiJe

boll)

a deatli

To deny the campaign the manpower

blow to the campaign that had been planned.

were firmly committed to the involvement of students and other

the
volunteers in the campaign, there were times when some questioned whether

press and the volunteers should get acquainted.
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During

tlu^

latter weekends of the canipnign when the flood

its crest the volvmtecr coordinators

Vs'ould

wat?

nearing

try to soften the rigors of a

Saturday of campaigning by holding a party late in the evening in the cities

where the volunteers were concentrated.

These social events offered the

volunteers a chance to relax, warm-up and share their experiences before
trundling off to the basement of some church or the rec room of
sleep.

house to

Keeping the puritan spirit, booze was not allowed nor much else in the

way of party fixings, just loud music, milling or exhausted and slumped bodies
trying to sort out

v;hat

their trip to New Hampshire meant and how their

experiences could possibly help elect McCarthy and/or stop

McCarthy
2Ath.

VJith

\^7as

a war.

scheduled to campaign in Manchester Saturday evening, February

the exception of the few students who worked as travelling aides

of the Senator, until that evening few of the students had seen Senator McCarthy
in New Hampshire.

As usual a party for the volunteers was scheduled and, on this

evening, it was to be in the Manchester Room of the Sherator-Carpenter Hotel
in downtowT-i Manchester.

The scheduled starting time about 10:30 p.m. was late

enough so that the candidate and the reporters would be tucked away after a
long campaign day.

McCarthy had travelled to Manchester from Berlin and arrived to tour

Manchester's busy ethnic social clubs.
national reporters

v;ho

His car was followed by a bus load of

enjoyed watching the urbane McCarthy pass among the

spots.
startled patrons of Manchester's most prominant social

Before the tour

student volunteer party to
began Curtis Cans had ordered the organizers of the

McCarthy's tour was over and he
be sure that the party did not begin until after
accommodations.
and the press had returned to their respective

In fact he had

-
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t

hat

t

'no

partly should not: begin unt il ai:tcr

12:00 mJ.dnight whon

quite sure all of the reporters would be out ol sight.
that jf the reporters stumbled upon

young people,

]

tlie

party

tiiey

ho.

was

Cans was deeply concerned

would see an unruly mob of

istening to rock music and appearing much as did their peers

then protesting outside the political system.

He felt that if this image were

projected the carefully managed effort would be destroyed in a welter of contro-

versy over the appearance and behavior of contemporary youth.

Hoeh

liad

been meeting with Cans

V7hen

Cans issued his order.

As Hoeh drove

the short distance from the Sheraton-Wayfarer Motel, whore the meeting was held,
to the Sheraton-Carpenter he mulled over Can's order in his mind.

IsTlien

he

arrived at the Sheraton-Carpenter he had concluded that contrary to Cans his

view

\v\as

th.at

owii

the young people were the ones who had the greatest stake in the

campaign and their commitment should not be hidden.

He immediately found the

person who Cans had talked to and said that he should continue with the preparations.

The party, Hoeh said, would be held at the earlier hour.

He then said

that he intended to not only invite McCarthy to meet the volunteers but also to

Invice the reporters,

l^ien the

entourage returned to the Sheraton-Carpenter from

the socJal club tour little betrayed the crowd that had assembled inside the

Manchester Room.

A nervous Curtis Cans had m^ade sure that the large crowd of

volunteers was not straggling outside the hotel or even in the lobby leading to
the Manchester Room.

McCarthy led the throng of reporters and film crews.

Into a darkened room almost packed with young volunteers strode McCarthy to

Instant applause from the crowd.

One of the rare electric events of politics

occurred as McCarthy came in view of
v^ork so hard

for him.

tlie

several hundred who had come this far to

The television lights followed McCarthy through the crowd

to a low platform and microphone.

Cans had made sure that those closest to the

.
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dour and nearest the pJ.Mtfonn were anions

tlie

"neatest and cleanest for Gene."

McCarthy spoke briefly, welcoinhio his workers with the now famous
phrase, "you
all look like a government in exile," which brought a roar from
the crowd.
ansv7crcd several questions about his candidacy,

replied with his usual skill.
delighted.

the war and such, to which he

The crowd, the press

The candidate, especially sparkled.

He

aiid

Senator McCarthy were

It had been a long day for all

but each moment was savored as the rapport between McCarthy, his campaign and the

often cynical press blossomed.

It had been a risky venture to bring the three

together under such inauspicious circumstances.
into a force of considerable power.

As a result the three were joined

McCarthy left for his hotel, the television

lights faded, cameras, note pads, lights and microphones were packed, and the
reporters, crews and volunteers made friends in the dimness of the Manchester
Room.

If there was a love-in during the campaign,

the evening of February 2Ath

came the closest to it.

The authors of

concerning students

tlie

in

book The American Melodrama wrote of earJ.ier discussions
1968 politics which captured the concern many felt before

students, politics, media, campaign and candidate were joined as they were in New
Ilampsiiire

McCarthy supplied the all-important respectibility to the
enterprise, the students came through with the energy. Back in
November 1967, Robert Kennedy had discussed with Professor Galbraith
Kennedy
the kind of campaign McCarthy ought to wage in New Hampshire.
to
tell
Galbraith
urging
point,
specific
was very emphatic on one
McCarthy, "Make sure this is a grown-up enterprise. He'll have
So let him
more Dartmouth undergrads than he could or should use.
and yet
"grown-up"
could
be
look out for that." That a campaign
conventional
the
of
part
was
not
make lavish use o^^student volunteers
political wisdom.

VJhile

With care on both

tlie

part of the students and on the part of those managing the

campaign, a "grown-up enterprise" materialized.

the
Like many of the more successful events of the New Hampshire campaign

volunte.irs'

party and the McCarthy visit were spontaneous.

To have staged such

^12
a

mooting would

liavc

bocn Impossible.

If Cans'

instinct" had been followed

Instead of lioeh's, the moment would have been lost;

the students might have

viewed themselves as an embarassment to the campaign, and been less willing
to
continue.

McCarthy, himself, could have vetoed the visit, but he had come to

trust the New Hampshire leaders judgment.

He also like the sincerity, intelligence

and energy of the young people he had met.
the pact between candidate,

Saturday evening, February 2Ath sealed

issues, campaign and an inquisitive, amazed press.

From then on a honeymoon prevailed that could not be dimmed as the press attributed

prodigious accomplishments to the nation's youth suddenly aroused to effective

political action.

Before February 2Ath, the reporters had begun to find the edges of the

growing volunteer body in the campaign.

The student press from the schools

vjhoso students came to New Hampshire were the first to run stories about adventures

on the New Hampshire campaign trail.

story headlined

"Tlie

The Amherst Student in a February 12th

McCarthy Campaign:

Students, Speeches, Snoopy," recounted

the reporter's travels with the campaign and observation of the "Senator ... up
at 6:15 a.m.

in 10 degree weather

arrived at work.

.:o

greet Scott and Williams employees as they

Four Smithies, bedecked in cellophane-blue McCarthy hats and

holding 'Happiness is McCarthy' posters featuring pictures of Snoopy, told the

workers 'Senator McCarthy would like to meet you..."

The writer's enticing con-

clusion for those who might consider heading for New Hampshire to campaign read:
The day in Laconia and Lebanon may not have been well oiled
nor the turn outs overwhelming, but the enthusiasm of
tlie volunteers which McCarthy is banking on heavily, was in
Tlie four Smith girls had been campaigning
great evidence.
with the Senator all week, and they were still vibrant,
running alongside the Senator as he toured the dov,7ntowns of the
two villages, holding signs, handing out J.^terature, and
providing the needed spark of enthusiasm.

^tl3

The rcporuin}' by the student press was not always without serious
criticism.
Tlic

Yale Dail y News headlined a story about New Hampshire, "Bright Hopes and
Dim

Realities," v;hich led "Despite a newly-polished campaign style, Senator Eugene

McCarthy gave little evidence in his swing through New Hampshire last week that
he can launcli a major attack there against President Johnson's Vietnam policy."

The article v/ent on to note places where the blame for the campaign's failure

might be laid.

First noting that the "...daily press which tends to ignore a

candidate if he doesn't come up with a new and striking statement each day...,"
and "...McCarthy's organization which has only two full time paid workers in
III 5

the state."

Peter Donham, editor of the Harvard Crimson came to cover the

student activity in New Hampshire for his paper.

He tried to retain his

journalistic neutrality, but eventually he became so attached to the campaign and
Senator McCarthy that he gave up not only his editorial position but college as

well and ran away to the press staff of the McCarthy political circus.

The New York Times printed its first notice of the student involvement
in New Hampshire February 18th

\<rith

a section heading

which read, "College

Students Help," foilov;ed by:
The McCarthy campaign has been bolstered, particularly on
weekends, by college students from inside and outside the
state who have addressed and stuffed envelopes and done
other necessary chores as their contribution to the Senator's
campaign against the Administration's conduct of the Vietnam war.
As

tlie

result of Hoch and Studds' urging a few items concerning the student in-

volvement did appear in the New Hampshire press but these stirred only local
interest.
7th coluimi:

Jack Hubbard of the Concord Daily Monitor

,

wrote in his February

McCarthy had become^ an inspiration for the
disonchanted Democrat, and the slogan (At Last,
Democrats have a Political Alternative) has
become a battle cry for his New Hampshire organization, most of whom arc political novices.
The McCarthy campaign perhaps has the least chance
of succeeding in New Hampshire but it is by far
the closest to the soil of political protest, and
it represents a significant grass roots movement.

The backbone of the New Hampshire McCarthy
headquarters is the college student, and many
of them believe McCarthy is the last bastion
of opposition in the existing political structure
to President Johnson.

On weekends, these students trek from all over
New England, pitching in with the drudge work of
the campaign, typing, pasting, mailing, and
answering the telephone.

Last weekend, more than 90 students came from
Amherst, Smith, Connecticur College for Women,
Mt. Holyoke, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Harvard, New York University, and Yale to work on
the McCarthy campaign.

Some of them were in Concord, while others
were dispatched to storefront headquarters in
Nashua, Manchester, Keene, Laconia, Lebanon, and
Dover to do office work.

Still otlier students went hunting for voter
checklists in Granite State towns.

s
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lie govornor was rcndy Lo concede
that the student power
Invasion has assisted McCarthy.
J

'They're a good, clean-cut buncli,'he said.
'l hope
they come up here and live and become good Democrats.'

The emphasis was on the word 'good.'
'They have stirred up curiosity and interest, and they
have very^^robably cut down on the President's margin.'
he added.

Even in the heat and bitterness of the last few days of the campaign. Governor
King, who did not spare his language when it came to McCarthy, knew that the

kids had

v;on

their way into the hearts of even many who would be voting for

President Johnson on March 12th.

The fact that the kids had been attacked and

the public had come to their defense assured the New Hampshire McCarthy leaders

that they could expand the use of outside volunteers beyond headquarter

assignments.

To tliem

tlie

'

role of the volunteers had been legitimized.

They

had survived an attack and were prospering through the special attention
the volunteers received in the press.

Unquestionably columnist Mary McGrory became the godmother or midwife,
depending upon one's view, who thrust the volunteers into national prominence.
After her first colum.n appeared a flood of reporters, film crews and subsequent
articles and television features reported on the volunteers to the point where
It almost

became the dominant story of the campaign.

Larger than life images

of an immense "children's crusade" were marched out of New Hampshire by film

and typewriter to a confused and cynical national populace.

In a time when the

generations seemed irreconcilibly apart, the accounts of volunteer activity
from New Hampshire were refreshing if not completely reassuring.
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The st;vident.s are in contrast to the rank and file
party pro Liiat inipvjiates the "CltizGiis for Johnson"
headquarters in Manchester, and full time campaigners
working for Nixon and Romney.

During the week, the McCarthy activity lulls somewhat
because classes are in session.

Not until almost

a

national press.

It was not until the Manchester volunteers party February
24th,

month later would stories of the same depth be written for

and the escalating fortunes of McCarthy in New Hampshire, that the national

press sensed there were more stories in the 1968 New Hampshire campaign than
those tied strictly to the activities of the candidate.

While Hoeh and Studds were sure that the Hubbard account was not premature,
the Johnson campaign saw an opportunity to take a crack at the volunteers

coming from outside

tlie

state.

In a press conference Governor King commented

that the McCarthy campaign could not be considered as a serious threat because
it had failed to receive broad local support.

In fact, he noted,

the campaign

relies almost totally on college students from outside New Hampshire to support
its efforts.

Concerned that this change might stir the investigative juices

of the Mancheste r Union Leader the New Hampshire leaders anxiously waited to

see wliat response might develop.

Like other tactics of the LBJ committee

King's comments seemed to backfire.
of King's remarks explaining their

A number of local people were critical
o\vTi

involvement in the campaign and defending

the assistance the students were providing with their local activities.

Toward

the end of the campaign Governor King was quoted as having said, "It's those

damned kids,"

wlicn

asked why McCarthy was creeping up on his candidate.

interview published four doys before the election David
Boston Globe wrote:

B.

Wilson of the

In an
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Mary McGrory, who

h.ul

bL>on a

Johnson supporter In her columns and even

his ally on the war, had come to appreciate the critique
of Johnson's policies

by Robert Kennedy, but was captured by her friend Eugene
McCarthy.

A skeptic,

a realist and believer in the invincibility of an incumbent
president. Miss

McCrory came to New Hampshire to cover McCarthy as a friend attempting
to
ease-

the pain of his Don Quixote quest.

She then visited the state headquarter

and could scarcely tear herself away to write her column

became among the most important of the political year.
Success for McCarthy:

Closing the Generation Gap."

—

a

column that

The headline read:

Datline:

Concord, N.H.

Eugene J. McCarthy is fighting hard here to close
the wide gap between himself and President Johnson in the
New Hampshire primary next Tuesday. Where he has already
been visibly and dramatically successful is in closing the
gap between the generations and making good on his promise
to civilize dissent.
Sen.

It was no surprise that students from 100 colleges as far
west as Michigan and as far south as Virginia should rush
up here week-ends to give their all for an anti-war candidate.
VJhat is phenomenal is the reception they have been accorded
by reputedly hawkish natives who are traditionally unfriendly
to strangers.

Grave apprehension attended the first unleashing of youth
three v;eeks ago.
It was widely feared that the senator's
'hippie' friends would deliver the coup de grace to hi-s
marginal chances.
But thanks to brilliant generalship on the part of the youth
director, Sam Bro\>m, a dropout from Harvard Divinity School,
and unexpected docility on the part of the students, the
enterprise has developed a spirit and life that has un-nerved
the pro-Johnson camp, beginning with Gov. John W. King.

Their parents and professors might not recognize the cheerful,
humble, willing volunteers who ring doorbells, sweep floors
and lick envelopes for 16 hours at a stretch.

From the moment their buses disgorge them and their sleeping
bags at the door of the state headquarters at Concord, they
are subject to a selection process that would outrage them
under any otlier circumstances.

"A

.

The "straights'" and the "non-straights" are separated.
The
"straights" (clean-shaven, neatly-suited and modestlyskirted) are allowed to go out on the wards with file
cards and instruction sheets. The beards are put in the
back room to fold and stuff literature, as Beatles music boil
deafeningly out of the record player.

—

"Oh yes, I see the logic of it
be neat and clean for Gene,
said a 19-year old Indiana dropout with a straggly growth
of chin whiskers and wearing a button that said in Hebrew,
"We try harder."
"I realize I would be a shock to a New Hampshire Yankee.
I'd be an image-breaker for the senator.
Four of the
others in the backroom arc candidates for PHDs in thermonuclear physics at Cornell, so I don't mind at all," he

concl uded

One "hairy" made the supreme sacrifice for his candidate. Told at the door of the Unitarian Church in Concord
that his beard would keep him from engaging the voters
in doorstep dialogue, he asked for a razor and on the
spot shaved a four-year-older.

Those who pass muster in gentility, civility and kemptness
are given the classic instructions as put down in the
Democratic National Committee handbook
"be nice, pet the
dog, help with the groceries."

—

'Their sheet tells them "not to get too wound up on the war
and suggest the argument
although they are sternly
forbidden to argue -- that on the war the "question is not
so much to change horses as to change streams."

'

—

The greatest coup of the youth movement perhaps was tc
recruit AO Yale "Frenchies"
graduate students in French
who could speak in their paternal tongue to New Hampshire's
One particularly fluent
enorm.ous French-Canadian community.
She had
lass straggled in from the wards six hours late.
been feted at every home she visited and was inundated in
wine, coffee, and gallic volubility.

—

They report
they have knocked on 60,000 doors.
despair that
feeling
of
a
Johnson,"
with
back a "malaise
high taxes.
about
grumbling
much
done,
and
anything can be
In all,

Some of McCarthy's migrants wish he would speak more
forcefully about the war, but they accept him as he is.
They feel that liis quiet, rational presentation gives the
lie to the notion that he is a wild radical with an uncouth
following.
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do! jj'JiLod wit h Llicm, overwhelmed by
their
or}',ani:.:aL ion, devotion and
self-discipline.
i;;

"My campaign may not bo organized at the top,"
he sand
after a conference with an advance man who is
editor
of the Yale Law Review, "but it is certainly
tightly
organized at the bottom."

The Concord headquarters, which is managed by Ann
Hart,
the dissenting daughter of Sen. Philip A. Hart of
Micliigan, a Johnson supporter, is now engaged in trying
to hold back an expected invasion of 2500 for the
last
week--eiid of the campaign.
They can only handle a thousand.

Several scores of Concord and Manchester families have
offered to put up the visitors, and churches have let
tliose with sleeping bags use the floor, St. Anselm's
College in Manchester has contributed the beds of students
who weekend away.
Sam Brown makes no great claims for the effect of his
young army.
"I don't know whether we're just having
a good time or we could make a difference.
All I know
is that we're the one thing McCarthy's got that nobody
else in this campaign has or could get."

A 17-year- old high school drop out laboriously inscribing
a stencil about a McCarthy meeting, said:
"Sure, I'll
tell you why I'm here.

It's the only decent thing to do."^

Mary McGrory's remarkable column stamped

a

permanent label of meaning-

fulness and legitimacy on the role of the yomig volunteers in the campaign.

While written late in the campaign and long after New Hampshire residents had
become infatuated

wit;h the

student effort, she did mold the activity in

language that had a tremendous impact across

a

distressed nation.

Shortly

after the column appeai'ed a steady stream of reporters and network film crews

arrived at the Concord headquarters wanting to see the backroom and the

basement wlierc it was alleged the "hairys, the freaks, and the non-straights"
of the campaign were laboring.

did not exist.

To their surprise such

Even at their worst,

a

"chamber of horrors"

those working in the basement on the

mailings, were neat, clean, orderly, but with scraggles of beards and only
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sllghUv less than
found in

I

lie

8

.•ulcuiuato

skirts to face New Hampsliivo.

'

cold.

s

What they

Ploiisant Street Extension store-front was a beehive of activity,

carefully departmentalized, orderly and exceptionally neat for a campaign
office.

Even the ash trays, the few that existed, were emptied frequently.

Whether the order came from

a

compulsiveness engendered by the selection

process that greeted those arriving or because of the real fear of fire in the
old wooden building, would be

liard

to determine;

except that almost all of

the local headquarters were kept in the same constant orderliness.
to radiate energy,

Each seemed

efficiency and seriousness which had its only counterpoint

in the humor of the occasional wall signs and the relaxed ease with which much

of the campaign's drudge work was accomplished.

The Third Period
It took more than a series of telephone pleas from Hoeh and Studds to

begin the

flovj of

staff and volunteers to New Hampshire.

A lag, of sorts,

between the time that those who had come to New Hampshire and had returned to
school, and when they could convince others to go to New Hampshire developed.

Aggressive recruiting coupled with student press accounts of

Nev7

Hampshire

experiences, expanding national press attention to McCarthy and the deteriorating

situation in Vietnam turned the trickle of volunteers into

a

stream that as

Mary McGrory noted in her column, reached flood proportions.

volunteer
In their campaign planning, H.oeh and Studds had expected modest

help and had obligated themselves to tasks that volunteers could do.

Their

have to be
strategy targeted the cities and towns where the campaign would

especially effective in order to produce the votes needed.

The priorities

expectation of volunteer
were set according to population and a reasonable
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oncrr,y.

The mailing labeJ preparation was the first priority
task.

The

second, canvassing, something neith.er Hoeh nor Studds had
had experience

x,ith,

developed as the major volunteer activity as the numbers again
swelled toward
the end of

tlie

campaign.

The logistics came to determine how many volunteers could be usefully
deployed.

Gradually volunteers, who had come out of

a

certain Spartan resignation

about the effort were replaced by an increasing number who felt that the

McCarthy campaign had become an important "happening" and that

if

they

were to be a part of their times, to be contemporary or more among their peers,
they had to experience New Hampshire in 1968.

What had been first, an effort to get people to

com.e,

now became an

effort to sort and assign before they arrived, to an effort to hold back those

who could neither be housed nor given meaningful work in the campaign.

In

the recruiting careful instructions had been given to those on the campuses

that they should not head for New Hampshire until they had called telling how

many would be coming,
arrive.

hov^

they would be travelling and when they expected to

They also had to have

department.

a

destination assignment from the volunteer

As Mary McGrory reported by the last weekend of the campaign,

the volunteer department could house only 1000 volunteers, and the canvassing

department could only deploy that number in areas that had not been canvassed
earlier.

Reports that upwards of 2,500 volunteers were planning to be in

New Hampshire that last weekend sent the campaign leaders in

a panic.

They

had to stem the flow but still end up with enougli volunteers to accomplish the

canvassing plans for the weekend.

Through

a

series of telephone calls to the

sources for volunteers, the leaders were ab]e to

d

1

5;courai;e those

coming

the greatest distance and regulate the flow of those coming sliorter distances.

A campaign that might well have been overwhelmed by having too many people
to manage was able to protect itself.

When asked to tally the costs of the McCarthy campaign, Hoeh replied
that he though it was probably one of the most expensive campaigns ever
run in New Hampshire.

Not because they had spent more money than had been

spent before, but because of the number of volunteer hours that had been

expended for McCartViy.

In one calculation it was estimated that there were

over 5,000 individual visits to New Hampshire and that each visit had
day value of at least twelve hours.

a

work

The per hour rate of $2.00 could easily

be assigned to each hour producing a conservative estimate of $120,000 worth
of volunteer energy spent in the campaign.

Beyond the actual worth of the

work was the incalculable value of the image that was projected by the student
seriously at work for McCarthy.

Their movement became almost as important as

the candidacy itself.

Footnote
What was often lost in the myth that grew larger than the reality of
the volunteer involvement in New Hampshire was that an important symbiosis

developed that made the happening.

were not all that.
graduates.

First, as Hoeh likes to recall, the "kids"

Almost as many older people joined as did college under-

Many of those who managed the local headquarters were outside

forties, or Fred
volunteers, but volunteers like Arthur Herzog in his middle

Willman, in his thirties, or Jon Grace in his thirties.

With almost every
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busload of volnnteers thovc would bo
or older activists from the college

a

mixture of faculty, faculty wives,

to\^^us

who came to New Hampshire to help.

But of far greater importance was the involvement
of scores of local people
in each of

tlie

cities and to\^ns where the campaign developed.

It was these

people who created the welcoming port-of-entry for the volunteers.
these people

It was

guided the work, set the limits, oriented the newcomers, and

wlio

gave the activity

a

sense of competence and professionalism.

Without this

subtle melding of locals and "kids", the effort would have failed.

volunteers would have foundered in

a

The

sea of misconceived good intentions.

When there were questions, the locals were there to correct, reassure, advise,
and encourage.

The same was the case at the state level where the state

campaign leaders were on hand to set policy, work through schedules and to help
keep the campaign in close touch with the political ethos of their state.

The

campaign avoided both controversy and tragedy because the symbiosis prevailed
from the beginning to end.

The same feeling that produced an effective working

rapport inside the campaign between volunteers and locals migrated outside

contagiously affecting the press, the politically alert and ultimately the
voting population.

While there were occasional differences of opinion betv/een

the outside managers and the inside leaders,

there was little if any hostility

encountered by those working in the localities.

It was,

unquestionably, a

unique and amazing social phenomenon.

Reflecting on the student effort after the campaigns of 1968, Richard
Goodwin, who had come to work in the campaign, said, "They were like the Viet
Cong.

They couldn't be fought in the traditional way."

Richard Strout added,

"In New Hampshire, there were 'nominal leaders' and 'coordinators' supposedly
in charge of one thing or another, but most of these

'led'

because they simply
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happened to be tlune first.
was obscure.

The

tleiiiarc;it

Ion between chiefs and Indians

Everyone pitclied in to do anything."

Strout went on to note,

"The Children's Crusade emerged just as the candidacy of George Roraney died,
and reporters from across the country began to focus on it as a new curiosity.

And,

indeed,

it was one of

American politics.

the most dramatic

phenomena in the history of

But the reporters paid so much attention to the young

people that they missed the broader story of the McCartliy effort," he contended.
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XI

CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

H o. a d c| u a r t e£s J)j_g ani^atj^

Through January and to the middle of
February Hoeh and Studds had attempted
to manage the campaign with their
volunteers and through the odd moi^ents they
could spring from their jobs.

They expected the Washington headquarters
to

supply the essential ingredients of the campaign
CBpecially all literature,
handouts, D.edia production, graphic designs and
to arrange media purchases.
As with other campaigns with which both had had
experience, these items were

prepared or ordered well in advance of the time when they
were needed.

The

timetable Hoeh and Studds had developed for the campaign
specified dates when
items would be required.

Radio time had been reserved, as had billboard space,

and some limited television time.

Dates to begin canvassing were set as were

the dates when the first direct mail would be sent.

While there was always a

Plight margin in the schedule for delays many of the times were critical.

When

a radio reservation came due it meant that either the copy for an advertisement

was ready or the time would be lost along with the time and money used to purcl:iase

the space.

As the sequence of deadlines neared, Hoeh and Studds realized

that little had been done in Washington to prepare the necessary materials.

Often when materials did arrive they could not be used because they were not
appropriate for one reason or another.
content that was

i.-)0t

consistent

Usually the problem was one of tone and

xv'ith hov/

McCarthy was campaigning in New Hamp-

shire or what Hoeh and Studds knew of the New Hampshire political ethos.

These

early problema were frustrating but time remained to have materials reprinted

through Washington or substituted with inaterinls developed in New Hampshire.

^26
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Working with the New Hampshire based
advertising agency of Weston Associates, Hoeh and Studds had begun outlining
the media campaign that would be
required if McCarthy was to succeed.

Their first effort was to have Weston

option as many billboards as were available in
the key communities.

Next he

reserved as much of the better radio time and
television time available on New

Hampshire stations.

With each time or space reservation there was a
produc-

tion lead time and usually a time when cash must be
produced in order to hold
a space reservation.

On the word of Blair Clark, Weston was willing to use

his agency's credit to hold the media time.
lems.

Production presented other prob-

Billboard space was the first to be available.

The national office had

not developed a logo, color scheme, or other aspects of a unified
campaign
image.

No official photograph was available.

Clark was busy with preparations

in other states and Hoeh and Studds were facing the day toward the middle of

January when the first billboard space vrould be available without anything to
put on the boards.

Selecting campaign slogans can be among the most frustrating tasks faced
in a campaign.

Seemingly endless hours are spent by mature adults sitting

around in meetings or in offices listing possible slogans that will capture
the essence of a candidacy in a phrase.

The New Hampshire leaders expected

that this task would be performed nationally either in V7ashington or New York,
and that slogan, billboard layout and related graphics would come well set and

packaged for use not only in New Hampshire but across the nation.

As the dead-

line for the billboard space neared, Hoeh and Studds realized that a slogan

had to be selected, colors and graphics determined and billboard paper printed
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or the space would carry the exiatinr. message
while being paid for by the

McCarthy campaign.

Without the usual protracted consideration,
Hoeh and

StuddG decided that the phrase "...there is an
alternative .. .McCarthy tor

President" would run without a photograph.

Using the same slogan and graphics,

stationary for the New Hampshire campaign was also printed.

For Hoeh and

Studds the slogan seemed to capture what they sensed was on
the mind of the

New Hcunpshire Democrat.

To have been more direct and more specific would have

been more than the New Hampshire voter was prepared to digest at this
early
stage in acceptance of dissent.
the experience represented to Studds and Hoeh was the beginning of

Wliat

a migration of the national campaign to New Hampshire.

Hampshire

— from

the standpoint of Studds and

et the national level.

Through January, New

Hoeh— was competing

for attention

As the month progressed, and especially in the period

of reaction to the first McCarthy campaign visit. New Hampshire began to occupy

the top priority position.

Slowly, in New York, Boston, Washington and across

the nation, those close to the candidacy or sensitive to the issues being

tested,

sav;

wise fail.

that if McCarthy failed in New Hampshire their efforts would like-

Clark, the various political coalitions, the national office and

others began to realize that the total protest effort of 1968 rested on New
Hampshire, and that neither the resources nor the personnel existed to support
a national campaign until the political bridge of New Hampshire had been

crossed.

The first concession to this conclusion was the arrival of a young

former Harvard Divinity School student named Sam Brown.
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Snm Brown had boon vorklnc as a
volunteer coordinator through the New
York
based Coalition for a Democratic Alternative
(CDA)
His ties vith Allard
.

Lowenstein went back to National Student
Association activities and with Al
into the search for an alternative.

While Lowenstein had

bec-n

almost completely

detached from the campaign since early December
in Chicago. Sam had actively
sought to put flesh on his promise that the
nation's student population would

respond to the opportunity of the McCarthy campaign.
of the national staff to come to New Hampshire.

Sam Brown was the first

He provided the first sus-

tained link V7lth the New York and Washington bases of
the national campaign.

Now that Sam Brown had arrived and Hoeh and Studds had
poured out their
frustrations with Washington and the national campaign, some
changes began.
Brov7n had not only Clark's ear but also the confidence of
the CDA leaders in

New York.

He affirmed the New Hampshire leaders' concerns and urged that

Clark assign quickly some one to manage New Hampshire who could connect back

effectively to both New York and Washington.

Clark responded by releasing

Curtis Cans from his non-primary states desk.

By February 20th, Cans was in

New Hampshire to assume the long vacant position as the full-time campaign
manager.

On his arrival a migration of campaign personnel from Washington

and New York began.
Cans realized that the campaign could not meet its objectives unless it

was staffed with long term volunteers and the response time between New Hampshire and Washington was significantly reduced.

To accomplish both of these

requirements meant that almost all activities pertinent to the New Hampshire
campaign would have to be based in New Hampshire and that where full-time
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staff were not available in New Hampshire, they
would have to be broupht in

from outBide.

The migration he iimnedintely stimulated
practically stripped

both the Washington and Now York offices of the key
desk assignments along with
a group of willing volunteers capable of assuming
management of most of the

local headquarters.
With the exception of two campaign activities, scheduling
and fund raising,
all else was managed from the Concord headquarters.

From Cans' arrival to the

end of the campaign, almost the total national McCarthy effort
emanated from

New Hampshire.

Clark remained in Washington with the skeleton of the national

staff and, of course. Senator McCarthy maintained his senatorial office's

contact with the campaign.

Scheduling of Senator McCarthy in New Hampshire

was managed by Sandra Hoeh from her Hanover home and campaign financing
operated wherever money could be raised.

The principal sources continued to

be Hew York although long time friends of McCarthy also became major contri-

butors.

In spite of the staff shift. Cans began to experience the same frustrating

delays and inaccuracies which had plagued Hoeh and Studds in their efforts to

work through the Washington headquarters.

Instead of relying on Washington to

produce radio and television materials Cans and his staff began producing them
through the Weston Agency in New Hampshire.

Ad layout and materials prepara-

tion remained somewhat dispersed with preparation occurring in New York as well
as in New Hampshire but the communication was direct and responded to the

critical media deadlines.
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GnuH assumed daily headquarters'
management responsibilltieo

.

Most of the

operating departments of the campaign were
organized and staffed at least to a
limited extent before Cans arrived which
meant that most worked smoothly with

minimum supervision.

Cans completed the area headquarters staffing
and made

sure that each was supplied with materials
and properly tied to people in the

headquarters who could respond to requests for help.

Hoeh and Studds retained

scheduling policy, overview of materials preparation,
management of staff vs.
local relations, general supervision and press contacts
concerning the New

Hampshire aspects of the campaign.

In addition to Cans' daily management

assignments he moved quickly into an important vacuum that had
developed when

Washington failed to produce suitable radio advertising materials.

Cans spent

long hours working with Merv Weston and his staff preparing radio
advertising
copy, lining up celebrity endorsements and assigning the completed
material to

media markets and time slots.
Perhaps better than anything else, campaign materials preparation illustrated the complications caused by the confusion which resulted from conflict

between New York and Washington.

The New York City based Coalition for a

Democratic Alternative had become a substantial political action organization
several months before McCarthy announced his candidacy.

With McCarthy's can-

didacy the locus of political action shifted from New York to Washington.

When the CDA was not invited to become McCarthy's national campaign organization or to have much of a role in that organization outside of New York,
conflict, developed.
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The conflict might have faded
quickly if the national McCarthy
campaign
had hecn able either to preempt CDA's
financial base or to create its owi...

With the exception of the private resources
of people like Blair Clark and
Martin Peretz, the early McCarthy candidacy
drew little substantial financial
help.

CDA kept its own large treasury and were
willing to release it to the

McCarthy campaign only upon their own terms.

During the early weeks of the

New Hampshire campaign CDA was the best, and
often the only, source of posters,
reprints of important articles and campaign flyers.

While this material did

not have McCarthy's stamp of approval, it did help
the New Hampshire leaders

show that a serious campaign was in the making.
and Blair Clark resolved their differences.

Eventually. CDA's leaders

Some of the CDA staff moved to

Washington, some to New Hampshire, and the rest continued fund
raising and
other support from New York.

For much of the campaign, however, CDA and

Washington remained independent with the result that both produced campaign
material for New Hampshire that reflected their respective images of what the
campaign should be, rather than what the New Hampshire leaders felt was
appropriate.

Early in the campaign a series of one sheet, black and white, 8h x 11
inch flyers

v/as

printed, each with a distinct message, usually a quote from a

prominent national or international leader, followed on the reverse
quotations and McCarthy's responses,
was often not.

l^/hile

vrith

other

the format was effective, the tone

Avoiding the rule that all materials must be checked before

distribution, several flyers escaped from Washington to New Hampshire without
clearance.

Of

tVie

two most controversial, one carried a photograph of General
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Douglas MacArthur. braided hat, dark
glasses and corn cob pipe with the
quotation, "Anybody who coimnit. the land
power of the United States on the
Continen
of Asia ought to have his head examined."
The other carried a photograph of
Pope Paul VI seated on the papal throne
with his hand raised in blessing with
the quotation, "We cry in God's name STOP..."

On the reverse were quotations

from Pope Paul, Richard Cardinal Gushing of
Boston and Bishop Fulton

J.

Sheen,

under the title "Religious Leaders Speak Out on
Vietnam."

Although a strong piece of campaign material, the McGarthy
leaders felt
that the MacArthur campaign piece could be used
selectively in New Hampshire.

The Pope Paul VI piece seemed to them to be questionable
under the best of

circumstances.

Shortly after the materials arrived in New Hampshire, Hoeh

received a call from Senator McGarthy then campaigning in the midwest.

He

had heard about the two pieces and wanted Hoeh's description of
them and
reaction.

When Hoeh finished reading and describing the Pope Paul flyer

McCarthy said, "Don't use it."

Hoeh said he did not think it was what McGarth

wanted in his campaign and that it would not be veil received in heavily
Catholic New Hampshire.

That night the several boxes were sealed with tape

and early the next morning taken to the Concord City landfill and buried under
that day's city refuse.

A campaign worker watched to make sure the boxes were

not broken open but buried intact and completely.

The MacArthur flyer was

used after McCarthy accepted Hoeh's advice on how it might be effective.
The ultimate irony of the difficulty between Washington perceptions and

New Hampshire materials needs came when a long awaited brochure arrived.

The

carefully developed text had been attractively laid out in a graphically ap-

pealing format.

There McCarthy was shown meeting voters, in formal poses.
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with his family, In uniform as

a

baseball player, with President John

F.

Kennedy

and, in a 5h by 14 inch fold at the bottom of
the brochure, meeting New Hamp-

shire voters before the Kennedy memorial bust in
front of the Nashua City Hall
on his first day of campaigning.
the brochure would be used as

to-door distribution.

a

The New Hampshire leaders had specified how

mailer in addition to general street or door-

With the brochure was to be a two page letter and

return mall card,l all stuffed into a number 10 envelope.
arrived Hoeh took two pieces of paper and a
and stuffed an envelope for weighing.

half ounces in weight.

Wliat

3

a

When the brochure

by 5 card, folded it together

He found the package was one and one

was expected to be a one ounce first class mail-

ing now would double in cost or have to be changed.

To Hoeh and Studds this

was the final straw in their frustration with Washington.

ploded over the telephone to whoever answered.

Together they ex-

It was much too late to print

a new brochure or to change other aspects of the mailing.

What they found was

that the weight of the mailing could be reduced below the one ounce limit by

tearing off the photo flap with the New Hampshire picture.

The next several

days were occupied by volunteers tearing off the one part of the brohcure that

was New Hampshire.
As the critical deadlines neared, the frustration turned to desperation
as the communications between Washington and New Hampshire failed to improve.

Neither Hoeh

iior

Studds seemed to be able to penetrate the barrier of distance

or to communicate the urgency they felt concerning McCarthy's fate in New

Hampshire.

Wlicn

Curtis Cans arrived he confirmed what Hoeh and Studds had

been saying for more char a month.

What had been a national McCarthy campaign
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with resource, and personnel scattered
across the

ot_),e_r

49 priu,ary and non-

primary states quickly shifted to support
only one primary

.

New Hampshire.

The Washington headquarters had attempted
to staff and organize both primary
and non-primary states, develop a national
press and research operation, organi..e scheduling and advance desks,

stimulate fund raising, Bmnage primary

state campaign media and numerous other national
campaign related activities
that completely occupied the limited full-time and
volunteer staff then available.

What Cans did that the New Hampshire leaders had
not been able to do

was to assert that without a success in New Hampshire
there would not be a

meaningful McCarthy campaign after March 12th.

This meant that New Hampshire

had to be the top priority concern of everyone in the Washington
headquarters
and, for that matter, ever^^where else in the campaign.

Within the week of Cans' arrival the shift was complete.

Almost all cam-

paign materials, radio advertisements, television material, newspaper ads,
and the like were prepared in New Hampshire.

Printing was done elsewhere,

sometimes, but as the time shortened before the election, so did the lead time.

Doing things in New Hampshire gave the campaign managers the highest level of
control.

The result was that the conflict was reduced to a minimum, campaign

materials, advertisements and media production tightly controlled.

It became

possible to adjust the content of items that were already in production to take
advantage of new opportunities.

A maximum level of flexibility

v;as

within the production and distribution constraints of each medium.

possible

Cooperative

printers, radio and television production personnel and distributors, who themselves caught the excitement of the campaign, made sure that the McCarthy cam-

paigners received the best possible service.
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Canvassinc
The canvassing priorities were the same
as the canpaign's other priorities
as outlined by the December 21st and
January 7th memoranda.

The heaviest can-

vassing efforts would be conducted in the cities
with the largest Democratic

registration and so on, ^.orking dovm the list by
population.

They hoped to

canvass as many cities and towr.s as time and volunteer
energy would permit.
The style of the canvass would dictate how much could
be accomplished.

If it

were to be a simple literature drop, then only a few hours
would be needed to
cover most communities.

If it were to involve finding specific households
and

contacting pre-identif ied voters, then the task would be much more
complicated.
Those involved in the canvass planning concluded that something more
than just

handing out campaign material had to be accomplished.

Principally they agreed

that some type of voter contact would be important to provide the campaign with

feedback.

All agreed that the major canvassing push would have to be during

the last three or four weekends of the campaign which allowed approximately

one or two weekends to experiment and then to complete the canvassing strategy
that would be adopted.

At approximately the same time as these deliberations were in progress,
the Keene McCarthy committee began its ovm canvassing effort.

David Hoeh had

discouraged them from their original intention which had been to take the issues of the

v;ar

to the doorstep rather than simple support for Senator McCarthy

Tljeir idea for the issue oriented canvass had come as an extension of the "Viet

nam Teach-in" concept.

They had thought that if the war were the principal

reason for McCarthy's candidacy, not his nomination, then the issue was the
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real concern, not promoting McCarthy's
candidacy.

Hoch advised that most

people would not be prepared to discuss world
politics on their doorstep and
Height be offended by the stridency of
the contact.

He suggested that if a

contact at the door was made that it should be
directed to the support of
McCarthy.

The Keene committee adopted this advice, prepared
their own can-

vassing literature and reported considerable success
in their efforts.
Several days before a final meeting to adopt a canvassing
strategy, Hoeh

received a call from Dr. Al Shepard, a New York based marketing
specialist.
Shepard wanted to volunteer some time to the campaign.

He profiled his ex-

perience as a product researcher and marketing adviser for a number of
large
corporations and prominent products.

He suggested that the campaign might

need assistance in identifying issues and strategies that would outline
McCarthy's

market appeal to New Hampshire voters.
Cautiously, the campaign leaders pursued with Shepard what he might offer
the campaign.

Shepard indicated that the canvassing concept was much like a

marketing study conducted before a new product was introduced or to evaluate
the public's response to a product that had been offered.

The challenge, he

suggested, was to develop ties between the public's mood and Senator McCarthy
as an acceptable alternative to President Johnson.

The purpose might not be to

displace the President as the Dem.ocratic party's presidential candidate but
rather to demonstrate through votes the public's skepticism.

Shepard approached

his marketing analysis from the motivational perspective of the buyer or the
voter.
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Sheparcl agreed to work with tl^ose
preparing the canvassing materials,
draft

Instructions for the test canvass, and
also conduct a training session in
the
techniques.
Hoeh advised that the test should be
made in a city that had

political and ethnic characteristics much like
Manchester where the percentages
of registered Democratic voters was
high.

He noted that Somersworth

,

located

in the .southeastern corner of New Hampshire
came close to resembling Manchester,

l^ile a small city, approximately 9,000 population,
it had a long tradition of
strong Democratic Party loyalty, contained a sizable
percentage of French-

Canadians in its population and was isolated.

The city was tucked in between

Rochester and Dover without much contact with either city or

vdlth the social,

political or economic activities of that area or, for that matter,
much of
the remainder of the state.

If the canvassing was successful in Somersworth

it could be used in other cities with similar characteristics
such as Nashua,

Manchester, Berlin, Claremont, Lebanon and Laconia, and perhaps other less

Democratic and less ethnic cities as well.

Hoeh was reasonably sure that word

of the test would not leak far from Somersworth since its links outward were

limited, but the city would be a valid test case because the campaign had not

received much attention there.

If the canvassers did sense a favorable re-

sponse to their approach, or at least not hostility, then Hoeh felt a canvassing activity statewide would be worth the risk.

During the remaining few days of the
made.

v;eek,

preparations for the test

V7ere

The maps, voter lists and instructions were prepared with packets of

campaign materials that had been selected to state McCarthy's position on
those issues which Shepard thought might be most on the voters' minds.

When
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the voluntoev. bog.n .u-vlvin,
for

tho.

vcokend. the „o.t cxporlcnced and
best ap-

pealing oC the volunteers were
selected to reeeive Shepard's
training. lUey «er
told vhat their assignment would
be and found that almost all of
those who had
been picked were delighted to do
something more than prepare .ailing
labels or
sort campaign materials.

The canvass would give them a chance
to .eet New Hamp-

shire voters themselves and to express
some of their

o^'r,

feelings about the Is-

sues In the campaign.

The fifteen or so selected met with Shepard
for the training session early

Saturday morning.

Shepard, a forceful Individual, emphatically
described the

does and don'ts of the agreed upon procedure.

The canvasser was to ring a door

bell, offer a pleasant greeting and introduction,
hand the packet of McCarthy

material to the person at the door and then respond
to any questions that might
come.

If there were no questions then the canvasser
was instructed to end the

contact with a phrase such as, "I hope you will consider voting
for Senator
McCarthy, March 12th," and then go on to the next door.

Between contacts the

canvasser was instructed to note on the address card what the response
had been
at the door.

Had it been positive, negative or undefinable?

The volunteers

were advised not to become involved in debates or to be trapped in lengthy exchanges.

If they met hostility at the door they should end the contact as

quickly and pleasantly as possible and move on.
Each canvasser was to receive a package of address cards for approximately
25-30 households.

The amount of work time for the pack was expected to be

about five hours.

Each volunteer was asked to carefully assess each aspect of

the contact and to precisely record any reactions that they might encounter at
the door.
v/orth.

The fifteen got in their cars and headed out of Concord for Soraers-

It was a cold,

grey, snowy day when most people found themselves not

wanting to venture outside.

It was February 10th.
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Those who had prepared for the canvass
busied themselves in the headquarters but verc preoccupied .uch like
the officers of an air squadron
that has
just sent its plan..s on a mission. If the
canvassers ran into serious problems
they were to call for instructions.

One of the leaders of the expedition who

had had some earlier canvassing experience
with civil rights work in Alabama,

did call to report they they had arrived and
were not meeting hostility.

What

concerned him was that in the early contacts they had
had difficulty determining who the person at the door was supporting.

He attributed this non-response

to the inexperience of the canvassers and the
weather.

In the dark of the late winter afternoon the canvassing
volunteers strag-

gled back to Concord.

The looks on their faces were unsettling.

cold, tired » disappointed and frustrated.

They were

They reported that it had been al-

most impossible to detect differences in the reactions from one contact to
another.

There had been no hostility, but at the same time there was almost

no recognition of McCarthy or willingness to discuss him or the issues he

represented.

People had accepted the campaign material courteously but the

doorstep exchanges had been brief as the person who answered hurried to get

back inside, out of the cold and away from the door.

The canvassers described

their own Increasing misery as one brief contact led to another, each seeming

colder and less personal than the last, with each increasing the depressing

combination of being cold and feeling the isolation of being alone in a strange
place.
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The Je-brieflng o£ the canvassers
revealed both positive and negative
results.
m.Ue the contacts had been cold and remote
there had been no antagonism.
Hoeh explained that New Hampshire
people are apt to be shy and reluctant
to re-

veal their own feelings.

Shepard responded to this observation
by suggesting

that perhaps the next test should be a
bit more challenging.

He felt some

questions could be asked or analogies between
McCarthy and issues raised that

would call for a response from the person at
the door.

Discussing this idea

with the canvassers they felt they needed something
more than the campaign material and a phrase of introduction to bring a
response from the person at the
door.

They had hoped that they would be able to discuss
some of their own

feelings concerning the war and related Johnson administration
policies.

When

this did not happen their disappointment increased and
with it their own

uncertainty.

They felt that some local preparation for the canvass might also

help to encourage people to express their opinions to the canvassers and
to

understand why the canvass was being conducted in their community.
Shepard, calling upon his motivational research experience, advised that

both leading questions and pre-canvass preparation should be tried to determine

whether a useful rapport could be established between the canvasser and the
persons being canvassed.

He recalled that that week's edition of the Saturday

Evening Post carried a cover story written by retired General James Gavin
titled, "We Can Get Out of Vietnam."

Shepard thought that the Gavin article

might be a means of linking McCarthy and the canvasser to a respected national
figure, not a candidate, who was critical of the administration's war policy.

Twenty copies of the magazine were purchased and Shepard prepared modified instructions.

The canvassers were scheduled to return Lo Soraersworth for addi-

tional testing Sunday afternoon February 11th.
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ShepardVs Sunday morning training
session varied on two accounts from
the one that had been held the day
before.
First he advised the canvassers
to be more active in their contact
at the door.

As the lead for the contact

he demonstrated how the Gavin article
should be used.

His instructions read;

I'm from the McCarthy for President
headquarters. This
week in the ^aturdax Eveninr^ Post, General
Gavin has
expressed his ieeling that \^ Can Get Ouj^ of
Vi^iiam.
I'd be very interested in your own feelings
about the
war from what you have seen on television and
read in
the papers.

INSTRUCTION

:

listen to the person 's r esponse

Senator McCarthy feels that although we started out
to
since 1963, the war has become more
and more an American war.
It is our boys who are
fighting (mostly). Why?

hel£^ in Vietnam,

During this introduction, Shepard advised that the canvasser have
his or her
copy of the magazine folded to the lead page of the article and that
the lead
page

be.

clearly in view of the person being canvassed.

Following the offer to

explain "Why?" the canvasser should mention as reasons a summary of Gavin's
argument such as

Corruption in the government:

Even in their own rigged
election, the present
government received only
about 30% of the vote cast.
The people do not support
the government
that is
why it has become an
American war.

—

Effect on United States:

Over 2 billion dollars a
month is being spent in
Vietnam - over 70 million
dollars a day. This (70
million) is more than the
total fiscal budget for
1967-1968 in New Hampshire:
The 2 billion a month would
keep the New Hampshire
government going for almost
30 years.
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Result? The request for a
10% tax increase (by the
Johnson administration)

After suggesting aspects of the impact of
the administration's policy the canvasser was advised to suggest some ways to
get out of the war.
Again rather
than referencing the positions of McCarthy
the candidate. Shepard advised that
the Gavin article be the source for ways to
withdraw from Vietnam.

How do we get out - how do we stop the waste of
tax money
and more important, the loss of life?
General Gavin's article recommends much the same thing
as Senator McCarthy.
1.

Properly support our boys
in Vietnam by bringing the
scattered planes, ships
and forces from North
Vietnam and the hillsides
to the cities in South
Vietnam,

2.

Cease fire on our own initiative. Maintain a holding
action in the cities. We
would fight back if attacked,
and the forces and equipment
to do it would be there.
(See Step #1)

3.

Specific offer to mediate
the situation. Some specific
city, some particular mediator (U Thant, the Pope, etc.)

To conclude the contact Shepard advised linking the issues with the importance
of the person's vote and Senator McCarthy's candidacy.^

What
•

yovir

vote meana

51% Lyndon B. Johnson:

Lyndon

B. Johnson write-in is writing yes, I want my taxes increased;
yes, I want more boys sent into
Vietnam.

51% Eugene J. McCarthy: Congress may think twice
about tax
increase; people in other states
encouraged to speak out; open Democratic Convention.

Restore the spirit which existed
before 1963
exemplified by
Kennedy

—

The canvasser was then told how to record the
responses after the contact
had been concluded.

Instead of a three point scale of

f avorable-to-McCarthy

favorable-to-Johnson or Indefinite, a five point evaluation was
advised.
five points v/ould give the canvasser a way to classify all
contacts.

The

The

headquarters could then analyze areas where additional campaigning might
move
voters toward voting for Senator McCarthy.

The new scale read:

1.

Favorable to McCarthy

2.

Indifferent but leaning toward McCarthy

3.

Totally indifferent.

4.

Indifferent but leaning toward Johnson

5.

Favorable to Johnson.

WViile all involved felt that a pre-announcement of the canvass in a com-

munity would be desirable, in the case of the second test scheduled that same
day for Somersworth, it was impossible.
As the canvassers left for Somersworth the canvass organizers began to

have second thoughts on what the test might produce.

They were concerned that

the attempt to engage the voters might produce the hostility that they feared
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might be

m

the background of the New Hampshire
electorate.

New Hampshire

voters, after all, were reputed to
be "hawkish- toward the Vietnam
policy and
to have a strong sense of national
loyalty that might not pennit the
questioning that the new canvassing approach
emphasized.

The long Sunday afternoon passed as had
the previous afternoon while the
canvassers worked and the canvass organizers
waited in the Concord headquarters.

Late that afternoon the canvassers returned.

been the exact opposite of the day before.

Their experiences had

Instead of the non-response,

they had been able to start conversations that
revealed not the feared hostility, but a deep concern about the issues that
the canvassers raised.

Often the canvasser was invited inside to talk and pursue
the interview.

Wii]e few canvassers could report that the contacts led to
number

1

cr

"favorable-to-McCarthy" responses, it was clear that the war was on people's
minds and that they were willing to discuss it with a stranger.

There had

been little or no hostility either to the contact or to the appearance of a
young, quite obviously college aged person on the doorstep.

Even in working

class, isolated Somersworth, the President and his administration's policies

had produced concern rather than unquestioning loyalty.

The canvassers were

stimulated by the effort and had returned warm, anxious to canvass again,
and genuinely surprised by the hospitality that they had experienced.

The careful de-briefing of each canvasser discovered little that was
not positive about the experience.

Shepard's advise had made it possible

for the canvasser to get beyond the introduction of the day before.

They

found that when the did go beyond the Introduction, the contact wanted to
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talk ana appeared al.ost relieved
that so.eono was willing to
discuss their
concerns.
Occasionally a person would note that
they had not been able to
talk with .:belr owr. children and that
it was nice to once again speak
in

friendly tones -with someone of their o.^
children's age.

canvasser was a stranger seemed to be a
positive asset.

The fact that the

Many said that they

had not talked about these things with
their friends, neighbors or relatives

They did not want to broach controversial
subjects with people who were clos
to them in their working or personal
lives.

^vT^at

appeared to Shepard as he

analyzed the de-briefing, was a tread of repression.

People had masked or

buried their personal concerns about the state of
their nation and the un-

settling impact of this concern on their personal lives.

The canvassers

gave them a chance to reveal these concerns without
threatening higher

valued social communications.

would have almost no

V7ay

The canvasser, obviously from out-of-town,

of betraying the momentary trust that the contact

placed in the conversation.

The canvass contact produced what amounted to

a moment of mutual relaxation.

accomplishing
v;ar,

The canvasser derived a feeling of at last

something meaningful in terms of personal opposition to the

while the contact seemed to enjoy opening a hidden part of his/her own

psyche that had been protected from doubt.

important new campaign tool.

The test had clearly produced an

There would be one or two other tests in other

communities before a full-scale effort was organized but at least the dimensions of the technique were now known and could be developed.

Joel Feigenbaum, a Cornell graduate student in nuclear physics, jumped
on the data that the canvass had produced.

analyze the canvassers' reports.

He was thirsty for a chance to

He drafted charts to record the daily can-
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va«slng results and to estimate the
support such an effort would require.
Others could estimate the number of
contacts that each canvasser could make
during a weekend in New Hampshire, and
from that project the number of canvassers that would be needed to cover the
priority cities. The job of preparing voter address cards, maps and canvassing
instruction packets for the
tests then had to expand to cover a much
larger effort.

Within a day or two of the tests, canvassing
became the major volunteer
activity of the campaign.

Preparation for a full-scale effort would require

the full attention of each of the principal leaders
in the test.

refined the canvassing instructions to specific details.

Shepard

Each canvasser

would be given a copy of the instructions and be required
to sit through
an orientation session.

Those first volunteers who had canvassed in Somers-

worth became field operations supervisors.

They would conduct the training

and then lead a canvassing crew to a priority community.

The leaders were

responsible for distributing the canvassing packets and then collecting the
completed cards at the end of each day.

These cards were then to be returned

to the state headquarters for analysis.

In many respects the logistics of the canvass became almost as important
as the canvass itself.

There had to be close coordination between the seve-

ral supporting departments within the headquarters and then similar coordina-

tion between the state headquarters and the area headquarters.

Canvassing

Instructions, materials for distribution, maps and supervisors had to arrive
at the right place at the right time in order to be sure that the brief time

the volunteers could spend in New Hampshire on a weekend was put to productive

use. To guarantee that the
orientation for the canvassers was
the same in
Berlin as it was in Manchester, and
to .ake sure that the canvassers
under-

stood the importance of their role,
the supervisors were carefully
oriented
to their jobs by both oral and
written instructions. While the role
of the

local committees in the canvass was one
of logistical support, the supervisors
were instructed to check their plans with
the local connnittee and to observe
their advice.

From the beginning the cooperation
between the local committee

and the canvassing activity was excellent.
By the third weekend, February 24th, the
reporters had discovered the

canvassing story.

Film crews would follow canvassers and reporters
began

telling the story of a mystical relationship that
had begun to develop between
the canvassers and the New Hampshire voters.

The stories themselves often

served as the means of pre-advancing a canvassing visit.

The area headquar-

ters would release canvassing dates to the media with the
result that the

canvassers were often expected when they rang a doorbell.
ready with their own questions and welcomes.

Residents were

The result was that the can-

vass showed a major shift favoring McCarthy.

Felgenbaum carefully analyzed the date he drew from the cards turned
in by the canvassers.

Shepard concentrated his skills on evaluating the de-

briefing reports from both the canvassers and the field canvassing supervisors.

Both evaluations kept the campaign in close touch with its impact

and progress.

by area.

Feigenbaum prepared weekly reports of the canvassing results

He began to detect a shift from the "3" group to the "2" and from

the "2" to the "1".

In some areas the shift was more dramatic than others,
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but in all area. th. raove
to.a.d McCarthy was shown and
that .ove increased
in intensity as the weekends
passed.
McCarthy's percentage of the vote
crept

fro. 20 to 25 percent when the
I's and 2's were taken together
in the first
veek, to 25 to 30 percent in the
second week, and 30 to 35 percent
in the
third week.
Feigenbaum began to project election
percentages which had
McCarthy approaching the 50 percent
figure, a percent that all had thought
was impossible in the earliest days.
Wl.at was of greatest concern
was the
fact that the movement toward McCarthy
was less vigorous in Manchester and
in Nashua.

vote.

Both cities accounted for much of
the state's Democratic primary

Wiile the Keene, Concord. Portsmouth and
Laconia areas were reporting

canvassing support for McCarthy exceeding 50
percent, the number of voters
in those areas was far less than the
expected turnout in Manchester and Nashua

Shepard accepted Manchester as his challenge.

In addition he would keep

close tabs on the de-briefings to find what approaches
to the voters were most
convincing.

As he evaluated these de-briefing reports he would
formulate

changes in the issues to be emphasized and the approach of
the canvassers.
In this way Shepard was able to monitor the flow of the
issues and to adjust

the details of the coming weekend's canvass to respond to a
new event or

issue that had been either produced during the week or was found to
be important to the voter.

The instructions that were developed for both the canvass and for the

past-canvass reports document the thoroughness of the planning and the execution of the canvass.

Under the title "Information for Volunteers" the follow-

ing mimeographed instructions were given to each canvasser.
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INFORMAT ION FOR VOLUNTEERS

>Jict£_abjnit^

-

Approximate figures on voter rerisDemocrats, vith Dem^ Ls
^ '
' ^^^'^
Ind ndeL'l
'''^^
(^^^>' approximate number)
?oti^f patterns,
\oting
o'.ttf
H
however, give Republicans 54% and
Democrats 34%.
The Governor, John King, is a Democrat,
and the Senate seats are
split between Norris Cotton (Rep) and Thomas
Maclntyre (Dem)
King
and Maclntyre arc very active on behalf
of President Johnson.
Independent voter registration means that
the voter has never
voted xn a primary before. Crossing over
is not permitted, and a
voter can vote in a different primary only if
he changes his registration 90 days beforehand.
The primary is a two-part affair.
There Is the selection of a
slate of delegates to the national party convention.
These may or
may not be pledged to a particular candidate. Then,
there is the
preferential primary, in which the voter indicates the
candidate he
would vote for in the election itself. In this part
of the primary
it is possible to write in the name of a candidate
of the other
party.
These votes do count in the final result.
.

The Canvass - Part of the purpose behind the canvass is to determine the nature of support for the Senator. There will also
be
the effect that we have upon the voters as the Senator's personal
representatives. Our appearance and behavior will have as much effect as will the fact that he is interested enough about the public
to send representatives to answer their questions and solicit their
opinions.
We also hope to convince them that the Senator is the
candidate who vcill best voice their concerns.
Your approach will therefore be indirect. You are to feel out
the voter's opinions before pressing any of the issues (e.g., the
pledge card, Vietnam, taxes and Inflation, Johnson's credibility).
You want to put yourself inside his frame of reference and discover
how he comes to the conclusions he comes to. Be a good listener.
The pitch v;ill vary with your o\m style, but bear in mind certain things.
1) Always mention the name of the person (s) on your card.
We
want to know if he has moved, died, etc.
2) Always identify yourself as a representative of Senator
McCarthy.
3) If the Senator has been in town recently, mention the fact,
ask the voter if he has seen him.
If he is coming shortly, mention
when and where he will be appearing, and that he would very much
like to meet the person you are talking to.
4) Never ask if he is going to vote for McCarthy.
Your most
direct bid will be "I hope you will consider voting for McCarthy."
The following are two different approaches, which you may find
useful to consider:
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volunteer for Senator McCarthy, who
is offoriio TT.
r-* I
^'"'^"^
.-i^oun}
an alternative to Lyndon Johnson.
(Break for conversation of a general
nature, about weather, scenery
nexghborhood, etc. Mention if Senator
has been or will be in to\^
Conversation should drift soon to Senator
and issues.
You can pr^l
duce least controversial piece of
literature and discuss it, or ask
If he^ knows anyone who has been
sent to Vietnam.)
^^^11°
I am representing Senator
McCarthy, who is
running for the Democratic nomination for
President.
I wonder if
there are any questions I could answer for
you, any issues you would
like to discuss, if I could interest you
in some literature...."
Remember that you are there at their service, to
answer their
questions, and discuss the issues that interest
them, not to press
your opinions on them or pressure them into
voting one way or the
other.
You may be asked what brings you to New Hampshire.
Let them
see how urgent you feel it is that everyone consider
the issues
carefully, and how important the New Hampshire primary
is for the
\jhole nation.
Being from out of state can be turned to an advantage.
Perhaps you do not have a primary in your state so you
cannot express
your opinion on this question except in this way. A lot of
people
commented favorably on the interest shown by young people in coming
out to canvass.
,

When discussing issues be sure to state the Senator's position
rather than your own adaptation of his views.
If you are not familiar
with these positions already, consult the pamphlet' that has been prepared well before you venture onto the streets. Certain issues will
probably recur as follows:
The Pledge Card - You should know that the Democratic State Committee has openly endorsed President Johnson, before the voters of
the state had a chance to express their opinion.
They have sent out
a pledge card to all registered Democrats.
These are individually
numbered and it is a fair assumption that there is a master list with
numbers checked off as they are returned. Voters may express resentment at coercion and thr threat of reprisals, and also feel that
the secrecy of the ballot is being violated.
Taxation - You all know that McCarthy is against a tax increase
at this time, and that much of the taxpayers money is being used for
graft and corruption in Saigon.
But did you know that the war is
costing every person in the U.S. $150 a year, that more is spent in
Vietnam every day than goes into the N.H. General Fund every year,
that N.H. taxpayers pay $2 to Vietnam for every $1 that goes into
the General Fund.
Your voter may not know it. Tell him.
T he War - Don't get too wound up in this.
You have only a short
time in which to deal with a question you have spent a great deal of
time and thouglit on.
- It's not so much a question of changing horses, but of
changing streams.
- McCarthy does not support unilateral withdrawal, but
rather a negotiated peace.
"Never negotiate out of fear, but never
fear to negotiate."
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^^^^"^^^ ^^^^ addresses)
?
Concord-"nr
Oliflce. one addressed to
"Jessica" and one
addressed to Verlin." Jessica
and Verlin are or.anLing
activities respectiJeJv.
Klen%rTfrJ"'
Keep the third copy of ONES and
TWOS for your oZ office^

to

the.

.

'

Separate out all the "moved".
"Deceased" etc. and remove.
Send these cards to the Concord
Office, addressed to Verlin
Some of these will be challenged
on election day.
,

Separate out all cards for convalescent
homes, nursing
homes from the rest.
Most of these people have not been
contacted because an appointment is
required.
It xd.ll be
up to the local headquarters to arrange
appointments
with these people.
If you have many cards v;hich have
"old" or "elderly" x^ritten on them, these should be separated
out also.
It would
be helpful, if possible, to have local
people go to canvass

these people.
people.

They are not effectively canvassed by young

If you have any questions, please
contact John Barbaieri,
your canvassing liaison at the Concord Office.

Dated:

February 28,

1968^^

These instructions showed that another phase of the campaign
was about
to begin.

As with the earlier phases, the leadership

x^as

planning activities that would come next in the sequence.

anticipating and
Cans assigned his

assistant, Jessica Tuchman, and another former Washington headquarters
staffer,

Verlin Nelson, to begin preparing for the immediate preliminaries of the
election.

The canvass offered an unforeseen chance to build a get-out-the-

vote effort around those
for Senator McCarthy,

x,7ho

had been identified as inclined toward voting

Since the trend was moving strong in McCarthy's favor,

it seemed useful, or at least worth the risk, to follow-up canvassing contacts

with second visits or telephone calls.

Both were Intended to increase the

commitment of the potential McCarthy voter, and to increase the probability
that the person would actually get out and vote.

VThere it also
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appeared that the trend of the
ca„vasoi„B return, showed especially
strong
movement toward McCarthy, the THREE'S
and even EOUR's were re-canvassed
In
hopes that they ..ight be either
encouraged now to support McCarthy
or, in
the case of the FOUR's (leaning
toward Johnson) they might be either
neu-

tralized or shifted toward McCarthy.

The canvass produced a number of
secondary effects that added Important
momentum to the campaign. When originally
conceived the canvass was intended
as a simple contact between a McCarthy
worker and the voter.

The media hype

that the canvass received and the strongly
positive response the volunteers

themselves received, had not been anticipated.
happening.

The total venture became a

New Hampshire residents were entranced by it
and often were re-

ported anxiously waiting for the canvass to arrive
in their community and at
their doorsteps.

The Johnson campaign had neither an alternative
strategy

to combat the canvassing flood nor a means of
attacking it.

The McCarthy

campaign leaders were less concerned about an attack from
the Johnson campaign leaders than some damaging event caused by the behavior
of a volunteer.

From the first weekend of canvassing to the last the leaders anxiously
waited
for that telephone call reporting a drug bust, an automobile accident,
some

sort of violence or any other embarrassment that might sour the public's
taste for the canvass.

Wiile there were minor incidents, an occasional traf-

fic violation or nervousness on the part of a local police force, nothing

developed to the point of an embarrassment.

In all cases the volunteers

exercised extra caution and courtesy taking to heart the campaign's warning
that their behavior was a direct reflection of the campaign.

Habitual
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speeders cut their .peed.

Having a McCarthy sticker on a car.
especially

one with an out-of-state registration,
was a heavy burden.

It was carried

by the driver as if it was a personal
credential from the campaign that this
person was the Senator's ambassador.

Direct Mail

Although the canvassing activity assumed the
spotlight of the campaign
during the last weeks, the preparation of the
mailing continued.

In some

cases it became so difficult to extract usable
mailing labels from voter

registration lists and address sources that other ways had
to be found to
mail.

At first the leaders resisted abandoning the idea
that only registered

Democrats and Independents should receive the mailing but as the
mailing
deadlines neared, they considered blanket mailings to all resident
addresses.

Hoeh had used a commercial direct mail firm in Manchester during earlier
campaigns and had been pleased with the cost and the result.

From the time

Cans arrived he and Hoeh discussed how the mailing should be handled.

Both

agreed that the laborious process of creating the mailing labels should continue as long as it was feasible and there were enough volunteers to do the
work.

They also agreed that when the volunteer power was needed in other

aspects of the campaign there would have to be a shift away from the mail labe

preparation.

About three weeks before the election Cans saw the mail effort

lag in his assessment of priorities.

He thought the canvass would accomplish

much of what the mailing had been originally conceived to do.
volunteers away from the mailing.

He shifted

Cans concluded that in those communities
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where the mailing labels had
not been
oeen prepared
nrcmrpH nand where the canve.ss
shox^ed
trends toward McCartliy
ly unat
that It
it wm.T^
would be acceptable to blanket
mail to all
addresses and not be concerned
about wasting mailings on
Republicans. At
the sa.e ti.e the campaign
managers reviewed their strategy
for the .ailing
light of the canvassing returns,
especially given the strong returns
fro.
many of the smaller co^^nunities.
These returns showed that the
percentage
favorable or leaning to McCarthy was
substantial.
To reach more potential
voters tucked away in the less populous
towns, the leaders extended the
list
i

m

of tov^ns that would receive mailings.

The only way to mail to these towns

in the time that remained would be
to use a commercial mailing
house and

blanket all addresses.

They hoped that some of the Republicans
who received

the HcCartliy mailing would write-in
the Senator's name on their ballot es-

pecially since Governor Romney had withdrawn
from the Republican contest.
This change was purely one of strategy and
did not affect the mail pre-

paration work that had been going on in the
basement of the Concord headquarters for more than a month.

During that period the labels had been typed

filed, sorted, pasted on canvassing cards and on
envelopes.

were sorted and boxed by city and zip code.

The envelopes

A letter that was drafted early

in January came back from the printer toward the middle
of February.

Two

versions had been prepared, one addressed to Democrats that other
to Independents.

A third version for the blanket mailing had to be printed quickly

that was addressed simply to voters.

Stuffed with the letter was the brochur
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The nulling reached the post
office and the co^ercial
.ailing hou.e on
schedule.
The original thought was to
have the mailing arrive during
the
wecK before the election. For
those who had been contacted
by the campaign
the mailing would reinforce
whatever positive impact that
contact had had.
For those who had not been reached
by the campaign the mailing might
encourage
the recipient to consider learning
more about McCarthy in the time
remaining.
What was omitted from the mailing
was a return card.

Hoeh and Studds had

originally intended to enclose a return
postcard much as the Lodge campaign
organizers had done in 1964. When the
"pledge card" issue broke the return
card idea was dropped.
However, the canvassing results tended
to work for
the McCarthy cam.paign much as had the
return card in the Lodge effort.

The

canvass gave the McCarthy manager an approxiination
of the impact of the cam-

paign that revealed trends more accurately than
did the Lodge return cards.
The initial mailing plan was expanded considerably.

First, many more

towns were added to the priority list than had been
advised in the beginning.

Secondly, the idea of blanket mailing to parts of the
state where the campaign

was succeeding better than expected was an important change.
thing

that;

Thirdly, some-

is usually tried in campaigns that have a longer development
period

than did the McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire was also accomplished.

number of special group mailings were prepared.

according to target priorities.

A

The mailing effort worked

First the originally planned mailing, then

the additional to\^ mailings, then the special group mailings, and finally

reminders to vote addressed to residents in communities that would not have
on election day organization.
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Preparing materlaJs for canvassing,
distribution of raaterials to area
head.uart.rs, special pre-election
literature drops, and other distribution
efforts were handled by the volunteers
consigned to the cave-like environ
of the Concord headquarters
basement.

galley of an ancient Roman ship.

The space had the appearance of the

Hands moving constantly in steady
rhythm.

stuffing envelopes, pasting labels or
collating canvassing packets.

The

workers stretched along folding tables with
their arms reaching for the work.
In the background a stereo played the latest
rock.

Stavis wrote:

During the week, we philoeophers theologists,
sinologists, lawyers and a few people with only
bachelor's
degrees all tore mailing labels, pasted them on
enve.

lopes, stuffed, sealed, stamped, and sorted
by zip code.

When masses of volunteers came for the weekend, we
learned how to supervise.
We did appropriate time and
motion studies, developed executive training programs,
analyzed the relationship between endurance and commitment, and moved cartons, tables, and chairs. We had
seminars in folding, advanced stuffing, elementary sealing and interdisciplinary stamping. All this work was
geared to the throbbing rhythm of the hard-rock records.^

When the mistake in the weight of the mailing was discovered Stavis recalled:

A butcher's scale revealed that it was slightly overweight, and the post office would not accept that extra
fraction of an ounce without extra postage. Not being
able to afford that, we developed nev/ courses in advaxiced unstuffing, resealing, and stamp saving.^

Issue Targeting

Alan Shepard,

v/ho

had skillfully oriented the early testing of the can-

vass had shifted his attentions to Manchester at Hoeh's suggestion,

miat

Shepard did was explore what was on the mind of the potential voter and then

advise strategies that would orient the campaign to these concerns.

His de-

briefing sessions with the canvassers helped him to plot the issue profile
of the voter.

He found the voters were concerned about taxes, inflation.
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crodibil:Uy or
^Tohn

a

general feeling that things had
become unsettled since

Kennedy's assassination.

His technique was to list
those issue subjects

that were mentioned most often by
those canvassed.

He would examine the list

noting links between subjects and
from that compile strategies that
would
make the campaign relevant to voter
groups.
Shepard recognized that for the
ca.,paign to succeed in the time
remaining, it could not begin an
educational

effort to get people to respond to issues
not uppermost in their minds.

He

felt that the war was a difficult issue
to deal with in the context of the

campaign.

He sensed that people wanted the war
over, wanted it won or wanted

the United States to get out, but were not
comfortable with a lengthy dis-

cussion of the details.

Their level of frustration tended to increase
when

faced with an account of U.S. policy failure in
Vietnam.

The frustration

seemed to produce a defense reflex that was masked
with expressions of loyalty
to the administration or a form of close-mindedness
that expressed hostility
to the source of the frustration.

To avoid direct and unsettling confronta-

tion with voters on the war policy, Shepard advised an oblique
approach.
In Kanchester, news of the Johnson administration's proposed surtax
on

incomes to support the federal budget was greeted with great hostility.

The

administration was already viewed with considerable suspicion because of the
fallings of the war, an increasing rate of inflation and a general souring of
credibility.

The proposed surtax was the final straw.

Shepard discovered

that the tax proposal was mentioned most frequently by contacted voters.

Shepard suggested that a new piece of campaign material be prepared that would
tie McCarthy's opposition to the war and the continuation of the war to the

voters' opposition to the tax surcharge.

A

The itcn that was produced
was a card the same
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s:l.e as

the Internal
Revenue Service's 1040 A for. the short form - of the
ta. return that most
workers in New Hampshire file.
The text of the IRS form was
screened as a
background for the message printed
in red ink. "Will LBJ's
proposed 10% tax
increase put your family budget in
the red?"
Beneath the phrase was the
suggestion printed in blue, "Your 'X'
for Senator McCarthy says NO."
The
card helped re-enforce the tax issue,
demonstrate McCarthy's opposition to

the tax proposal and open the
subject of taxes when McCarthy
campaigned,

^^en the cards arrived from the printer
Shepard grabbed all the volunteers
he could find and sent them to the
factory gates to distribute the cards
to workers changing shifts.

The card was included in the canvassing
kits,

distributed at factory gates, included in some
mailings and was used in
all of the cities where there was a
concentration of Democratic voters.

Shepard did much of the same thing with a number
of other issues that
he garnered from his research effort.

The feedback which Shepard was con-

stantly monitoring provided intelligence that came as
close as the campaign

would come to having direct poll information.

Shepard spent almost three

weeks in New Hampshire checking, testing, researching and
then advising cam-

paign approaches.

His influence was pronounced in the final pattern of ma-

terials, advertising and through the telephone canvass that operated
in

Manchester especially.

He developed the telephone message that was used and

adjusted it almost on a daily basis as he perceived that voter issue concerns

were changing.

He was especially effective in tying McCarthy and his posi-

tions buck to the things that were on the mind of the New Hampshire voter.

To him the voters had to be motivated to vote for McCarthy.

To get them to
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a ,ci„.hl„ with McCarthy
it was ossentlol that
the campaign reach for

these concerns.

Shepard worked as a consultant
to the n,anaaers and In that
capacity helped shape the the„,es
that would bring McCarthy In
closer touch
with the New Hampshire voter. To
so„e extent Shepard was able
to Influence
McCarthy's approach during the final
weeks.
Several of the themes which Shepard
identified were given more emphasis
in McCarthy's speeches than before.

McCarthy, however, had found his own
stride.

minor adjustments.

Shepard'

s

work accomplished some

Shepard Influenced canvassing, the
re-orlentatlon of some

campaign materials, the content of the
radio and newspaper advertising and
press release program.

The Celebrities

During most of the campaign there had been a
number of what were described
as "secondary speakers."

Most of these had been scheduled independently
of

the McCarthy campaign by organizations concerned
about the war policies.

Work-

ing through church groups, local peace committees
and responding to campus

invitations,

a

regular procession of critics had brought their views to New

Hampshire cities and towns.
effort than others.

Some were more closely allied with the McCarthy

Allard Lowenstein, Sandford Gottlieb, the Executive Direc-

tor of SANE; Zolton Ferency, former Democratic Chairman of Michigan; and
several others

v;ho

had been involved early in the search for an alternative candi-

date came to New Hampshire as speakers.

Others, like David Luce, a disillu-

sioned AID officer in Vietnam, or several exiled Vietnamese critics of the

current regime in Saigon were not connected to the campaign at all.
ta.lks and the

Their

press coverage which these meetings received did expand public

information about the personal and political impacts of the war.

Occasionally
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durin, the early weeks of the
campaign, the New Hampshire
leaders would receive calls fro. outside New
Hampshire fro. organisations
concerned about the
war, offering to send speakers
to New Hampshire.
In all cases they rejected
the offers.
They felt that their energies
were already extended too far to
manage other schedules.
Further, they did not want to
risk additional controversy.
If there was to be controversy
in the campaign they felt it
should
come from McCarthy's own activity.
They did not want to be in the
position
of having to defend or deny the
comments of secondary speakers. Those
who
came to New Hampshire at the behest of
other sponsoring organizations could
not be tied to the McCarthy campaign.

When Curtis Cans arrived to manage the
campaign he brought with him

from the national headquarters a person to
schedule celebrity and secondary
speakers, Sandra Silverman.

When she arrived the McCarthy managers concluded

that the campaign had gro;m to the extent that
it could support this addi-

tional activity and that it could also sustain any
controversy that might
result.

Her first task was to develop campaign schedules for members
of Senator

McCarthy's family.

Mary, the Senator's second child, had just begun her

freshman year at Radcliffe.

She had become a part of the student group that

swirled around the effort to find an alternative to President Johnson in
1968.
As Richard Stout wrote concerning McCarthy's decision to run for the presi-

dency

:

Though many people urged him ultimately, his decision to
run was a private one.
His daughter Mary had been suggesting it for months.
Didn't he want to be remembered
in history for some nobler act that support of Lyndon
Johnson's re-election? she had asked.''
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Mary arrived for her
f^r.^^
fi^at m
New „
Hampshire visit just
before her faM
^ was to
spea. at the Concord
Co„.unlty ^^^^tei,
Center
r
h
^
February
6th.
An 18 vear o^d fr.
freshman.
she seemed shy and
an
unllk.l.
unlikely carapalcner l-.,.f- >,^>.
y
-^-Putatlon as an Influence
on hor
ner f.H
father ,had preceded h^rt>
^

"

,

- - .-P

in an. „a. sHe con..

... ea.pa.,n. .n.
.ecans. or .e.
school work She
qhe mf^,^.^might uhave to concentrate
her errorts
efforts in
In Cambridge.
r
k .
The New
„
Hampshire leaders hoped
that they would
uid be oble
-ble to encourage the
y
^
McCarthy
.o ..:p
^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
^^^^^^^^
tical ven.n.e. .Ha.
.e„ „a.,.M.e people
en,o. .eee.n. .He
.a.n.ea o. ean-a-e. ana .Ha. ..H .a„iUa.l.,
Help.
.0 .o™.l..e .Hel.
.pinion.
Of the candidate
himself.
,

Mrs. AHl.all McCa..H.
Ha. Heen

™..lns HeHlnd

a. had Heen He. .ode
In previous ca.pal.ns.

ca.pal,n.

.He scenes In Wa.Hln..o„

.ow sHe was n.,cd .c ,oln
.He

she agreed .0 vlsl.
PeH.ua., 14 and 13.

Xo Help He. accep. He.

new .ole as a ca^palgne.
sHe as.ed Ma., .0
acco.pan. He.. Wo.Ulng
wl.H .He
local co„l..ees. «l.la„
Bunn of Conco.d a..anged
a .wo da, scHedule
.Ha.
had H.S. HcCa..H, and Ma.,
vlsl.lns MancHes.e., .asHua.
Pe.e.Ho.o and Keene

Recalling, Barbara Underwood
wrote:

If

fcs.

McCa..H, could please make

a

vlsl. to a new

fon,-

Children, she said and 'no. one
o.He. candlda.e o. His
wife Ha.s shown an, in.e.es.
in ou. cen.e., and i. .eally
Is .he p. do. and jo, of our
cl.,.
THe.e was. Howeve. '^a
McCa..Hy's schedule, bu. mI"'
"
',
llZ Lha.
said
Sa If
Jf he. mo.he. did
not Have the time .0
•

^"f "

go.
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she would be hannv to P<M,r.v

W

«a^f kind.
same

i

'^'^^ '°

^^^^ ^^-y ^-'^ been
b^ scheduled for the
programs throughout the state.

lllTuiTZ 'h'"' K
of.

^

Fro. that ti.e on the ,ulet Mary
McCarthy beca.e one of the .ost
important
secondary campaigners for her father
in New Hampshire.
Sandy Silverman would
schedule her to meet with community
groups, McCarthy committees, for
radio
and newspaper interviews, and
for school visits as well as to
encourage
volunteers who had not
seen her father in person.
Eventually, her time
was in such great demand and her
own ability to concentrate on her
studies
had diminished in the excitement of
her father's campaign that she arranged
for a leave from Radcliffe for the
duration.

"It's difficult to assess the exact role
played by Mary McCarthy,"

wrote Barbara Underwood, "probably most
important was that she was there in
the state of New Hampshire and gave
credence to the fact that her father

was a decent and intelligent man.

Local people who got to know her tended

to judge the Senator based on Mary's o-,^
intelligence.

While Mary McCarthy was Sandy Silverman's first
scheduling subject, the
task that brought her to New Hampshire was different.

She expected to imme-

diately begin scheduling a parade of notables who had been
attracted to the

McCarthy candidacy.

Shortly after she arrived she met with Hoeh and Studds

to discuss her Intentions.

They told her to be extremely careful and to
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clear with

then,

each person she intended to
schedule into New Hampshire.

They explained that they felt the
campaign was beginning to takeroot.
It
was succeeding because they had
avoided appearing frivolous,
dis-establishment. or less than masculine in approach.
They had carefully selected
as references for the anti-war
positions quotations from prominent
military

officers such as General James Gavin and
former Commandant of the Marine
Corps, General David Shoup.

They were concerned that Sandy Silverman
might

now turn this aspect of the campaign into
a sideshow.

To explain to her

what they meant they said they felt that only
those celebrities who project
strong, masculine images should be scheduled
for New Hampshire.

They did

not want women or performers from the arts who
did not associate easily

in the public's mind with the masculine aspects
of national pride.

To be

an effective critic of the war policy Hoeh and
Studds felt that the celebrity

would have to have an image of prowess that was established
in the public's
mind.

To be less than that both felt that the charge which the
Manchester

Ulli2Il

Leader enjoyed repeating, that all anti-war protesters were "sissies,

fags, cowards, or other social deviates" might be re-enforced.

ample of someone

v;ho

Their ex-

would be an effective celebrity visitor was Paul Newman.

To their surprise, Sandy Silverman scrapped the list of actresses and per-

formers she had compiled and began trying to get Paul

Ne^vmian to

visit New

Hampshire.

Although the

Nev/

Hampshire leaders were conservative in their approach

to using celebrities they understood the value of the celebrity role.

A

celebrity created excitement, attracted attention and reached people who
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..iOht not c,t.o.„l.c ,tve

t^ou„„

u,o c„.„.i,n.

„oe„

TeU

that McC.rt,.,

had too little ti.e renaming
to generate enou.h
excUc.ent on Ms o„n to
bring out a significant voto.
the voter Interest level
could ho Increased
then, perhaps, more of the
marginal
bxudx voters,
voters m-^nv
r.f ^^
many of
them young and new voters,
might just vote.

„

Sandy .Silverman arranged visits
for several academic celebrities,
such
as John Kenneth Galbraith, who
came and went without stirring
either much
attention or controversy. Late in
February she announced that Paul
Me^n
had agreed to campaign in New
Hampshire for McCarthy.
Sandy Silverman had
connections with a group in New York
who was soliciting celebrity help
for
the campaign.
Wl.en she reported that her
first list of notables had been
rejected by Hoeh and Studds she explained
how important it was to the cam-

paign to have someone like Newman
campaign in New Hampshire.

The New York

group had been soliciting successfully
celebrities for fund raising benefits,

parties and possible campaign activities.

Many had already been used in New

York to make recordings supporting McCarthy
that would be used as commercials
during the closing weeks of the campaign.
The New York committee arranged a private
airplane flight for Newman

which arrived in Manchester late in the afternoon of
Monday, March 4th.

No-

tice of Newman's availability and arrival times were
so short that Sandy

Silverman had to scurry among the better organized local
campaigns trying to
find places for him to go and things for him to do on such
short notice.

Keeping in mind Hoeh's warning about possible controversy, she planned
a
dinner in Manchester v/here David Hoeh and Richard Goodwin might talk
with
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Newman about how

),e

.i^ht be effective in New
Hampshire,

He had admitted
that he had not done this
sort of thing before and
needed some help with his
approach.
Over dinner Newman was briefed
about McCarthy. New Hampshire
and
What his Visit :night contribute.
He was then trotted out to
the airplane
for a flight to Lebanon.
Then he was driven to Enfield
where Sandy Silverman
had arranged a reception for hi.
in a private home.
Like other tests in the

campaign little damage would have
resulted if Ne.^an's performance
bombed in
Enfield. With fingers crossed, Hoeh
and Silverman waited for the report
of
Newman's foray into the New Hampshire
winter night.

Shortly after 10:00 p.m. Hoeh received
a telephone call reporting
that
all had gone exceptionally well.
With a house full of people, Newman
was a
bit unsure of himself at first, but after
fielding a few questions effectively he relaxed.

Even several of the campaign's more
skeptical academic members

from the Dartmouth faculty found Ne.^an
competent and engaging.

The test

satisfactorily completed, Sandy Silverman began
final scheduling plans for a
full day of visits in Nashua, Manchester and
Dover where Hoeh felt Newman's
attraction could greatly help the campaign.
Wiiat

Newman accomplished was immediately shown by the crowds
he drew

the next day and by the press clippings from his brief
visit to Enfield.

The campaign had progress ed about as was normal for New
Hampshire campaigns.

The candidate usually receive good media attention when in a city
or town but
fade to the inner pages v/hen campaigning outside the state or when
surrogates

are active.

Paul Newman was an exception.

He attracted radio and newspaper

attention for his visits and, for the first time in the campaign, there were
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crowds waltlns.

>*at ho did and what he .aid
received prominent attenti,
Ion in
the local newspaper, and .nore
than passing notice in the
others.
The

l^b^on Vallcz Nens carried

two photographs of Newroan
in Enfield.

The front page was captioned
"McCarthy Supporters

-

Paul Newnnan. tough-guy

filn. star,

gave Knfleld area citizens a
soft-sell pitch for Minnesota
Senator
Eugene McCarthy for president
Monday night. He said U.S. needs
change of
policy in Vietna„."10 The page 3
photograph was captioned. "Female
Fans
Actor Paul Newman is surrounded by the
distaff side during brief call at
Enfield gathering Monday night...."
The story the Valley Ne^s carried
on
his visit described how Newman
experimented with his campaign style.

-

Newman, who has
his performance
backer and he's
thing I can for

been nominated for an Academy Award for
in "Cool Hand Luke." is also a
McCarthy
here in the Granite State "to do everyhim."

When Ne^^an finally arrived, about an
hour later than
scheduled, most of the crowd pushed into
the front hall
to watch him come in the door.
And that's exactly what
happened. A woman or two gasped as he walked
in chewing Spearmint gum, but no one immediately
uttered a
greeting or even shook his hand. They were all
spellbound and Nev,Tnan appeared embarrassed.
But he finally walked on into the house, shook
some hands
and threaded his v/ay to the front of the living
room to
say a few words for McCarthy
very few.

—

"I'm no public speaker," the actor began, "an in about
30 seconds you'll know why."

Newman spoke softly, thoughtfully, a far cry from the
tough guy characters he's protrayed, such as Hud and
Harper.

"Coming up today," Newman said, "I realized that Eugene
McCartliy doesn't need me, I need Eugene McCarthy."
Newman, his face tan and his hair greying, looked at the
floor and fumbled with the Spearmint package in his hand,
"I don't want any more of the last four years," he said,
"I've had it,"
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''''

to all ^or McLrt^.;.

-^<^^

^i'"
questions and shake
his hand. "Zt
llTuTul
One young man asked for an
autograph.

"That's not what I'm here for,"
Newman replied
want to turn this into an autograph
party!"

"I don't

Ne.^an would not sign a single
autograph while campaigning but
would sign
McCarthy literature between stops
that would be distributed following
his
visit.

Instead of an autograph or

a

kiss, Newman adopted his own
trademark,

would look a stunned admirer in the
eyes and quietly say, while pinning
a McCarthy button on the woman's
coat, "Listen to what Senator McCarthy
is
saying, that is important." He would
move slowly through a crowd shakixtg
lie

hands, pinning buttons on lapels and
reminding people that they, like himself,

needed Senator McCarthy.

Several days after the first Newman visit,
several canvassers were
stopped by a state policeman in the western
part of the state for speeding.
Their car carried an out-of-state plate.

As the tropper was writing out their

ticket he said, "I'm doing this to show you that
Paul Newman isn't the only
one who can write autographs."

Then as he handed them their warning he said,

"By the way I'm a number one."
VHiile serious

candidates of presidential caliber, and especially McCarthy,

dislike sharing the stage with other stars, the Newman phenomenon
in New Hampshire lent celebrity status to the campaign.

McCarthy did not meet Newman when

he was in New Hampshire and did not want to be photographed with Newman
at that
time.
Wlia t

Ho did not reprimand Hoeh or anyone else who planned Newman's visit,

McCarthy resisted was having the nature of his campaign changed from that
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oi one foc„ssl„a on
t„c is„ue. to on.
<.t

ic,.t „t the

H...

avo«. «,e hoopla

u.t pc.aonaU.od

U.e cirort.

„..pshire s.a,«. «e„.a„
„.p.e.se„.ea what

of a

To

Hoped .o

conv.nUonal ca.paisn.

While he would not p.o.ote
the Idea of celebrity visits
or lend hl.self to the.,
his silence allowed
his managers to do what uiey
they lelt
felt was
uao ir,
In ^t,„
the t
best. ^interests of the campaign.

Althongh Nev^an was a bit
pu.zled that he had not met
McCarthy during his
visit, he too appeared to
understand the importance of
separating the two
images at this juncture.
In the days that followed
Newn-an's February 4 and 5th
visit, the size
of McCarthy's crowds increased
and were notlcably more excited
and intense.
By the mysticism of association,
McCarthy had gained some of Newman's
cele-

brity status and was now viewed
himself as a celebrity.
and style had not changed but he
had become charismatic.

McCarthy thrived.

McCarthy's manner
With this status

The total pace of the campaign began
to quicken notlcably

at just the crucial moment.

Following Newman came Tony Randall.

His style was quite different.

His

response to questions tended to be brittle,
occasionally irritating and defensive.

He cameto campaign for approximately
three days, but after the first

day his responses caused concern.

with emotion rather than reason.

He tended to answer questions on the war

His forte as a campaigner was that he kissed

every woman at each of the well attended coffee
parties and practically every

woman that he encountered during his visit.
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A separate, loglotical activity
aLnct exactly the sa:ne as that
which
supported Senator McCarthy when
campaigning had to be organized
for

the cele-

brities.

This meant schedule preparation,
advancing, cars, drivers and a
host or hostess to accompany the
celebrity.
Sandy Silverman had to manage
as many as three celebrities
campaigning in the state at the same
time.
The heaviest flow of celebrities
was during the final ten days of
the campaign. During that time Paul Nev.-man
returned, Robert Ryan, Rod Serling
and
Jack Parr came to campaign.
Some like Serling and Parr came to
assist with
the media campaign as well, and would
spend much of their time in the record-

ing studio of Weston Associates
advertising agency.

Each celebrity who came

to New Hampshire made an endorsement
tape which was added to the tapes

recorded by Harry Belafonte. Robert Vaughn,
Dustin Hoffman, Lauren Becall,

Jason Robards, Lee Reraick, Joan Bennett and
Joanne Woodward in New York.
Perhaps Nexvman's most successful visit was the
one that was planned

with the greatest skepticism.

McCarthy volunteer, Marc Kaski, firmly in

control of campaign affairs in Berlin, reluctantly
agreed to host Newman

during the last x^eekend of the campaign.

Kaski recalled:

Concord was feeling guilty about how little they had done
for me.
They wanted to do things for me but... I was...
v/ay up north of the ^-.Tiite Mountains.
They kept offering
me Paul Newman for a day to campaign in Berlin.
Hoeh and Silverman were offering Kaski Newman because they felt he would
be

well received in Berlin and would help in the final push before the election.
They also v^ere offering him because a plane was available to shorten the
trip, an advantage vjhich was not available to the others.
to the offer:

Kaski reacted

Belli
I wasn't sure that the
people in Berlin wanted
Paul Ne.™u to tell them who
to vote for. so I at>Kea
ask^d
^
around to find out.
.

»

The people I spoke to (asking)
do you think he should
come said they didn't think it
was a good idea.
(They
said) the people were making up
their own minds, and
this would make it just like any
other campaign where
some labor boss or the mayor comes
out for a candidate.
It s no longer the people's decision.
It's who do you
listen to? Do you listen to the mayor
or the labor
union council or a movie star? 12

Kaski coiicluded:
If what we wanted to do was have
them make up their own
minds, this was defeating our primary
purpose, so I
turned Concord down a couple of times.

Then, I found, many did suggest that the
people of Berlin usually made up their minds by the last
weekend.
If Nev/man were to come up here the last
day or two before the primary, no damage would be done.
It would
sor of be... a fitting climax to the campaign.
Frankly,
they just thought it would be a fairly exciting
thing
for Berlin to have Paul Newman there.
They also
thought that there might be some people who had not
been contacted during the campaign and who knew very
little about McCarthy who might be swayed by the visit—
and many people would.

The reason they figured that Paul Ne^v-roan would be able
to reach some people who hadn't been reached during the
campaign was that there was a championship hockey game
in to\m. that final weekend.
The whole town goes to the
hockey game or listens to it on the radio. Most of those
\7ho go to it are those from the mills who weren't at
home when, the canvassers visited.

A radio aiaiouncer who had persuaded me twice from having
Paul IJewran come up said, "Ok.
Have him come up that
weckeiid and I'll arrange for him to drop the puck at the
hockey game and make a speech over the loud speaker."
The radio announcer had not declared for McCarthy himself.
He was just being helpful. 13
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KnsV,

Hn^ny

called Sandy Silverman to
say Ne„,na„ could

co.,o he outlined a .chodul. t„at «o„ld
.cate „o3t candidate. „uch
leas a novice ca.pal.ne.
lil.0 .cv^n.
Not giving No^^an a chance
to say anything but yes.
Sandy
Silverman got Dick Goodwin to
>„lte a brief speech for Newman
to read over
the hockey rink's speaker and.
incidentally, the radio station
covering the
hockey game. Newman prepared for
the visit with Goodwin's "script"
while
flying to Berlin.

Well, Paul Ne^^an came up to
Berlin and visited a shopping
center, went to the hockey game,
spoke on the radio, reaching about everybody, and creating
a great deal of e:^citement in the city.
Everybody loved him. He spoke very
well and people all kind of looked
around and started
nodding at each other. "McCarthy is
in this thing for real.
He s not one of the
you know, a number of strange candidates enter the New Hampshire primary
and they come through
town one day every four years and
that's all people see of
them.

-

This sort of cre<nted some feeling of
permanence and determination on the part of Senator McCarthy
that he was in
this seriously, he was not playing games,
and that this
city was very important to him.

—

I think his visit, coming at the
time that it did was very
successful and might even have made the difference
in the
campaign. 14

During the evening of March 12th Kaski would report
the unexpected.

Eugene

McCarthy would carry the city of Berlin.
A celebrity of a different sort but of no less importance
was Richard
Goodwin.

At 31 years of age Goodwin abandoned his recently acquired
teaching

position at MIT to join the McCarthy campaign in New Hampshire.
to meet Senator McCarthy in Berlin Friday, February 23rd.

He arrived

Goodwin had become

convinced that Johnson was vulnerable and that since Robert Kennedy would not
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be a cnndldate. the only ,a.e
regaining wa. McCarthy in New
Hampshire.

Coodw
had been a youthful .e.ber of
the Kennedy administration
and was the first of
Kennedy's political operatives to
support McCarthy. A skillful
speech writer
and strategist, Goodwin had
.bitten an article for the New Yorker
under a

non^-d'pW outlining how Johnson might
party.

be replaced as the nominee of
his

The Tet offensive was the final
straw for Goodwin.

An unlooked-for consequence of Tet was
the arrival of Dick
Goodwin.
Speculation at the time suggested that
Goodwin
had been cunningly insinuated into
the operation to oversee Kennedy's (Robert) interests.
He did. of course, but
Ills initial motivation was
uncharacterisically impulsive.

At home in Boston, Goodwin read about
the bombing of the
temples in Hue and decided the situation
demanded more of
him than mere private proddings of Bobby.
So he threw
his typewriter into the back of his car
and motored to
New Hampshire. 1-5

While the Amerlxan

Melo^^

had

Goodwin arriving in Manchester, the

fact was that he first met with McCarthy at
his overnight stop in Franconia,

The next day Gcodwin joined Sy Hersh, McCarthy's
travelling press secretary
in Berlir,, where he said, "Sy. with these two
typewriters we're going to

overthrow the government ."16

Goodwin began vnriting immediately.

He was

dis.urbed that only a small group of the national reporters
had bothered to
follow McCarthy on his northern swing.

He had Hersh place a series of calls

to the major national newspaper and wire service editors

not covering the campaign.

chiding

them for

Goodwin told Hersh to announce that McCarthy

would be making a major policy statement the next afternoon in Manchester
and thai if thoy did not wish to be scooped by their competition they better
get someone up to New Hampshire to cover the event quickly.
sat down to write the statement.

Goodwin then
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McCarthy.. Invitational
reception in Berlin drew a
large and enthusiastic crowd hut the next
afternoon many times the number
of invitations drew a
.uch smaller crowd to the Alpi.e
Club in Manchester.
Not a candidate who
used a pre-prepared text. McCarthy
departed from his norm and read
Goodwin's
speech.
copies of the speech had been
prepared for release once McCarthy
began speaUing,
For the first time in the
campaign a McCarthy address
received
lengthy coverage in the major
newspapers across the nation.
It was Goodwin's
speech, read by McCarthy to a crowd
that was approximately one half
reporters.
In 1963, we were told that we
were winning the war.
In
19o4 we were told we were winning
the war.
In 1964 we
weratold the corner was being turned.
In 1965, we ^ere
told the enemy ..as being brought
to its knees.
In 1966,
in 1.6/, and now again in
1968, we hear the same hollow
cairns of programs and victory.
For the fact is that the
enemy is bolder than ever, while we
must steadily enlarge our own comrJ.tment.
The Democratic Party in 1964
promised no wider war." Yet the war
is getting wider
every month.
Only a few months ago
were told that
sixty-five percent of the population was
secure.
Now
we know that even the /auerican Embassy
is not secure. 17

Goodwin brought more than a talented typewriter
to the campaign.

He

brought the experience of one who had been involved
in a successful national

candidacy and one

viho

understood the dynamics of national politics.

His

perspective bolstered the efforts of the New Hampshire
leaders, none of whom
had had previous national campaign experience.

Goodwin was himself a cele-

brity who had lived and worked at the pinnacle of domestic
politics.
reputation as

tlie

His

"infant terrible" of the State Department in the period

immediately following the Bay of Pigs fiasco gave him both respect and
credibility fimong those concerned about the Vietnam War.

His writing had received

wide circulation since he left the Johnson administration.

Goodwin knew how

to attract the attention of the national press.

if any,

\^i.le few,

of his
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apeeCcs „ere .ubso,ue„cly read by
McCarthy. Goodwin was U.ere
the,

reporters' reaction, to McCarthy's
own spcakin, stylo.

to hel, shape

Coodwin became an

Important, advisor in the crucial
rrur^a^ last
i ^r-^
a
days
otr the campaign who helped
the New
,

Hampshire managers to avoid mistakes,
to capitalize on the errors
of the
Johnson organization, and to build
on the momentum that was growing.

477

Notes

McCarthy manacers doclda^ not to
they had even bfe.i thinHnp

^1

.

DavL uoeh the';-?^^^^^? ef
palgn paid for the Dri.n-ln,.
the^HcCarthy calpaigr.!

file !opy!"'"'

copy

,^

p

""'''^

h

/

S

th "c\?ds" artwork, and
T'i
plntea.
The cam
n„7 ''"f^J''"=>
"^"^"^ '"^ Pl^Os"^ "rd Issue for

'""P^'Sn, Canvassing Suggestions Mea,orandu.,
David

^McCarthy Campaign, "Information for
Volunteers."

4m„
McCarthy Campaign, "Instructions:
file copy.

^Stavis,

backfired, the
<'<="i<='l "-at

B.

^^Ibid., p.
''stout, R.,

Op.Cit.

,

,

pp.

C.

Hoeh

David C. Hoeh file

Post-Canvassing." David

C.

Hoeh

7-8.

8.

0£.

^Undervrood, B.

,

Ci^t

.

,

73.

p.

0£.Cit.

,

"McCarthy," p. 66.

^Ibid.

'^The Lebanon Valley News (March 5, 1968).

IWc

Kaski, Oral History Transcript, (Washington, D.C.:
McCarthy
Historical Project, Georgetown University, 1969),
p. 24.

^^Ibid., p. 24-25.
^^Ibid.,

p.

25.

^'^Ibid., p.

26.

^^Chester, Lewis, et.al., Op.Cit.
^^^Ibid,

^'^Ibid.

,

p.

93.

t n A

1'

ABVERTIMNG. M^VIERIALS.

:^£^iMnC

T

i;

R

ffiDIA,

XII
AND CA>a.AIC,N FINANCES

and Campaig n M„f».-<„1-

Mervm Weston

„a„ been given the go ahead
to prepare a .edla program
for
the McCarthy campaign by lUalr
Clark.
Through a .emorandu. that had
been
developed as a result of conversations
with Clark and ,Ioeh. Weston
outlined
a "Media strategy and Plan"
which also carried costs for each
of the Items.
The memorandum read:
I.

MEDIA STRATEGY
We are plann.ing a short but strong
campaign peaking in the final d-^vs
'"'^
before the primary. Radio minutes,
newspapers and outdoo? signs)
will provide continuity, television
and radio ZD's, the crescendo!

The campaign uses radio minutes. TV
minutes, direct mail and large
'^"^^^
awareness
and understanding of Serar^'-^rr^ position
^iJ^M
tor McCarthy's
on Vietnam and present administratL
poUciestelevision and radio ZD's and small space
newspaper ads to provide
maximum noise" during the final days of
the campaign.
In all media placement we are depending
upon continuing news of the
Vieunam war to increase the relevance and
impact of our messages,
in the broadcast media particular attention
will be paid to scheduling announcements in nev/s adjacencies.
T-I.

MEDIA PLAN
1.

Duration:
Four weeks starting Tuesday, February 11 and ending
Monday, March 11 (Tuesday. March 12 for morning
newspapers).

2'

Media Cost:
$59,b52 Media costs have been reduced by 15% where
media are coimnissionable

3.

Media;
^'

Radio ($17,000)
This is the basic medium.
We are planning 175
60 's and
10 'e on each of 2.5 stations during the four weeks.
50
We
will attempt to place announcements adjacent to news broadcosts for maximum impact and concentrate in the 6-9 A.M. and
:

:
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3-6 r.M. time periods for
greatest reach. The schedule will
build to maximum weight during
the final days of he
paign (see flow chart).

IL-

Radio costs assume local rates
(50% of national).
Jf rates
are higher, the per-station
schedule can be reduced in ?^e
six multi-station markets.
B.

News papers

Dailies ($8,661)
We are planning four 1750 line ads
in each of the nine New
Hampshire dailies. This one-a-week
schedule will be staggered for the different newspapers
to minimize reader duplication.
The final ad will be scheduled
for Monday.
March 11 in evening editions and Tuesday,
March 12 (Primary
Day) xn morning editions.
(If copy suggests a larger number of smaller space units, these can
be substituted for
one or two of the 1750 line ads.)
The local "political rate" has been
used for our costing.
In some cases the national rate is
lower, so contracts
will be noted request lov/est available
rate."

Weeklies ($3,646)

During the final week of the campaign one 1750
line ad in
each of New Hampshire's 25 weekly newspapers
will be scheduled
.

C.

Television ($13,525)
Boston television will be used during the final week
to peak
the ciunpaign.

We will schedule 10 prime time ID's; 5 early fringe minutes
and 5 afternoon minutes during the last half of the
final
week.
The schedule will use all three Boston stations but
will be concentrated on WBZ which has the best New Hampshire
coverage.
The prime ID's will be placed preceding high-rated
progrcjms.
The fringe minutes will be purchased following the
early evening news. The afternoon minutes will also be news
adjacencies.
In addition to this spot schedule, two afternoon womenoriented half hour programs are planned. These would feature the Senator discussing his candidacy with groups of
local ladles.
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9^L^Ji

K.

Direct_Mail (414,885)

($2,035)

^9
nom'''^'
(89,000)
and

"'^^
f
Independents

'°

^''^^^^ li^t of Democrats
Because ui.
of husband
auboana

^

(120.000).

and wife duplication th-ic ,t-{ti u
estimated total of
150 nnn
150,000
The first mailing will be
done early in the campaign; the second, in the last
week.l
'

With the proposed Media Strategy
and Plan was attached the
following Flow
Chart which projected each element
across the campaign calendar.
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(;8,S6l)
A. 9 d.-tiliea
1 1.750 lln«
ads
Schcdullr.gi Stngyer Inaettion dates in markets bocau
of overlap.
evening papars and Tuesday the 12tl> in morning papers.
B.

-/i

•

Buying policyi seek news broadcast ad)aoenclea
6-9AM, 3-6PM
::c

-i

2S wankl les
1

Last ad should run on Monday th« 11th in

($},6<16)

1.750 lino ad

TV (513.525)
3 Easf.on stations
1 early luo. :60's
5 afterr.onu
iCO's
10 priiie ID'S
2 diyti.-.f 1/2 hour proyrans

(52, 035)

2iit.'i'i2J:

27 2<-shoat

posters
pirort Mil (514,665)
2 rollings of
150,000
:

Total Cost 559,652

Buying poUcyi .rin-.a 10 's preceding high rat«d programs.
Early
rringa i60'» failsiiina early news,
Afternoon i60's {ollcwlnq

X

20
20
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The ...ai. pl„„ p„p„,,,

^^^^

overall ca.pal,„ «,,,egy
tha. ccul.

^^^^

.ho .eaia options available
In .e„ Ha.p^.l.e.

Plan and Ueseon Associates

Wdlately

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^

„oel,

and Cla.U accepted ehe

began acquiring options for

tl«,e

Reserving tl.e or space fro.
New Hampshire radio
stations or newspapers Is
not dlfflcu.
Kadlo stations reduce
progra. tl„e to Insert advertising
and
newspapers will print n,ore pages.
Pre^lu. placement In so,„e New
Hampshire
newspapers .ust be reserved ahead.
The KancheHer Union Le^^^
sells space
on its front page other
papers do not.

Television schednllng Is less
flexible

Channel 8 £ro„ Poland Springs.
Maine, broadcasting fro. Mt.
Washington, and
Channel 9 broadcasting from
Manchester, were reasonable and
covered a useful
portion of the New Ha.„pshlre market.
Channel 6 from Plattsburg. New York
penetrated western New Hampshire and
was also used for political
advertising
occasionally in New Hampshire, the
Republican candidates, Romney and Nixon,
had booked much of the oetter
television space for the New Hampshire
aimed
stations.
Boston television, while predominant
in the New Hampshire market,
was exceptionally expensive for the
time alone disregarding the high cost
of

preparing effective television advertising.
"final" week use of Boston television.

The original plan called for

In all but the Instance of direct

mailing and billboard advertising, the ffiDlA
PLAN and budget specified tl-e
or space acquisition not preparation
or production of the actual media inserts.

The first item on the plan that opened was
the billboard space.

Weston

Associates was able to acquire most of the billboards
they had advised In the
"nine key" areas of the state.

The billboards were the first media evidence
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thac ehero

„

„eca«„.

,,„,^3„,^^_

^^^^
type, ana colo.. .e.e use.
.o p..pa.e st.tlono.,.
envelopes an. oU,e. p.in.ea
necessities of the campaign.

Mo«

.ajo. campaigns are planned
well before .he beslnnln^
of .he actual
campaign.
Cu.ln, .hat preparation
period an extensive resource
of photographs.
£11. footage, draft advertising cop,,
advertising and materials
layouts are
developed.
This was not the case with
McCarthy In 1968.
The file materials that the
McCarthy senatorial staff maintained
related
entirely to his Minnesota
constituency. His family had
been photographed with
farmers. In meetings and with
appealing backgrounds, but not New
Hampshire
backgrounds.
Much of the material was dated
not having been used since
McCarthy's last senatorial candidacy
in 1964.
When anyone went to prepare
New Hampshire advertising materials
for McCarthy they had to begin
from
scratch.

During the early weeks of the New
Hampshire campaign and right to the
end, McCarthy would have to take
time from his campaign schedules to
record
advertising copy or prepare television
materials.

In addition to the void

in visual material on McCarthy there
was also very little that had been recorded.

His positions on the critical issues
were best described by him in

response to questions, as the part of a
speech, or in casual exchange while
street campaigning.

His verbal skills were not translated easily
into writ-

ing that he could then read for a radio
advertisement.

To' capture vintage

McCarthy it had to be recorded as it happened, not
as it was contrived in a
studio.
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He.U..„,

^^^^

McCarthj durln, „,„ch of
his early campaigning.
iig.
fa

^^^^

^^^^^

m

I„ addition,
-ddltlcn arrangements
were
made to acquire film
^hQ^ had i,
.lim that
4
been taken by the
r,^*-,
Lej.evision network
/ cue televi-lon
crews that
haC .,1.0 loHowea McC.^Hy.
o.aduall, a library ol ne«
£11., recording, and
PhotograpH. ..lu np.
1. .oo. the Ne„ Hampshire
leaders some .l„e to realUe
that: U.e delay In
producing campaign .edla In
New York and Washington
was because the resource file
did not exist.
i

Weston Associates managed
the printing of the
mailing portion of the Media Plan.
February 9th Weston reported
his progress:

r:v^r:harhL-":rd^L:in^-^h^r.-rto-hr^^^^^^^

~
1.

^

^^g

-Of

Mallln^^oprnnTc

Mailing to solicit funds from
colleges
Being printed:

1,500 letters - one page two colors.

1,000 #6 3 A envelopes - one color.
This has a
Business Reply Indicia, which
means each return
will cost you 8c.

Outside envelopes being supplied by
headquarters.
2.

Mailing to Democratic Party members
Being printed:

60,000 letters - two colors first sheet,
one
color second sheet.
60,000 number

9

envelopes

60,000 folders out of New York
3.

Mailing to Independents
Being printed:

80,000 letters, two colors first sheet, one
color second sheet.
80,000 number

9

envelopes

80,000 folders out of New York

A.

Mailing Procedures
The niaiJiiiC's to
third

Mnnr1^oe^«-,T-

xt

i

IJ^lZTlT^alL

Ml

ether ,„aJllngs will go first
class, at 6c each.
Voter brealcdo™ In the
4 third class cities are
as follows:

DEMOCIUTS

Manchester
Nashua
Concord

Portsmouth

INDEPENDENTS

25»500

8,200

8,500

11,100

1,675

5,428

1,164

4,750

36,839

29,478

Concluding his Deraorandum, Merv Weston
advised:
Total number of Democrats and Independents
is 66,317.
We
guesstimate a shrinkage of 25% because of
homes with two
adults registered in the same party.
We are therefore
printing 49,737 (or 50M) third class
envelopes for th^s
purpose.
The remaining 90M envelopes will be
printed
with a first class indicia.
Both mailings will have to be stuffed
and sealed.
The
letters are being folded by the printer in
a special way
so that the second sheet slips into the
first sheet, so
it will be picked up as a two page letter.
This collating of both sheets must be done by hand, i.e.,
volunteers.
The third class mailings must be addressed
with zip code,
sorted and tied into zip coded packages, with
both address
sides faced out, top and bottom.
On first class mailing, zip codes are not necessary,
but
preferred.
They can go out in bulk, but for expediency,
have them broken down into cities and towns.

Checks have to accompany deliveries to the post office.
The //9 envelops that will be delivered to you are practically free, so don't get mad if they are not perfect.
Some of them will stick together in one spot - simply
break them open. A few may tear. Discard them. We have
supplied an oveyage.-^

•Ihe

envalopo.8 did stick and
without th.
the extra patience and
energy
,

volunteers they would have
delayed
ej-a^ed the mailing.
„nii^

oJ:

the

More than a "few" had
to

be "discarded."

The fund raising letter
„.s to be the New Hampshire
campaign's onl,
erfcrt to ral.e r.nds locally
to support the campaign,
since It vas thought
that McCarthy loyalists
were on the state's campuses
a .ailing soliciting
funds fro. faculty and
administrators .Ight be worth the
cost.
The returns
did exceed the cost of the
.ailing but the exact total
was never calculated.
The .ailing did stl.ulate
other ca.pus organizing and
provided the New
Hampshire con^ittee with names
that .Ight not have co.e fro.
other organlzing efforts.

Materi als for Distribution
Most of the caiBpaign materials
used in New Hampshire were prepared
and
printed either in Washington or New
York.
The first generation of these materials was composed almost entirely
of one sheet flyers developed
from text
and file photos available in
Washington.
The first of these to appear in

New Hampshire hit an important theme of
the 1968 McCarthy campaign, "What's

happened to this country since 1963?"

The blue printed flyer carried a

photograph of Eugene McCarthy with President
John

F.

Kennedy, and read:

John F. Kennedy got this country moving.
Now the fabric
of that great achievement is unravelling.
All around us we can see that the last five
years have
brought decay to replace progress, despair to replace
hope, and failure In war to replace success in
the pursuit of peace.
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taxes.

In 1963, our great cities
were relatively tr-inn,Hi
Now, the streets of our
cities are s'^JL briati;ssness, violence, and desperate
fear.
Now, the Presi!
'^^^
'^^^
continuing"'

.

^iolen^L'^^-^^^'^'

In 1963, the deep concerns
of American young people
were the peace corps and civil
rights.
Now t^ere are
demonstrations and draft protests.
In 1963, we were at peace,
just as we had been at
peace for the eight previous
years under Eisenhower.
Now, we are at war.

Gene McCarthy stood shoulder to
shoulder with Kennedy
in the Senate, and he will stand
head and shoulders
above Johnson as President. There
is one candidate
who can get this country moving again,
and carry on
the traditions John F. Kennedy began.
That man is Gene McCarthy.'^

Shortly after the Kennedy flyer appeared,
the New Hampshire campaign

prepared one of the few flyers generated
entirely in New Hampshire.
carried a copy of the Johnson campaign's
"Pledge Card" and read,

It

"UThat

ever happened to the secret ballot?" and
then a picture of McCarthy with
the message, "You don't have to sign anything
to vote for Senator Eugene

McCarthy on March 12, let Johnson know it.

McCarthy for President."

A

duplicate of this flyer was prepared in Washington for
New Hampshire except
that it used black ink in reverse and

i^as

printed on both sides.

Both the

"Kennedy" flyer and the "pledge card" flyer were used throughout
the cam-

paign and v^ere included in the packet of materials delivered
by canvassers.
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Wit. a ro.n,al p).ot:o,raph
of McCarthy whlcU .ead,
..HcCa.U.y for Preside...
i.
l.^.rse type .ith the
,.ote. '.This can a^ain he
an America of Confidence,'
helow
and adjacent to the
photograph.
On the back side under
the heading .'The
Spirit of America." excerpts
of a McCarthy speech
read:
John Kennedy set free the
spirit of An^erica.
The honest
optiinisn, was released.
Quiet courage and civility
be!
ca.e the n,ark of American
govern..ent, and new pJo 'rams
of pronuse and of dedication
were presented: ?Je Peace
just the proMse, but
f^^i^^^^
tht ier^
the
beginning of the achievei>,ent of
that promise.
•

All the world looked to the
United States with new hope
confidence and an openness to th^
futur:"
^'^'^S held by the dead
hmTof --IT
''T''''^
frightened by the violent hand of
the future
^he
fuL;^ which was grasping at the
world.

r T
'

This was the spirit of 1963.

What is the spirit of 1967? mat
is the mood of America
and of the vjorld toward America today?

—

It is a joyless spirit
anxiety, of uncertainty.

a mood of frustration, of

In place of the enthusiasm of the
Peace Corps among the
young people of America, we have protests
and demonscra-

tions.

In place of the enthusiasm of the Alliance
for Progress
we have distrust and disappointment.

Instead of the language of promise and of hope,
we have
in politics today a new vocabulary in which
the critical
word is war; war on poverty, war on ignorance,
xcar on
crime, war on pollution.
None of these problems can be
solved by war but only by persistent, dedicated,
and
thoughtful attention.

The message from the Administration today is a message
of apprehension, a message of fear, yes
even a message of fear of fear.

—
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This is not tho roal c^n-Jvita
^
Aiucrica.
1 do not believe
that it is.
This
ihis is a Lime ^
to tect the mood and
spirit:

? f

To offer iu place of doubt
In place of expediency

nitres"

-

—

trust.

right of judgment.

'"'""'^

neighborhoods and conunu-

In place of incredibility

-

Integrity.

'''''

^^^^ ^^^^^^
^^Sond^'°^^
spond to the trumpet and the
steady drum. 5

agam"

re-

The flyers were designed to
give McCarthy identity, tie him
to the lost
spirit of the Kennedy era, and to
introduce McCarthy to a public
that did not

know him.

To aid in this process of
introduction and legitimacy, the

Washington headquarters prepared a
weekly flyer called. "Newsbriefs from
McCarthy for President." The publication
was composed entirely of clippings
pasted and reproduced from the original
newspaper type. A batch of "Newsbriefs" would arrive at the end of each
week in time to be used as the wrapper for the packet of canvassing materials
to be distributed that weekend.

With the exception of the "Pledge Card"
flyer almost all of the first
Pha£.e

text.

printing carried few photographs or illustrations
and a great deal of
The thinking behind such material was that
the campaign literature

should provide the recipient with sufficient
information about McCarthy for
the person to make an evaluation.

The extensive text, especially in the

"Newsbrief" would substitute for McCarthy's early difficulty
in getting

print or electronic media coverage.

The flyers served as a digest of McCarthy'

positions, and a glimpse of his character.

During the early weeks of the

campaign the objective of the printed materials was to stir interest
among

The second generation of
printed materials
mafPr^ni. kbecame more
specific to New
H»psM.e a.a .o U.e i...e= on .He
.i„.3 of
spe«„. of vo.o.s en,.Me
to vote „..eh a^th.
were af.ed at pa«.e.la.
oonsUt.encies a„on, the
Democratic Party vot^r-nf iNiew
v«,, u
vuL^ro oi
Hampshire.
uxi.t,.
TItp
f^•rot- of
ine iirst
these was one ad~
dressed to New Hampshire union
members.
The photograph on the face
showed
McCarthy shalcing the hand of
a worker arriving at
his factory in the darkness of a New Hampshire
winter morning. On the reverse
under the heading.
"Sure, George Meany tells you
to vote for LBJ
but:" the flyer compared
McCarthy's voting record on issues
of concern to organized
labor as opposed
to Lyndon Johnson's record
on the same issues.
Following the sugary of
the issues and voting records
was a quotation under the heading,
"For twenty
years Gene has been an inflinching
defender of the rights of labor!"
i.

'-J'

-

In 1908 the AFL conference
headed by Samuel Gompers
declared:
"We now call upon the workers of
our Lmmon
country to stand faithfully by our
friends, oppose and
defeat our enemies whether they be
candidates for
president, for congress or other office,
whether executive, legislative or judicial."

What was true 60 years ago is still
true today.

Another flyer of the same generation
titled "Shrinking Dollar - Growing
War" showed a 1964 dollar at full size
with a toy-sized battle dressed soldier in contrast.

The next panel showed a 1966 dollar
crumpled and smaller

with a photograph of the soldier growing in
size.

The third panel labelled,

1968, showed a miniature dollar and head of the same
soldier now filling

more than half the panel.

The text on the reverse, titled, "The Bigger the
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BoU,.V

Vou.

co„..a..ad the economic
situation

«,e .ni.ed
period 1961-1965 vith the
impact of the war ,n the
year.
Gince 1965.
From "unprecedented
ULCQ prosperity
prosDPr^^v•• the war had
produced "inflation"
of "10%," shrinking Social
Security
j-i-y benefitq
Denerits, an gold
oni^ drain,
.
trade deficit.
Which had already set off
uncertainty in the dollar not
seen since the "Great
Depression." The flyer concluded,
.'Vote March 12th
McCarthy for President.
Most of the flyers produced
in Washington during this
period were ai.ed
for use in the New Hampshire
primary.
One flyer was produced that
could be
used in other states as well.
With a photo of McCarthy backed
by people
shown waving a McCarthy for
President poster on a stick, the
text read,

States dnrlng

t.,e

t,

.

i

-

••McCarthy for President

-

'Let Us Begin

Anew....-

On the reverse, McCarthy

was shown photographed in his
Senatorial office with bookshelves
behind him,
looking toward a window.
The draperies woven with a
presidential-looking
eagle, softened the light cast across
his face and three piece suit.

The

text, "McCarthy is the Man...,"
summarized McCarthy's career under the head-

ings, "Courage and Integrity, Leadership
and Achievement, and Time to Act."

The latter read;

America in 1968 is a deeply troubled nation.
hope, new leadership. And we need it now.

We need new

Eugene McCarthy and the Democratic Party can provide
that
leadership. .in the spirit of Adlai Stevenson and
John F.
Kennedy. Let us begin anew.
.

Help stop the War in Vietnam.'

.

We reject the notion that the people's choice Vv-ill be
turned down by the Democratic National Convention.

Eugene McCarthy for President.^
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- W...... ........
buted reprinted

.p....

.....

^^^^^

froiB the

February bth
6th issue of tLook
v magazine
>
was by McCarthy
titled, "UTiy I'm Battlinc
tla-ng LBJ.
LET
tv,
There was a reprint from
the Catholic
church's weekly publication,
Our Sunday Visitor,
titled "Th.
^
±±y-L.^ txcxed,
The many lives of
Abigail McCarthy." vhlch
whlcli also
»^cr^ contained
r^r.
y.
a photograph of the
McCarthy'., three
Oldest cMlaren.
.„ ,a p.,. .,„eo,raphe. puhXicat.on
prepare, fro. speech
excerpts and biographical
material was assembled for
New Hampshire titled
"McCarthy for President
His Record and His Message
for America."
Following McCarthy's second
campaign tour of New Hampshire
beginning
February 6th enough photographs
of McCarthy campaigning
in New Hampshire had
been taken to produce a
campaign flyer. The first of
these was titled.
"McCarthy Speaks to New Hampshire,"
and used a tabloid format.
A series of
high quality photographs,
printed on offset paper rather
than newsprint,
gave the flyer an attractiveness
not typically seen In political
printing.
Beside or beneath each photograph
was a text paragraph on the
issue represent ed by the photo.
The photos were large, of New
Hampshire people and
places, and showed McCarthy as a
candidate in New Hampshire. The
printing
ca^e as the result of New Hampshire
leaders' complaints that most of the

-

material prepared for New Hampshire
either had too much text or too few
photographs, or were not specific to
McCarthy as a candidate in New Hampshire.

For several weeks afterward, the
"McCarthy Speaks to New Hampshire"

piece would be the wrapper for the
packet of materials used by the canvassers.
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c„nv...i„, .l.eo,raphed

a.or prepared

U,e tl... e.nv.se

Keen.. .
^^^^^^^^^

.hei.
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ec„.„,.i,3.
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Ka„, of U..o contained

,uoLuo„s fro. McCe„„, an.
ether nocaues concerning
current issues or problems
.hat the local co..lttees relt were of special
interest to their area.
Occasicnall, an i.sue
vould develop locall, «>at
would not he responded to
with existing material.
In these cases the local
eoo^ittee would find an
appropriate response and
print the answer. The federated
nature of the campaign
continued to the end.
usually the response would be
cleared through the Concord
headquarters before
being printed to be sure that
It was consistent with
what was happening
the campaign elsewhere.

m

The only .ajor publication and
.ailing effort outside those
authorized
and paid for by the McCarthy
campaign ca.e fro. the national
organization of
Clergy and Layxnen Concerned about
Vietnam.
Their six page, tabloid sized
mailer was sent to 200.000 New
Hampshire homes March 1st. The mailing
was
announced by press release, in Washington
which asked, "Who's right on Vietnam?" with the answer, "McCarthy is."
Intended as a non-partisan, voter

education mailer, when Governor Romney
was still a candidate, the organizers
of the mailing now aimed it, by
press release, at Democrats, Independents

and Republicans urging them to vote for
or to write-in McCarthy as the only

candidate opposed to U.S. policy in Vietnam.

An expensive effort that may

have aided McCarthy ultimately, it scarcely
stirred the political air during
the time that it was arriving.
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The final generation
of printed materials
aueriais J:or
for M,.
the campaign evolved
Jn
response to what was fplt
to bo
th. successes
o
be the
and questions produced
by the
campaign.
The final mailing wao
was
a
t^b^n^^
.
tabloid sized, newsprint,
8
two color
flyer.
It would be sent to
those names on the
thn labels
l.K i
prepared by the volunteers and blanket mailed
in th^
the larger communities
that showed a strong
trend for McCarthy as the
resuH- of the canvassing.
result
The front had a photograph Of senator McCarthy
in a factory surrounded
by workers, one with his
finger blurred in motion
as he emphasised his
point.
The title read
enator McCarthy Answers the
Three Questions Most
Tre.uently Asked by New Hampshire Voters." Thp ^
^.
hadj come from the canvassing
questions
and from Al
Shepard's motivational research.
Opening the flyer the reader
found the
three questions with an
appropriate matching photograph
to the left and the
answers to the right. Question
1:
"why are you running for
President(Photograph: McCarthy with
President John F. Kennedy)
The answer:
•

i

.

hope to restore the principles
and the sense of hope
^-ty during the Admin^^Lation of
of John
Johr F. Kennedy.
In 1963, the country was
booming; our cities were tranquil;
we were at peace,
and we felt that our problems
were being solved. America
was respected and admired around
the wo^ld.
Today our
cities are filled with misery and
lawlessness.
Our
""""^
ereat
problems
at
arhomf
home '%r"'^'
the need for better schools
and parks, for
decent housing and clean air
are not being solved.
We must concentrate our energies
on the huge, unsolved
problems Ox American society.
In this way we can, perhaps restore the sense of idealism
and high purpose
which we knew under John F. Kennedy.
The issue is not
merely Vietnam or riots.
If you share my feeling that
there is something wrong with the
direction of American
society today, then I ask your support.
We cannot chart
a new direction until we also
have new leadership.
I

f

-

"

The second question,
"Uo you
vou think
rliint It Is
<
possible to .chicvo peace
with honor
Vletna. „Uhont e.c.lflcln,
the Interests c£ the
co.ntr,,.. had ne.t to
It
a .hotosraph of McCatth.
seated
a Ke„ Hampshire
Xlvln, roo. dlscussln.
his
concerns with a group of
women.
The answer:

m

flve'ye:;s'"

M?er"n%f°''°"

^"^^

"""^^^

°'

l«st

-Lucreased the size of the
war.
Jc, iuir
fact Is
tact
that we are now involved
in an Pnriiooc.

-re"?.>:ro-j,t
Tf

^-

LricaT.:

It

,

in!

:-tLa-j
^""-t-j-t-j-xuxa

The
•

-\¥if =r

or at the conference fnKlc^

r-hou.andrLrf''"

tr

clear to me, therefore, that
we need a change.
withdrawal and defeat. Kos^
settlement at the conference
table "?hft
table.
That is what I want, and
what I will try to achieve
if I am elected.
I think we should
make some ci.xull.
effort Jo
lo
achieve that peace
Thnc ^ ;
necessary to take advantage
of one
ot
ono nf
t-L
of the many opportunities
to begin negotiations
opportunities which have been pointed
out by'mlnrwo'd
leaders such as Pope Paul and
Americans suc^ as Senator
George Axken.
It is necessary to devise a
workable political compromise which will allow
all the people of South
Vietnam to share in choosing their
governinent.
No one
can guarantee that new approaches
will work. However, we
do know the old ones have failed.
As vou
to the pojls
ask zour^lf if
think we are doi^-Vsklllf uTTnd-ifT'
fectxve job in Vietnam
seer>.s

Zl^

r\'"

-}

~

^

^

.

The final question, "Why do you oppose
the President's proposal to increase

taxes by ten percent?" had next to it
a photograph of McCarthy, talking
with
a jovial policeman, with the
background of Newport, New Hampshire's Main

Street.

The answer completed the summary of McCarthy's
New Hampshire cam-

paign and led to the back page and a reprint of
a marked primary ballot.

McCarthy responded to the question:
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"-'^^
-^ly take badly
millions of Americans, but
will hurt
rather t!
f^-'
than help
the economy.
The purpose of a tax
'""^
'^'^
economy'which if growing
iTolli:
too
fast.
Our economy is growing
more slowly anl
^^"^ers of I recession.
InaZlllTn
^'^"^s-the-board increase
as the
Prn^ff i had proposed
President
would hit lower income famiIt
to me that housewLes
ItTnT/'
''^T^yand older people
have . difficult enough time
kelpL
'^'-^
'^-Id
'
adV too'thelrb'
add
their burden
r^'^^
by r^'^'
imposing taxes which are likely
to become a drag on the entire
economy and thus diminish the total wealth of the
nation.

LeScd

•

t^™-

—

-

-

In addition to the ballot that
ended the flyer there was a message

addressed specifically to Independents.

It was a reminder that they too

had a stake in the outcome of
the New Hampshire presidential
primary.

"Independents.

Vote for McCarthy or You May Have
No Choice in November."

Independence means freedom of choice.
Yet New Hampshire Independents may lose their
freedom of choice
in November if they fail to vote
March 12th. There
is only one candidate in either
party who promises
to restore the spirit of John F.
Kennedy, and get
America moving again. There is only one
candidate
who promises to bring an honorable
peace.
That
candidate is Eugene McCarthy.
If you believe there
is a need to change the direction of
the nation and
its leadership, vote McCarthy, March
12th.
Be sure to ask for the DEMOCRATIC BAI.L0T.9

The last major printed piece of the campaign
proved to be controversial

within the campaign itself.

Besides direct mall, another way to reach the

dispersed voters of New Hampshire was to insert campaign
material with the
regular editions of the newspapers.

A special supplement was prepared by a

group of volunteer writers, editors and photographers based in
New York.
It was arranged for the supplement to be inserted in the March
3rd edition
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or the

N^i.,^

^^^^^

^^^^^^^

N-s.

The insert orders fro. Weston
Associates, dated February 26th,
said the
bundles of supplements would
arrive the day before the edition
that vould carry
the insert.

.T,ile this media device had
not been mentioned in the
original

plan for the campaign the Insert
cost of ?8,896.96 was made
possible when the
budget for media was substantially
expanded during the last weeks of
the campaign.
To produce such an Insert meant
a considerable lead time to
assemble
photographs, texts, prepare the layout,
and publish enough copies for the
distribution.
To meet mailing requirements the
inserts for each newspaper had
to carry the name of .the newspaper
on the supplement which meant at least

twelve title changes during the press
run.

After the problem which Hoeh and McCarthy
had experienced with the flyer
that used the photograph of the Pope, McCarthy
insisted that all copy and

materials used in the campaign should be cleared
through his Senatorial Office.
Because of the necessities of the campaign a
number of items used in New Hampshire were not specifically cleared through the
Washington office but were re-

viewed carefully by Hoeh. Studds, and/or Cans before
printing and distribution.
The supplement was prepared and printed in New York.

through Washington but the photographs were not.

The text was changed

A number of photos used were

from McCarthy office files which had been used in his earlier
campaigns or
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earlier in the New Hampshire
camnidcvn
P
campaign.
heen selected fo. the cover.

ti,«
The
exception was the photograph
that

Xt showed Senator McCarthy
reaching across

a work table in a New
Hampshire factory to shaUe the
hand of a plump, older

worker.

between
and a

It was a sensitive and
friendly event capturing the
moment of contact

person who had obviously spent
most of her life working in
a factory
presidential candidate who cared
enough to come and visit her in
her
a

Place of work.

U^en the first copies of the
supplement were received from
the printer one was sent to
McCarthy's Senatorial office. There
Mrs. McCarthy
saw it and reacted negatively to
the cover photograph.
To her the outstretched, bare-to-the-shoulder, heavy
arm of the older woman worker
was unattractive.
She felt that such an unflattering
photo might hurt her husband's
eandldacy.
This reaction filtered quickly back
to Curt Cans in New Hampshire,
with a specific instruction that the
insert was not to be used.
Cans was
about to call the newspapers that had
instructions concerning the supplement

telling them to cancel the order when Hoeh
arrived.
the supplement and said that it was
excellent.
••was a

picture of the real Miss New Hampshire

working in the state's mills."
calls.

ment.

Hoeh took one look at

The front photo, he said,

~

the one who spends her life

He told Cans not to place the cancellation

Such a call, he said, this late in the campaign
would be an embarrass-

Certainly greater than any problems that the supplement
might cause as

it now stood.

Cans responded that ha was in charge of these activities
and

that he had been instructed by McCarthy's Senatorial office
to keep the sup-

plement from circulating.

Hoeh said he would call McCarthy immediately to give

the Senator his thoughts on the matter directly.

McCarthy was not in his of-
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flee when Hoeh placed his
call

„o.h did leave

a

detailed .essa.e for

McCarthy.

A short tl.e later Hoeh
received a return call fro.
McCarthy's
ataff saying that the Senator
okayed the supplement distribution.
The pi ece
circulated as scheduled. Many felt
that the supplement was among
th. most
effective items used in the campaign.
For election day itself, a

3

by

7

handout card was printed.

On it was
the campaign photo of McCarthy,
advice to Independents about asking
for the

Democratic ballot, and on the back the
segment of the primary ballot showing
Eugene J. McCarthy's name and the
phrase, "Vote for all McCarthy
Delegates
and all McCarthy Alternates." This
card was used in the cities where
tradition held that something should be
handed to the voter as he or she was
entering the polls.

Most were distributed in Manchester.

Newspaper Advertising
To begin building momentum for the campaign
the newspaper advertising

schedule and budget proposed by Weston Associates
was implemented.

The

changes were in the size and the number of the ads
which increased as the

campaign

eiided and the

budget expanded.

Working with Weston's modest initial budget, the first
newspaper ads

began appearing February 20th with a large.

column by 11 inch, ad.

6

The

ad reproduced the Johnson campaign's "pledge card" with
text advising that

the voters didn't have to sign anything to vote for Senator
McCarthy.

large ad was followed on alternate days by a
tion ad which read, "Don't Sign Anything!

2

column by

3

The

inch identifica-

Vote Eugene McCarthy for President,
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The next wee... .e.ies
began with an ad of the
large si.e followed by
the
alternate day sequence of the
small identification ad.
"what had happened to
America in the years since John
P. Kennedy's presidency,"
theme of the large
ad was amplified by the
small ad which read. "Let's
get America moving again!
McCarthy for President." In the
final days before the election
the ad si.
Lze
and sequence increased, but
the identification ads remained
to re-enforce
the theme of the larger ads.
One of the n^ost effective of
the smaller ad.
caae from a slogan developed by a
New York agency, "New Hampshire
can bri,
America back to its senses. McCarthy
for President." One ad reflected
on
the challenge McCarthy had been
given early in his campaign when he
had been
told not to come to New Hampshire
because the state was felt to be too

"Hawkish."

Another dealt with the reasons why he
did come to New Hampshire

and the importance of the New Hampshire
primary.

At the same time the

Johnson campaign responded by repeating
an ad which had

a line

drawing of

Johnson, the slogan, "A Strong Man in a Tough
Job," and the text, "to vote
for President Johnson you must WRITE-IN
his name on your ballot."

The March 6th McCarthy ad read, "This time
let's elect a President we
can believe.

McCarthy for President," with the quotation:

And as far as I'm concerned, I want to be very cautious
and careful and use it only as a last resort when
I start
dropping bombs around that are likely to involve American
boys in a war in Asia with 700 million Chinese. .so,
just
for the moment, I have not thought that we were ready,
our Aicerican boys, to do the fighting for Asian boys.
And what I've been trying to do with the situation that
I found was to get the boys in VietniiDi to do
their own
fighting with our advice and our equipment, and that's
the course we're following.
So, we're not going North
and drop bowbs at this stage of the game...."
.

Lyndon Johnson
September 28, 1964

Campaign Speech in Manchester, N.H.
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appeared March 8th had a
photograph of th. He„ ...apahire
State house with the
.:.Ule. •!„ the next
seventy-two hours .ore .oney
will be spent in Vietna.
than the state of New Hampshire
spenife
iiuauo-i
all year
I
year. • Th»
.
ihe explanatory
text read;
to eliminate
poveity in America,
PovcJti'Jn
f'^f ' but also to buildmoney
all the roads
iOdQS,
schools, COIIgJ^O'7 hnc-n-I^n^.,
hospitals, andj houses we need.
And
c.^^^
u
wp'H
we d still have enough left
over to invest in underdeveloped countries so we don't
have more VietnaL in
^^^'^^^y^^
for a tax-cut after that.
?n
In 195., r":'
General Eisenhower promised
peace with honor
in Korea.
lie was elected, and
he delivered.
Senator
McCarthy can do the same. An
honorable man can brLg
an honorable peace.
'

^

Then a photograph of McCarthy and
the line, "McCarthy for President."
completed the ad.^^
In the same edition of the Concord
Monitor

,

there appeared the first ad-

vertisement from several special groups
that had raised their o.^ advertising
money to make appeals for McCarthy. The
ad was addressed to "Republicans"
and was placed by the Republicans for
McCarthy Com:.ittee, in newspapers where

an independent Republican vote was
thought to exist.
and Laconia were

tl)e

Concord, Keene, Lebanon

cities selected for the ad which showed the
segment of

the Republican presidential primary ballot
that listed the candidate names,

nine names in total, and showed, written in on
the ballot, "Senator McCarthy."

The text read, "Republicans

—

You can vote for Senator McCarthy.

his name on your Republican ballot.

Write in

"H

The advertising that appeared during the last three press days
of the

New Hampshire campaign used three formats for what were seen
as different
political markets.

The Monday, March 11th ad for McCarthy in the Concord

.Monitor, a market with a large Independent voter population, had
a photo of
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the SUatue of Liberty.

The text challenged
Independents to vote In the
prlmary or lose their freedom
of ehoiee in the November
eleetlon.l2
The Hareh 11th edition of
the >Whester Union Leader
carried ten separate advertisements for McCarthy
and a reminder that McCarthy
would be speaUin.
that evening.
On page 2. the New Hampshire
McCarthy Con^ittee had placed
its
ad offering transportation
and babysitting service for
McCarthy voters. Al.
Lso
on the page was an ad placed
by a private citizen who
signed his ad, "A concerned non-New Hampshire Democrat,
W. Hirsch, 9601 Wilshire
Blvd., Beverly
Hills, California."
It read;

An Open Letter to New Hampshire
Democrats
The presence of Senator Eugene
McCarthy on the primary
ballot provides an opportunity for
New Hampshire Deioocrats to directly register their
concern or approval
of the State of the Union.

Perhaps when the history of the 1968
campaign is written
it x^ill record that only the New
Hampshire and Wisconsin
Democrats had a clearcut possibility to
affirm their
position as to the main issues.
At this point in the campaign what is
being decided is
not a contest between two candidates but
an answer to
the question:
"Has this administration handled the problems of Vietnam, civil rights, balance of
pa^Tnent, crime,
foreign aid, draft, etc., to your satisfaction?"

^

Do
have confidence in the administration's
progress
reports and predictions of future success in solving
today's problems?
IF YOU ARIZ NOT SATISFIED, YOUR ONLY CHANCE TO
BE HEARD
IS BY A VOTE FOR SEI^iATOR EUGENE MCCARTHY.

The American dream was born In New England and Tuesday
the future of that dream will once more be at stake.
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•

The eyes of all thinking Americans
who do not have the
privilege of voting in this election will
be on the outcorae.
If the New Hampshire Democrats
within the confines of their polling booths show their
historic courage
and by their action say that things are
not right then
perhaps the start of a meaningful change
in direction
will have been effected through a traditional
electoral
process.-'--'

On page three of the same edition, an ad
appeared as the statement of

forty-four, "New Hampshire Artists, Writers,
Musicians and Craftsmen," sup-

porting Senator McCarthy for President.

Their message:

Because we believe...

That he is a man of integrity, courage and reason.
That he is a man who offers an honorable and feasible
solution to America's third war.
That he is a man who understands the issues we face.
That he is dedicated to redirecting our energies topressing domestic problems.

V7ard

That he is putting his political future on the line
for the sake of his beliefs.
We support Senator Eugene J. McCarthy for President....

A formal waist-up photograph of McCarthy looking directly from the advertisement was included.-'-^
On the same page

v/as

another privately sponsored advertisement which

filled the other part of the lower portion of the page.

It read:

An Open Letter to All Fellow Democrats:
Our country is in deep crisis, as well as in Vietnam.
Our vote this Tuesday is too serious to be decided by
partisan politics as usual.

WE IIRGK ALL FELLOW DEMOCRATS TO VOTE FOR THE CANDIDATE
OF YOUR Cmi choice! Disregard any numbered pledge
cards, with their "arm tv;isting" copies to V/ashington,
as an invasion of privacy of your secret ballot; reject
any unfair, last minute attacks against a genuine Democrat and distinguished American, Senator McCarthy.
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dLl

you. vote count for
thec cancide

\ ^.

AMERICWS, to meet theL-^.,
MOffll ALL
these real needs of
our count?^:

war.

™
IS^Slr'srSi
«-'^<-'iJ-iining
a^tl^"^-

—

^
iff^
m desperatio

"'^-i"" Hore increases
in

To ensure an open
Democrat ic Convention

(Signed)

^W^l^.s

n.

.

Joe Myers, Chairman,

Manchester Democratic City
Committee, 1956-1965
G.

Allen Foster, Chairman,

Plymouth Democratic To™
Committee, Exec. SectY
Democratic State Committee of
New Hampshlrer^WlS
This advertisement grew out
of the work that Al Shepard
was doing in his
effort to develop support for
McCarthy in the Manchester area,
shepard dis-

covered that the former city
Democratic chairman. Joe Myers,
was deeply
disturbed by the behavior of the
democratic State Co.^ittee in their
support
of President Johnson's
renomlnation.

He took special umbrage to the
use of

the "pledge card" and to the
pre-primary endorsement tactics being
used by
the Democratic State Committee.
Shepard suggested that he develop a
statement that reflected his feelings that
could be run as an advertisement.
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The leaders of the
New Hampshire
nxre "RPk"
ktk in
^n Vq
.
68 Comittee
placed a one
half page ad which
appeared on pace
pare 66 nr
of m
the m
Manchester Union Leader
which
recid, "At the
Request of Kobert
Robert 1.
F v^r.
a
Kennedy, we urge that
you do n_ot .^ite
in the name of Robert- v
K Kenned, on the March 12th
President!.! Primary Ballot
vote .„,ene a. KeCarth,
.or President." xhen
Included In the ad was the
complete list Of delegate
and alternative delegate
candidates ,or the two
1

,

congressional districts.16

..„ss .ro„

the KPK ad. on pa.e
7. was a two

thirds page ad signed hy
Governor John W. King and
Senator To. Mclntyre
which read:
We urge you

SUPPORT OUR FIGHTING MEN
We know the communists in
Vietnam are watching the
'°
home have the
sal
same determination as our
soldiers in Vietnam!

H'^'r

" -

To vote for weakness and
indecision would not be in
the best interest of our
nation.

fighting men in Vietnam.
Writ'^J.T
Write-.xn
President Johnson on your ballot
on Tuesday.

The presidential preference
portion of the ballot was included
with the
printed names blurred and "President
Johnson" written in the space
provided.l7
The same edition of the newspaper
contained several other advertisements

placed by delegate candidates favorable
to the nomination of Lyndon
Johnson
urging the voters to find their names
on the ballot and vote for them.
Page

9

of the same edition carried the
advertisement addressed to the

"Independent Voters" that had been placed
by the McCarthy campaign in the
Conco rd Mo nito r, mentioned before.
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The Maryland CitlzenG
for McCartl>v
McCarthy nin.
placeda an ad that appeared
on pnge 12

for us.

Vote for Sen. Eugene J.
McCarthy. "18

A delegate candidate pledged
to McCarthy fro. the
2nd Congressional District, Ceorge Marrow,
placed a s.all ad soliciting
votes for McCarthy and h^.
self.
The ad appeared on page
14.
Across fro. Marrow's
solicitation, there
appeared an unsigned ad reading:
"is it Unpatriotic to
Oppose U.S. Involvement in Vietnam... The
question was answered "No.'
with quotations fro. General David Shoup, ret., for.er
Con^andant of the Marine Corps;
Brig, Gen.
Robert Hugos, ret.. Aide to
General MacArthur; Lt. Gen.
Ja.es Gavin,
ret

for.er Chief of Ar.y Research,
and a for.er Vietna. Green
Beret, Master Sgt.
Donald Duncan. The ad had been
developed and placed by a group of
anti-war
students and clergy working fro.
Hanover. Concord and Manchester 19
.

To avoid the crowded political
advertising that appeared on the news
pages of the edition, and to take
advantage of the high readership that
the

sports sections receive, a group of
twenty New Ha.pshire college students,
all enrolled in military officer
progra.s placed an effective ad.
Titled,
"Don't Call Ue Draft Dodgers," it read:
The undersigned New Hampshire college
students all receive ^comrai ssions as officers in the
United States Army
this June.
V/e believe in our country.
VJe will all
serve.
Some of us may die.
But we strongly oppose the war in Vietnam.
We think it
is tragic for Vietnam and for the
United States.

America has its own problems to solve. Our
cities face
crisis alter crisis while we use our resources
to conduce a senseless vjar thousands of miles away.
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We are concerned for
America.
We ack New Ilampshir'^ vofPrB

ot.

The most important
advertisement
cment of Mip
i.o^- two
the last
days was the one placed
in the most prominent
position for sale
salp in
-fn the
various New Hampshire daily
newspapers.
The
^^.^
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^
CO sell advertising space
on Its front page, earrled
the ad there In a space
approximating two-fifths of the
page.
A serene, presidential appearing.
Photograph of McCarthy in profile,
arms folded, looking toward
the curtained
window of his senatorial office,
shrouded with the eagle embossed
drapes,
was to the left of the ad with
the title, "Profile of Courage."
The text:

n,,,^

^

P'=°Pl'=
N» HampItlt^'A^T'^T
shire and debate the critical
issues of our time Eucene
McCarthy brings a fresh approach
to securing a skft
and honorable peace in Vietnam.
He has challenged the
national priorities which put Improved
education and
^"
"^"^ l'""™ °f ':he national
a^Ldi'''°f''f
agenda. He has proposed economic
policies designed to
restore the Kennedy boom
a growing economy with stable

"

-

The issue is leadership.
If you are not satisfied with
our present course as a nation
if you want to return
to the principles which got America
moving under President
Kennedy
then, Eugene McCarthy is your only
alternative.
He, and he alone, has come to New
Hampshire to give you a
choice.
That's not only courage.
That's what the democratic process is all about.

-

McCarthy for tri-sident
The high readability and sophistication of
the advertisement captured the
tone of the McCarthy

cai-.ipaign

and the importance of the New Hampshire result.

It solicited from the voter a demonstration of
courage comparable to that which

McCarthy had shown by becoming a candidate.

The courage to support his candl-
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a^cy

to .ea.U .eyon. ...

the current national
state.

^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^

^^^^

The
ihe ad eff=.n
i
effectively
countered the Johnson ad-

vertisement that shared tne
the adiacenr
f^„„f page space.
adjacent front
The Johnson ad was
the format that had heen
used In the
th» main t
brochure, a sketch of Johnson

m

and

the slogan, "A Strong Man
In a Tough Job."

All New Ha,npshire campaigns
use the Informal medium
of the Letter to
the Editor as a way to state
support for a candidate. The
Mscl^PJar Union
Leader has an open letters
policy and prints most of the
letters It receives.
Other New Hampshire newspapers
limit the number of letters
It prints and will
not publish letters that simply
reiterate a candidate's position
or that add
little except simple support for
the candidate.
Since the Union Leader's editors
are less likely to be selective
and the
newspaper will publish extra pages
just for the letters, a contest
begins.
Which candidate will receive the
most favorable letters? McCarthy
attracted
more than his share of the letters.
A number came from outside the state.
For the devotee of the
letters-to-the-edltor-columns the McCarthy supporters
were successful with the numbers In
the Union Leader and with the
quality that

passed by the editors of the newspapers
that limited publication.
Radio Advert:lsin|

>

As advised by Weston Associates in the
MEDIA STRATEGY AND PLAN, radio

would be the "basic medium" of the media
campaign.

Of the $59,652 media cost

budget. Weston had allocated $17,000 to radio
time and production.

A highly

flexible medium and one that was especially suited
to New Hampshire coinmunica-
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tlons habits, rudlo wca
lnpiiDi,n„<„„
ln<.xp.n.lvo. coolly
proB>.a™,od
lead Cl„e.

. ,„e3sa,e

.

and had an almost

cold

he changed „Uh a
telephone call
The avc.a,e price per
spot adverel„»e„t
„aa approximately
.5.00 ,.,hlch.
given the proposed Weston
radio
lo aavertismg
advertl^-i.o k
^
budget,
would pay for 3,^00
spot announcements.
Weston
We„ton ni-.r,,^^^
planned to uoe mostly 30
and 60 second messages
but. occasionally, they
did program 10 second
announcements.
The first radio time
purchased was used to announce
Senator McCarthy's
St. A„sel..s college
speech.
The major radio campaign
hegan hy scheduling
Advertising to coincide with
McCarthy campaign visits to
particular co^unltlcs.
Thirty second ads were placed
during the "adult drive"
(con^tlng)
time and adjacent to ncvs
broadcasts during the conunuting
hours.
While originally the radio
messages were scheduled to begin
February
13th, budget problems and delays
In production of expected
radio tapes from
New York pushed the start beyond
the planned date.
The first placement
orders were written February
15th to begin Wednesday, February
21st.
The
first tape contained two one
minute messages and four thirty
second messages.
These were scheduled to run from
February 21st to February 27th during
"drive times" only. The delay meant
that the Johnson campaign messages
began before the McCarthy ads.
This flight of nine Johnson messages
which were
used intermittently during the campaign
dwelt on the "Strong Man in a Tough
Job" theme.
They used citizen endorsements for the
President Johnson write-

in effort.

Within an hour of the first Johnson messages'
arrival at the

various radio stations Weston Associates
had a complete tape of the ads. 20

Cut 1:

(Johnson ad)

(Announcer)

Listen.'

L

"""^
knows that surrender
he
v^^^
f^'^"'
country down tl" rjver
'^'"^"S '"^ *ole
v'"
'""^"^ °" back and
running is oylTtll lZ't
love to see. And^rJi^ve
L'theTu^H
as we run.
J"=' as far
}
But heU r,H „^
^
Vietnam olT T^'t^^AT^rulV:.

^

m

^^'^

it"Klr""on '1^:
preswt,"'':^ t
job
t„e toushest-j„^

preference p^taaryO

%

""="^"8

:t:f
;;rrd!"Sn\,:?:.i,:,';:f
"^"P^hire presidential

"

'^•'^

j^hnson.'""

Cut 2:

to John Martlne

""^

°£ President

(Johnson ad)

(Announcer)

Listen!

...I know he's right and sometimes
what I see on TV makes
me ashaB^ed.
I see these draft card
burners and peace
marchers
they're nothing but surrender
marchers in my
^'^^^ ^^i-SS I know
'
he s 7iZ""
he's
right.
t'?";.'""
If
there was a better way or even a
faster
way in Vietnam or any other place.

-

.

(Announcer: voice over: You are
listening to Nancy Lorden
of Manchester.
The man she is talking about is
Lyndon
Johnson, President of the United States
a strong man in
a tough job
the toughest job in the world.
On ^farch 12th
you will have an opportunity to endorse
this man by writing
in his name on your ballot in the New
Hampshire presidential preference primary.)

—

-

...and believe me I'm writing in the name of
President
Johnson.
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Cut 3:

(Johnson ad)

(Announcer)

Listen.'

...backbone or all out
determination but whatever it 1.

r:n:er;^oi;rc:i::;cLl:
thc world.

He

---rand^^ir-

5rf

kn^ ^S:t^thr:^o?:

Zr:^^^^'^

to see xf we are going
to turn tail and run
f^J ho^^!.

(Announcer: voim n^rof.
Knightly of SaL")

^""^

-i

.

listening to Willia.

...we've never given up yet
and we shouldn't start now...

(Announcer: voice over:

The man he is talking about
is
'
-?
^-Sh
Job
^
?he
toughe
est
job
iob in
i";T"*
?r^"^On March 12th you
the world.
will have an
opportunity to endorse this man
by writing in h^rname
"^^^'^^^ presidential p
Terence primary.)
lerence

f

^

...what wa say cone hell or high
water and that's why
m writing In the name of President
Johnson.

I

When Hoch came to

being represented.

"Cur. 4"

he heard something that did not
sound as It was

The voice and the

nai..e

used did not match and Hoeh

recognized the voice.
Cut 4:

(Johnson ad)

(Announcer)

Listen!

...I don't think any man has ever worked
harder for his
country and I don't think any man has ever
faced more
difficult times.
I think he's doing a fantastic
job and
I m proud he's standing firm
and refusing to surrender
in Vietnam.
One of these days when the history books
are written I'm sure people will realize
that he, perhaps more than anyone else, knew exactly
what had to be
done to preserve this country...

(Announcer: voice over: You are listening to John
0 Connell of Keene.
The man he is talking about is
Lyndon Johnson, a strong man in a tough job... etc.)
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and that's w
;
Oohnaon.

^„'^.rt'
i'"\^''^',"""
'rlclns
In the name

The voice „as fa.lXl„ to
„oeh and

Wdiatel,

"
"'f
of President
'""''^

-

.eco^nl.ed as beln, that of

Charles McKahon. Senator
Mclntyre's l„-state representative,
not that of
John O'connell. a Keene school
teacher. Hoeh ^ot a volunteer
to call o'Connell

O'Connell stu.nbled a hit, said
he would call haCc later,
and hung up his telephone.
Hoeh. Studds and Cans then
played "cat with a „ouse" for
several days
threatening to relea.e the
mls-representatlon, as the Johnson
campaigners
struggled to cover-up their error.
vmUe not a .ajor flap It did upset the
Johnson campaign plan further
a campaign that was already
reeling fro. the
impact of the "pledge card" gaff.

-

The other five Johnson messages
pursued the same themes as had the
first
four.
Johnson would not "knuckle under to
the peaceniks, dreamers, fuzzy
thinkers, draft card burners, and
communists" but was doing his best in
spite
of the "criticism" and the "terrific
pressure" to accomplish peace in Vietnam.
One praised his "sticking with men like
General Westmoreland and not listening
to those peace-at-any-pricc fuzzy
thinkers..." while another said he's "not

about to pull out and surrender because
he knows as we all should know, that
could never mean peace."

The war, Johnson's leadership of the war,
and the

possible consequences of getting out of Vietnam
were the only themes pursued
in the Johnson messages.

There was no attempt to defend the administration

against charges of domestic neglect or economic
uncertainty that wore the

substance of the broader issue spectrum of the McCarthy
messages.
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The fl.«, ,„hnson messages
.o.e hca.d Tebruary

17t.h

and continued with

incroasin, frequency th.ouch
to March I2th.

The six McCarthy nd..
hurriedly
asscnblod, began February 21st
with the following sequence:
Cut 1:

(30 sec.)

(Announcer)

^;i;atever

happened to the secret ballot?

Do you want to abandon your
right to examine all of the
ifasues between now and
March 12th?

What does Lyndon Johnson have
in the cards for you?

Will the New Hampshire primary
be just a formality?
Senator Eugene McCarthy offers a
choice, not an echo.
There is an alternative
moving again.

-

McCarthy can get America

Vote Senator McCarthy for President.
Cut 2:

(30 sec.)

(Announcer)
Senator Eugene McCarthy has come to New
Hampshire because people are concerned.
Concerned
about higher taxes and rising prices,
concerned about
riots in the cities and the unending land
war in Asia.
Concerned because our national leadership is
unable to
meet these problems.
Concerned because it wasn't like
this five years ago.

Eugene McCarthy is a proven leader in the tradition
of
Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy. He i£
.s a
man v;ho thinks clearly and speaks honestly.

Senator McCarthy can get America moving again.

McCarthy for President.

Cut

3:

(30 t;ec.)

(Announcer)

llTloZ

Let

'

""""^^T-

s

get America moving again.
-o^'- to New Hampshire
as a
'^^'^^^^^^
candidate! Concerned
'

be
because
aus Nc"
New Sr'^'"'
Hampshire people are concerned.

You don't have to sign anything
to vote for McCarthy.

McCart^i'Lf
iiCL-artny
p""L'''^
tor President.
Cut 4:

'°

''^^^

Eugene

(GO sec.)

ihirr:peech!"'^

^^^^''^^^

^^^^^^^

^

"-P"

"... there are a nui::ber of
reasons, of course, for my
coming to New Hampshire.
I want to come here, principally, to talk about the issues
which I think are of
concern to the country...

(Announcer:
This is Senator Eugene McCarthy
speakingb in
-^^^
New Hampshire)

...there is kind of a special challenge
in coming to New
Hampshire, to, really, test oneself
against what's supposed to be the harshest political
judgment in America,
and also to find out whether the people
of New Hampshire
really are V7hat they have been said to
be.
Some of your
Democratic leaders have said that you're all
so well organized and disciplined now that there really
is no
point in my coming in, that the people
of New Hampshire will
vote pretty much as their party leaders tell
them to
vote.
1 doubt that this is true but in any case, this
is one of the matters I hope to test along
the primary
trail.
(Announcer:
formality?

Will the New Hampshire primary be just a

Senator Eugene McCarthy offers a choice not an echo.
There is an alternative
McCarthy for President.)

~

5U
Cut:

5:

(30 sec.)

(Senator McCarthy snp^HnrrN
In what has

ccct

.

becoL

^

Ha

that „a. has

^

7"

or

J^f

!

^W^- nation,

^J^^^^^Jl^l^

-

a^r::t^?i:L'-?h:ti^\^^'"-"endless escalation
has Imposed
f
upon
u^^uu us in
In V-^.^r,
o
Vietnam.
Senator
^Tr^nv^^T<^ will
i
NcLarthy
not turn
away from our responsibJ 1 f-foo
,
avenue to he.in .l^^i^sf
^^"^"^ ^^^^
irn::o^Ltio„^^":r'';e:^^!
-i

-f

There Is an alternative.

-i

McCarthy for President)

Unlike the Johnson advertising,
the MeCarthy messages could
and did contain
material taken fro„ McCarthy -s
speeches or specially recorded
messages fro. the
candidate. To have used Johnson
material directly would have oeant
Johnson's
tacit approval of the write-in
activity. The final McCarthy
cut in the first
flight of radio advertising was
excerpted froo another McCarthy New
Hampshire
speech.
Like other aspects of the media
preparation for McCarthy, the bank of
audio tapes available to create
messages did not exist. Only a few
tapes that
had been made of McCarthy's New
Hampshire speeches were available during
the
weeks when the radio material was
prepared. Until later in the campaign,
when
the travelling staff of the .Senator
expanded to Include a taping crew, did
the

volume of taped material increase to the
point where it could provide useful
audio material. The best McCarthy
material was the spontaneous McCarthy, not
the McCarthy reading a prepared announcement.

The sixth cut used in the first

flight drew on the scanty recordings that
existed early In February 1968.
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Cut

G:

(GO sec.)

cost of that war has
been
^^^"^
tinning...

(Announcer:
to

tl,e

e^rnl

^^^°^r^'
°^

^"'^

voice ovpr-^

^^^'^^^

^

continulnrdrlJn'of II

,f ,-„

no

\rT''
L?!

k

tu^r

peace, "xhere

V

"T"

"'^

'^^'^

—

those costs are con-

™

honorable alternative
materials that endle?^
Senator McCarthy

is^^rternlu::-!

Eventually recordings .ade In New
York did arrive 1„ New Hampshire
and were included
the second flight of radio
ads circulated by Weston
Associates,
this „,aterlal was an assortment
of taped endorsements that had
been prepared
by cooperating celebrities.
This collection became an audio
bank which was used
to assemble attractive radio
messages for McCarthy. Familiar voices
such as
that of Harry Belafonte. Robert
Ryan, Dustln Hoffman. Rod Eerllng,
Paul Ne^an,
Joanne Woodward and others read
messages or made personal endorsements
of McCarthy.

m

m

Weston Associates bought as much radio
spot advertising time as seemed
feasible while Cans, working with the
graduate student volunteer writers and
Weston Associates personnel, turned out
ad copy and recorded cassettes for distribution to the 25 radio stations used In the
campaign.
During the final
week. Rod Serllng spent several days in
New Hampshire recording messages and

introducing endorsements from other celebrities.

Each celebrity to visit New

Hampshire spent at least a few hours recording
messages for the McCarthy radio
campaign.
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The f.equency Increased fro.
35 spou announcements per
station per .eolc
during the period oc February
21st to 27th. to a schedule of
28 sixty second
spots and 70 thirty second spots
to be played between February
28th and 5:00 p...,
March 12th. The frequency per
station per day was ordered as
two 60 second spots
and five 30 second spots per
station.

The messages shipped with the
order .ailed

February 26th "kllJod" the preceeding
tapes and substituted new material.
In
the final throe days a third
flight of messages, to be used up
to the election,
were substituted for those shipped
with the original February 26th order.
The
final advertising was developed over
the last weekend before the election.
The campaign bought more time just
before March 12th to run a single new
message which was: "New Hampshire voters,
Think how good you will feel when you
wake up on Wednesday morning March 13th
and hear that Senator Eugene McCarthy
has won the Wew Hampshire Presidential
Primary.
for President.-

Vote Senator Eugene McCarthy

Like the "Profile in Courage" newspaper
advertisement used

during the last three days, the radio message was
the capstone of the

cair.paign.

The total spent for radio advertising time, as
tabulated from the remaining
invoices, was approximately $23,000.

Another $3,000 to $5,000 was probably

spent on radio message production and distribution.

The radio campaign was in-

tensive and confirmed the emphasis that Weston Associates
had advised in their
plan,

mile

technical skill and familiarity with the medium were more important

in the electronic media work than in other aspects of the campaign,
the effort

succeeded because of the volunteer cooperation it attracted and the creativity
of those involved.
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Tel evls lonj' r

WiCh al„osc no .one,

avaUaMe

r ammln ^

.o

.-adio and

newspaper ca^pai^n.
projected to .e^in d..i„,
Pebruax,. television was
abandoned as a ca.pai,n
-diu.. Weston Associates had
originally budgeted 513.646 ,o.
television to
be used durino the final
week.
The plan was
to:

...schedule 10 prime Mtop rn'o.

~

ite^

-i.r:h?

i

t;

^

i

,

-

^-the-b-t

»::i--u^e-"
coverage.
The pria.e Id's will be placed
precedirg hlrhrated programs.
The fringe minutes will
purchased f ol-

L

dxso De ne\vs adjacencies.
schedule, two afternoon womenoricnto'd'halT.''''
hour programs are planned.
These would featu^t th'
candidacy with groups of
ioc^l J:di"?2r
For each minute of broadcast a
production cost exceeding $1,000 was
expected in
order to make the messages credible.
Without the resources to produce such

programming in New Hampshire nor funds
to underwrite the cost of the
time, much
less the cost of production, nothing
was done to develop a television package.

McCarthy received seme television attention
by arriving and departing through
Boston, was interviewed on Manchester's
low market Channel

distributed local stations elsewhere in New
Hampshire.

9,

and several cable

He did not appear on an

"afternoon women oriented half hour" nor did he
appear on any of the several
Boston-based afternoon "talk" programs that sometimes
invite candidates.

The

yield from such non-prime time progranmiing was
not thought to be sufficient for

McCarthy's New Hampshire effort to be worth the time he
would have had to spend
away from the campaign.
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A "stand by" package oC
television lueseagea to fill
Weston's plan had been
prepared In Washington. Senate.
MeCa.thy video-taped several
messages as well
whleh dwelt on the ^,o. then.es
he had developed through
the New Hampshire campaign.
Toward the end of the campaign
the McCarthy campaign found
Its own financial angel. Pro. having
hardly the resources to buy
radio advertising time,
the campaign found that it
could not only accomplish the
radio program but could
also expand its television effort.
It was. however, too late
to develop sophisticated television material or to
begin any programming before the
final week
of the campaign.

A progran. of 10 second ID's, 60
second announceraents

,

and five-.inute pro-

grams was quickly developed fro.
the "stand by" material, and that
which Senator
McCarthy had video-taped earlier in
February.
Weston Associates was able to buy
time on three Boston television
stations and two New Hampshire stations
for
the shorter announcements.
V^en the option to develop two one-half
hour pro-

grams came, Weston Associates ran into a
problem.
for the two programs on WBZ-TV.

They sought to reserve time

The times they wanted were early evening

first, several days before the election,
and the second, election eve.

-

the

WBZ was

reluctant to sell the time to Weston for the near
prime half hour periods he had
selected.

He had no difficulty reserving the time slots
on New Hampshire stations,

but found that the Boston station did not want to
sacrifice network programming
for a political production of interest to the small
portion of its market,

l^hen

word of this refusal got back to New York, Blair Clark
and Howard Stein, the
angel, contacted the programming executives of the National
Broadcasting System,

told them of their problems, and a few telephone calls later,
the New Hampshire

519

McCarthy campaign had Its prc-elocMon
television time.
aired on ,«.,-TV betv.-cen 7:30 and
8:00
on Channel 8.

p.,..

The pro.ra™ v-ould bo

March 11th and between 8:00 and 8:30
p...

WOT-TV broadcasting from Poland Springs,
Maine, via

Mt. Washington.

New Hamprihire.
The first of the two one-half hour
programs was produced in a Boston studio,
with Senator McCarthy discussing his
campaign with a group of the volunteers
who
had worked in his New Hampshire campaign.
The objective of the program was to

capture visually some of the wide interest
that had been generated by the students who had worked in New Ha-^pshire and
to use their enthusiasm as a foil for

McCarthy's own sincerity and concern.

The program was an engaging dialogue

that ranged across the major issues of the campaign
and closed with McCarthy

turning toward the camera with a closing statement.
The second program was taped in Boston on the morning
of March 11th, the day
It was to be shoim.

Jack Parr, the recently retired "Tonight Show" host, had

been quietly managing the television station he oxmed in Maine
when his daughter.
Randy, a student at Radcliffe, became Involved in the New
Hampshire campaign.

She had become one of the weekend volunteers and a regular among the
anonymous

workers In the backroom and basejuent of the Concord headquarters.

Her accounts

of the campaign and concern about the U.S. Vietnam policy had motivated her father to breech his retirement to help McCarthy.

Dick Goodwin conceived of the

idea of using something like Jack Parr's old "Tonight Show" Interview format as
the setting for the election eve program.

Parr agreed to be the host and the

McCarthy campaign had an entertainment event as well as a campaign concluding
political program.

Parr had been seen only occasionally on television during
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the .evc.al yoa.s since

retirement.

His willincness to serve as
the inter-

viewing host for the McCarthy
telecast .eant that the show
would attract the
curious who had not seen Parr
for several years.
A somewhat rusty Jack Parr
attempted an interview of Senator
McCarthy .uch
as he had done each late
evening for al.ost a decade.
Senator McCarthy, .ore
relaxed than Parr, responded to the
questions Parr offered, questions
that
Goodwin had developed fro. Al Shepard's
motivational research. Why was McCarthy
running? my had he entered the
New Hampshire Primary? What were his
differences with the Johnson administration?
^^at were his concerns about the impact
of the war on domestic affairs?
And then questions which Parr hoped
would probe

McCarthy as

a

personality and as an elected official.

Toward the middle of the

program McCarthy rose from his chair,
walked a few steps to the corner of a desk
that had been placed away from the chairs
he and Parr had occupied during the
interview.

He perched on a corner of the desk,
settled slightly, and began

talking directly through the camera.

In the ten or fifteen minutes available.

Senator McCarthy explained his candidacy, what
the next day's vote could mean,

how he would change policy, and what kind of
President he would be.
effective media moment.
I

The "cool" candidate had met the "cool" medium.

McCarthy

projected through the camera into the living room as a
striking contrast to a
harsh Johnson or a tense Richard Nixon
gures then on television.

I

It was an

~

the two most prominent political fi-

McCarthy, the television candidate was in harmony with

McCarthy the "Profile" newspaper advertisement and McCarthy the "bring
America

back to its senses," radio message.

Jubilant, McCarthy left the taping session

to complete the last day of his New Hampshire campaign.
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Flnanc i r)^i_the_ Campa±p^n

The New Ha.,pshiro political
.eallty is that ,.o„ey for
ca^pai^ns i. limited
under the best of circumstances
and .o„ey to support the
primary condidacies of
presidential candidates is rarely,
if ever, derived totally
fro. the Ke„ Hampshire populace. The Johnson
campaign sought to fund its
activities with
locally raised money and felt they
could do so since the continuation
of Johnson
in office meant continued emplo^w^nt
for some and potential rcvards
for others.
It was also a part of the New
Hampshire McCarthy strategy to make
it embarrassing for the Johnson Committee Co
import c.-.mpai£n money and also to
use noncy that
had been raised for the Kew Hampshire
Democratic Party to run the Johnson campaign.

The McCarthy strategy worked.

limited.

The Johnson Kew Hampshire war chest
was

Not until very late in the campaign
did the Johnson Co-^ittee begin to

spend extensively for radio, newspaper
and television advertising.
time almost

an

Until that

of the Johnson campaign was supported
by a few volunteers.

Democratic State Committee Staff, and staff
loaned by Senator Mclntyre and
Governor King.

Urhen

but collapsed.

Then and only then did they spend money in an
attempt to re-coup

their "pledge card" strategy failed, their
campaign all

their losses.

Much like other aspects of the McCarthy campaign the
financing pattern fell
into three distinct periods.

The first, described earlier, was the period prior

to and jufit shortly after Senator McCarthy's announcement
of his New Hampshire

candidacy.

The Kev^ Hampshire leaders had been able to collect a small pot
com-

posed of one $250 contribution from Sandra Hoeh's Hartford, Connecticut
aunt and
uncle, and a number of smaller sums that had arrived spontaneously.

contributions listing from the campaign read:

The first
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Rebecca

Z.

Solomon, 65 Middlcbrook Road
Hartford, Conn.

^,50^^^

Robert L. Finley. Tamworth, New
Hampshire

David

G.

100.00

Underwood, 29 Runford Street
Concord, New Hampshire

100.00

Elinore M. Adams, Box 101, E. Concord,
New Hampshire

qq

George M. Marrow, P.O. Box 797, Brattleboro,
^^^'^^^

20.00

Gerhard Lenski, ADA Westwood Drive, Chapel
Hill,
North Carolina

'

25 00

John Stevens, V/atkins Hill, Walpole,
New Hampshire
Mary Scott-Cralg,

Norman

R.

2 QO

2 Chase Road, Hanover,
New Hampshire

Torrcy, Jaffrey Ctr.

,

10.00

New Hampshire

10.00

(N.H. McCarthy for President Committee contributions
report) 22

This fund of $527.00 was the total resource of
the campaign until the second week
of January 196S.

All previous activities of the New Hampshire McCarthy
Committee,

principally mailing, travel and telephone calls, were paid
for by the individuals
'

Involved

—

principally, David Hoeh and Gerry Studds.

Hoeh had received a per-

sonal contribution from a New Hampshire supporter to help
pay for his travel

and that of his wife to attend the Chicago meeting of the Conference
of Concerned

Democrats, early December 1967.
^

Gerry Studds financed his own travel to that

conference as did the others of the New Hampshire delegation that attended.
s|

Studds used his own personal checking account to vnrite deposits for telephone

installation, headquarters rental, furniture rental and some of the early equip-

ment rentals needed to open the Concord headquarters.
hI

Once McCarthy had announced

his entry in the New Hampshire primary the first $527 in the fiscal agent's ac-

count

v;aa

quickly expended.
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The New Hampshire leader, had agreed
that they would not permit the
campaign
to .pond more than was on hand to
pay the campaign's obligations.
Studds ventured c.t on the liiBb with his checking
account as a minor violation of this

principle but had reasonable assurance from
the National Campaign Manager, Blair
Clark, that he would not be stuck.
There was, however, a delay between the
time
that money was needed to begin New Hampshire
activities and the time money began
to arrive.

Until this delay developed, the New Hampshire
leaders were under the

impression that sufficient money was available from
national sources to fund the
campaign budget.

Allard Lowenstein had referred repeatedly to substantial
funds

already pledged to an alternative candidacy if only
Senator McCarthy would run.
There had been press conferences in Chicago during the early
December

CCD.

meeting where large contributors had pledged hundred of thousands
of dollars to
support an anti-war candidacy.

When it came time to pay the early New Hampshire

bills it came from the personal fortunes of two individuals who had not
been

involved in the Chicago braggadocio.

Martin Peretz, Harvard professor and

Singer Sewing Machine heir, and Blair Clark, Clark thread heir, each sent a

check for $5,000.

Clark's check came through the National Office of the McCarthy

campaign and was listed as such on the contributions report filed in New Hampshire,

Shortly after the Peretz and Clark checks were received, Ann Raynolds of Springfield, Vermont, and Mabel B. Harrison of Hanover, New Hampshire sent checks of

$1,000 each.

The second phase, the middle of the campaign

f inane ii\g,

was underway.

During Blair Clark's visit to New Hampshire January 2nd and 3rd he met to
revicv^ Weston Associates'

outline of the campaign's media components.

discus&ion Weston drafted his first advertising budget.

From this

A budget that would be

revised again as the Ml'DIA PLAN MJ) STRATEGY discussed earlier.

The first tabu-
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laU.o., for c..,pal8n .dvortl^in,
vas S/.3.007. This

would continue to Increase

by the t^ae David Hoch
su..„Uted an overall bud^oc to

Malr Clark. .,anuar, 18th
Obviously, the ?50.000 flgur.
that Hooh and Studds had
suggested as being the
amount required to fund a McCarthy
candidacy
New Hampshire In their December
22nd ..emornndum. had been exceeded
by the advertising budget alone.

m

,

Clark had negotiated the essentials
of an advertising budget with
Weston
which Weston then forwarded to I.oeh
for his revisions and inclusion
with Hoeh's
proposed overall ean^paign budget.
In a memorandum prepared by the
McCarthy
leaders and submitted to Blair Clark,
were projected the financial needs
of
the campaign.
1.

Media budget (attached to the original
memo)

2.

Headquarter.?:

$50,500.00

Costs include: rent, heat
(vjhere necessary)
act.ivit)'related advertising, telephones, signs, personnellimited, transportation,
and covering of some costs
for volunteers.
,

Concord - State
Nashua
Manchester
Keene
Laconia
Lebanon-Hanover
Dover
Portsmouth
Berlin
Home headquarters: up to
45 H.H. at $50 per spot
3.

2,250.00

Personnel:

Scheduling
Advance
I'ress

Overall
Volunteer coordination
Contingencies

$

1,000.00
2,000.00
1,500.00
2,000.00
1,000.00
2, 500.00

$10,000.00
4.

3,000.00
2,400.00
2,600.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,500.00
1,000.00
750.00
1,500.00

Transportation

10,000.00
2,500.00
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5.

Television (all should be
programmed

????

out of Boston)
6.

All other items that will
come up that
I can t think of at
this moment
TOTAL:

NOTE:

$82,500.00

The headquarters costs are
higher than had been expected
^.e are having difficulty
finding store-front locations
^°
allocate budget to a headauartlrt t }
u
""'^^ "-^^^'-^y
possible.
We wi?f
tr'"' supplement if they
will then
are in desperate need.

The staff situation remains
critical.
We need full-time
people to carry the daily load. We
are making some progress but need the bodies as ^v^ell
as the money. 23

Clark accepted the budget from the
New Hampshire leaders.

monitored the obligations according to
the budget plan.

The fiscal agent

The middle phase of the

campaign followed the expenditure pattern
advised in the memo.
One of the early mailings was to a list
of approximately 1,500 contacts
that it was presumed might contribute to
the campaign.

The mailing stimulated

a modest but steady flow of money and began
some local fund-raising initiatives

as well.

A Dartmouth history professor,

F.

David Roberts, began organizing the

Dartmouth College faculty to contribute to the McCarthy
cam.paign.
colleagues in other departments to help him.

He recruited

Each pay day he would remind his

contacts to collect a contribution for the campaign.

He then would bring his

collection to David Hoeh's office, pouring it like a tribute
across Hoeh's desk.

With the bills, checks and change, Roberts provided
amount and the contributors' names for the records.

a

careful account of the
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Tvo UniverHity ol New mnup.hlre
professors raised all of the funds
needed
to support the Dover Area
headquarters.
In Keene. a Joint Keone State College
and loeal citizen con:mittee raised
funds to support their local activities
entirely.
Other corro^Kltteea submitted budget
requests to the campaign but most

had raised at least a part of their
needs locally.

The Hampton chairman sent his local
budget to Concord for approval before

going ahead.

Tentative proposed budget for Hampton area:
Rental of trailer headquarters (half price)
Advertising
Paper, envelopes, etc.
Telephone
Lights
^^^^
Miscellaneous

$100 00

150 qo
50] qq
25.00
25.00
250 00

TOTAL:

$1,500.00

Sound fea&ible? With adequate funds, we are optimistic that
we can do a job in this area. Do we have your approval?

Please send us - as soon as possible - literature, buttons,
bumper stickers, large signs and posters for the headquarters, etc.
We plan to have our committee organized by next
week; and will attempt to get pictures and a blurb in the
five local papers that service this area.
Will inform you on our progress.
Sincerely, Dave Morin
Our slogan in this area will have to be along the line:
"Be
proud to be an Ame rican
Vote McCarthy I"
(Democrats are
virtually non-existent.)
.

Although a steady flow of contributions was regularly received at the
McCarthy headquarters in Concord, the amounts did not keep pace with the proposed
budget much less an expenditure pattern that was projected to exceed the budget.

Many contribuLi ons came spontaneously from McCarthy sympathizers across the
country with states like North Dakota, North Carolina, Illinois, Georgia, California, Washington, Ohio and Florida, included with New York, Washington D.C.,
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Pennsylvania. Maryland. Virginia and the
other New England states.

Some state

McCarthy connnittees, either with no primary
or later primary elections, raised
and forwarded n.oney to New Hampshire
for the campaign.
The National Campus
Concerned Democrats sent $1,000 and a New Jersey
Coalition supporting McCarthy
made a special trip to New Hampshire to
give David Hoeh a check for $5,000.
In SDite of the good intentions and hard
work, the flow of funds was not suffi-

ciently predictable to con^mit all aspects of the
media plan as each deadline
came due.

The campaign period, 10 weeks, meant that little
time could be de-

voted to fund raising and without funds, valuable
time would be lost.

The cam-

paign faced this dilemma early in February.
Early in February the flow of funds from Washington almost
stopped.

Clark

could not supply the New Hampshire campaign with the money
to begin the radio
and newspaper campaigns, to pay for mailings, to reserve television
time, to

open headquarters, or to supply the paraphenalia of posters, buttons, flyers,

bumper strips, etc.

For the first two weeks of February it looked as if the

campaign might die of starvation.

Volunteers made the money go further, but

without money the campaign would die and no one involved in New Hampshire
financially capable of assuming the debt to go forward.
extended their agency credit to the limit.

\^yas

Weston Associates had

Desperation began to pass over the

leadership of the campaign both in New Hampshire and Washington.

It was apparent

that McCarthy had not stirred sufficient attention in the national media to at-

tract major contributions.
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Two struggles were going on
among those attempting to manage
the campaign
outside New Hampshire. The first
concerned the dispute between the
powerful
and well financed Coalition for
a Democratic Alternative of
New York City and
Blair Clark.

The second struggle was between Clark
and Russell Hemenway, Executive

Director of the National Committee for an
Effective Congress (NEC), concerning
potential sources of campaign funds.

Hemenway, and NEC's principal backer,

Maurice Rosenblatt, also was trying to build a
campaign organization and funding base for McCarthy.

Urhile doing this he had

discovered that the young,

financial genius. Howard Stein, director of the Dreyfus
Fund, was attracted
to McCarthy.

Under Hemenway's tutelage. Stein became a willing
student of

national politics opening both his purse and his power to
Hemenway's advice.
Being a cautious invester Stein was reluctant to release his money
or his contacts to Hemenway or anyone else vjithout having a substantial role
in the deci.

sions as to how these resources were to be used.

Hemenway brought Stein with him to New Hampshire during McCarthy's first
campaign visit.

Several days after the visit, David Hoeh received a call from

Hemenway saying that Stein would like to help with the campaign and asked Hoeh
to find a house that Stein might rent for the duration of the campaign.

Hoeh

called Clark to check on this offer.

Clark advised Hoeh to let him handle Stein

and to delay responding to Hemenway.

Early in February, Stein himself called

Hoeh.

Stein said he wanted to help with the campaign and had arranged to bring

several professional people with him who could provide assistance to the Senator,

529

Stein's InLercst caused concern .luce
the one thing that the New Hampshire
leaders feared was having their role in
the can^paign over-ridden by supposedly
expert outsiders. They felt that they
had the pulse of the McCarthy potential

under their own fingers.

Again Hoeh contacted Blair Clark relaying his
conversation with Stein.
Clark instructed Hoch not to have further
conversations with Stein nor to make

arrangements for him to become involved in the New
Hampshire activity.

weeks passed with no contact with either Hemenway or
Stein.

Several

Clark feared that

Stein would move-in on the campaign in a way that V70uld
side-track Clark's efforts to build the national campaign organization.

He had convinced McCarthy

of possible dangers in becoming too closely associated
with Stein and Stein's

experts.

Both Clark and Jerry Eller, McCarthy's Administrative Assistant,

feared that Stein's desire to become extensively involved in the campaign
might
set off a series of negative reactions that would disrupt the fragile New
Hamp-

shire venture and their

impasse continued.

ov;n

efforts to regulate McCarthy's candidacy.

The

Hemenway tried his best to keep communications open be-

tween Stein and McCarthy but was not able to resolve things until the New Hanip-

shire and national campaign practically died from a lack of money.

Early in the third week of February, Hoeh received a series of telephone
calls.

Hemenway called to say that Stein would be calling again; Hoeh called

Clark to find out what he should do, and Clark said that Hoeh should listen and

work out something with Stein that suited Hoeh's needs in New Hampshire.

Hoeh,

feeling a bit like he was walking on eggs, accepted Stein's call, agreed to discuss the campaign's financial situation with him, but promised nothing else.

530
He assured Stein that the New
Hampshire aspects of the campaign were
progressing

well but v;hat he needed was help paying
bills.

Hampshire and help as he could

-

Stein said he would

corue to

New

quite a different posture from that Hoeh

sensed in the earlier conversations.
Wliat

Hoeh learned later was that Elliot Janeway, a
friend of the McCarthy's

had called Abigail McCarthy and suggested that
Howard Stein really should be
used and that he could help.

Through Abigail McCarthy, Senator McCarthy sug-

gested that Clark welcome Stein but do so on a basis
agreeable to Clark.

Clark,

by this time, acutely felt the pressure to get money for
New Hampshire, the

national office and to meet media reservation deadlines in the
other primary
states.

Stein, his wife, and several friends came to New Hampshire, took a

suite at the Sheraton Wayfarer and began quietly helping, much like the
many
other volunteers.

Clark v;ent through a similar experience with the leadership of the Coalition for a Democratic Alternative.

An agreement was worked out v/here Harold

Ickes and Sarah Kovener would have important roles in the campaign and especially in the leadership of the McCarthy effort in the New York presidential pri-

mary.

Ickes came to New Hampshire to help Cans.

chest.

The Coalition opened its war

The New Hampshire campaign received a check for $9,700.

The Coalition

printed much of the material used in New Hampshire

Howard Stein's arrival in New Hampshire began the third and final phase of
the financing of the campaign.

With Clark's caution in mind, Hoeh and

Studds arranged to meet Stein to explain the status of the campaign.

Stein as-

sured both that he admired v;hat they had accomplished to date and wanted to
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assist In ways that they thought might
produce a McCarthy victory.

Both Hoeh
and Studds relaxed as Stein made
clear that what he wanted was to find
his niche
in the campaign and to contribute
from that place as much as he could.
Hoeh re-

viewed the campaign plan and their view of
its status at the time of the meeting.
He noted that his principal concerns were
about money and that for some unknown
reasons the national campaign had been slow
in supporting the New Hampshire activities which were essential to the success of
the campaign.

Stein said that

he felt he could help with the money problem
if Hoeh could specify what was

needed, how much it would cost, and what priority
the items were in the scheme
of the campaign.

Several days before, Hoeh had prepared an inventory of
the campaign activities and the probable cost of each.

He carried the list with him at all times

and had brought it to the meeting with Stein.

proximately $70,000..

The outstanding balance was ap-

On the list were items such as printing, mailing, postage,

radio time, extra billboard space, newspaper advertising, television
programming,

headquarters costs, hotel/motel bills, telephone installations and several other
major items.
of items.

Stein thoughtfully listened then took the list and checked a number

When he finished he said, "Okay, I'll take care of these.

Clark to pay for the others."

You get

The items Stein had checked were the principal

media items, radio, television, mailing costs, postage, and some aspects of the
headquarters operation such as the telephone costs.

value of the list or more than $35,000.

His total exceeded half the

Stein said that in addition to

v/hat he

had checked on Hoeh's list he had gathered approximately $6,000 worth of first

class stamps and these would be sent to the headquarters immediately.

The items
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remaining on Hoeh's list that Stein said Blair
Clark should fund wore materials,
campaign support and operations expenses.
'

These had been included in the ori-

ginal budget for the campaign and had remained the
same throughout.

VJhat

Stein

assumed were items that had either been added to the
plan or substantially expanded as McCarthy showed increasing strength in New
Hampshire.
The brief, approximately one-half hour meeting ended with
Stein asking Hoeh
to make a photocopy of the list and agreeing to
check his progress with Hoeh

regularly.

Hoeh suggested that Stein meet with Weston Associates as soon as

possible to work out the details of the space, time and production orders
that
Stein now had assumed.

Hoeh and Studds had come to the meeting with Stein feel-

ing as if they were referees in a bankruptcy hearing.

They left with not only

the venture in tact but with almost all of their "v/ish list" funded.

Hoeh bailed Clark in Washington to report the details of the conversation.

Clark was uncomfortable with the result but agreed that the only other option

would be to scale the campaign back significantly and jeopardize McCarthy's
chances.

He especially did not appreciate being put on the spot by Stein con-

cerning who would fund what.

But Clark accepted, recognizing that he had lost

a certain freedom of action in his own situation as the result.

Hoeh recognized

this loss as well but felt that unless McCarthy did well in New Hampshire there

would be little after

Nev7

Hampshire to manage.

Stein recruited several of his friends to assist him in his role of media
financier and producer.
turer, Arnold Hiatt.

Among these was a wealthy, young, Boston shoe manufac-
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Stein and Hlatt controlled the funding
and production of the final media
push including newspaper advertising
and radio messages, but, especially,
the

heavy for New Hampshire politics, television
prograiTuning.

They worked directly

with Weston Associates, contracting and
paying for the advertising they ordered
The content of the messages and the theme
of the advertising did receive clearance through McCarthy, Iloeh and Cans In most
instances, but for all intents and

purposes, the Stein/Hiatt activity was another of
the separate departments that

evolved in the campaign.
Senator McCarthy once described the financing of his
campaign as being
like the spending of a poor man.

There was never enough money at any one time

to plan how it was going to be spent.

Consequently, when the money did appear,

as it did when Stein arrived in New Hampshire,

than winning the New Uauipshire primary in mind.

it was spent with little more
If the money had been avail-

able earlier or budgeted smoothly through the campaign, the cost of the

paign might have been reduced.

cara-

Managing the finances was not a high priority

for the campaign at that stage and consequently proper fiscal controls did not

occur.

The New Hampshire loaders kept close tabs on spending during the early

weeks when they

vjere

concerned that they might incur a debt that they would be

obligated to pay off after the election.

They relied on earlier campaign ex-

periences to cut costs, shifted funding of many activities to local communities
and resisted spending when the money was not in the bank.

Much of this changed

when Stein came to New Hampshire and Curt Cans assumed much of the day-to-day
C£unpaign spending.

Contributions
As important to' the campaign as Howard
Stein's participation was the rol e
of the small contributor., and fund
raisers.

David Roberts' fund raising effort

in Hanover produced more than $1,200 through
more than fifty individual contributions.

Approximately 360 individual contributions were
received directly by

the New Hampshire campaign.

agent was $98,808.39.

The total sum received and recorded by the fiscal

Of this amount $33,756.27 came to the campaign's
fiscal

agent from the National headquarters of the McCarthy
campaign and $30,700.00
came to him from the New York based Coalition for a
Democratic Alternative.
The remaining $34,332.12 came from individual contributors
ranging from $1.00
to $3,000.00 each.

Seven contributions between $500 and $1,500 were received

as were five checks above $1,500 to $5,000 not including the
early checks from

Blair Clark and Martin Peretz.

Expenditures

An exact listing of all expenditures of the New Hampshire campaign docs not
exist.

The records of the fiscal agent only include those disbursements which

he handled.

He received and spent the $98,808.39 in contributions and transfers

that he received and had a debt in unpaid bills as accounted March 26, 1968, of

$18,284.80.

That figure, as noted in the report, did not include "bills for

telephoiie service and rented autoes" which had not yet been received.

The

telephone bill, when finally received was more than $8,000.00 and the car rental
bill exceeded $2,000.00, totalling $127,093.19 as the amount that was recorded.
Not included were the costs of supporting the New Hampshire campaign at the

national level, nor

the.

printing that was done in New York, nor the obligations

that Howard Stein accepted and paid himself or through the national headquarters,
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No account, were gathered from the
operation of the local committees nor

were contributor records compiled for
these committees.

A conservative esti-

mate of what the monetary cost of the
campaign was would be between $225,000
and $250,000.

To this figure it would be reasonable
to add the equally conser

vative value of the volunteer time.
$250,000, for a total value of close to
$500,000. a sum considerably more than the New Hampshire
organizers estimated

when they outlined the campaign in December.
Ultimately, it was the money that made it possible to
build the momentum
of the final weeks of the campaign.

Without Stein, the Coalition for a Demo-

cratic Alternative, Blair Clark's promise to assume the
debt that would result
and the media purchased in the final 10 days, the sense of a
building climax

would not have resulted.

The campaign might well have withered badly, forced

to retreat to protect itself from a post-campaign debt.

Through the energy of

the volunteers and the skillful work of their taskmasters, the impact
of a

dollar contributed to the campaign grew considerably.

Ultimately, however,

there could be no substitute for the money that supported the final push of
the campaign.

.

.
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CHAPTER

XIII

CONCLUDING THE CAMPAIGN

McCarthy Adds Campaign Days
Shortly after McCarthy returned to Washington
after his middle February
visit, he announced that he would increase
his campaign schedule in New Hampshire.

He was obviously reassured by the welcome he
had received and felt

that he could best focus the attack on the stumbling
Johnson campaign himself.
He could think of no better way to support his
candidacy than by doing very

well in the primary voting.
The expanded schedule meant that more of the larger
cluded in McCarthy's appearance schedule.

to^vns could be in-

Instead of being able to campaign

only in the cities and a few of the largest tovms, McCarthy could
visit most
of New Hampshire's regional centers.

McCarthy v/ould spend almost all of the

time after March 2nd through primary election day, March 12th, in New Hampshire.
VJithin forty-eight hours of McCarthy's arrival in New Hampshire for the

five day schedule, March

2 to 7,

most of the campaign's activity that either

supported McCarthy in the field or was part of the candidate-related press

activity moved from Concord to the V7ayfarer Motel just outside of Manchester.

A New Hampshire campaign press office stayed in Concord as did all other aspects
of the campaign, including the volunteer support, canvass management, mailing

preparation, celebrity scheduling and election day planning.

The two headquar-

ters worked closely on those activities that required coordination, but much of
the campaign was now on pre-deterrained tracks that allowed only slight modifi-

cation.

Cans headed the Concord activities with the staff which had come from
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W..shi.ngr.on and

Goodwin.

New York.

Iloeh

coordinated the Wayfarer operation with Richard

Scheduling remained a three part activity.

Sandra Hoeh was the prin-

cipal manager cf the schedule working through Concord and
McCarthy office staffer

»

Grace Bassett, to coordinate the Senator's activities.

The national press, now practically in awe of the McCarthy
campaign, became almost part of the campaign.

With little to cover except McCarthy, they

spent the days traveling with him and the off hours watching the volunteers,

finding new stories, and even helping with some campaign tasks.
had become professional almost before their skeptical eyes.

The campaign

With attractions

such as Dick Goodwin, a seasoned notable who had been at the national pinnacle
the youthfulness of the McCarthy venture was quickly overshadowed.

Goodwin's

experience and confidence lent certainty to the work of those near him, es-

pecially when crucial decisions had to be made and made without mistake or
hesitation.

McCarthy's earlier campaigning was

nov;

amplified by wider press attention

the enthusiasm of the local committees, and the excitement that presidential

campaigning lends to a

Nev7

Hampshire winter.

It began to manufacture that

elusive commodity essential to a successful campaign, charisma.

McCarthy arrived in

a

Now when

community he was recognized, people came out of their

shops to meet him, went out of their way to shake his hand, and crowds even

gathered anticipating a visit.

McCarthy had reached New Hampshire's taciturn

voters in a way that had not been seen since Estes Kefauver's campaigns of
the 1950's.
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McCarthy, the candidate, broke into full
stride during the final days of
the campaign.

One night he spoke to thunderous applause
and many interruptions

in a Nashua Hl^h School,

the next he spoke before a Dartmouth
College audience.

It was the same hall that had held George
Wallace's hostile audience almost one

year before.

McCarthy had been advised that Dartmouth student
audiences tended to be
reserved in their reaction.

If he could stir them to interrupt his speech

with applause it would be a significant response, but
not to expect other than
attentive listening.

McCarthy, with the editor of the Daily Dartmouth

on stage before a packed Webster Hall.

,

came

The applause was courteous, no shouting,

no standing, no signs, just more than 1,500 people clapping.

David Hoeh sat

next to E. M. "Ned" Kenworthy, New York Times reporter, who had been
with

McCarthy the evening before in Nashua.

Kenxrorthy leaned over to Hoeh and said

that he felt this was a different audience.

McCarthy was introduced and began his speech.
saying that McCarthy

night before.

v/as

Kenworthy leaned over again

about to use a speech similar to that he had given the

It went on with McCarthy's best illustrations and rhetorical

allusions floating out across the silent hall like a breeze in a sound absorbing
room

—

no response, no reaction, no hand clapping, almost no sound at all.

The

Nashua speech, V7hich had stirred more excitement than any other McCarthy speech
in New Hampshire, seemed almost totally without impact on this Hanover audience.

The only noise in the hall came from the outside when a few late arrivals found
the door cJosed.

inside.

The hall was filled to capacity.

No more could be allowed
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His speech ranged across the
arguments of his candidacy and criticism
of

the administration's policies and
behavior.

Inserted in his frequently used

arguments were sections that had been
prepared by Sy Hersh on the problems of
the cities which David Hoeh thought might
be of particular interest to the

largely urban oriented Dartmouth audience.
"This priority is not being recognized by the
present
administration. The time» as the President's Riot
Commission tells us, is short if we are to prevent
more
bloodshed.
I believe that this nation can stem
future
riots and bloodshed
we have the potential, we have
the intellect, and we have the will."

—

"But we cannot solve any problems if we persist in
wasting manpower, money and moral energy in the war
in Vietnam."

McCarthy noted that two years before Johnson had said the
United States could
fight the war in Vietnam and the war on poverty at home.

But "the president's

recent budget message was nothing more than a signal of surrender, a sign of

abandonment of the War on Poverty and the special needs of America."
"The people of this nation and the Congress have not had
a chance to pass objective judgment on this vrar.
As our
military component has grown so has our commitment to
South East Asia. And no place along the line did anyone
pass a reasoned judgment on what was happening in South
East Asia."

"I'm a messenger bringing this message and it's not a
popular one. In ancient history, such messengers were
usually the first ones executed.
I may be in that came
situation," he said with a laugh.

McCarthy quietly brought his speech to an end as he frequently did, with a
series of poetic allusions.
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The message from the Adrainistration
today is a message
Ox apprehension, a message of fear,
yes
even a message
of fear of fear.

—

This is not the real spirit of America.
I do not believe
that it is.
This is a time to test the mood and spirit:
To offer in place of doubt
In place of expediency

—

—

trust.

right judgment.

In place of ghettos, let us have neighborhoods
and
communities.

In place of incredibility

—

integrity.

In place of murmuring, let us have clear speech;
let us again hear America singing.
In place of disunity, let us have dedication of
purpose.

In place of near despair, let us have hope.

This is the promise of greatness which was stated for us
by Adlai Stevenson and which \ms brought to form and positive action in the v;ords and actions of John Kennedy.
Let us pick up again these lost strands and weave them
again into the fabric of America.

Let us sort out the miusic from the sounds and again respond to the trumpet and the steady drum.^As McCarthy ended and returned to his chair on the stage, the audience rose

almost as if it were one person.

Their silence during the forty minute speech,

as if bottled, was expelled in a sudden rush of extended standing applause.

Hands beat against each other as if the action might re-enforce their own con-

viction so effectively pronounced by the speaker and at the same time somehow
vent their own individual frustration with the course of national events.
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Wien at last the applause subsided, the
student moderator called for questions.

The first to rise was an Army lieutenant, in
uniform.

The lieutenant

asked McCarthy whether he had received any roilitary
support during his campaign?
His reply was that it was interesting to see
"who was willing and free to speak
out," and that some retired military officers have
expressed views which parallel his own.

The lieutenant went on, "Well,

I

just want you to know

I

drove

two-and-a-half hours to get up here from Ft. Devens, Mass.,
to show my support
for your campaign."

(The lieutenant received a standing ovation from about

half those in the hall.)3

A scries of questions followed concerning McCarthy's position on the
war,
how he proposed to end it, and what might be the effect on the U.S. economy
of
ending the military effort.

On this latter point he said, "This is the first

time in our nation's history war has not stimulated economic growth.

transition from

v/ar to

peace is the least of our worries."

Economic

He then received

several questions about the Selective Service law, draft resistance, and

conscientious objection policies.

To these McCarthy advised, "Act according

to your conscience," and stated that he favored a policy of "Selective

Conscience Objection."

An emotional and polarized subject, McCarthy satisfied

his listeners with his responses to these questions without suggesting that the

students ignore the Selective Service laws, or promising unconditional amnesty
to those who had broken the law.

It was on this last point that McCarthy spoke

with considerable courage and sincerity.

He reviewed his own feeling of quali-

fied support for the notion of war in national self-defense and the idea that
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a

nnliou so threatened mlBhl: compel citizens

to-

engage in defense.

He then

distinguished this view from what was then occurring
in the United States to
support the unjustified war in Vietnam. He
closed by suggesting that when
the war concluded,

then a policy of amnesty should be proposed
for those who

have been jailed or exiled because of their
objection to the war.

A calmly

stated, well reasoned, expression of concern, a
gesture toward healing the

damage of the war went unreported by those covering
the speech.

Kis answers

to the questions had brought repeated applause,
even cheering and several

standing ovations.

Election Day Organization
Several v/eeks before the election the McCarthy managers began developing
the election day plans.

As with other aspects of the campaign the first task

was to assign one of the volunteers to the job of evaluating
to bo sure that the McCarthy vote got to the polls.

v/hat V7as

needed

For this task Richard

Korling, a Yale undergraduate student, who had abandoned his education for the
campaign, was selected.

Rich drafted a get out the vote program which was

approved by Hooh and Cans and sent to the local McCarthy committee chairman

February 22nd.

The memorandum read:

Tuesday, March 12, Is fast approaching, and it is time to
give some thought to preparations for activities on election day itself.
Our main activities will include providing McCarthy poll-watchers, rides to the polls and
volunteers to get out the McCarthy vote.
We are asking you to appoint one person (it could be yourself) to coordinate election day activities for your local
area.
This person should plan to spend some time each day
getting local volunteers to work for McCarthy on election
day, and should be able to spend election day at your local headquarters coordinating these volunteers.

.

Enclosed is a list of cltios and towns
with a large number of registered Democrats in your area.
Your election
day coordinator should be responsible
for recruiting and
coordinating volunteers in these cities and
towns.
Obviously, the largest towns are most important,
and should
be organized first.

Here are some things your election day coordinator
should
start on right away:
- Call city or to\m clerks to obtain opening
and closing

times and addresses of polling places for each
city
ward or town. Keep a copy of this information for
yourself, and please also send me a copy as soon as
you get it.

- Find a person in each city ward or town to coordinate
drivers on election day. This job can best be handled
from a home in each area.
The only necessity is a

telephone, and somebody who will answer it on Monday
and Tuesday, March 11 and 12,
Ads containing these
telephone numbers will be placed in newspapers prior
to the election.
- Find drivers to take people to vote.
An approximate
guideline for the number of drivers you will need in
each city ward or town is one for every 400 registered

—

Democrats
your own local experience may suggest a
different nuir.ber of drivers. You should also try to
have a few extra drivers on hand at your headquarters
to help out in areas that need extra drivers.
- Find poll-watchers for uach polling place.

- Obtain naps for drivers.
The location of the polling
place and the driver coordinator's home should be
marked on each map.
If canvassing is being done in
your area, copies of the maps provided to canvassers
can be made
- Find a volunteer la\'0'er to be available to your headquarters in case of election procedure complaints on
election day.
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- Stockpile election day supplies, and
set them away in
a special place reserved for
election day.
Suggestionsa 3 X 5 note pad for each driver
coordinator and several for your headquarters, 2 posters for
the sides of
each car you plan to have, crepe paper and
masking tape
for decorating cars, enough McCarthy
buttons for ejection day workers, and enough McCarthy
literature to put
a small stack in each car on election day.
- As you get volunteers for election day
activities,

please send me their names, addresses, telephone
numbers, and where and what they have volunteered to
do.
Also keep a copy for yourself. The week before
the
election, I will send out instruction sheets to the
volunteer workers; they will also receive thank-you
notes after the election. Your volunteer workers
should be on duty all the time polling places are open.
You may want to set up shifts for volunteers who can
work only part of the day.

Please try to keep me continually informed on your progress
in acquiring an election day organization.
I shall try to
keep in frequent contact with you by telephone.
Your estimates of the number of drivers, poll-watchers, and
volunteers to distribute literature outside polling places
or to turn out the McCarthy vote are important.
VJe expect
to have out-of-state volunteers to fill in gaps where you
are unable to obtain your own local volunteers.
Hov/ever,
local volunteers are much more effective because they knov;
a large number of voters, known their way around to^m, etc.
In addition, the job of assigning out-of-town volunteers
where they are needed most will probably be a large one.
For all these reasons, it is extremely important for you
to do as much as you possibly can to build your own election day organization.
I expect to be in Concord Headquarters at the following times:
February 26-27 Monday evening through Tuesday afternoon;
March 1-5
Friday evening through Tuesday afternoon; and,
March 7-12
Thursday evening through Tuesday evening.

If my help is required at other times,
myself available.

I

may be able to make

Please appoint an election day coordinator as soon as possible.
I shall contact you next Monday evening (February 26th).
Sincerely yours, Richard Norling.^
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Attached to tho letter was the following
listing titled, "Election Day
AssigniT.ent Regions."

A note on the list stated, "Numbers in
parenthes
ises are

the number of registered Democrats in
each town or city."

Berlin

Keene

Berlin - 4 v/ards (4,378)
Northumberland (563)

Keene- 5 wards (1,353)
Walpole (275)
Swanzey (242)
Troy (218)
Winchester (213)
Hinsdale (164)

Gorhara (547)

Littleton (387)
White'field

(174)

Concord

Laconia
Concord - 9 wards (1,680)
Pembroke (903)
Aliens tov7n (648)
Pittsfield (271)
Boscax^on (157)

Dover
Dover - 5 wards (2,306)
Somersworth - 5 wards (3,002)
Rochescer - 6 wards (2,011)
Newmarket (920)
Rollinsford (483)
Farmington (4J.0)
Durham (255)
Milton (192)

Hampton
Hampton (454)
Exeter (667)
Epping (373)
Seabrook (244)

Laconia - 6 wards (1,958)
Franklin - 3 wards (1,046)
Conway (326)
Meredith (288)
Tilton (226)
Ashland (186)
Belmont (183)
Andover (168)
Alton (147)
Barnstead (157) (?)
Plymouth (142)
Lebanon
Lebanon - 3 wards (854)
Claremont - 3 wards (2,688)
Newport (903)
Hanover (500)
Lincoln (327)
Enfield (133)
Manchester

Manchester - 14 wards (24,549)

Hennlkcr- Hillsborough

Hillsborough (199)
Henniker (127)

GoffstovTn (1,254)
Kooksett (654)
Bedford (477)
Raymond (196)
Auburn (171)
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Nas hua
"GtGi-'boroufih

Nashua - 9 wards
Solem (?.000)
11

D«rv°"(

,

ElL

rnw/"'^
'"^^

.

8

I'lalstcw (550)
Pelham (505)
Merrimack (476)
^
Loncjoaderry (278)

.

t,^^^

~Portsmouth
"

'

,

n

Peterborough (287)
Greenville (.i,15)

^

/,

1

(8 0R2^

,

,

Windham (148)
The strategy that Hoeh and Studds had developed
early in the campaign had

now been refined into a series of target cities
and towns clustered around area

headquarters.

In addition to the preparations which Norling
outlined in his

February 22nd letter, area committee chairmen and election
day activity coordinators were asked to attend a meeting at the Concord headquarters,
Sunday evening March 3rd.

There Hoeh and Cans reviev7ed preparations for election day add-

ing several aspects that had not been covered in Norling' s
earlier letter.

The

most important of these additions was the suggestion that each area headquarters

organize telephone or canvassing re-contact procedures to remind those who had

been canvassed to vote.

The basis for this re-contact was to be the canvasser's

card and the notation on that card indicating whether the person contacted was a
"1", "2" or "3" respondent to the canvass.

Those "favorable to McCarthy" (the

"1" voter), and those "leaning toward McCarthy" (the "2" voter), would be called
or re-canvassed to remind them to vote.

The "3" voter, would also be contacted

In hopes of convincing them to vote for McCarthy.

This re-contact would be made

especially in the case of those who had been canvassed earlier in the campaign.
The recent escalation in the campaign and McCarthy's extensive press attention
was'

presumed to be having a sufficient effect on the "3" voter to justify the

re- con tact.
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What the election day activity depended
on the most was the competence of
the respective local organizations.

Persons experienced with the political

campaigns and the vote production of their respective
communities were the key
to reaching the McCarthy vote.

The canvassing results gave the basis for know-

ing where McCarthy was strong or weak.

In the strong districts the local com-

mittees organized to pull voters, concentrating their
planning where the work

would produce the best returns.

Familiarity with the election day ethos of

each district gave the local workers the background to adjust
their efforts
to avoid irritating voters by doing things that would not be
well accepted,

and at the same time not omitting activities that had come to be expected
from
a candidate organization on or immediately before an election day.

As the demands on the local organizations for candidate and celebrity

schedules ended and the canvassing activity reached its final peak during
the weekend of March 9th and 10th, election day preparations took the highest

priority.

In addition to the advertising blitz on the radio, television and

through the newspapers, a number of local committees distributed printed reminders to vote and last minute appeals to vote for McCarthy.

For Docal organiza-

tions with extensive manpower and thorough going organization, a number of

simultaneous activities could be supported during the final weekend.

Those

local committees that were less well organized took on only the highest priority
tasks as directed from the state headquarters.
the campaign,

As had been the case throughout

the managers had tried to offer a shelf of activities that would

stimulate the weaker and more recently formed area organizations as well as

challenging the strong and well developed committees.

.

.
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Only
ca,npaign.

one.

separate activity was allowed to develop
with the sanction of the

That was the effort of the Vietnam
Veterans Against the War.

members spoke separately to separate audiences.
way on street corners with leaflets and
placards.

Their

They campaigned in their own

They organized their own

press conferences using their own spokesmen,
presenting their own view of the
issues, and asserting in their own way, support for
Senator McCarthy.

The McCarthy Machine

A few days after the New Hampshire presidential primary vote,
an advertisement appeared in the New York Times

,

sponsored by the Coalition for a Demo-

cratic Alternative, soliciting funds for the "McCarthy Machine."
ad, the heading read, "McCarthy's Machine Needs Money."

A full page

A picture showed

twelve serious-looking student-aged men and women, coats in hand with a caption,

"The Machine."

The text of the ad read:

Senator Eugene McCarthy is backed by the most improbable
political machine in American history.
It works for nothing, runs on peanut butter sandv/iches
and soft drinks, and spends the night in sleeping bags or

empty warehouses.
You can't buy a machine like this, even with the offer
of money.
.

.

And you can't con them either, with a lot of overblown
promises.

They're looking for a new kind of leadership for our
country and they believe that Senator McCarthy is the only
one who can provide it.
That's why they went out and rang every doorbell in the
state of New Hampshire.
.

.

Unless every person reading this ad sends a few dollars,
McCarthy's mightiest v/eapon will be stilled.
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And the bantle will have to be fought
by a lone man with
a limited staff.
If you've already given, we thank you.
please give again.
If you've never given,

And ask you to

there's no better time than now.

$1 from you will feed one student for one day.

$10 will provide 20 students with lunch.

$50 will feed 25 students for two days or 10 students
for 5 days.

And there's also the cost of transportation

^

For the last 10 days before the primary the "McCarthy
Machine" was In high

gear and ready for the critical final days.

A mistake, a national crisis, an

international incident might shift the voters' attention from an insurgent candidacy back to the President,

^vliile

a national crisis or international inci-

dent was beyond the control of the New Hampshire campaign, the first, a mistake
that could cost voter support, was on everyone's mind.

close election.

It was going to be a

The canvass said it; the leaders felt it; and the media had

come to recognize it.

.

As the tide turned in favor of Senator McCarthy, the Johnson campaign

leaders fought back.

middle of February.
positions.

The "pledge card" had become a serious liability by the

Their remaining alternative was to attack McCarthy's

Until this time, the strategy of the Johnson campaign had been to

ignore McCarthy, minlmi:;e his possible appeal, deny that loyal New Hampshire

Democrats would support his insurgency, and refuse to concede more than a
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small portion of the vote to him.

McCarthy would not get

looro

3,000 to 5.000 votes total

well into February.

A vote

than

-

Senator Hclntyrc's early prediction that
3

to 5 percent of the vote

-

not

more than

remained the party line of the Johnson campaign

toti.1

better than Mclntyre's projection would, by

their own definition, have to be considered significant.
The Johnson leaders had received an analysis of the
probable voters in
the New Hampshire presidential primary from Oliver
Quayle and Associates,

public opinion pollsters, that showed first, that the voter
was essentially
a "hawk" toward Vietnam policy, and secondly,

know McCarthy's stand on Vietnam issues.
leaders

v/as

that these same voters did not

Quayle 's advice to the Johnson

to step up their attacks on McCarthy as an advocate of peace and

also to get McCarthy to define his peace plans precisely.

The combination of

strategies, Quayle suggested, would solidify support behind a
and at the same time, drive McCarthy into a corner.

v.rtrite-in

effort

Quayle 's advice justified

the Johnson leaders' shift from ignoring McCarthy to attacking him directly.

The radio commercials and Governor King began the assault.
in Quayle' s advice

\jas

What both missed

that there is a difference between questioi.ing a policy

position and questioning one's political and national loyalty.

King went for

the jugular and concentrated on the question of political and national loyalty,

Mclntyre, when he actively campaigned, sought to
differences.

drav*

McCarthy out on policy

Unfortunately, King had jumped the gun and by the time Mclntyre

arrived in New Hampshire to begin campaigning for Johnson much of the damage

had already been done.
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Instead of a coordinated and sustained
policy attack on the McCarthy campaign, Hclntyre had to separate himself from
the position King had taken.

In

addition to the split which had developed in the
Democratic Party between the

Johnson and McCarthy supporters there was now a split
within the Johnson camp
between its leaders, King and Mclntyre, a split that
would be especially
troublesome to the Johnson campaign as the election approached.

Mclntyre

and his supporters within the Johnson campaign became
increasingly uncomfortable with King's rhetoric.

From the beginning when the Democratic State Committee

vjas

asked to endorse

the Johnson renomination, the McCarthy leaders had sought to have the
machinery
of the New Hampshire party remain neutral.

^^Jhen

this tactic failed, the leaders

saw political advantage in reminding voters that the basic ethos of New Hamp-

shire primary politics was being violated by the endorsement.

\Ihen

Governor

King launched his attacks on the loyalty of the McCarthy supporters they in turn
felt it was time to again remind the public of the trampled ethos of primary

election neutrality.
Once again the McCarthy leaders called upon the Democratic State Committee
to reconsider their earlier endorsement of the Johnson renomination and to open

the Democratic Party to the organizations of both of the candidates.

In a

letter from David Hoeh to the Democratic State Committee membership he requested
that all Johnson campaign material bearixig the Democratic State Committee attri-

bution be recalled and that a complete audit of Democratic State Committee accounts be made in order to determine

hov/

the funds were being used.

The request

was rejected at the February 18th meeting of the Democratic State Committee but
the tactic aided the McCarthy effort.^

554

The mooting producod at least two new
supporters for the McCarthy effort
frora the n^embers of the

State Conui^ittee attending including one,
Robert Proulx,

Chairman of the Grafton County Democratic Comirdttee,
who had previously supported the endorsement of Johnson's renomination.

A number of others were

deeply disturbed by the behavior of Craig and
Boutin, who attended the meeting,
toward friends who had shared the earlier battles
of the Democratic Party.
The net effect of the confrontation was positive for
the McCarthy leadership.
It illustrated to what extent the Johnson leaders
would go to deliver New

Hampshire to Johnson, spiting both friends and political
sensitivities.

Manchester Union Leader picked up the dispute in an editorial titled,
"'Pedigreed' Democrats," with an editorial cartoon.

The editorial read:

Wliatever else might be said of the heated controversy currently raging within the Democratic State Committee it
should be stated, for the record, that it is completely
unnecessary and need not have grown to such proportions.
In any fair contest. President Johnson figures to run
roughshod over Minnesota Sen. Eugene McCarthy, whose
voice of appeasement falls on deaf ears in a state whose
motto is "Live Free or Die'."

What concerns us, and should concern all Democrats, is
the unbridled arrogance of those who, despite LBJ's insuperable advantage, nevertheless feel the need to "stack
the deck" and to run roughshod over all who disagree with
them.
Apparently they care not a whit about the party
disunity their actions are fostering.
State Chairman William H. Craig of Manchester, who threw
the parliamentary book at McCarthy backers at Tuesday
night's State Committee meeting in the Queen City, won
at best a technical victory.
But it could prove to be a
costly victory indeed over the long haul.

The
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As far as parliamentary procedure goes,
Craig was correct
in ruling out of order several indirect
attempts to overturn the State Committee's official
endorsement of President Johnson.
Craig said he v/ould entertain only a specific motion to "reconsider" the previous
action of the
committee.

However, it is the Dem ocratic S tate Commi t tee itself
that
Ig^PJ^P^' o rder in endorsin g LIU and violatin thejm^trality that al l Democrats hav e a ri ght to expect
it will
a dhere to faithfully
^i

.

This newspaper opposes the candidacy of Sen. McCarthy
with
every fiber of its being, but we cannot help but sense and
sympathize with the feeling of outrage of McCarthy's supporters when they see the State Coirmittee attempt to transform the Democratic Party into an exclusive club v;here
only "pedigreed" candidates and their supporters are welcome 7
.

The editorial was merely a minor break in the pattern of editorial attack

which the Manchester Union Leader^ aimed at the McCarthy campaign, but it did
revive in the final weeks of the campaign the issues of fairness and party
neutrality.

Somehov/, after the February 20th meeting,

the Johnson campaign

lost its momentum.

Symptomatic of

v/hat the

Johnson campaign was encountering

in an Art Buchwald column that appeared February 22nd.

v/as

reflected

He wrote, "A few weeks

ago David Brinkley reported that a scientist had programmed all the pertinent

military information about the U.S. and North Vietnam and fed it into a computer,
raising the question:

'Wlien

will the

computer answered that the U.S. had

v/ar

v7on

be won and which side v;ill win?'

the war two years ago.^

The

For some pecu-

liar reason, the Johnson campaigners were under the impression that the public

was satisfied with the progress of national and international events and that
all they needed was an answer.
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Like Buchvnld's computer, each time the
question was asked the computer

produced an answer, but the answer did not
quite fit the situation.

\^.ile the

administration called on the voters to trust the
President and support his
policy, the TET offensive produced bloody photographs
and frightening casualty
lists.

In spite of what the public saw, the military
leaders proclaimed a victory.

At one moment the leaders in Washington and New Hampshire
talked of freedom and
the right to dissent and the next such expressions were
viewed as disloyal, even

traitorous acts.

The bastion of democracy

seemed in immediate danger.
resisting.

x^as

embattled.

Basic freedoms

The powerful were threatening and the weak were

Battle lines were beginning to form as the rhetoric became strident,

the threats more frequent, and the bitterness more intense.

evaporated.

\-Jhat

The middle ground

had been a confident renomination effort on the part of the

Johnson leaders in New Hampshire now became a frightened, disorganized and
desperate back slide.
a revived campaign,

While Quayle's polling results had provided a basis for

the leaders, principally Bernard Boutin, who had to report

his activities to the Wiite House regularly, seemed to panic.

He held frequent

meetings of the remaining workers exhorting them to circulate more pledge cards,
line-up local committee members, and to remind those

party's incumbency to renew their support now.

v.'ho

had benefited from the

As the Johnson fortunes began to

fade the meetings became more and more unpleasant.

Boutin would not tolerate

disagreement or criticism within the organization any more than Governor King

would outside.

In the last days only those who had to attend the meetings be-

cause of their employment did so while the others drifted to the sides and away
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from the hostility.

On election .i,ht. several of the
major Johnson workers

would spend the evening at the McCarthy
headquarters to await the returns.

They

had become disillusioned by the Johnson
leaders and disgusted by the direction
the campaign had taken.

The "Red Herring" Charge and New Hampshire
Politics

Legends of New Hampshire politics and especially
Manchester politics are
filled with tales of how last minute charges changed
the results of close elections.

Almost a political fossil in the way the city frequently
reacts to the

last minute charge, Manchester acts as if it were still
in the age of the "yel-

low journalists" and the issue distorters of the late 19th
century rather than
in the age of multi-media news and skepticism.

through public media to be given credibility.

A charge need not be made
It might simply be a rumor cir-

culated in a few crucial places and spread rapidly in the ethnic communities of
the city during the last hours of a campaign.

Manchester is a divided city

physically, socially, ethnically and economically.

The physical barrier is the

Merrimack River v/hich separates the city's predominantly French-Canadian West
side from the commerical district and the Irish, Yankee, Greek and upper income

communities of the East side.

A long history of social, economic, religious and especially ethnic conflict has bujlt numerous unseen barriers between neighborhoods, parishes, social
clubs and even financial institutions and professional organizations.

created its own communications networks and response mechanisms.

Each has

The most sophis

ticated of these, of course, was the network within the French-Canadian community
The church, parochial schools and the French language kept the community a tight,

provincial and socially regulated entity for generations.
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Only since the advent of television in the
post World War II period has
the tightness of that community begun to
crack.

appear in the late 1950'

s

The first cracks began to

and widened in the 1960's as the younger members
of

the community sought education, jobs and status
outside the traditional community.

In a city like Manchester, which was once dominated
politically by the

Republican Yankees and then for several generations by the Irish,
the FrenchCanadians were usually at the bottom of the socio-economic-political ladder.
As the French-Canadian population grew beyond the 50 percent mark, an
inevitable conflict developed between the two principal ethnic populations, the

politically skilled Irish and the culturally isolated-French Canadians.

Manchester city politics an eventual accommodation

v/as

two groups that centered on politically sensitive jobs.

were Irish his deputy would be French, and the
his deputy Irish.

fire

In

achieved between the
If the police chief

chief would be French and

The scheme carried into the political jobs in the Postal

Service, city boards and commissions, and into the Board of Mayor and Alderman.

A French mayor usually meant that the chairman of the Board or Alderman

would be Irish and vice versa.

The unwritten but carefully observed political

accommodation preserved harmony within what might have been a seriously fragmented and dangerously rense city.
Politics outside of Manchester were quite another thing.

In order for a

Democrat to win one of the three statewide electoral offices, Governor or the
two U.S. Senate seats, that candidate would have to carry Manchester by a sub-

stantial margin.

From 1912 until 1962 only once had the Democratic Party been
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i^uccesGful ia electing one of its candidates
to statewide office and that was

In 1932 when ex-Governor Fred Brown was
elected to the U.S. Senate.

In order

to reduce what would normally be expected to
be a substantial Democratic plurality

from Manchester leaders of New Hampshire's Republican
Party had learned to play
the Manchester political instrument with great
precision.

It was possible to

manipulate the issues and the fears of the ethnic communities of
Manchester
in such a way as to reduce the Democratic plurality in almost any
election for

statewide and even congressional district office until U.S. Senator Styles
Bridges died in 1961, and John W. King and Thomas J. Mclntyre were elected

Governor and U.S. Senator, respectively, in 1962.
The first line of battle for those

v.-'ho

sought to play the Manchester poli-

tical instrument was in the selection of candidates before the state primary.

Often the Democratic ticket was loaded with unknown candidates with convenient

ethnically recognizable names.

For the most part these were "straw candidates"

who had entered or been encouraged to enter solely to reduce the vote for the

one candidate with the highest potential for seriously challenging the incum-

bent Republican.

In other words the ethnic instrument of Manchester was played

by the Republican officeholders to select their own challengers.
If by chance a strong candidate did slip through the maze of the nominating

primary, then several other tactics were still available, principally the "Red

herring charge" and the "backfire" issue.

By generating a plausible rumor and

then spreading it judiciously within the communications netvrork of one or more
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ethnic co.u'aunitieG just before the election,
it was possible to change the

Manchester vote enough to defeat the Democrat
and elect the Republican.

The

rumor had to be reasonably credible, spread
through credible channels, spread
so late that it would be impossible to answer,
and usually carry some emo-

tional tone such as an ethnic slur or some damned
if you answer or damned if

you don't aspect.

The most famous of these many final moment rumor campaigns
occurred in the
tight gubernatorial contest between the Republican H. Styles
Bridges and the

Democratic candidate, John

L.

Sullivan.

respected in their o\m parties.

Neither was an incumbent and both were

Sullivan, a highly regarded Manchester at-

torney, expected to draw a heavy vote from his home city.

Bridges knew that in

order to win the election he had to cut Sullivan's Manchester plurality.

To

do this he found a ready made and classic Manchester problem, the Merrimack

River and its bridges.

Several bridges had been washed out during a flood.

The construction of bridges linking the French-Canadian West side with the

Irish-Yankee East side was alvjays an issue that churned political emotions.
In the waning hours of the

193-^!

campaign a rumor

\vras

spread in the French-Canadian

community that when Irish candidate Sullivan had been asked what he would do
about the bridges he had said, "Let the frogs swim."

The rumor surfaced in

the last several Jiours before the election, spread throughout the French-

Canadian community

J,

could not be answered by Sullivan, and rekindled the al-

ways smoldering emotions betV7cen Manchester's principal ethnic groups,

l^/hen

the votes were counted Sullivan lost the election because his Manchester plurality had eroded.

The margin was 2,362 votes. ^

in the United States Senate and John L.

Navy by Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Bridges went on to a long career

Sullivan was appointed Secretary of the
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As the New llampshiro Democratic Party
revived durlnc the late 1950's and

early 1960's, itc principal fear was the rumor
problem in Manchester.

The last

few hours before each election required special
vigilance on the part of candidate organizations in order to head off and to
neutralize the last moment charge.
The difference between what had happened in 193A and
the 1960's was that now
V/illiam Loeb, using his publications, played the
instrument in the open.

Loeb

has so successfully played the Manchester instrument in his
favor that since

1950 no candidate had succeeded to the governorship of the state of New Hampshire

who

has not taken Mr. Loeb's pledge to veto any state sales or income tax
legis-

lation.

Even a slight equivocation on the part of a candidate toward the "broad

based tax issue" has been enough for Loeb to set in motion the machinery that
would destroy the candidate's margin in Manchester.
In fact Bernard Boutin, the Johnson Committee Chairman, had lost his 1958

bid for election when he did not secure a sufficient plurality of Manchester

votes to overcome the Republican strength outside the Democratic cities.

Loeb

alleged that Boutin was a "broad based taxer" and in spite of Boutin's fervent
deniajs, Loeb's viev; stuck, especially in Manchester.

As the final days of the 1968 presidential primary neared, the Johnson

campaign was searching for a way to reach the voters who were slipping rapidly
toward McCarthy.

They knew the Manchester political ethos and felt that they

could play the instrument to their benefit if the right issue could be found.

Oliver Quayle's polling revealed a conflict in the perception between the New

Hampshire voters' issue profile and the position that they attributed to Senator

.
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McCartl.y.

The profile showed that voters held
"hawk" views toward the Vietnam

War solution and yet seeraed to be moving
toward Senator McCarthy in their support.

To counter this trend. Governor Kins
escalated his attack on McCarthy

during the last weeks of February.

Unable to gain much attention for these

charges, especially since Senator McCarthy did
not hesitate to explain his

Vietnam position, the Johnson leaders shifted their
efforts.
First they had to recognize that McCarthy had
gained considerable strength
in New Hampshire.
that McCarthy

Boutin began back-tracking from Mclntyre's early prediction

have to get more than 3,000 to 5,000 votes in order for
the

x,70uld

result to be considered significant.
get more than 30 percent of the vote.

Boutin now said McCarthy would have to
On the eve of the election Boutin said

he was interested in securing just more than 50 percent of the vote
for Presi-

dent Jolinson.

The convention delegates had always been conceded to Johnson.

Secondly, Boutin's organization had been scouring the record of the McCarthy

campaign to find an error, inconsistency, mis-statement, or issue position that
they could use to their advantage in the final hours.

McCarthy hard on his war position was failing.

Wliat

Their strategy to hit
the McCarthy leaders had

discovered was that the New Hampshire voters found McCarthy credible and were

willing to support him even though when asked their own position of the war the
answer was that of

a

"hawk."

Wlien

given the alternative, win the

the respondents took the win the war position.

\That

v;ar

or get out,

seemed to be happening was

that even the "hawks" were attributing to McCarthy their own view of how to end
the war and because they found McCarthy reassuring as an alternative to Johnson

they had become McCarthy supporters.

leadership

This was baffling to the Johnson campaign
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The Johnson Campaign Fip h ts Back

The first evidence of the increased Johnson
campaign pressure came with a
blast from Governor King and the first newspaper
advertisements placed for the
final weekend.

The Governor charged that Senator McCarthy was
"perpetrating a

massive hoax on the voters of New Hampshire by claiming
friendship and support
for the late President John F. Kennedy."

King charged that McCarthy had, "tried

to scuttle President Kennedy's nomination at the
1960 Democratic National Con-

vention," and that since then McCarthy was the "biggest thorn in
President

Kennedy's side."

He went on to note that the "Senator has fooled no one who

remembers how much damage he tried to do to the late President's candidacy
and

legislative program of the early I960'

s.

"10

The second attack came through a newspaper advertisement that echoed the
same theme but added, "Sen. McCarthy promises an 'alternative,' but he refuses
to give one significant detail of his alternatives.

Because of this he has not

gained the support of a single member of the U.S. Senate.

decision and wispy promises.

...

"H

Don't vote for in-

Both King and Mclntyre signed the advertise-

ment.

While King tended to reach for the jugular of McCarthy's issues, Mclntyre

represented McCarthy as being "vague and oftentimes contradictory in his statements, "l^

Mclntyre would read excerpts from McCarthy's comments as reported in

the newspapers, and charge that McCarthy's statements V7ere "poor substitutes

for positive and definitive policies."

McCarthy, Mclntyre contended, was simply

"exploiting the frustration so many Americans feel about Vietnam. "^^
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King, on the other hand, ended the final full
week of the campaign with
the charge that any significant vote for McCarthy
in the presidential primary

would be "greeted with cheers in Hanoi."
King's comments, made during a press conference at the
capitol, v;cre obviously inspired in part by a McCarthy
charge on Wednesday that supporters of President Johnson
were using tactics like those employed in the 1950' s by
the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin, the
Republican red-hunter.
"That'e political poppycock," said King.
is using smear tactics himself."

"He (McCarthy)

King's harshest comments were directed to McCarthy's position calling for an early end to hostilities in Southeast Asia.
King said: "The question to be answered is, shall we
continue to resist naked Coita:nunist aggression with all
the resources at our coumiand, or will v;e say the price
is too high, trie going is too rough.
We are ready to
negotiate on terns laid do\m by Ho Chi Minh.
"That is why the people most interested in this election
are Ho Chi Minh and his Conmunist friends.
They will be
scrutinizing the returns for signs of a weakening of
Merican will."

King was asked if he thought his attacks on McCarthy might
not be a bit strong.
"I have always used the hard sell
approach," said King.
"I am a hard sell person, I guess."
King concluded the press conference by revising his predictions for the election
"His earlier estimate that McCarthy vjould receive only 12
to 18 percent of the Democratic vote" v;as revised with
the Governor stating that McCarthy "could get as much as
25 percent. "lA

Within a day a major controversy began to brew that

V70uld splinter the

campaign as it entered the final weekend of the campaign.

Johnson

Governor King had

been Intep.perate in his remarks before, but now the comments revived images of

r
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baltJng by demanding the sort of unquestioning,
unthinking loyalty that Joseph
McCarthy had demanded during his scourge of the
1950'

s.

In response to King's comments McCarthy held a press
conference

vs^here

he

played several of the radio tapes, sponsored by the Johnson
campaign, that had
urged against voting for "fuzzy thinking and surrender" and
called for a vote
on March 12th in "support of our fighting men."

He also showed, as further ex-

amples of the Johnson Committee's campaign style, copies of recent
nev/spaper

advertisements that repeated the same themes.
"In my twenty years in Congress," McCarthy said, "I have never been the
target of such charges from fellow Democrats."

He then went on to compare the

statements that King had made and that Mclntyre had endorsed to those made in
the 1950'

s

by the "more irresponsible" Republicans, like an earlier Sen.

McCarthy, the late Joseph

R.

McCarthy of Wisconsin.

He added that the same

charges could be aimed at his fellow members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee such as the Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield, and Vermont's

Republican Senator George

D.

Aiken.

In fact McCarthy noted, "The Senate

Foreign Relations Commii tee was lined up about

2

to 1 against the administra-

tion's conduct of the war. "15

McCarthy charged the New Hampshire Johnson campaign leaders with following
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other administration spokesmen in trying to
"prevent free discussion in the United States.
resent it some, and

I

hope so," McCarthy added.

There might be people who would
It was McCarthy's feeling that

the tactics to which he objected could be controlled by the

Democratic National Conunittee if they wished.

VJliite

House and the

Earlier McCarthy had called upon

the Wliite House to repudiate the tactics of Johnson's campaign managers in New

Hampshire but there had been no response.
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Concluding the press conference McCarthy denied advocating
surrender and
said that he felt his campaign had encouraged voters to ask hard
questions

about the war.

In fact the reaction of the Johnson leaders in the final days

seemed to McCarthy to be an indication that he had "thrown a scare" into
their

campaign and that their tactics would "generate resentment among New Hampshire
Democrats" bringing him more votes.

Governor King's attack and McCarthy's measured response gave the press
the chance to shape the public view of the last charges of the campaign.

To

the reporters and their editors, King's attempts to snuff out the McCarthy

challenge by tactics reminiscent of those of Joe McCarthy sparked their intense interest at a critical moment in the campaign.

Now with the Johnson

surrogates apparently unleashed to attack McCarthy at will in a manner that

struck a certain horror of the past in the editors' minds, the full power of
the press shifted perceptably behind McCarthy.

inside pages to the front page.

McCarthy stories moved from

Value charged wards such as "appeaser" and

"surrender" found their way into headlines and sub-heads.

It was as if the

Johnson leaders and, especially Governor King, had handed the "lavid" in this
contest the rock to slay themselves, the "Goliath."

It became the combined

function of McCarthy and the press to shape that weapon into something that
might actually slay Goliath.
The Portsmouth

Her_a.ld

led the editorial attack.

Arrogance and Deception

—

Editorial Opinion

New Hampshire's Democratic party leaders have shovm a boundless capacity for insulting the intelligence of their political brethren; now they seem bent upon a campaign aimed at
impungiiig their loyalty as well.

First there was that arrogant business about the pledge
cards.
The party's hierarchy triggered understandable
resentment among the rank-and-file with this coercive
device, and the effort to obtain such pledges has since
been all but abandoned.

The pledges were sought, of course as a means of "lining
up tlie troops," so to speak, for a President Johnson
write-in movement. Those who signed were made to feel
that they were irrevocably committed, wnile any abstainers
were left to wonder about their future standing with the
party.
In fact. Gov. John W. King, one of the principal promoters
of the pledge cards even went so far as to threaten the
laggards.
Democrats x^ho didn't join up with Johnson could
later expect to be "counted out," he warned.

Such talk obviously didn't give much credit to the mentality of Democrats, nor did it take into account the
fierceness of their independence. By and large, they
reacted with predictable hostility at such a brazen attempt to regiment them, and the pledge card veiiture thus
collapsed of its o\m dead weight.
It's a hard-headed hierarchy that presumes to direct the
thinking of Nev/ Hampshire Democrats, however, and the
mischief goes on.

The latest sample of it is even more shocking than what's
gone before, since it constitutes an attack upon the
patriotism of Democrats who don't happen to agree with
the party leaders as regards President Johnson and the
extent of American involvement in Vietnam.
U.S. Senator Tom Mclntyre and Gov. King are the principals,
if not the perpetrators of this particular outrage, for it
is they who lend their names to a large, page-deep newspaper advertisement which clearly seeks to trick the reader into believJ.ng that a vote for President Johnson is
somehow essential to showing "support of our fighting men
in Vietnam."

In other words, according to the rationale of the ad, the
voter \rho doesn't cast his ballot with Johnson might be
doing his country a disservice. The same reasoning applies
and the doubts that go with it, to any critic of the v/ar.

568

It is particularly appropriate that the
advertisement was
.placed with the Manchester Union Leader, since
the language
of it is strictly the language of Loeb.

The ad, incidentally, lists the Democratic State Committee
as the sponsor of record.
This means that it probably was
paid for out of regular party funds.
Hence, all Democrats
are made to share the responsibility for it whether they
agree with the ad or not. Furthermore, a lot of party contributors of adverse persuasion probably have been charged
with the cost.

Interest now forms around the question of how disdainful
Democrats will respond to the ad after they realize the
ruthless manner in v/hich their right to think differently
has been trampled down. Theirs is just cause for violent
protest against the excesses of the party's leadership,
and it will be surprising indeed if the rebellious clamor
doesn't make itself heard from one end of the state to the
other. 16

The Concord Monito r published two editorials restating similar themes,
the first titled "Dirty Pool" written by the newspaper's general manager,

Thomas

W.

Gerber, read:

The activities of New Hampshire's Democratic machine politicians in the presidential primary campaign are little
short of revolting.

Their actions and statements are a disservice to their
candidate. President Johnson, an insult to the state's
Democratic voters and a violation of the democratic process.

The three v/ho are responsible are Gov. King, Sen. Thomas
Mclntyre and Bernard Boutin of Nashua, one time Small
Business Administrator.

J.

Their activities hark back to the darkest days of American
big city bossisra and the era of the smear and
politics
the innuendo characterized by the late Sen. Joseph R.
McCarthy (R. Wis.).

—

The tragedy of these tactics is that they are invoked at a
time when there is an aching need for the injection of
ethics, responsibility and statesmanship in the operation
of the American system.

.
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The word "politics" still has a derogatory tone. Armtwisting tactics, implied threats of retribution, and the
dictatorial denial of the right to dissent only sour
further the public's attitude toward the honorable pursuit of public service.

New Hampshire's Democratic bosses began their bulldozer
operation in November.
On a snowy Sunday, they rammed through a meeting of the
Democratic State Committee a resolution backing President
Johnson in the primary campaign.
State committees of both political parties traditionally
have refused to take sides in primary contests. This is
because state committees are supposed to represent rankand-file Democrats or Republicans who support a particular
candidate

Then came the numbered pledge card bit.
Wliile we are confident the original intent was not to
tv/ist arms
a "you support us or else" tactic
that

—

—

is just the V7ay it came across.

In the public vievj, names of loyal Democrats could be associated with numbers, and thus checked upon. The distinct
impression was that if you didn't sign, tlie bosses would
get even.

But by far the most disgusting aspect of the Democratic
CcUTipaign has been the statements of King and Mclntyre
against the President's opponent, Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy
(D. Minn.).

they say is that a vote for Sen. McCarthy is a vote
for Ho Chi Minh, communist premier of North Vietnam.

\That

This is a smear.

It suggests that to disagree is treason.

We hope President Johnson can stay aloof, or even disassoT.W.C.l^
ciate himself, from such irresponsibility.

—
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The second editorial writteii by the assistant
editor, George W. Wilson, titled
"Short Memories, Convenient Ethics," was especially
pointed since it was aimed
at the politically vulnerable Senator Mclntyre and
Governor King.

from the Concord Monitor and the independent

Support

minded Concord voter, had been

particularly important to both in their 1966 elections.

Wilson wrote:

Gov. King and Sen. Mclntyre, as chairmen of the cairipaign
to corral write-in votes for President Johnson, have
stooped to reprehensible smears to discourage votes for

Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy.
In advertisements and public statements, the two have
suggested it would be unpatriotic not to support President Johnson when the nation is at war, that a vote for
McCarthy "will be greeted with great cheers in Hanoi."

King and Mclntyre suggest that the normal democratic
process of criticizing U.S. policies should be suspended
when the nation is at war.

They say "the Communists in Vietnam are watching the New
Hampshire Primary to see if we at home have the same
determination as our soldiers in Vietnam."

Writing in President Johnson's name is equated with "supporting our fighting men in Vietnam."
With this nonsense, they invoke the flag and primitive
enthusiasm to line Democrats up behind the President.
Has it occurred to King and Mclntyre that the very purpose of elections is to test the policies of the incumbent office-holder or administration? That Senator
McCarthy's dissent and presence in New Hampshire is in
the finest tradition of American government?
If they disagree with McCarthy, let thera discuss the
weaknesses in his proposals. Let them emphasize the
differences between the President's Vietnam policies
and the Senator's views.

"
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Statements by King and Mclntyrc violate "good tnste,
fair campaign procedures and are a direct insult to
voters of New Hampshire."

They seem to 'feel that anyone who disagrees with them
is un-American."
Those sentiments, shared by King and Mclntyre, were
voiced in September 1966 by Hugh Bournes of Laconia,
who now is a Superior Court Judge but then was a
national committeeman for the N.H. Democratic Party.
He made the comments in response to signs erected by
retired Brig. Gen. Harrison Thyng that said: "Think
American, Vote Thyng for U.S. Senate."

Thyng 's injured opponent?
G.W.W.18

Senator Thomas J. Mclntyre.

Other New Hampshire newspapers echoed the themes stated by the P ortsmouth

Herald and the Concord Monitor
an editorial titled:

.

The Boston Globe joined the discussion v;ith

"McCarthy on the new McCarthyism.

The managers of the Nev^ Hampshire write-in campaign for
President Johnson have placed ads in various newspapers,
and Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy (D-Minn. ) hopes they will
boomerang just as some say the famous pledge cards have.

"The Communists in Vietnam are watching the Nev; Hampshire primary," a typical ad reads.
"They're watching
to see if we here at home have the same determination
as our soldiers. .. in Vietnam.
Don't vote for fu?:zy
thinking and surrender.
Support our fighting men..."
Sen. McCarthy charges that these are essentially the
same tactics used by the late Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy
who was, needless to say, no relation.

And, whether or not one supports him or the administraIt would be better
tion's war policy, he has a point.
to concede that the motives are good ones on both sides.
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The question of our involvement in the war has been
raised
in an entirely legal, democratic way and, should
be decided
in the voting booth on its and the candidates' merits,
and
not on the basis of name-calling or appeals to emotion.

Almost all Americans support our boys in Vietnam, though
they differ over the policy that sent them there. To
charge an opponent with lack of patriotism, over an issue
that has divided the country so deeply, can only do grave
damage to the national interest. 15

Senator Mclntyre Criticizes the Johnson Campaign Tactics

The editorial barrage and the consequences of Governor King's attack began stirring the consciences of several prominent, liberal and fairrainded sup-

porters of President Johnson.

The protest began to take shape when Sen.

Mclntyre arrived in New Hampshire to join in the final weekend push for the

President Johnson write-in.

Under a headline that read, "VJording of Some Ads

Regretted by Mclntyre," the Senator was quoted as saying he was "sorry about
the v;ay certain advertisements pushing for a large write-in.

.

.have been worded.

The Valley News had editorialized against the Johnson campaign tactics in the
same edition carrying Mclntyre 's interview.

He stated that it had not been

his intent to "question the patriotism of Senator McCarthy" adding "He sits

right behind me in the Senate and I've never known a nicer, more gentlemanly
man.

And I'd never question his patriotism. "^^

Either before or shortly after his interview, Mclntyre received notice
that five candidates for delegates favorable to the nomination of President

Johnson had signed a statement repudiating Governor King's remarks.

Their ad-

vanced notice to Mclntyre of their action gave him time to disassociate himself
from King's charges.
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Datelined Hanover, the stateinenL
papers with great impact.

hit.

the afternoon New Hampshire news-

The Concord Monitor headlined the news, "LBJ Dele-

gates Repudiate King for Statements," and led the story:

The hard sell Presidential primary pitch of Gov. King
was repudiated last night by five Johnson delegates who
said they could not claim the President "has cox-nerned
the patriotism market."
In a prepared statement signed by five delegates from
Lebanon and Hanover, King's contention that a vote for
Sen. Eugene McCarthy, D-Minn.
would be a vote for
"surrender" was rejected. 21
,

The statement was signed by Mrs. Jean Hennessey, Hanover, former head of the

Democratic State Platform Committee; Robert H. Guest, Hanover, a member of the
Democratic State Executive Committee; Robert

C.

Elliot, Lebanon, former Demo-

cratic City Chairman; Herbert Hill, ex-state Democratic Party Chairman, and

former history professor at Dartmouth; and Richard Sterling, a professor of

government at Dartmouth.

They noted their support for the President in his

domestic programs, in foreign policy areas including the handling of the
"Pueblo" incident, and his "continuing to seek valid negotiations in Vietnam."
They concluded by saying:

We make clear, however, that in our opinion, those who
vote for Sen. McCarthy, will not be voting for "surrender" but for the second best candidate.
In addition, we believe that all New Hampshire citizens
who vote Tuesday in accord with their reason and conscience contribute importantly to the Democratic process. '^'^

The Concord Moni tor account of the statement

v/ent on to

note that "the

statement by the five delegates was mild compared to the private comments."
"I think the governor has gone way overboard this time,"
said one highly disgruntled delegate, whose name was

withheld.
"Some of us were around when Nixon did this to Stevenson.
And we don't like it,..."

"
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"it is all over, this feeling," said a spokesman,

"This is no Hanover syndrome.
Everybody I know agrees
that McCarthy is a good Democrat.
Talking about withdrawal is a difference in judgment, not in patriotism."
"The governor is way over his head in foreign policy."
"1 don't think the governor has recognized that he has
gone too far," said one person.

"\^en it comes out in advertising from the Johnson committee it makes everybody look like they are supporting
this view, and I don't think it is the view that they
support
.

"There was a lot of people who feel very uncomfortable
about the position they have been put into by Gov.
King." said a delegate.

"There are a lot of people voting for Johnson who feel
very uncomfortable about the war and wish there was a
way out of it."
"And they feel very uncomfortable about hurling names
at McCarthy, there is no question about it."
The story concluded that "VJhite House and officials at 'Citizens for Johnson'

headquarters had no comment on the statement from the delegates "23
.

The controversy prompted additional editorials.

The Boston Herald

Traveler wrote under the heading, "McCarthy vs. McCarthy ism?"
Sen. Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota may be overstating
the case when he says that the managers of President
Johnson's New Hampshire write-in campaign are using
essentially the same tactics that were used by the
late Sen. Joseph McCarthy back in the 1950' s. But
he has a right to complain.

Democratic Gov. John W. King has called Sen. McCarthy
"an appeaser" and "a spokesman for the forces of surrender." Newspaper ads tell New Hampshire voters that
"the Communists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire primary" and caution against a "vote for vzeakness
In a spot announcement on radio,
and indecision."
William F. Craig, the Democratic State Chairman, advises voters: "Don't vote for fuzzy thinking and surrender."
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Political campaigns have strayed frcui issues into innuendo before. But the Minnesota senator's foes seem
to have strayed especially far.
One cannot help but
recall the late Sen. Joe McCarthy's charge that Adlai
E. Stevenson was "soft on communism."

There is no certainty, of course, that President Johnson
is responsible for such tactics.
But there can be no
doubt that the Wliite House and the National Democratic
Committee could put a stop to them if they so chose.
The Portsmouth Herald took the opportunity to hammer away at Governor King

again through an editorial titled, "Disgraceful Political Tactics."

Noting that

it is "customary to make allov/ance for a certain amount of devilry in politics,"

the editorial affirmed that within the bounds of usual political exchange it
is acceptable to promote a candidate while attacking the record, issues,

"flaws" and "shortcomings" of the opponent,
But these Johnson-minded Democrats are not content to
go by the usual rules.
They turn their backs altogether
on the real issues in the process of inventing trumpedup arguments deliberately calculated to trade upon fear
and confusion.

Until today we thought we had seen the worst of it when
Sen. Ton; Mclntyre and his co-conspirator. Gov. John W.
King, joined in placing a newspaper advertisem-ent which
presumed to show that a vote for President Johnson, because of his war policy, v/as proof of one's patriotism.
Readers of the ad were led to believe that since the war
in Vietnam was in the national interest, and since President Johnson was devoted to continuing the war, it
naturally followed that voting for Johnson was also in
the national interest.
Further, the inference was made that failure to support
the President v;as tantamount to "letting the boys down"
in Vietnam.
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This, of course, v/as a vicious and cynical repudiation
of
•the vjholc idea of fair play in politics, since it
was born
of utter f limfl amine ry.

That Sen. Mclntyre would lend his name to such evil tactics was especially reprehensible since he has had so
much experience defending himself against the same kind
of chicanery.
As for Gov. King, he seems oblivious to any restraints
that decency would impose.
And he remains so, for the
governor struck again only today with a further statement
designed to put the national loyalty of voters in question if they dare to make a political choice other than
President Johnson.

According to Gov. King, a "significant vote" for Sen.
McCarthy in next week's primary would be "greeted with
cheers in Hanoi." He said such an illomened event would
be interpreted as "a sign that the iuuerican people are
ready to quit."
What gives Gov. King such strong feelings about this
forthcoming political decision? Considering that he
never was very active before in advancing the interests
of the party v/hich favored him with the governorship,
the matter of his present passion arouses interest.
There must be something in it for him if President
Johnson's good name survives the primary.
Could it be that he hopes by his efforts to clinch that
federal judgeship in Concord which is supposed to be
awaiting him? If so, it's a rotten bargain when the
people of the state have to be deceived as part of the
price 25
.

The combination of the editorial assault and the statement of repudiation
by the five Hanover/Lebanon Johnson delegate candidates had a considerable impact

upon Senator Mclntyre.

His statement of disagreement with Governor King domi-

nated radio news broadcasts that Saturday afternoon.
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The New Hnmpr.hir e Sunday Nevs printed a front page,

iii

red ink headline,

"Mclntyre Slaps at King," with a black ink addition, "Rebukes 'Unfair' Attack
on McCarthy."

To McCarthy leaders and the reporters it now appeared that the

long simmering disagreement within the Johnson camp as to how their campaign

should be run had exploded to the surface.

The McCarthy campaign sat back to

watch the fight develop further.
Senator Mclntyre was now in

a

most precarious position.

To disagree

with King and the approach which King, Boutin and Craig had taken in the campaign meant damaging President Johnson's chances in the election.

At the

same time many of Mclntyre 's most vigorous supporters, both Johnson and

McCarthy supporters, objected to the tactics being employed.

Further,

Mclntyre was faced with a certain retribution which comes from violating
the gentlemanly ethos of the United States Senate.

To lend his name to ir-

responsible attacks on a fellow senator or to engage in such activities could
only damage his effectiveness in the Senate.
self of this dilempaa by standing on

the-

Mclntyre had tried to clear him-

side of decency and the preservation

of the Democratic Party organization in New Hampshire.

Sunday

Nev^s

The New Hampshire

knew how best to damage his record, especially in Manchester wher

Mclntyre had trailed King in both the elections of 1962 and 1966.
Sen. Eugene McCarthy's campaign to wrest tlie presidential nomination from President Johnson got a startling
boost this weekend from Sen. Thomas J. Mclntyre of

Laconia.
For Gov. John W. King it appeared to be a deliberate
slap in the face....
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In remarks Friday Mclntyrc defended McCarthy against
a
series: of attacks by the governor
whom he did not name
in which Mr. King has been warning that votes for McCarthy
will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi, the Coimunist capital of North Vietnam.

—

—

King, in those attacks has been joined by a number of
other Joluison lenders, notably State Democratic Chairman
William Craig, who has sponsored a series of ads saying
the ComiTiunists in Vietnam are watching the New Hampshire
primary."

Hclntyre called such warnings "unfair" and a grave injustice to the Minnesota senator.
Less surprisingly yesterday, Mclntyre was joined in defense
of McCarthy by U.S. Sen. Robert F. Kennedy.
He called the
attacks "baseless" and said they would dangerously increase
"the terrible strains and divisions" of U.S. political life.

Like McCarthy, Kennedy is a bitter critic of administration
war policy and an advocate of "de-escalation" in Vietnam.
Some McCarthy critics have looked upon the Minnesota Senator
as a "stalking horse" candidate, with Keimedy scheduled
later to emerge as the major Democratic opponent of President Johnson for this year's nomination.
Mclntyre, however, has recently paraded himself as a "hawk"
and strong backer of the Johnson war policy, although in
his campaign last year against Gen. Harrison Thyng he took
a pronouncedly "dovish" line against Thyne's proposals to
deal bellicosely with the Communists ....
In addition to the first page "news" story which the New Hampshire Sunday

News carried, the edition also contained two editorials.

The first titled

"McCartliyisms" led, "New Hampshire Democratic leaders, especially Gov. John
W.

King, are to be congratulated for getting out their shillelaghs last week

to give the peacenik's candidate,

laboring."

Senator Eugene McCarthy, a vigorous be-

It went on to congratulate the Johnson leaders for "borrowing"
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the editor's description of McCarthy as "The Hanoi
Candidate,"

The editorial

contended that the "howls of anguish from the McCarthy
camp prove the effective
ness of this attack.

We have even the delicious spectacle of a McCarthy
lament

Ing that he's the victim of McCarthyisml "27

The second editorial attacked Senator Mclntyre for his "boost" to
Senat<
:or

McCarthy's "flagging New Hampshire campaign."

The title "Mac the Knife" cast

Mclntyre as stabbing the Johnson campaign in the back by criticizing King's
characterizations of McCarthy.

The editorial contended:

We would be the last to suggest that McCarthy is less
patriotic than Mclntyre.

—

The fact is nobody in New Hampshire
certainly not
Governor King or Mr. Craig
has impugned McCarthy's
loyalty.

—

It is his judgment which is being questioned.
Neville
Chamberlain at Munich acted out of the highest regard
for his country's welfare
"peace in our time." But
his tactics, like those of McCarthy, were those of

—

appeasement and surrender.

Hitler was overjoyed, just as will be Ho Chi Minh if
McCarthy gets a good vote on Tuesday.
Indeed the Communists must already be delighted at the boost given
their cause by President Johnson's New Hampshire cochairman
I

Bad blood between Mclntyre and Gov. King long had been
rumored. They are reported to be rivals for the federal
judge-ship which LBJ will shortly bestow in this disdistrict.
This latest bit of back-stabbing by Mclntyre
will not close any rifts but it should greatly assist
Pre.sident Johnson in making up his mind on the judgeship. 28
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Mclntyre Recants

When Senator McCarthy returned to the Wayfarer after his
campaign visits
that Sunday afternoon, he accidently encountered Senator
Mclntyre arriving

for a Johnson campaign sponsored event at the same
motor inn.

McCarthy thanked

Mclntyre for his moderation and courage in speaking out against
the remarks of
Governor King.

Mclntyre mumbled a response, appeared a bit stunned by the

encounter, and hurried off to the reception.

Those watching were puzzled by

the exchange and especially by Senator Mclntyre 's reaction. 29

\vhat

they would

soon learn was that Mclntyre had just come from a meeting arranged by Bernard

Boutin to get his co-chaiman back on the track of the campaign.

From subsequent accounts of the meeting, Boutin, using the full force of
his ties with the

VJlilte

House, insisted that Senator Mclntyre clarify his

earlier statements and re-affirm his full support for not only President

Johnson but for the campaign and its leadership.

Mclntyre, who had been in

Washington for most of the campaign and had not been involved in planning the
Johnson write-in was obviously shocked by the direction the campaign had taken
in

h;.s

absence.

What Boutin made clear to Mclntyre, during that Sunday after-

noon meeting, was that it was not only too late to change things but that unless Mclntyre came fully on board the carapaign he would suffer serious political damage in Washington and in his relationship with the White House.

I-Jhat

this implied was that the White House was in support of the tactics which the

Johnson managers had devised and that Mclntyre was the odd man and might well
be out if he did not return to the fold.
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The next morning the Manchester Union Lc^adcr carried a story
headlined,

"Mclntyre Drops Defense of McCarthy," with a suh-head, "Does Complete
AboutFacc, Joins Gov. King."
U.S.

Sen. Tom Mclntyre of Laconia, reportedly under heavy
pressure from the regular Democratic establishment, last
night abandoned his defense of Minnesota Sen. Eugene J.
McCarthy against charges by Gov. John W. King that votes
for McCarthy "will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi."

Mclntyre 's clarification press release read:
Let me make it clear!
Gov. King and I are united in our
support of President Johnson.
Gov. King said that Hanoi
is watching the New Hampshire Primary.
I say that is the
truth.
Gov. King said that a 'significant vote for Sen.
McCarthy will be greeted with cheers in Hanoi.' I agree
that is unfortunately true.
100%
Gov. King says that
McCarthy's charge that we are using foul techniques in
this campaign 'is a smokescreen.'
I agree with Gov. King.

—

Gov. King and I have said repeatedly in this campaign
that we support President Johnson's stand in Vietnam.
We support our fighting men in Vietnam. We say, Gov.
King and I, that the people of New Hampshire can best
show their support of our troops in Vietnam by writing
in the name of President Johnson on Tuesday.
VJe ask
that the people of New Hampshire join us.^^

In response to v/hat the Manchester Union Leader reported as "heavy pres-

sure from the regular establishment here and in Washington," Mclntyre not only
issvied the above statement, V7hich v^as released at about the time Mclntyre had

his chance meeting with McCarthy, but had sealed his resolve by making a radio

commercial tape.
election.

That tape v/ould be aired during the time remaining before the

It was Mclntyre who would be the vehicle for the famous last minute

charge of the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary.
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In what seemed to many the ultimate irony, Richard Nixon, when speaking

in Nashua "deplored" the attacks on McCarthy.

patriotic Americans.

"All of the candidates are

All deserve a respectful hearing," Nixon declared.

"There has been a tendency to let the campaign get down to personalities,"
and this he deplored

.

-^-^

Mclntyre's Recording:

The Red Herring

A week had passed since Senator McCarthy had spoke before the student
audience at Dartmouth College.

Saturday morning, March 9th, as McCarthy was

campaigning in Franklin, a radio station teletype carried a report of a charge
coDTiing

from the Johnson campaign which referred to McCarthy's response to the

question he had answered in Hanover concerning amnesty.

The teletype report

stated that McCarthy had promised blanket amnesty to all draft dodgers, resisters, and deserters of the Vietnam period.

Hoeh, then traveling with

McCarthy, called the VJayfarer press office to get them to monitor the release
and also to review the tape of McCarthy's Hanover speech.

To him this ap-

peared to be the last minute charge that had been expected as the campaign

neared its climax.
Later that afternoon the McCarthy press office issued

a

release which

said that the remarks attributed to McCarthy had been taken out of context
and that the correct reading was as transcribed from the tape of the Senator's

speech.

Since Saturday is a dead news day in New Hampshire the only motion

either the Johnson charge or the McCarthy rebuttal received was over the radio
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The matter seemed to have gone the way of many charges during the campaign
when
it did not prominently appear in New Hampshire's only Sunday newspaper.

That evening David Hoeh received a tip from one of his contacts at a

Manchester radio station that Senator Mclntyre had recorded a political advertisement that was scheduled to run at a saturation rate Monday and Tuesday.
The summary of the message was similar to that which had been picked up
Saturday.

Hoeh relayed his information to Richard Goodwin and explained to Goodwin
the potential impact of such a last minute accusation on the voter.

To Hoeh

the charge sounded much like one that had defeated John Sullivan many years

before.

It was a charge that could not be satisfactorily answered in the

time that remained, and further McCarthy's

ansx^^er

as transcribed from the

tape did lend at least a half-truth substantiation to the charge.
By the time Hoeh found out where the tape had been recorded it was after

midnight.

Goodwin said that it was imperative that either the tape be de-

stroyed or that a copy of the exact text be secured.

Sometime after 2:00 a.m.

Hoeh awoke the station manager who agreed to let him hear the recording.

Hoeh

met the manager at about 2:30 a.m., and got an accurate transcription of the

recording.

The manager also showed him the booking schedule for the tape.

The heaviest plays were for Manchester, Nashua and Berlin.
The substance of Mclntyre 's message was that McCarthy had promised blanket amnesty to all Vietnam draft dodgers and deserters.

He contended that

such an action would undermine the moral fiber of the nation.

To vote for
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McCarthy, Mclntyrc contended, would be to turn a back on
the boys fighting in

Vietnam and could do nothing more than please Hanoi.

By implication, a vote

for McCarthy would be tantamount to endorsing treason if not
actually an act
of treason. 32

The McCarthy managers were stunned by the charge, the distortion of

McCarthy's response, and by its potential impact during the last hours of
the campaign.

They concluded that the message would have a serious impact

in Manchester and might also be damaging in Nashua and some of the Seacoast

cities,

Hoeh advised that the campaign take steps to stop the message from

being aired.

It seemed to him to be sufficiently inaccurate as to be libelous

and the threat of such legal action might be enough to keep stations from ac-

cepting the message for transmission.
While

HoeJi

explored this option, Goodv7in reacted differently.

The like-

lihood of stopping the message seemed remote to him and perhaps the conse-

quences of letting the message go would be more destructive to Johnson's

candidacy nationally than blocking it in New Hampshire would be of help to
McCarthy.

As the sun rose on the last full day of the campaign, Monday,

March 11th, Goodwin had worked out a strategy.
The Mclntyre message contrasted two perspectives of the campaign, that
of the New Hampshire leader and that of a person with national political cam-

paign experience.

Hoeh felt the message should be stopped in order to keep

it from destroying the momentum for McCarthy.

message play without

a

Hoeh felt that to let Mclntyre'

rebuttal, and no rebuttal was possible, would produce

irreparable damage to McCarthy's New Hampshire vote.
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Goodwin, on the other hand, saw in the charge the
essence of Johnsoii's

national campaign.

If the tactics embodied in King's characterizations
and

Mclntyre's last minute message succeeded, then the Johnson
managers would reproduce the fear motive, the patriotism image and the characterization
of
dissent in each subsequent contest.

To Goodwin the damage to McCarthy's

New Hampsliire vote would be insignificant compared to the outrage of the
reporters, editors, columnists and television anchor men.

To them, Goodwin

concluded, the Nclntyre charge would be seen as a severe threat to treasured

traditions of free speech, free press and civil dissent.

Johnson might sur-

vive the New Hampshire primary through this strategem but the image of a

newly repressive political ethos would destroy his chances in other states,
especially the next primary, Wisconsin.

It was with this response in mind

that McCarthy convened an early morning press conference.

With restrained outrage in tone, McCarthy gave the reporters transcripts
of the Mclntyre message, read it, then read the statement which had been pre-

pared as his reaction.

The message was clear and needed little explanation.

What Mclntyre represented in his suatement was Wiite House ordered and White

House approved.

This would be just the beginning of a campaign strategy that

would be used across the nation unless it was immediately and convincingly
shown for what it

v/as.

The reporters needed no further prompting.

was at hand of what they had felt during the past week.

The proof

A national reaction

against the Johnson campaign tactics and characterizations was growing.

Re-

gardless of whether McCarthy succeeded or failed in New Hampshire his service
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had boen to rovcnl the naturo of the Johnson caiididacy
and the ^^dllingness of
ite managers to repress dissent, limit debate and cast
aspersion on the motives
of those questioning administration policies.

A full blo;^ image of a national

politics shaped according to the model of the Texas unit rule caucus system
and
the unquestioning loyalty which Lyndon Johnson demanded was not clearly
pre-

sented to the nation.
shake.

This would be a difficult, if not impossible, image to

Richard Goodwin knew this image would be a consequence.

experience to draw this from

v;hat

He had the

might have been simply another In a long

history of the infamous last minute, "Red-herring" charges of a close New

Hampshire campaign.

Predicting the Impact:

What Will Be Significant?

The numbers game had been a favorite topic of the reporters throughout
the campaign.

Now in the final hours they each had to pick a number, a per-

centage, which each candidate would have to achieve in order for the results
to be significant.

For Lyndon Johnson the figure had to be above 50 per cent

and to be a decisive victory at least 60 per cent would be necessary.

For

McCarthy the subheadline of a March 11th He rald Traveler story summed up the
problem: "And the Experts Are Still Baffled."

Throughout the campaign the McCarthy leaders had refused to be trapped
by the numbers questions of the reporters.

McCarthy refused the bait himself,

answering that he expected to "win" the New Hampshire primary but refused to
define the word "win."

587

Evans and Novak in their coluivm dated January
25, 1968, said "A McCarthy

vote of luore than 20 percent would be a surprise and a total
of less would be
a

significant disaster. "33

A mail- in Manchester Union Leader poll, reported

February 7th, had Senator McCarthy receiving 28 votes to Johnson's 388
and
Robert Kennedy's 36.

The Johnson campaign leaders began their campaign with

the assumption that almost all true New Hampshire Democrats would be voting

for the President,

'90,000 Strong' was the theme.

To concede even a few votes

to McCarthy was upsetting.

By February 18th the New York Times reported:

Senator nor the Governor seemed unduly concerned.
Mr.

McCarthy's staging an upset

Minnesota Senator

—

.

"Neither the New Hampshire
.about the possibility of

the official party estimate is that the

be lucky to get 12 per cent of the vote. "3^'

v;ill

Boutin commented in an interview February 26th:
"If we're free of snow storms or sub zero weather, I
would guess we'll get a vote of somewhere in the area
of 50,000 to 55,000, and I think more than that is well
conceivable."

How many of those votes would be for President Johnson?
"t^liat we're looking for is a substantial majority.
We're
out to better the record of 196A when the President got
something in the order of 29,000 and I would hope we
could rollup 60, 70 or more per cent."
Does Boutin think a Johnson winning margin of two to one
enough to have Johnson look good in New Hampshire?
Boutin replied, "I v/ouldn't couch it in those terms.
I say the President should do as well or better than he
d±d in 1964 wlien he had everything going for him... no
opposlti on.
and he got around 29,000 votes.
.

.

"Now, I'd say anything 25,000 and up is a very clear
victory. "35
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Governor King predicted a Democratic vote of "42,000" with
Senator

McCarthy receiving "between 12,000 and 18,000 votes. "36

The Boston Globe re-

ported the findings of a Time magazine poll of New Hampshire
voting that gave

"President Johnson 62 percent, Sen. McCarthy 11 percent, and Robert Kennedy
9

percent."

A Newsweek article in the March 4th edition reported "Wiat is

disheartening to the insurgent forces is a survey conducted by a McCarthyprone University of New Hampshire political science professor:
49

percent

it gave LBJ

of the vote. Sen. Robert Kennedy 21 percent and the Minnesota

senator only

9

to 10 points. "^8

Wlien Evans and

Novak looked at the New Hampshire situation again just

before the election they wrote, "So unpredictable is the size of the voter
turnout and the number who will actually write in the President's name that

scientific pollsters cannot guess the outcome.

But contrary to early boasts

by the Democratic regulars here that McCarthy would be held to 10 percent,
his total is likely to exceed 25 percent and conceivably could climb to 40

percent

—

enough to give him momentum for next month's Wisconsin primary. "39

To add to the fun, the result-; of New Hampshire high school polls began
to trickle into the newspapers.

Remembering that former Deaiocratic National

Chairman, John Bailey, held much stock in such polls, the results were en-

couraging to the McCarthy leaders.
...In a mock primary election held yesterday at Concord
High School, on the Democratic ballot, Sen. Eugene McCarthy,
D-Minn., easily topped the list polling 184 votes while
President Johnson, whose name did not appear on the ballot,
received 37 write-in votes.

A total of 542 students, 48 percent of the student body,
turned out to take part in the mock election. '^0
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This was an iir.portant indication of the ir.pact that
Senator McCarthy had made
on the New Hampshire populace.

Concord was an importcint city for him and

contained an independent voting population.

If his candidacy had been this

attractive, the returns in like communities on election day would
be encouraging.

With a headline, "McCarthy Drive Snowballs Through New Hampshire," the
l3ogton Herald Traveler concluded,

"If McCarthy pulls more than 25 or 30 per-

cent of the vote he is a "winner."^!

Such concluding analyses began to

frighten Bernard Boutin and he raised his expectations of what McCarthy

would need in order to be termed a "significant" vote.
Neither the Johnson people nor McCarthy is making any
broad predictions.
Bernard Boutin. .. said last week
that if McCarthy does not get 40 percent of the vote
his campaign will be a failure.
But V7hat will be interpreted as a dramatic win by most
in New Hampshire is roughly 35 percent to 37 percent
of the vote.
With this McCarthy could capture all of
the V\ delegate votes to the Democratic convention in
Chicago in August. ""^2
In this item was the first mention of delegates.

this writer, Robert Healy, the Globe

gates to Johnson.

'

s

Virtually everyone except

Political Editor, had conceded the del

This was certainly the case among the McCarthy leadership.

Boutin's struggle to escalate his prediction of the McCarthy percentage

was reported

b>'

the New York Times.
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Two months ago leading New Harapshire Democrats gave Senator McCarthy less than 15 percent of the vote.
Two weeks
ago a top Johnson Administration strategist raised this
to 30.
With five days to go, the Johnson campaign director, Bernard Boutin, said it would be "a disgrace if
McCarthy gets less than 40 per cent," based on his spending and campaigning.

McCarthy backers said they would be well satisfied if the
Minnesota Senator got 25 per cent of the vote.*^-"^
The New Hampshire Sunday News handicapper set the odds at:
'pledged'

to win; McCarthy,

Reston wrote:

"Johnson, 6-5,

3-1, slow starter, but closing ground. "^^

James

"If McCarthy gets 25 or 30 per cent of the vote against a

President of his own party in that election, the President's victory will
not be a triumph but a warning."

And in the same issue the Times reported

that "49 percent, believe the United States was wrong to have become involved
nrJ.litarily in Vietnam,

according to the latest Gallup

Poll."*^'^

During the final week an advance staff for the NBC coverage of the election had been preparing a background book on the 1968 New Hampshire primary
for David Brinkley and Chet Huntley.

Part of that assignment was to determine

the percentages above which a "significant" result could be ascertained.

In-

to the mysterious "black box" that was used to produce their calculation were

numerous interviews, some spot polling, the wisdom of pundits such as

Richard

Scammon, former Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and the expectations
of the candidates' managers.

The McCarthy managers set 25 per cent as their

figure hoping the network would not set its mark much above 30 per cent.

Boutin scrammbled to get the networks to accept his threshold for McCarthy as
being 40 percent.

Late Monday afternoon, March 11th, NBC's conclusion was set
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and rumored about, the halls of the Wayfarer.

Anything above 35 percent for

McCarthy was determined by the network as being "significant."

Given what the

canvassing results had shown, the McCarthy managers protested like Cheshire
NBC had placed the figure a bit higher than they had wanted but not un-

cats.

reasonably so.

For Johnson, the NBC threshold was 50 percent.

No delegate

count prediction was included nor a projection of a vote total in the Demo-

cratic primary.

Now that NBC had come to its conclusion, the election could

be held.

New Hampshire Votes
Curtis Cans had learned from the reporters that Waterville Valley would
be the first community voting in the presidential primary.

As has become a

New Hampshire tradition, he arranged a special mailing for those on the Waterville Valley voting list.

McCarthy from

v;hat he had

He suspected that the result would be favorable for

learned from those campaigning in northern Grafton

County.

Soon after midnight, March 12th, the first returns trickled back to Manchester:

for Richard Nixon all eight Republican votes.

Party side:

eight votes for McCarthy,

2 v/rite-in

and not a single vote for Lyndon B. Johnson.

workers and reporters straggled off to sleep.

On the Democratic

votes for Robert Kennedy,

With that omen, most campaign
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Tvo activities occupied the McCarthy workers election day.
to get out the McCarthy vote.

vote once the polls had closed.
cair.paign

v/as

The second was to get ready to tabulate that
At the state headquarters in Concord and the

headquarters in Manchester at the Wayfarer, tally sheets, name cards

and tote boards were carefully lettered and arranged for those
conie

The first

to watch the returns.

v7ho

would later

Someone had had credential stickers printed that

would be distributed to the campaign workers to insure that they would be allowed into the rooms where the excitement would be the greatest.

How these

would be distributed no one had quite figured out, but each of the principals
involved in the campaign v/ere given a pack to hand out to those they recog-

nized when the crowd would arrive that evening.
NBC had reserved the convention hall of the Wayfarer and had been spending the V7eek building sets, erecting computerized tally boards, having installed numerous telephone lines, teletypes, and setting up tally tables with add-

ing machines to aggregate the vote.

David Brinlcley and Chet Huntley had ar-

rived a day or so before and their evening news broadcast had originated from
the Wayfarer studio the previous evening.
CBS, once again interested in the New Hampshire result, had set up a mini-

studio in a downto\im Manchester hotel where Walter Cronkite would report,

"That's the

v;ay

it is."

ABC relied on the primitive facilities of their Man-

chester affiliate, Channel 9, as their base.

Volunteers from the New Hampshire

League of Women Voters and university students had been organized to collect
the vote at each polling place and report to the wire service pool which then

593

relayed the tallies to their network, newspaper and radio
station subGcribers.

NBC had conunli^Eloned Richard

Scaimiion

and Oliver Quayle to select sample pre-

cincts for early analysis and projection purposes.

gathered and reported separately.

These results could be

Since with only a few exceptions. New Hamp-

shire voted by paper ballot, the results v/ould take some time to tally.
Also, since there were a number of local issues to be voted upon at the
town

meetings, and town meeting polls do not usually close until the warrant for
the meeting has been completed, some towns wou]d not have their presidential

vote tallies completed until late in the evening.

With all of the local is-

sues, presidential candidates and write-in candidates on both the Democratic

and Republican ballots, and numerous candidates for delegates and alternative

delegates to the national conventions, completing a vote tally for even the
small towns was a demanding and time consuming task.

each voter

v;as

The ballot that faced

the size of a newspaper page.

McCarthy spend the day with friends, chatting with reporters, being
photographed watching volunteers preparing placards, posters and trimmings
for the evening.

He was relaxed, seemed confident that the returns would be

favorable, and visibly enjoyed v/itnessing the final burst of energy that was

concluding

tlic

campaign.

The same thoroughness that had become the trademark

of the campaign carried through the preparations for the evening.

An image

of what had been accomplished in New Hampshire would be projected from the

McCarthy headquarters across the nation and even the world that evening.
That image had to summarize and exemplify what had been accomplished in New

Hampshire and what the New Hampshire vote should
signify in terms of the

McCarthy candidacy and the McCarthy position on the
issues.

\^at had become

an exceptionally exciting political event for
the reporters, the volunteers,

the professionals and an important part of the New
Hampshire electorate now

had to be encapsulated for transmission outside New Hampshire.

To do this

the McCarthy campaign rented the largest meeting room left in
the city, an

expandable banquet room at the Wayfarer, set up a stage, decorated the stage

with tally boards, and a large McCarthy for President banner.

The television

networks set up their cameras, special telephones and tables were set aside
for the reporters, radio connections, and tape recording equipment was installed.

V7ith all the

electronic equipment, the stage, backdrop, and other

paraphenalia, even a few people standing in the remaining space would like
like a monstrous crowd.

Each local McCarthy committee and headquarters kept close track of the
voting.

In the afternoon they began calling those names on the canvassing

cards that were identified as number "1" and "2" favorable to or leaning to

Senator McCarthy.

If time and volunteer power allowed,

the "3" were also

called in hopes that the last minute Johnson campaign charges and steady

McCarthy response might have motivated them toward voting for McCarthy.
To make getting to the polls more convenient for the voters, rides and

babysitting were offered.

Radio and newspaper ads carried headquarters tele-

phone numbers for voting help.

Au the final jog to the voter, an advertisement

with a message that was also repeated on the radio appeared in the newspapers:
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How will you feel Tomorrow Morning?
Just stop and think for a minute. How would you feel
if you woke up tomorrow to find that Eugene McCarthy
had won the Democratic primary? Wouldn't you feel
that suddenly there was new hope for America
that
perhaps we might break out of the dreary circle of
rising discontent and continuing stagnation? Wouldn't
you be proud that New Hampshire had changed the entire
political picture of the nation
and restored vitality to the democratic process? And, wouldn't you be
pleased that the independence of New Hampshire voters
had enabled a lone man of conviction to triumph over
huge odds and all the prophets? You can m.ake Wednesday
that kind of morning... by voting for Eugene McCarthy.

—

—

McCarthy for President. ^+6
With almost no information about what was happening during the day, except turnout figures from some of the cities' ballot box totals, McCarthy

workers busied themselves throughout the day.

In spite of the cold,

sno\vry

weather, the turnout of voters selecting the Democratic ballot appeared to
be ahead of the projected 50,000 to 55,000 total.

NBC at selected polling places and reports

from.

Spot checks of voters by

McCarthy workers suggested

that the McCarthy vote was holding about as had been projected from the can-

vassing results.
The city polling places closed at 8:00 p.m.

Partsmouth, voting by

machine, reported first.
Ward'^^

McCarthy

Johnson

5

157
122
115
119
A3

6

_A_3

24
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268

1
2

3
A

44

68
38

48
46
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The

Port:

City, locaLion of two important military installations,
had voted

more than two to one for McCarthy.

The excitement produced by this first

serious return rippled through the Wayfarer.
soon became clear that McCarthy

V7as

As the returns filtered in it

solidly above forty percent and had a

good chance of electing a majority of the delegates.
In the excitement of the returns, two other surprises emerged.

Those

arriving from the polling places reported something that had not been assimilated by the networks. McCarthy had received a significant vnrite-in vote on
the ballots of Republican voters, especially in communities like Concord,

Peterborough, Hanover and others with disaffected Romney supporters and
liberals disguised as Republicans.

This information led the McCarthy leaders

to immediately call for a careful tabulation of all of these votes.

The second surprise came when the results were called in from Berlin.

Ward^S
1
2
3
4

McCarthy

Johnson

AOl
358
A73

A29
361
294
A40

1,636

1,524

AO^

McCarthy had carried BerlinI
At about 10:30 p.m., McCarthy slipped out of his cottage to drive into

Manchester for an interview with Walter Cronkite.

McCarthy enjoyed Cronkite's

manner and the fact that he had come to New Hampshire during the past weekend
to see what was happening himself.

McCarthy was also amazed that NBC would go

to such elaborate lengths to cover the voting but not really cover the campaign.
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AG a
first:

persor..-.,!

tweak at NBC's extravagance, he let CBS and Cronkite
have the

interview.

He returned to the cottage in tine to be summoned for
a live

interview with David Brinkley and Chet Huntley on the 11:00 p.m.
news.

With

Blair Clark, Hoeh, Studds and several others, he plov^ed a path
through the

snow from his cottage to the rear of the Convention Center, arriving
minutes
before the live broadcast

V7as

to begin.

Introducing McCarthy, David Brinkley said that McCarthy had scored a

•

stunning upset not only in the preferential vote but by the election of delegates as xcell.

McCarthy summarized his

moaning which he felt it conveyed.

o\<m

reaction to the results evd the

To Brinkley 's question as to whether he

had talked to Robert Kennedy, he said that he "had talked with Robert Lowell,"

which McCarthy felt was at least as important that evening as having received
a congratulatory telephone call from Senator Robert Kennedy.

As the concluding rite of the campaign, McCarthy then strode across the

covered bridge into the Bedford room where his supporters, workers and the
curious, waited for their hero.

Amidst cheers that erupted with the slightest

provocation, McCarthy thanked all for their help, urged them to continue, and

expressed the possibility that what had started in New Hampshire now would go
all the way to the Chicago Convention and, perhaps, even beyond.

In the few

hours of that evening, McCarthy had become a serious presidential contender
and everyone in the room sensed the importance of the change.

.
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THE VOTE, THE RESULT, AND THE IMPACT

Introduction:

UT^at

Produces the Impact of

a

New Hamps hire, Pr1...rv?

Observers assess the results of the New Hampshire
presidential primary
from two immediately available returns.

The first, and

n^ost

important, is the

return from the presidential preference portion of
the ballot -- the "beauty
contest."

In this return there are two aspects which draw
attention.

The

first is the percentage of the total vote, and the
second is the actual number
of votes each candidate receives.

For these returns the analysts have calculated a significance
projection
for each of the principal candidates.

In 1968 the NBC projections (35 percent

for McCarthy and 60 percent for Johnson) were the accepted significance
points
in the Democratic primary.

For either candidate to reach or exceed the signi-

ficant percentage would mean victory.

Beyond the 60 percent for Johnson figure

was another agreed upon threshold, that of a normal "win-lose" election, 50
percent.

If President Johnson received less than 50 percent of the Democratic

vote then it would mark a political disaster for him, at least as elections
are interpreted by reporters.

Presidential primary voter turnout helped to determine the appeal of a
candidate or of

a

particular contest.

If the total vote was less than that

recorded in previous contests then it could be concluded that interest was low
and the respective candidate appeal was low; therefore, the significance of
the contest

v;as

less.
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The secor.d sicniflcant return examined
by election observers is the result
of the delegate selection portion
of the ballot.
Although the New Hampshire

delegation to a national convention is
minute, the fact that voters vould trans
late their support for a candidate in the
preference portion of the ballot, to
support convention delegate candidates is
a further indication of candidate
appeal.

On both accounts (percent of the preference
vote and delegate selection)

McCarthy scored impressively.

As for turnout,

the number of votes cast in the

preference primary exceeded that of the previous high vote
in John F. Kennedy's
1960 presidential primary.

For that election a significant turnout for Kennedy

had been predicted by Governor Wesley Powell as having
to be above 20,000 votes
The total turnout of Democratic voters was 53,652 with
50,899 casting ballots
for candidates, a return far in excess of the threshold of appeal
that Governor

Powell had projected. as of significance.

Participation in both party primaries

in 1960 was 41.5 percent of the total voter registration.

The significance figure for the 1968 election was set at the 40,000 total
vote figure which John

F.

Kennedy had received in the 1960 pres idential primary

(Kennedy's vote total was 43,372.).-1-

This was the figure both Boutin and

Mclntyre used as their reference point in predicting primary returns and turn
out significance.

The total Democratic vote cast for candidates was 55,464 of

a total Democratic vote cast of 60,519.

The percentage of the total vote cast

in both primaries was 46.4 percent although the total number of registered
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voters had increased by 9.0 percent from 1960 to
1968.

lloeh

had predicted that

the intra-party contest would produce approximately
10,000 new Democratic party

registrations as the result of new voters and Independent
voters selecting the

Democratic primary ballot in the election.

He had contended that regardless

of the outcome of the primary and the fact that the number
of registered Demo-

crats in New Hampshire would increase importantly,

success for the Democratic Party.

VJhen the next

the primary would be a

tabulation of Democratic Party

registrations was made shortly after the March 12th result, the New Hampshire

Democratic Party exceeded 100,000 registrations for the first time in its histor}^.

Instead of the "90,000 strong" which had been the Johnson campaign's

campaign cry in support of the President there were now 10,000 more persons
identified as Democrats.

The Republican Party, dominant by approximately 60

percent to 40 percent, declined.

Both the issues and the contest had attracted

increased participation generally and specifically increased participation

within the Democratic Party.

TABLE 14.01:
A.

Votes Cast, Presidential Primary 1960 and 1968^

Democratic Vote

Yea.r

Vote cast
for Candidates

Democratic
Vote

Principal
Candidate Vote

1960

50,899

53,652

43,372

1968

55,464

60,519

50,783

B.

Year

Voter Turnout

Total Names
on Checklist

Total Votes
Cast

Percent
Votes Cast

1960

325,885

135,216

41.5%

1968

368,503

168,762

46.4%

A
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While

the.

candidates of one party often receive

a

scattering of write-in

votes on the ballot of the other party,
the 1968 presidential primary produced
a significant Democratic vote on the
Republican Party ballot.

A total of

7.

percent of the Republican votes were cast for
Democratic candidates with
Eugene McCarthy receiving 5.3 percent of that
total.

On the Democratic ballot

5.1 percent of the vote cast was for Republican candidates
with Richard Nixon

receiving 4.6 percent (See Table 14.02)

Presidential Preference Vote Analysis
As the principal objective of the campaign the result of the
preference portion of the ballot was of the greatest significance in the evaluation
of the

McCarthy campaign strategy.
and the next day.

The totals were what counted on election evening

The totals caused the impact and the media's evaluation of

those totals created the impact.

As Table 14.02 shows, Lyndon Johnson failed

to achieve even the 50 percent mark.

Senator McCarthy's showing of 42.0 per-

cent exceeded the significance projection of 35 percent by

7

points, an accom-

plishment that gave the election its startling interpretation.

When the full

returns were available March 13th, the Republican write-in totals for both Johnson and McCarthy added further impact.

VThen the

Republican write-in vote was

added to the Democratic vote totals, Johnson received 46.7 percent of the total
to 45.9 percent for McCarthy^

Democratic candidates.

a vote difference of 524 between the two principal
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TABLK 14.02:

Ofiicial Results, New Hampshire Presidential Primary
1968, By Candidates-^

Democratl c Primary
XT

Lyndon
Johnson

L

XUlaVy

1

77 fl

,

.7

o Vi n CI n n

1. /A>)

23,263 (42.0%)

Eugene
McCarthy

5 511

Richard
Nixon

2,532

(

4.6%)

Richard
Nixon*

80.666

Robert
Kennedy

606

(

1.2%)

Robert
Kennedy

None

Paul
Fisher

506

(

0.9%)

Paul
Fisher

249

(

0.5%)

Nelson
Rockefeller

201

(

0.4%)

George
Wallace

None

Cromiuelin"''^

186

(

0.3%)

George
Romney*

1,743

(

1.7%)

Richard
Lee*

170

(

0.3%)

Stone*

527

(

0.5%)

Jacob
Gordon*

77

(

0.1%)

Harold
St as sen*

429

(

0.4%)

Ronald
Reagan

362

(

0.3%)

Herbert
Hoover*

247

(

0.2%)

David
Wa tumuli*

161

(

0.2%)

William
Evans*

151

(

0.2%)

73

(

0 11)

39

(

0.04%)

Nelson
Rockefeller
George
VJallace

John

Scattering

1

Lyndon
27,520 (49.6%)

(.

Eugene
McCarthy*

March

374

(

0.4%)

11,241 CIO S7)

VJillis

154

55,464(100.0%)

Don Dumont*

Scattering

636

103,938 (100.0%)
*

Indicates that name appeared on ballot.
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It Is not clear exactly where the
Republican vote for the Democartlc candi-

dates

ca.«e

tions.

from except as a product of particular campaign
events and sugges-

The principal event was the withdrawal of Romney
as an active candidate.

Some Republican voters may have intended to vote for
Romney as an anti-war gesture but shifted their vote to McCarthy as the only
active candidate opposing
U.S.

Vietnam policy.

Write-in voting suggestions were widely circulated in the campaign.

The

principal suggestion, of course, was that promoted by the Johnson campaign
on
behalf of their candidate.

A secondary suggestion came from Republicans working

for McCarthy v/ho urged Republicans to write McCarthy's name in on their ballot.

A third suggestion came from the editors of the Manchester Union Leader

to dis-

satisfied Democrats urging them to write Richard Nixon's name in on their Democratic ballots. The background for each of these suggestions had been the success of the Henry Cabot Lodge write-in effort in the 196A presidential primary.

A potential surprise write-in for Robert Kennedy did not occur on either ballot.
Active Kennedy support had been completely incorporated v;ithin the McCarthy
campaign.

Noting Table 14.03, 1968 Republican Vote for McCarthy and Johnson, the
county returns show some relationship between effective McCarthy organization,
the activity of Republicans for McCarthy, and the county McCarthy vote as a

Republican write-in.

With rare exception, where McCarthy did well as

crat he also did well on the Republican ballot.

a

Demo-

The McCarthy caaipaign was well

organized in those counties where McCarthy drew more than 80 percent of the

1

1

606
:

1/..03:

^My_

1968 Kcpubllcan Vote, for McCarthy and Johnson, by County/*
%

%

Johnson

McCarthy

17.0%

83.0%

A 97

(65)

(318)

(6143)

25.4%

74

(53)

6%
(156)

(5329)

21.0%

79.0%

(109)

(409)

41.0%

59 07

/ .

(166)

(238)

(5173)

19.9%
(129)

80. 1%
(521)

(9601)

28.

71

(466)

(1192)

(25434)

Merrimack

19.8
(223)

80.
(899)

7 87
(14355)

Roc kins? ham

24 4

75

(347)

(1078)

(22994)

16.9
(88)

83.
(436)

7.1%
(7350)

33.3

66.7

(132)

(264)

24.4

75.6

(1778)

(5511)

Belknap

Carroll

Cheshire

Coos

Grafton

Hillsborough

Strafford

Sullivan

/

J-

LBJ/McCart.hy
% of
Total Co. Rep. Vote

.

•

7

07

(7430)
O/o

9

6

8.9%
(4464)

6.7%
(108,273)
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comblacd Ropubllcon write-in vote for McCartl,y
/Johnson

.

The impact of the heavy

McCarthy vote in the university/college towns
of Durham and Hanover is reflected
in the totals for Strafford and Grafton
Counties.

The strong McCarthy organiza-

tion centered in Concord influenced the total for
Merrimack County as did the

organization in Laconia upon the Belknap County result.

In each instance where

the McCarthy campaign was strong the Republican write-in
percentage increased.

Only in Coos County did this increase not significantly benefit
McCarthy.
Of those communities that had been targeted for special
attention by the

McCarthy campaign and those McCarthy subsequently carried, only in two
did Johnson get more Republican write-in votes than McCarthy and was even with
McCarthy
in three others.

(See Table 1A.04)

The McCarthy percentage of the Republican

vote seems to increase with the size of the McCarthy percentage of the Democratic
vote.

This is indicative of the legitimizing effect of strong Democratic support

for McCarthy among those liberals within the Republican Party,

VThile there does

not exist a specific study of the McCarthy Republican write-in vote, the fact that
the vote tends to be strongest in communities producing significant Democratic

results for McCarthy leads to the conclusion that the vote represents that same

voting inclination as the Democratic McCarthy vote.

It is also possible to con-

clude that there was little calculated anti-Johnson voting for the sake of harming Johnson as a potential opponent for the Republican nominee.

No institutional

or editorial source advised voting for McCarthy to hurt Johnson's political future
as a Republican opponent.

Voting advice when given was straightforward, either

based on issue positions or direct candidate preference.

\^hile it is

possible
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combined Republican write-in vote for McCarthy
/Johnson.

The impact of the heavy

McCarthy vote in the university/college towns of
Durham and Hanover is reflected
in the totals for Strafford and Grafton Counties.

The strong McCarthy organiza-

tion centered in Concord influenced the total for
Merrimack County as did the

organization in Laconia upon the Belknap County result.

In each instance where

the McCarthy campaign was strong the Republican write-in
percentage increased.

Only in Coos County did this increase not significantly benefit
McCarthy.
Of those communities that had been targeted for special
attention by the

McCarthy campaign and those McCarthy subsequently carried, only in two did
Johnson get more Republican write-in votes than McCarthy and was even with
McCarthy

in three others.

(See Table 14.04)

The McCarthy percentage of the Republican

vote seems to increase with the size of the McCarthy percentage of the Democratic
vote.

This is indicative of the legitimizing effect of strong Democratic support

for McCarthy among those liberals within the Republican Party.

While there does

not exist a specific study of the McCarthy Republican write-in vote, the fact that
the vote tends to be strongest in communities producing significant Democratic

results for McCarthy leads to the conclusion that the vote represents that same

voting inclination as the Democratic McCarthy vote.
clude that there

Vv'as

It is also possible to con-

little calculated anti-Johnson voting for the sake of harm-

ing Johnson as a potential opponent for the Republican nomii^ee.

No institutional

or editorial source advised voting for McCarthy to hurt Johnson's political future
as a Republican opponent.

Voting advice when given was straightforward, either

based on issue positions or direct candidate preference.

VJhile it is

possible
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REPUBLICAN VOTE FOR MCCARTHY/ JOHNSON In
McCARTHY COMMUNITIES^
REPUBLICAN

Community

% Mc *
Dera.

Berlin

51.7%

Rochester

Concord

53.9

Portsmouth

Salem

1st

51.0

69.

56.5

Vote

•

Total

%

%

Rep. Vote

Mc

LBJ

100.0%

8.9

(1649)

(146)

7.8
(129)

100.0%
(1608)

4.3%

0.8

(69)

(13)

100.0%

10.%

2

100.0%
(1759)

12.5%

5.2%

(219)

(91)

100.0%

3.1%

1.6%

(2430)

(75)

(39)

100.0%

2.2%

1.2%

(597)

(13)

(7)

100.0%

8.0%

+

(1419)

(114)

(1)

100.0%

5.1%

0.2%

(707)

(36)

(2)

100.0%

10.5%

5.5%

(2210)

(232)

(122)

100.0%

1.8%

0.3%

(666)

(12)

(2)

100.0%

2.3%

0.8%

(614)

(14)

(5)

100.0%

5.6%

0

(595)

(33)

(0)

100.0%

0.4

(961)

14.3%
(137)

100.0%

1.9%

1.9%

(316)

(6)

(6)

5%
(139)
.

CD.

Pelham

57.9

Hampton

57.9

Plaiston

Exeter

57.5

Seabrook

Fariningtou

Meredith

Durham

Milton

*

+

60.3

63.0

56.5

100.0

8^1.6

55.

Communities where McCarthy received 50% or more
Less than o. 1%

(4)

9)

..

.

TABLE lA.OA (Cent.)
RErURLlCAN
Coraniunity

2nd

\y

Total

%

%

Dem. Vote

Rep. Vote

Mc.

LBJ

SI

iUU uA
(All)

CD.

r%^T

ay

/*\ 1
jLiXTiuo
xn
"i

rlllton

Pet er borough

New IpswJ ch

Lancaster

1

Rs

r>

SI

7

DD O
.

J

/

.

CU .

59

/

(

nn
UU n"/
()/o
(157)

1

.

inn

Hinsdale

Andover

Hillsborough

Source:

A A P/

(229)

(10)

i

1

*7

60. 0

53.6

63.8

0.9%

A

t

•

9a

.

(3)

n*v

1

O/o

.

(A27)

(21)

(7)

UU [J/o
(10A6)

y

OA
(100)

1

iUU Ua
(267)

b

i

.

.

.

6/i

(A8)

nn r\°/
iUU
KJ/o
(306)
1

1
JL

.

.

n"/
V

/o

(3)

.

inn
IUU.

(12)
1

i

•

o^y
y/o

(5)

u . uy/i
(0)
Z

.

0/!i

(8)

U . 0 /o

UU U/o
(160)

1

.

OA
(23)

/

.

.

(3)

.

to O
o
DO

09%

(0)
6 /.

21

.

i

A.4

.

0.

(6)

UU UZ,
(1062)

i

2

(10)

.

CI

Troy

.

(A)

(628)

Ashland

A«y
O/o

1

1 r\r\
rw
iUU v/o
(1A8)

L t-L.llVJLj.Xt-

T?

1

Z Mc

(7)

o"/
U/o

(1)
VJ , VJ/o

(305)

(7)

(0)

100.0%

0.0%

0.0%

(2A9)

(0)

(0)

100.0%

1.1%

0.9%

(561)

(6)

(5)

N.H. Manual of Gen. Court 1969

pp.

325-363
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that some. votci-B wrote-in McCarthy's nmne
on their Republican ballot to ha:
irm

Johnson's political future there is no evidence
of a drive to et.courage Republicans to write-in Johnson's name on their
ballot as a means of diminishing his

chances against a Republican nominee.
The 1968 presidential primary was the first election
of this sort where

votes cast by use of another party ballot were
calculated in the election
assessment.

Previously such votes had been insignificant.

John

F.

Kennedy

attracted 2196 votes via the Republican ballot in 1960 and
Lyndon Johnson drew
an unrecorded scattering of write-votes in the 1964 presidential
primary.

The

New Hampshire McCarthy leaders had anticipated that some Republicans
might
wish to participate in the Democratic contest to express their concern
about
the situation in Vietnam.

VJhile they had avoided actively soliciting Republi-

can votes until after Governor George Romney withdrew, their anticipation of
a Republican contribution to the final McCarthy vote was important to the suc-

cess of the McCarthy campaign.

If McCarthy had announced his New Hampshire

candidacy before the end of the primary voter registration period, a number
of those who ultimately voted for McCarthy on the Republican ballot might have

re-registered as Democrats.

Not having re-registered, their only voting option

was the Republican ballot.

Preference Results by County

Johnson and McCarthy split the ten New Hampshire counties each carrying
five.

Of the five that Johnson carried, two, Hillsborough and Sullivan, were

carried by more than 50 percent of the vote
ly.

—

56.8 and 54.7 percent respective-

McCarthy carried Grafton and Rockingham Counties by more than 50 percent
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-

3/k7

^>ud

.SO.

3

percent respectively.

(See Table 14.03)

In no instance did

Johnson carry a county by the 60 percent that
had been set as his significance
point by NBC prior to the election.

McCarthy failed to reach 35 percent target

in only one county, Hillsborough, and there
missed by 0.9 percent.

With 48.7 percent of the total Democratic vote
cast by Hillsborough County,
the doiT:inance of that county in the election is
shown.

Of the total vote cast

for candidates, Hillsborough accounted for 40.6
percent of the total and 46.4

percent of the total vote received by President Johnson
statewide.

As will be

shown later, Manchester dominates Hillsborough County
Democratic Party voting
as does the county in statewide Democratic contests.

McCarthy carried the next most populous county, Rockingham, which sprawls
east from Hillsborough County along the Massachusetts border to the seacoast
city of Portsmouth.

Rockingham County's rapid growth communities, outside the

sphere of Manchester and politically tied to Massachusetts, supported McCarthy

significantly.

Along with Rockingham the surprise counties for McCarthy were

Coos, New Hampshire's most northerly county, and Strafford, a county containing

three traditionally Democratic cities adjacent to the Maine border.

Other than the two counties which produced exceptional results for McCarthy,
the results were relatively uniform, demonstrating the particular dynamics of
the Democratic party in each.

Other counties that McCarthy carried, or nearly

carried, were ones with smaller populations of Democrats or counties not domi-

nated by a single large urban center.

dominated counties

sucli as

Johnson's support came from the city

Hillsborough, Sullivan, and found strength in Merri-

mack by carrying the populous near Manchester Democratic towns of Pembroke and

9

7

1
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Table )A.05:

1968 Democratic Presidential Primary Results,
by County

PARTICIPATION

County

Belknap

+

%

%

Johnson

LBJ
Total

McCarthy

3.5

42.5

A7.0
(949)

Carroll

44.0

45.

1.1

45.6

4.4

36.5
(1093)

Hillsborough + 56.8

8.1

+

48.0

4.0

41.0

Sullivan

Totals

+

WINNER

+

of Total

3.6

3.6
(2020)

46.1

27.1
(2279)

+ 45.7

1.2

1.2
(663)

52.2

12.6

45.5

5.1

4.8
(2657)

41.3

27.9
(2868)

+48.5

10.1

8.9
(4889)

52.4

52.4
(5697)

+54
(1639)
.

7.0

5.4
(2998)

47.0

25.9
(3355)

(766)

34.1
(7684)

34.0

40.6
47.0
(22,535)

48.7
(24,105)

9.1

43.0

9.5

9.4
(5214)

47.6

28.3
(5667)

16.5

13.9
(7692)

51.7

27.0

9.5

8.3
(4574)

34.2

39.8
(4865)

3.5

4.0

43.2

35,

(2242)

11.5

(3155)

Strafford

Participation

46.4

(2503)

Rockingham

Dem

(2373)

(12,791)

Merrimack

%

Rep. & Dera,

(1210)

(2231)

Grafton

% Total

County
Total

(303)

(1220)
Cooj

%

(858

(292)

Cheshire +

%

McCarthy
Total

+50.3
(3866)

45.4
(2076)

7.5

54.7
(1210

4.4

49.6%
(27,520)

100.0%

+48.9
(2235)

38.9
(859)

42.0%
(23,269)

100.0%

(8501)

(2211)

(2416)

100.0%
46.4
(55,454) (168,792)

35.9
(60,519)
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Allcnstown.

Failure to carry Berlin and Coos County.
rortsn,outh and Rockingham

County, and to domindte in the Strafford
County cities was dan^aging to the

predicted totals for Johnson.

Participation in the election as calculated in Table
1A.05 is based upon
total vote cast (Republican and Democrat) as
a percentage of the total checklist
of registered voters.

Total figures for registered Democrats and registered

Republicans are not available.

The only way to reach a semblance of a partici-

pation index is to use the total vote cast as
registration.

a

function of the total voter

To a degree, participation can be shown to be a function
of com-

munity governmental form.

Those units of local government organized as towns

held town meetings that coincided with the date of the presidential
primary.

Town issues are likely to boost election participation in the presidential
primary; whereas few if any issues or electoral contests are offered to the city

voters.

As examples of this effect, Strafford County, with three cities, Sulli-

van County with one city and a few small towns,
3^.2 and 43.2 percent participation.

t;.-ailed

in participation with

Cheshire County with 41.3 percent partici-

pation reflects the Jjnportance of the city of Keene, and the fact that rural
Cheshire County Is a popular retirement area.
in New Hampshire and many retirees travel then.

March is

a

good time not to be

Absentee voting was not permit-

ted in the 1968 presidential primary.

Town meeting issues boosted the participation in Carroll, Coos and Rocking-

ham counties especially, and kept it above 45 percent elsewhere.

61A

Portlcipatioa of Democrats as a percentage of the
total vote cast reveals
the relationship between Democrats and Republicans
in the counties.

Of the ten

counties only Coos produced more Democratic votes than
were produced for the

Republican party with Hillsborough's 48.7 percent close to the
50 percent mark,
Strafford County with 39.8 percent and Sullivan with 35.1 percent
Democratic
vote of the total vote cast are next in line.

The remaining six counties are

dominated by Republican voters with Carroll County the most Republican County
in New Hampshire.

The relationship between percent Democratic participation

to percent Republican participation will be explored later as a means of prob-

ing the origin of some of Senator McCarthy's support.

McCarthy Strategy and Vote Production

Hoeh and Studds prepared two vote targeting/campaign resource allocating
memoranda.

The first of these was sent to McCarthy prior to his announcement

and allocated his campaign time to concentrations of Democratic voters.

This,

the December 22, 1967 memorandum, showed that using ten campaign days McCarthy

could campaign in cities or clusters of cities and towns, that would contain
75 percent of the Democratic vote usually cast in New Hampshire.

The second

memorandum was prepared by Hoeh for the first meeting of the Campaign Committee,
January 9, 1968, and listed twelve large Democratic vote producing cities and
towns,

23 First Congressional District communities,

and 22 Second Congressional

District communities In priority for campaign attention.

This memorandum be-

came the basis for the organizational time, candidate time, volunteer efforts
and other campaign efforts to these communities in relationship to their im-
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portanco as Democratic vote producers.

At least some activity for McCarthy was

carried out in each of the targeted conmiunities.

The success or failure of the

campaign is reflected in the vote result from these
communities and is especially important in the case of the twelve large city/
town targets.

Targeted City/Lar<^e To wn

Re.qiiltR

The McCarthy leaders' strategy identified the twelve priority
Democratic

vote producing communities.
a town.

Of the twelve, eleven were cities and one, Salem,

Two other cities, Franklin and Lebanon, had not produced Democratic

primary votes in an amount sufficient to displace Salem on the list.

Reviewing Table 14.06, the importance of the target cities to the campaign
is evident.

50.2 percent of the total Democratic vote cast in the election is

accounted for by the twelve communities.

Of the total vote produced by the

twelve conmiunities, Manchester accounted for 40.6 percent or slightly more than
20 percent of the total vote cast in the Democratic primary.

Manchester pro-

duced a 69.0 percent margin against McCarthy v/ith that vote representing 45.9

percent of Johnson's vote among the tvjelve communities.

In spite of McCarthy's

difficulty in Manchester, he did receive 14.7 percent of his statewide total
from that city.

Of the twelve communities, Johnson carried seven, which ac-

counted for 80 percent of the total vote he received among the twelve.

maining 20 percent
carried.

v/as

The re-

distributed among the five communities that McCarthy

Of the twelve only in Manchester did McCarthy slip below the pro-

jected 35 percent figure and his victory in Berlin had

both political camps.

a

dramatic impact on

With the vote for both candidates cast in Manchester

A

315

17A

A

566

A
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TABLE 1A.06:

TARGET LARGE CITY/TOWN
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY

RESULTS, 1968

Participation

Community

Manchester

%

%

%

%

% Dem.

LBJ
Total

Mc

Mc
Total

Comm.

of Total Reg.

Dem. Vote

+ 69.0

A5.9

31.0
(3A12)

29.5

AO.

(12,351)

27.7
(A6,921)

21.5
(13,031)

AO.
(1776)

15.3

1A.9
(A527)

21.1
(22,579)

7.9

10.8
(3282)

36.2

00,398)

6.2
(3,768)

3.8

3.6
(1,103)

21.2
(5612)

2.0
(1189)

3.5

3.7
(1131)

16.6
(7266)

2.0

A.

11.

(1352)

(12,256)

2.3
(lAOO)

3.7
(870)

16.6
(9205)

2.0

3.0

3.2
(963)

11.8
(850A

1.6
(999)

6.2

A.

(1,392)

8.9
(15,736)

2.3
(1399)

3.6

3.2
(979)

10.5
(9A72)

1.6
(992)

(7591)

Nashua

+ 59.3

15.6

(2585)

Berlin

Somersworth

AS.
(152A)

+57.5

9.1

+ 51.7

+ 62.1

A.O

A2.5
(AAA)

37.9

A.l

(All)

(673)

Dover

+ 52.0

A8.0

4.1

A9.0

2.3

+ 51.0

+ 60.5

3.2

39.

(3AA)

(527)

Concord

46.

3.

+ 53.9
(707)

(606)

Keene

+ 53.3

3.5

(AlO)

(39;)

Laconla

5.

(625)

(676)

Rochester

1A.2

(1636)

(600)

Claremont

Vote

%

LBJ

A6.7

2.8

(All)

% of Total

(A, 755)

(1207)

(930)

Portsmouth

30.9
(268)

2.0

+69.
(599)

5.2

3.0
(92A)

12.6
(8586)

1.8
(1080)

Salem

A3.

3.5

+ 56.5

6.7

5.0
(1,520)

39.5
(83A5)

2.7
(1633)

100.0%

100.0%
(30,39A)

19.7%
(16A,880)

53.5%
(32,393)

Total Reg.
Voters

Dem. Total

Dem. Vote

50.2%
(60,519)

16.7%
(363,503)

(776)

(597)

58.8%
(16,511)

Total
Vote LBJ
%

60%
(27,520

+

WINNER

100.0%

1.2%
(11,551)
A

% Total
Vote Mc.
A9.7%

(23,263)

%

Total

Vote
100.0%
(60,519)

,

6.17

reir.ovcd,

McCarthy would have received

/.7.y

percent of the total for the eleven

remaining conimunitiGs to Johnson's 52.3 percent,
a relationship that comes much
closer to understanding the importance of concentrating
campaign energy among
these few communities in a Democratic primary.
be ignored.

Manchester, of course, cannot

It must be dealt with in every New Hampshire
political contest in

x^hich Democrats are involved.

Participation as evaluated in Table 14.06 presents a contrast to
that discussed in Table 14.05.

In this case, participation is the percentage that the

Democratic vote constitutes of the total of registered voters in the locality.
While not as satisfactory a measure of participation as V70uld be the percent

Democratic vote of the total Democratic Party registration, it is the only device to assess participation as a function of the Democratic vote cast given
the data available.

Contrasting participation percentages do reveal something

about the nature of the vote cast, a subject which will be explored in a subse-

quent section of this analysis.

Generally, those communities with small percent

Democratic vote of the total voter registration are communities like Rochester,
Laconia, Concord, Keene and Portsmouth which have substantially more Republican

voters registered than Democrats.

Those cities with higher Democratic percen-

tage participation arc those like Manchester, Nashua, Berlin and Soraersworth

where the Democratic Party has traditionally been strong, although less so in
the case of Nashua.

The anomaly appears to be Salem.

bined to increase participation.

There two factors com-

The first was the strength of the Democratic

Party in the comm>unity, but of equal importance is the fact that the towns, with
town meetings, had more reason to turnout for the election.

Subsequent examina-

tion of this factor shows the relationship between increased participation and
the

comTnun.i

ties where the town meeting form of government prevailed.
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The McCarthy campaign targeted 23 communities
In the First Congressional.
In order to be sure that campaign activities
were not just concentrated on the

basis of priority Deraocratic vote producers
but also related to the geographic

dispersion of the New Han^pshire population, the
congressional districts were
selected as targets as well.

The strategy related to the delegate selection

part of the election which was separated according to
congressional districts.
If a strict priority ranking of Democratic vote
producers had been used to

manage the McCarthy strategy, relatively few communities in the
Second Congressional District would have received campaign attention.

In terms of the final

result, the fact that nearly equal emphasis of the campaign was allocated
to
the priority communities of each district appears to have been important.

The First Congressional District list shows the importance of the radial

effect of Manchester on the top Johnson vote producing towns.

Pembroke, Goffs-

town, Aliens town, Hooksett, Merrimack, and to a considerable degree Derry and

Londonderry are within the communications and commuting sphere of Manchester.
As the participation percentage for each indicates, many of these communities

show high levels of Democratic voter participation indicating that Democratic

Party registration is heavy if not dominant.

The table also reveals the

McCarthy ability to attract voters from the academic communities such as Durham

location of the University of New Hampshire, and Exeter, home of Phillips

Exeter Academy.
Of considerable significance in terras of where the McCarthy campaign suc-

ceeded and where it had difficulty are the returns from communities with

strong local Democratic Party loyalties.

Old mill communities with sizable

•fAli:/;

U.07t

TARCKT COMMUNITIKS,

tat ConK.reuBlonal Dlotrlct
1968 Prei.lii«:ntifll Prlin«ty

PART ICl TAT ION

Commiin 1 1 y

Hudson

Z

Z

Z

t-BJ

1.BJ

_Mc

+ 50.0
\ -

Pembroke

12.4

44.0

8.5

42.6

KJjy J

Cof fotovfn

+ 58.7
V*»

10.8

41.3

10,2

11.4
(1028)

29.8
(3882)

1.9
(1158)

6.5

7.7
(698)

33.2
(2548)

1.4
(847)

7.9

9.3

21.3
(4714)

1.7

(843)

5.9
(53£)

30.8
(1880)

0.9

5.6
(510)

46.4

0.9
(563)

6.0
(545)

10.7
(5319)

0.9

6.2

5.3
(480)

27.4
(2007)

0.9

4.7

6.0
(543)

18.5
(3079)

0.9

6.2

5.3
(477)

12.1
(4050)

0.8
(490)

2.6

2.2
(198)

10.1
(2136)

0.4
(216)

5.7

4.7
(430)

9.6
(4719)

0.8

4.4
(398)

14.5
(2844)

0.7

2.7

25.6

0.5

(Z'iB)

/

ions

/ T ft? %

4.2

4.4
(398)

14.6
(2723)

0.6
(398)

1.3

1.7
(151)

15.1
(1304)

0.3

2.4

2.0
(1/9)

15.2
/ too

0.5

2.1

14.2

0,3

Comni.

(318)

}

+ 59.6

7.3

Allenstown

+ 60.3

6.8

+ 52.5

2 Dcm. Vote of
Totnl Regl Nt riit Ion

Z

Tot al

(267)

Mcwmarket

Derry

Z

(412)

/

+ 57.4

X Mc
Total

6.1

40.4
(Z09)

5.2

39.7
(188)

4.6

47.5

5.7

(232)

Pelham

42.

4.3

+ 57.9
(252)

Hooksecc

+ 59.3

6.5

40.7
(189)

Hampton

42.1
C

Plalstow

4.3

+

183}

39.7

(252)
1.6

+ 60.3

/AO \
toy;

Exeter

42.5

(105)

4.1

+57.5(232)

(172)

MerrlmacV.

+ 53.2

46.8-

4.6

+ 51.1

4.3

(172)

(195)

Rolllnsford

57.9

48.9-

2.8

2.9

/ 1 1 £ ^
(1
16)

Bedford

+ 52.0

48.0

4.4

(171)

(185)

Epplng

+64.0

36.0

2.3

(54)

(96)

Seabrook

37.0

1.4

+ 63.0
(99)

(58)

TUton

+ 57.6

42.4-

2.5

ranaingtoti

43.5

1.7

+ 56.5

+ 51.9

0

3.2

0

+ 100.0

2.0

(82)

(0)

PlttBf iold

+ 62.3

37.7
(40)

1.0

+ 84.6

7.4

1.6

(66)

DurKam

Mlltoa

15.4
(54)

1.3

44.6

1.3

+ 55.4

100. OZ

+

49. IZ

(549)

(569)

(454)

(413)

^

1

A 0 ft ^

1.9
(177)

10.1

3.6
(32/)

19.9

1.0

11.1

(Bit)

^ 1

1.3

1.0

/

f

f

(1\

0.3

QA I\

n/U)

0.6

c\\

/

D

1 11 nf>'\
od;
V

/ I

0.7
/

^ iH

f

186^

0.2
(140)

17.3
(2109)

0.6
(364)

1.6

1.5
(132)

17.5
(941)

0.3
(165

100. OZ

100. OZ

18. IZ

16. BZ

(9056)

(56,184)

(10,139

Total KeglBtercd
Voters

Den. Total.

DcB. Vote

(4050)

Total
Vote Mc

(557)

(363)

(66)

(4206)

1 Q*i\
If
3/

(579)

1

^ 1

(298)

(53)

50. 9Z

2.3

48.1
(129)

3,3

(139)

Meredith

/
\

(91)

(70)

Londonderry

1.9

(/b)

(103)

Vote

(1004)

0214)

^

of Totnl

r><'in.

4.0

Z Total

Z Total
Vote LIU

Z

15. 3Z

17. 4Z

15. OZ

15. 5Z

100. OZ

(27,520)

(2 ).263)

60,519)

(363,503)

(60,519)

DENOTES UINNKR

Vote
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FreuOi-Canadian populations and traditionally
conservative and loyal D(
democrats
supported the President impressively.

Pembroke and Allenstou-n share the voting

population of the old mill center, Suncook. where
the French-Canadian comn^unity
loyally supports Democratic candidates.

Similarly Pittsfield, Newmarket, Tilton,

and Epplng, though isolated from other influences such
as proximity to a domi-

nant urban center, contain pockets of Democratic
Party identifiers.

The towns where McCarthy's support was shown tended to be
those which had

experienced considerable growth in the post-war years like Pelham,
Hampton,
Plaistow, Seabrook and Exeter.

The in-migrants were mostly from Massachusetts,

many Democrats, and influenced by political experiences different from the
older

Democratic populations of the declining mill cities and towns.
trend were towns like Hudson and Goffstown.

Bucking the

Hudson, adjacent to Nashua had be-

come the bedroom town for many employed in Nashua as Goffstovm had become the

bedroom town for many employed in Manchester.

Hudson's population tends to be

In the tradition of the older Democratic inclined working population of Nashua;
a generation or so removed from the original migration to the textile mills of

that city but still closely tied by family and perspective to the old city's

politics.

Nashua is geographically small and if the Merrimack River did not

separate Hudson from Nashua it is possible that the area occupied by the two
communities would have been one city.

Nashua's Johnson vote of 59.3 percent

is sufficiently cJ.ose to the 56.0 percent for Hudson to support these inferences.

The difference may easily be accounted foi by the recent migration to Hudson from

Massachusetts which has also followed the migration to Hudson from Nashua.
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The Goffstown explanncion relates in part
to the fact that Plnardville, an
enclave just outside Manchester, votes as does
the west of the Merrimack River
wards of the city.

Goffstovm has also become a bedroom community for
those

leaving Manchester but still retaining strong ties to
their former home city.
Wlien the

percentage returns for the two candidates are added, Johnson
re-

ceives 75.3 percent of his statewide vote from the twelve
targeted communities
(Table 14.06) and the returns from the First Congressional
District towns

(Table 14.07).

On the other hand, McCarthy received 67.1 percent of his total

vote from the two targets and came within 0.4 percent of equalling
Johnson's
vote in the First Congressional District.

The participation calculation shows that there is a slight overall decline
in the relationship between the number of votes cast by Democrats and the total

number of registered voters.

The decline relates to the decline in Democratic

Party registrations in the small communities.
begins to increase.

At the same time McCarthy's vote

The smaller towns where the Democratic Party is weaker

produced more votes for McCarthy on a percentage basis than did the large communities and a relationship between Republican strengtli and McCarthy vote begins to appear.

The relationship becomes more evident when the inspection turns to the
target communities of the Second Congressional District, larger, more rural and
less populated of the

tv/o

New Hampshire districts.

Again, Johnson does well in

the old mill cities and to\-ms of the district (Franklin, Newport, Milf ord
non, Northumberland (Groveton)

,

Jaffrey, Littleton, V/inchester

,

,

Leba-

and Swanzey)

but has difficulty in the academic communities (Hanover and Andover)

,

and in
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communities ..Ith retirement or suburban residents
such as Hillsborough, Lancaster. New Ipswich, Gorham, Peterborough and
Wilton.

cratic voters declines, McCarthy's margin increases.

As the population of Demo-

The 22 target communities

of the Second Congressional District produced
12.3 percent of McCarthy's total

vote and a 51.5 percent edge over Johnson.
Wlien the

results of the

tx-jo

target community lists are combined with the

Second District percentages (Table 14.08) the importance
of the 57 communities
is sho\TO.

85.1 percent of Johnson's Democratic vote came from the 57 and

McCarthy received 79.8 percent of his total.

20.2 percent of McCarthy's total

was derived from other than the target cities and to^^s which raises
several

interesting questions.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the respective campaigns an assessment

has to be made of the result as a product of the effort.

It V70uld appear from

the results that as the campaign activity of the McCarthy organization decreased,
the percentage of McCarthy's vote increased.

Wliere

both campaigns concentrated

their efforts, in the cities and large toxins, McCarthy was the loser.
lacy

5.-1

The fal-

this assessment is a presumption that both candidates started either at

zero or equal in their vote gathering appeal.

Using this presumption one cam-

paign appears to be more successful than the other in attracting votes in competitive situations.

If this is so and the presumption is correct,

McCarthy campaign produced disproportionately to its effort.

then the

In those conmiu-

nities of low priority or without priority McCarthy did better than in those

communities of increasing priority.

1

TABLE

I4.0;i:

5

J

1

Target Co.nrnunU ion

X

z

X

PAPTTPT PAT! f^M

He

MC
Total

Conint

Ai

Total

lOL.ii

11.2

41.3

7.3

9.3

9.7

(213)
40. 1
(174)

6.0

(567^
7.8
(480)

1

9.1

38.0

5.1

7

5

9.3

48.7

8.2

7.1

+51.3

8.3
(509)
6.5

3.7

(204)
+61
(160)

5.5
16.0

+62.0
(245)

+51.2

(150)

(250)
.

48.7

7.0

f

Greenville

38.5

Ranover

(100)
15.0
(86)

3.2

+85.0

+59.3

6.6

(485)
40. 7
(122)

4.2

+51.7

3.3

(178)

Lincoln

48.3

3.3

(88)

Jaf f rey

+51.1

(94)

4.4

(119)

Wilton

44.2

+59.7

4.1

+63.9

Peterborough

42.3

New Ipswich

40.0

Lancaster

(48)
40.

3.0

3.7

1.8

3.5

+57 .7
(127)

4.4

1.8

+60.0

2.5

(72)

2.2

41.2

Troy

48.3

Hinsdale

40.0

Andover

46.4

Hillsborough

36.2

2.9
1.6

+58.8

2.7

+51.7

2.2

1.8

+60.0

1.9

+53.6

1.4

+63.8

3.9
(236)
2.7
(166)
4.

(247)
2.3
(138)
2.5
(158)
2.5
(152)

2.5

2.0

2.1

(124)
2.2

(161)

2.3

(67)

(38)

4.4

(125)
2.6

(60)

III ,

V

oco o1

Kcf,

1

s

I

rac ion

lot Total
Dem. Vote
.OZ
(594)

Q

S

mnn)
7

S
JJ

\
1

i

O

t

(^26)
(456)

n P

0.9

(4908)
7s n
\

0.9Z
0.8

H

)

S

(275)
9.7
(596)
5.8
(357)
3.3
(200)
4.2
(254)

2.7

(73)

(52)

4

2.

(77)

(48)

398')

2.

(60)

(72)

(534)
n
o
U O
.

(4do )
0.6
v,3ou)

70

7

1

I

.

c\
U

('2928')

31

1

U.o

(1400)
(731)
13.5

U.J

(208'')

24.4
(1219)
9.8
(2905)
15.6
(1253)
12.9
(2079)
18.9
(778)
11.5
(1688)
9.2
(1814)
18.7
(829)

23.0

(131)
2.1
(127)

(739)
11.7
(1316)
19.4
(758)
9.2
(1459)

16.0%
(42,713)

U.J
U.J
<'?RA)

0 1
V.J

n96)
u
f?68)
0.

fl47)
V/ •

J

(194)

0.2
(166)

0.3
(155)

0.3
(170)

0.3
(154)
0.2
(147)
0.2
(134)

(2686)

(2851)

100.0%
(6102)

Z Total
Vote LB

Z Total
Vote Kc

Z Total Total Registered
Dem. Vote
Voters

Dem. Total

9.8Z
(27,520)

12.3%
(23,263)

11.8%
IG.IZ
(60,519) (363,503)

100.0%
(60,519)

48,5%

Denotes Winner

45.5
(65)

(42)

•f

3.0

(88)

(78)

Ashland

+59.9

u/

(265)

(87)
36.
(56)

(59)
.

4.7

40.3

(93)

+54

+55.8

4.8

(99)

Swanzey

4.0

(139)

(129)

Winchester

48.9
(114)

(110)

Littleton

.

.J

Ul

1

.

V

(237)

(190)

Northumberland

1

1968 Presidential Primary

Z

(260)

Gorhan

2nd Congressional District,

LDJ
Total

+59.9

Lebanon

.

623
,

(302)

Mllford

)

Z

+58.7

Newport

21

1

LDJ

Community
Franklin

5

100.0%

51.5%

100.0%

11. 3Z

(6,815)

Vote
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The fallacy Is. of course, that the
candidates did not start either at zero
or at equal shares.

Tresident Johnson's share was considerably more
than McCarthy's

share at the beginning.

None of the foregoing data analysis of the
returns pro-

duces an explanation of whether the campaigns were
effective or why McCarthy

should draw increasingly from communities with larger
numbers of Republicans.
Some subjective analysis has been provided based
upon an understanding of the

political dynamics of the voting in some of these communities
but other tests
seem to be required in order to test the relationships.
One attempt to find an explanation was undertaken by Robert Craig
when he

developed a tabular analysis of vote return as related to the size of the
voting
district.

While a similar pattern of increasing McCarthy support with declining

vote district size is shovm (Table 14.09), the explanation does not go beyond

summarizing the data.

The questions which need further study concern the rela-

tionship between community size or some characteristic related to size and the

vote percentages produced for the

tv;o

candidates.

Secondly, it is important to

determine whether the respective campaigns had either a positive or negative
effect relative to the vote percentages produced for the respective candidates.

These quet^tions

v^ill be

explored subsequently, as will the assessment of where

the respective candidates stood relative to each other in the mind of the vot-

ing public at the beginning of the campaign.

D elegate and Alternate Delegate Selection

The second mark of electoral success in the New Hampshire presidential
primary comes from the tabulation of delegates and alternate delegates selected
to represent the parties and the candidates at the coming nominating convention.
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As will be recalled,

the McCarthy campaign managers opted for the
delegate fil-

ing control that a pledged slate offered.

On the other hand the Johnson campaign

managers chose not to control delegate candidate filings.

Because President

Johnson did not declare his candidacy in New Hampshire, his managers
were limited
to the "favorable" delegate candidate option.

Not wishing to create controversy

by selecting those who should file as Johnson delegate or alternate delegate can-

didates, an open filing season followed.

The result was that in the First Con-

gressional District there were 27 delegate candidates listed as "favorable to
the nomination of Lyndon B. Johnson as President," 12 candidates for the 12 dele-

gate slots listed as "Pledged to the nomination of Eugene J. McCarthy as President," and one candidate listed as "favorable to the nomination of Robert F.

Kennedy."

The total list of candidates was 40, with 12 to be selected.

The vote for First Congressional District delegates as shox-m by Table 14.08
reveals the success of the McCarthy strategy.

\*Ihile

Johnson defeated McCarthy

56.6 percent to 43.4 percent in the First District only three LBJ delegates were
elected.

Two of the three were the most prominent Democratic officials in the

state, U.S.

Senator Tom Mclntyre and Governor John W. King, and the third was

the Democratic Party chairman, William Craig.

The vote for Johnson favorable

delegates vas concentrated on the two top Democratic Party elected officials
then widely scattered among the other candidate names.

On the other hand, the

McCarthy vote was concentrated among the twelve with no McCarthy delegate candidate receiving less than 8,395 votes.

TABLK 14.10:

ItFl.FCATE SFJ.ECTION.

Int

ConRveHflonnl District.

S

1968 Dcmociatlc Prculiitnt lal Prlmnry

NAKZ
I

.

2.

AlleRlonce

PL?.nCED

KAVOKAULE
Other

yOTK

BeauvnlB

McCarthy

X

8729+

Blsnchard

McCarthy

X

6572

3. Bouraaaa

Reynolds

X

2110

4.

Brecon

LBJ

X

8210

S.

Bunker

LBJ

X

4336

6.

Burke

LBJ

X

6164

7.

Cannell

LBJ

X

4420

8.

Carrier

McCarthy

X

8722+

9.

Connor

McCarthy

X

6694

10. Craig

LBJ

X

8888+

11. Daaals

LBJ

X

7550

12. Devlne

LBJ

X

7123

13. Dlsl-iman

McCarthy

14. Cupula

LBJ

X

7870

X

4603

8395

X

15.

Eckcr

LSJ

16.

Farrell

McCarthy

17.

Rail

Kennedy

X

2159

18.

Healy

LBJ

X

6176

8852

X

8716+

X

19. Holland

McCarthy

20. Kantercs

LBJ

X

5807

21. Kelley

LBJ

X

5628

22. King

LBJ

X

9630+

23. Lemleux

LBJ

X

5970

X

4118

24^ Leslie

_

i

LBJ

8694+

X

25. HacLelLan

McCarthy

26. Kaicel, A

LBJ

X

5554

27. Kartcl, L

LBJ

X

7029

28. KcDonough

LBJ

X

5745

29.

McEachem

McCarthy

8840+

X

X

10315+

30. Mclntyro

LBJ

31. HcKay

McCarthy

32. Killlmet

LBJ

33. Morln

McCarthy

34. Mycro

LBJ

35. O'Calloghnn

McCarthy

36. Prcacon

LBJ

X

5374

37. Quinit

LBJ

X

7009

38. Qiiinney

LBJ

X

4440

39c

Rob*

40. £.ulllv«n

X

.

f Denotes Election

6626

8994+

X
X

McCarthy
LBJ

8419

X

S686

8675+

X

8929+

X
X

7963

628

Ay Table 14.10 suggests, residence and
ethnic background, as revealed by

surname, aided the McCarthy delegate candidates
in their voter appeal.

q

David

Morln, French-Canadian surnained, topped the McCarthy
delegate list in spite of
the fact that he was not from Manchester.

All of the McCarthy delegate candi-

dates from Manchester were elected as were the Irish
surnamed delegate candidates

from outside that pivotal Democratic city.

Surname and residence are important

vote attractors for the mostly anonymous names appearing on the
McCarthy delegate
slate.

The concentration of votes kept the pack of McCarthy delegates close
to-

gether with the next closest Johnson delegate. State Senator Henry P. Sullivan
of Manchester, placing 16th with a vote A30 less than the 15th place McCarthy

delegate, Professor Robert Dishman of Durham.

Delegate voting in the Second Congressional District followed

pattern as that in the First.

similar

a

The concentrated McCarthy vote elected eleven of

the twelve delegate candidates V7ith only the Johnson campaign manager and former

gubernatorial candidate, Bernard

L.

Boutin, bucking the trend.

There

v;ere no

other Johnson delegate candidates of the prominence of Boutin or with other than

localized appeal.

It was a contest between relatively anonymous Johnson candi-

dates against similar McCarthy candidates.

(Table 14.12)

Although the number of Johnson delegate candidates was less by

8

candidates

than that In the First Congressional District (total 19) the preferential vote
In the Second Congressional District was almost even

Johnson's 50.8 percent.

—

McCarthy 49.2 percent to

McCarthy voters concentrated their delegate voting while

the list of 19 candidates dispersed the Johnson delegate vote sufficiently to

eliminate all but one of their delegate candidates.
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TABLE lA.ll:

Delegate Selection, 1st CD. Elected
Delegate Vote, 1968 Democratic Presidential Primary^

Name

Residence

Candidate
A llegiance

Vote

1)

Mclntyre (senator)*

Laconia

LBJ

10,315

2)

King (Governor)

Manchester

LBJ

9,630

3)

Morin

Hampton

McCarthy

8,994

A)

Ross

Manchester

McCarthy

8,929

5)

Craig

Manchester

LBJ

8,888

6)

Farrell

Manchester

McCarthy

8,852

7) McEachern.

Portsmouth

McCarthy

8,840

8)

Beauvais

Manchester

McCarthy

8,729

9)

Carrier

Manchester

McCarthy

8,722

Bedford

McCarthy

8,716

10) Holland
11)

MacLellan

Manchester

McCarthy

8,694

12)

O'Callaghan

Laconia

McCarthy

8,675

13)

Blanchard

Portsmouth

McCarthy

8,572

Hudson

McCarthy

8,419

U) McKay
15)

Dishman

Durham

McCarthy

8,395

16)

Sullivan

Manchester

LBJ

7,965

*

12 To Be Elected

Results:

3

LBJ,

(

McCarthy Delegates Elected

U

'ABLE 1A.12:

DILFCATE
PrJaary

NAME
Bouchard

1)

SK.1.F.CT10N.

2nd CongrcoBlonal Dlotrict.

Candidate
Allcplancc

Pledged

McCarthy

X

•

1968 ITcBldmtl.l

Favorable,
vote

2) Boutin

UU

3) Brvnmer

LBJ

4) Burelle

Kennedy

5) Coutermfirsb

LBJ

6) Sanlell

McCarthy

7) Daoust

LBJ

5372

8) Dion

LEJ

5584

9) Farley

LBJ

5219

10) Elliot

LBJ

4607

11) GrandmalEon

LBJ

5075

12) BacV.ett

T

/•IX li"

T
A

X

X

1 1

7^22+

LBJ

4S98

13)

HUl

LBJ

5083

lit)

Hoeh, D.

McCarthy

X

6967->'

15) Kennedy

McCarthy

X

7555+

16) I^fiiDontagne

LBJ

5833

17) Leonard

LBJ

5176

18) Marrow

McCarthy

.

6952+

X

5197

19) Kartell

LBJ

20) Meloney

McCarthy

21) Morin

LBJ

5221

22) Mlms

LBJ

4641

23) Oleson

McCarthy

X

7240+

2«) Proulx

McCarthy

X

6905+

25) Shea

LBJ

X

5383

26) Spanos

LEJ

X

4893

7108+

X

27) Studds

McCarthy

X

6895+

26) Underwood

McCarthy

X

6768

29) VallLcr

LBJ

30) Wall In

McCarthy

X

7108+

31) Whclton

McCarthy

X

7033+

32) Vlnn

LBJ

4-

X

Denotes Election

Sourrr!

H. Munual for the
General Court 1969 No. 41

N.

X

5444

6366

631

As Table 14.13 shows, the combination of French-Canadian
surname and Nashua

residence was the most powerful at tractor of votes.

Secondly, French-Canadian

or Irish surname was the second most powerful attractor, with
the third being a

measure of prominence either produced by the campaign or derived previous
to the
campaign.

Bouchard was then a Nashua alderman; Daniell a previous congressional

candidate in the district; Oleson was a popular state representative and Wallin
was a prominent Nashua state representative.

Only the perception of Concord as

a Yankee Republican city appears to have handicapped the vote gathering of Studds,

who was elected, and Dr. David

Unden-.'ood

who was not.

The next highest Johnson

candidate was Miss Cecilia Winn, a prominent Nashua civic leader and long-time

Democratic Party loyalist.

Alterna t e Delegate Selection
Only for the afficionados of politics does reaching for the essence of an

election extend beyond the selection of delegates to the selection of alternate
delegates.

But when the fate of a presidency is involved in the reading of the

electoral evidence, alternate delegate selection gains considerably in importance.
For the First Congressional District the combination of overfiled delegate

candidates and dispersed vote that elected nine delegates for McCarthy when he

received only 43.4 percent of the vote did not hold up for the selection of

alternate delegates.

There were a total of 27 candidates filed:

13 Johnson and 2 undesignated.

(Table 14.14).

12 McCarthy,

632

TABLE 14.13:

Name

DELEGATE SELECTION, 2nd CD. Elected Delegate Vote,
1968 Democratic Presidential PrimaryU

Residence

Candidate Allegiance

Vote

1)

Bouchard*

Nasliua

McCarthy

7684

2)

Kennedy

Keene

McCarthy

7555

3)

Boutin

Nashua

LBJ

7421

Franklin

McCarthy

7322

4) Daniell
5)

Oleson

Gorham

McCarthy

7240

6)

Wallin

Nashua

McCarthy

7108

7)

Meloney

Clareniont

McCarthy

7108

8)

Whelton

Nashua

McCarthy

7033

Hanover

McCarthy

6967

9) Hoch, D.

10)

Marrow

Chesterfield

McCarthy

6952

11)

Proulx

Ashland

McCarthy

6905

12)

Studds

Concord

McCarthy

6895

13)

Underwood

Concord

McCarthy

6768

Nashua

LBJ

6366

14) Winjn

*

12 to be Elected
Results:
1
LBJ,

11

McCarthy Delegates Elected

TABLE 14.14:

alternate delegate selection. Ist Congressional District,
1968 Democratic Presidential Primary

Candidate
Allegiance

Name

1)

Abbot Jr.

2) Barnard

Pledged

LBJ

McCarthy

X

0/7 J

T

4) Belair

LBJ

5) Bergeron

LBJ

Vote

DATA

3) Bcaiilieu

Chaplain

Other

1030
0 / 0 j+

McCarthy

X

7QQQ

7) Cleveland

McCarthy

X

/

8) DesJardin, G.

McCarthy

X

9) DesJardins.H.

LBJ

6)

10) Eshoo

McCarthy

Dy 1

O / (JOT

X

11) Rowland

X

12) LaCrolx

LBJ

9146+

13) LaFleur

LBJ

9336+

lA) Laplante

McCarther

15) Levest^ue

LBJ

9293^

16) Nardi

I.BJ

8450

17) Kontiandin

LBJ

908^

18) O'Callaghan

McCarthy

X

8183

19) Onlgman

McCarthy

X

7770

20) Preston

LBJ

21) Ralche

LBJ

^i) Sanders, Jr.

TUT

23) Simpson

McCarthy

X

8170

2A) Spalding

McCarthy

X

7767

25) Tobln

LBJ

26) Wesiton

McCarthy

X

7982

27) Windhausen

McCarthy

X

7853

+ Dcnoten Election

X

8274

9476

X

X

9579+

9881+

63A

As Table

U

for delegates.

.

15 ^hows the Johnson vote concentrated,

as had the McCarthy vote

The combination of Manchester residence,
Irish, or French-

Canadian surname, assured election of the Johnson
list with the exception of the
Yankee-surnanied Ray Abbott Jr. of rural Jackson.

The only McCarthy candidate to

slip to election was the French-Canadian surnamed
Gertrude DesJardin of Manchester.

Robert Preston, a former State Senator, placed
high in the voting by the

chance of having his name at the top of the alternate
delegate ballot.
If the Johnson campaign leaders had exerted control
over delegate candidate

filings to produce a list which more closely matched the candidates
with the
slots available, the delegate election, probably would have
patterned that for

alternate delegates.

The fact that the Johnson candidates carried all but one

of the alternate delegate seats in the First Congressional District
was lost in

the amazement produced from the election of the nine McCarthy delegates.

The alternate delegate filing for the Second Congressional District slots

matched the number of seats;
favorable to Johnson.

2A total candidates,

12

While the preference vote was almost equal between McCarthy

and Johnson the alternate delegate \oting elected

Johnson candidates.

12 pledged to McCarthy,

As Table 14.16 displays,

9

McCarthy candidates to

3

the voting clustered with only one

candidate, John McCarthy, above 7,000 votes and the Hanover resident, Robert
Guest, trailing as number 24 with 6,247.

As Table 14.17 suggests, a Nashua residence attracted votes as did the one

surname popular to New Hampshire Democrats.
from a northern

towii

John McCarthy, a political unknown

near Berlin topped the voting followed by the former chair-

man of the Hillsborough County Democratic Party, LBJ favorable, Robert Philbrick

635

14.15:

Alternate Delegate Selection, 1st CD., Elected
Alternate Delegate Vote, 1968 Democratic Presidential
Primary

Name

Residence

Candidate
Allegiance

Vote

1)

Tobin*

Manchester

LBJ

9881

2)

Bergeron

Manchester

LBJ

9607

3)

Raiche

Manchester

LBJ

9579

A)

Preston

Hampton

LBJ

9476

Manchester

LBJ

9336

5) LaFleur
6)

Levesque

Rochester

LBJ

9293

7)

LaCrois

Rochester

LBJ

91A6

Laconia

LBJ

9089

Salem

LBJ

8763

Rollinsf ord

LBJ

8708

Manchester

McCarthy

8617

Hampton

LBJ

8552

13) Abbot Jr.

Jackson

LBJ

8476

IM

Narci i

Manchester

LBJ

8450

15)

Barnard

Gof f stown

McCarthy

8295

^

8( Normandin
9)

Belair

10) DesJardins, H.

11) DesJardin, G.
12)

.

Sanders, Jr.

*

12 To Be Elected

Result:

11

LBJ,

1

McCarthy Alt. Del. Elected

TABLE 14.16:

Alternate Delegate Selection, 2nd CD.,
1968 Presidential Primary 1*^

Candidate
Allegiance

Name

rcivorciDj.e

Pledged

Other

Vote

1)

Boggis

2)

Bunce

LBJ

3)

Coniaris

McCarthy

X

64A2

^)

EberharC

McCarthy

X

6A51+

5)

Fairbanks

LBJ

X

6346

6)

Gallen

LBJ

X

637A

7)

Guest

LBJ

X

6247

8)

Harrison

LBJ

X

6286

9)

Hennessey

LBJ

X

6425

10)

Hoeh, S.

McCarthy

11)

Makriu

LBJ

12)

McCarthy

McCarthy

X

7027+

13)

Morse

McCarthy

X

6461+

1^)

Philbrick

LBJ

15)

Richardson

McCarthy

16)

Sapc io t es

LBJ

17)

Sheridan

McCarthy

18)

Short 1 id ge, Jr.

LBJ

19)

Stanley

McCarthy

20)

Sterling

LBJ

21)

Taylor

McCarthy

X

6725+

22)

Torrey

McCarthy

X

6387

23)

Wood

McCarthy

X

6568+

2/0

York

LBJ

McCarthy

+r)rMinrr>R

F.I

X

6861+

X

X

6482+

X

X
X

X

6862+

6371

6447

X

6433

6768f

X
X

or t Ion

6687+

6462+

X

•

6329

X

6424

6569+

637

TABLE 14.17;

Altcrnnte Delegate Selection, 2nd
CD. Elected
Alternate Delegate Vote. 1968 Democratic
Presidential Primary^^

Name
1)

Philbrick

3)

Boggis

Stanley

5)

Taylor

6)

Mokris

7)

York

Gorham

1

Milford

juv^a r L iiy

LBJ

Nashua

7027

6862

Mr o
P:^ r f Viv
y
* iL-

Vote

CI

1.

L.

1 1

Nashua

6861

6768

Nashua

6725

Nashua

LBJ

6687

Concord

LBJ

6369

Keeno

li^—V-^di.

Lily

6568

Hanover

McCarthy

6A82

Richardson

Fitzwilliara

McCarthy

6462

1)

Morse

Nashua

McCarthy

6461

2)

Eberhart

Concord

McCarthy

6451

3)

Sheridan

Concord

McCarthy

6447

4)

Coniaris

Hoilis

McCarthy

6442

8)

Wood

J J

nut- n

.0)

.

McCarthy*

2)

4)

Candidate
Allegiance

Residence

*

L> •

y

12 to be

Elected
Result:

3

LBJ,

9

McCarthy Alt. Del. Elected

638

of Milford.

The other two Johnson favorable alternates to
be elected were Harry

Makris, a fonder Nashua state representative, and
Edward York, a long-time state

representative

frora

Concord's only Democratic ward, Penacook.

The remaining

alternate delegate candidates elected as pledged to McCarthy
were facing their
first electoral experience as political unknowns.
The result supports the notion that a McCarthy voter backed
McCarthy with

sufficient intensity to carry that support through the list of alternate
delegate candidates.

That intensity was at least sufficient to cast those few addi-

tional votes to elect McCarthy alternates over Johnson alternates in a
one ratio.

tv;o

to

Without either strong residence or ethnic attractors to distort the

voting, the notation of candidate support was sufficient to concentrate the

McCarthy vote once more in the election.
In summary the effectiveness of the McCarthy delegate strategy cannot be

over-emphasized.

20 of 24 potential delegates were elected pledged to the nomi-

nation of Eugene J. McCarthy and 10 of the potential alternate delegate candidates were also elected pledged to McCarthy's nomination.

Not only had McCarthy

done unexpectedly well in the preference portion of the ballot, but he had sur-

prised all observers by actually translating his support into delegate strength

—

strength that would control a state's convention delegation and elect

McCarth}'^

delegates and the next Democratic National Committeeman and Committeewoman.
Wlien this

additional success was combined with McCarthy's unexpected strength

as a Democrat and surprise support among Republicans, the picture was one of

total victory for McCarthy in New Hampshire.
frora

That was the message that eminated

New Hampshire the evening of March 12th and in the days following the elec-

tion as the final details of the voting were compiled.
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Who Voted and

One political ccientist, Robert

E.

V.'hy

Craig, examined the data gathered

through a commercial survey sponsored by the American
Broadcasting Company.

The

survey was conducted by Audits and Surveys. Inc., New York,
N.Y., with the con-

sultation of the Survey Research Center, Political Behavior Section,
of the Uni-

versity of Michigan.

The ABC survey, Craig reported, was conducted in two parts,

the first during the week of February 12, 1968 and totaling 581
respondents, and

the second during the week of February 19, 1968 and consisting of 562
respondents.

For the purpose of his analysis Craig combined both samples and then sought
to duplicate, whenever possible,

the approach and measures used by the major vot-

ing studies, principally The American Voter,

and measures which represent vari-

ables found to be Influential on voter choice in other non-party competitive
elections.

He then also examined long-term influences on voting behavior such

as party identification and ethnic background as well as short-term influences

such as issues and candidate evaluation.

He sought to determine the relative

Importance of these proximate forces in determining candidate choice when party
labels arc the same.

As the conclusion of his analysis he assessed the overall

relative importance of influential factors in the psychology voting for a Presidential primary election. '•^
The first part of Craig's analysis

v;as

to examine some seventeen social

and ecoiioEiic factors which had been measured in connection with candidate pre-

ference.

He found that less than half were in any way related to candidate

preference and of the half these were only moderately related.
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Subjective social closs Identification, age.
marital status,
number of dependent children, occupation,
number of years
spent outside New Hampshire, education and
family Income
were weakly related to candidate preference.
'

Size cf place of residence, type of occupation
(white collar/
blue collar), place of birth, race, sex, membership
in labor
unions and religion, were all insignificant factors
in the
preference of Democrats for cither McCarthy or Johnson. 18

Craig concluded that the "generally weak relationships"
of the social and economic

measures as related to candidate support meant that social
explanations of the results were "not sufficient."

Craig went on to note however, that this did not

mean that these factors played no part at all in an explanation of
the phenomenon
of the McCarthy insurgency.

support

v;as

The unique character of the social base of McCarthy

revealed in the close examination of the relationships of socio-

econom ic factors and candidate preference 19
.

The pattern of socio-economic support for McCarthy has two
clear features, mille the first conclusion about McCarthy
support must be that it did not come exclusively from any
one group in the population of Democrats, the second conclusion is that some groups did respond to McCarthy's candidacy more than others and that these groups tended to be at
opposite ends of the social and economic dimensions which
v/e normally use to analyze social and political phenomena. 20
Consequently, Craig concluded that McCarthy's support came from many groups
not from any

one.

group's disenchantment with President Johnson.

The insurgency,

therefore, came from "widespread social disenchantment with the course of

government," Craig concluded.

Picking apart this conclusion Craig found first that McCarthy attracted increased support froai "both older and younger groups" while those of the "middle
age group" heavily supported Johnson.

The same division Craig found when he
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examined education as related to candidate
preference.

-Those Democrats with

high school diplomas tended to prefer Johnson
much more than those with less than

high school education or those with more than
high school education. "21

A similar finding came when Craig examined for
income and occupation relationships.

The upper incomed, professional and technical
occupations and the

unskilled, blue collar workers tended to support McCarthy
more heavily than did

other occupational and income groupings. 22
When Craig collapsed the income range the difference vanished,
which he

noted demonstrated the "crucial
tionships."

x-^ature

of the categorization in observing rela-

To an extent he experienced the same problem when he sorted his

occupational groupings.

The class distinction was less clear when occupations

were clustered by whether or not they are self employed.

The analysis did show

that McCarthy attracted support "despite wide differences in occupational status

and work experiences. "23

Marital status produced a strange mixture of support for the candidates according to Craig.
ried

i'nd

"Those who were single, married with one child, or never mar-

with one or two cliildren, tended to support McCarthy more than others."

The analysis profiles what Craig defined as a "coalition of unlikely colleagues."

Examining "residential mobility" Craig found that McCarthy drew his support more heavily from those

v;ho

were recent residents of other states and those

who had lived in other states one, three, or six years.

When he examined the

"subjective social class" data he found another mixed pattern but one which
tended to support the overall conclusion that McCarthy drew more heavily from
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those worklng.-class identifiers than
from the middle-class identifiers.

When

Craie sorted for strength of identification
he found that McCarthy's support
came from "those vho were strong
middle-class identifiers and working-class
identifiers, weak or strong, but more likely
from weak. "25

Concluding his socio-economic analysis Craig
summarized that while such
factors did not explain candidate support they
did produce interesting observations.

"McCarthy support was not isolated among only a few
segments of the

social groupings of Democrats, but rather drew some
strength from almost all
social groupings."

At the same time Craig noted that McCarthy's support
was

strongest among "unlikely electoral colleagues"

—

the richer and the poorer,

the most educated and less educated, the older and the younger,
the highly

skilled and the unskilled, the middle-class identifiers and working-class
identifiers.

This was the social base of the McCarthy candidacy. 26

Reaching for other explanations of the result, Craig searched the political background of what he labelled the "protest."

Psychological political background factors include partisan
attachment, feelings of political efficacy, habits of interest, information and participation, and positions on generalized issues of domestic politics which appear to be an
enduring part of American electoral competition. 27
These political background factors were more directly political in content than
the socio-economic factors and yet, as Craig noted, "are not particularly cam-

paign objects and, as such, are factors which might play a prior role in influencing voters' choices between candidates."

For two party confrontations Craig said

the political background factors arc "indirectly influential as screening devices
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for incominc Information."

In this way he suegested they
help indirectly to

influence the ultimate direction of the
vote as well as the decision whether
or
not to actually vote. The factor
which usually serves as a "major
referent"
for the voter is party identification,
Craig noted. 28
His analysis of the New Hampshire
presidential primary of 1968 found that
these factors

d_id

not serve as major reference points for
the voters' decisions.

At the same time, Craig found that these factors
were significant influences on

candidate preference and that an "interesting
pattern of such influences emerged. "2
His study showed that while party identification
as such had not a "major refe-

rent for all vote decisions," he found that Democrats
with weaker attachments
to the Democratic party were more likely than strong
Democrats to support

McCarthy in his challenge to the Democratic President.

A Democrat's view of the efficacy of political activity which was less,
or
one with less political information, or one who participated less in
primary

voting tended to prefer McCarthy over those "who were
patory, or knowledgeable."

uiore

efficacious, partici-

At the same time, Craig found that liberals split

their vote between the two candidates, as did conservatives, except that the

more educated liberals tended to support McCarthy much more than less educated
liberals.

Craig described the McCarthy Democrat as a "sort of political under-

class."

\{hat he

o pposite

poles of various social and economic stratification measures.

then found was that those who supported McCarthy came from

The "lower

efficacy blue-collar workers and higher efficacy white-collar workers, lower income, weaker Democrats and higher income weaker Democrats, highly educated libe-

rals and not very educated conservatives, all showed Increased tendencies to

support McCarthy.

Craig concluded that these "disparate groups" produced a
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coalition which had a "ba.e in so^e
sort of political underclass
but which was
Joined by what can only be called
part of the old Dcunocratic elite
structure."
Craig concluded that no background
factor of a psychologically and
politically
enduring character served to orient
all individual voters to the objects
of the
campaign in the way that partisan
identification does in two party competitive
campaigns.
Without this factor Craig notes that
the "less permanent objects of
the campaign itself" are left to explain
the major portion of the voting decision, 31

The voting decision for McCarthy from the
standpoint of what Craig called
a

"social movement" was founded on a "political
and psychological underclass"

which he saw as reacting favorably to McCarthy as
"the underdog."

This "under-

class" as Craig called it, was joined by some members
of the politically domi-

nant class, and this "coalition of under- and upper-class
Democrats was a hallraark.

of the McCarthy, coalition."

as well in Craig's analysis.

A hallmark that also had socio-economic links

^

Developing this conclusion Craig controlled his data to search for relationships that might reveal the actual dimensions of the McCarthy coalition.
As he noted from his review of the voting research literature:
If early voting research v;as dominated by a search for
social causes of voting behavior, more recent research
has been dominated by a psychological approach to the
same behavior. And, at the heart of the psychological
approach to voting behavior lies the concept of party
identification. -^3

Since party identification in a primary election can at the best be considered
only as an indirect factor influencing the formation of a voter's decision,
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Cral, conciudcd. It night ca.lly
b. neglected in a search for
voting behavior
explanations.
Instead of skipping the factor. Craig
controlled his data carefully to sketch the possible relationships
that .ight exist.
Again, the unusual
coalition that Craig was finding as the
basis of McCarthy's New Hampshire support, demanded that he not overlook any
possible explanations.

Using his first finding, that weak Democratic
Party identifiers were more
likely to support McCarthy than strong
Democrats, and that strong Democrats

overwhelmingly support Johnson, he went on to control
for significant socioeconomic factors.

He found that strong partisanship was enough
to outweigh

residential mobility as a candidate preference factor.

McCarthy's support came

from those with "less residential permanence" and a
"weaker" sense of "partisanship," while Johnson's support was the reverse.

when controlling for occupational type.

Craig found similar phenomenon

"Strong partisanship erased differences

of support between white and blue collar workers."

He found that blue collar

Independent Democrats were more likely than white collar workers who were Independent Democrats, to support McCarthy.

what Craig labelled as "weak Democrats

.

The relationship was less clear with
"3^^

The phenomenon of "sccial opposites"

being attracted to McCarthy was revealed again in the occupational analysis.

When controlling for income Craig found a different condition.

Lower income,

less partisan Democrats tended to prefer McCarthy more than the upper income,
less partisan Dcraocryts.

Among the stronger Democrats Craig found that those of

moderate income preferred McCarthy "more than those of lower or higher income
levels."

The spread favored the conclusion that weaker feelings of attachment

to the Democratic Party produced the coalition of "dissimilar socio-economic

groupings."
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Using a "Domeatir

J'^supc^
"''^
^

Tnrlo^^"
^''"^'^^'^

t-^

i

^'^"1^

respondents according to a seven

point scale ranging fro. "strong
liberal" to -strong conservative,"
Craig sought
to reach beyond the en.otional
attachment to a political party that
voters .ay
reflect to o ".ore broadly cognitive
meaning." He found that the voters
did
use their opinions on the questions
that composed the cognitive scale
to differentiate between the candidates; although,
as he noted, "not in any overwhelming
V7ay."
The responses showed that the more
"liberal" tended to prefer McCarthy
than did the more "conservative." The
"strongly liberal," he found, "preferred

McCarthy less than did the "moderately
liberal," and that the "weakly liberalgroup showed the strongest preference for
McCarthy of all the groups. Wat remained significant as in other evaluations.
McCarthy drew some support from
among all groups

-

even the conservatives.

Something that apparently sur-

prised Craig. 35
To Craig the use of educational levels clarified
the relationship between

domestic issues and candidate preference.

He found McCarthy's strongest sup-

port coming from liberals with "some college education
and consistently signi-

ficant support among non-high school graduates, regardless of
their position
on the liberal-conservative index.-

Johnson, on the other hand, derived his

support from those with high school diplomas, regardless of their position on

domestic issues.

CraJg found that the ability to differentiate between issues

and the candidates and to relate these voting decisions was constant.

Those

with no high school diplomas supporting McCarthy and those high school graduates
supporting Johnson remained consistent regardless of their domestic issues

6A7

pc.itlons.

Beth croup. lalled to
ai££e.e„tl„te between the two candidate,
on
the srcund. of their dc.eatie
issue positions, of this group
those with a high
school diploma tended to support
Johnson while those without shifted
toward
McCarthy 36
.

Examining further, Craig controlled for
voter attitudes toward the efficacy of political participation and
candidate preference.

To develop the rela-

tionship Craig created a "Political
Efficacy Index" which scaled responses
fro.
"Low Efficacy," in nine levels to "High
Efficacy." Again the analysis produced
the "strange mixture" of those sensing
"fairly high" value in political activity
and those sensing "nodorate" and "low
efficacy" were the McCarthy supporters.

The middle levels and the ambivalent level
favored President Johnson. 37

Controlling for social class identification, the
relationships shown

earlier were repeated.

McCarthy retained support among working-class identifiers

who sensed lower feelings toward the efficacy of political
activity.

This led

Craig to conclude that "McCarthy's candidacy represented
those who felt left out
of the political system, either through representation
or reward."

Craig found

that the support for McCarthy was the highest when "low income
and lower effi-

cacy converged. "-^^

The relationship between socio-economic status, sense of political efficacy,
and support for McCarthy remained constant across the analysis Craig developed
of factors such as employment status, income and education.

by social circumstance

The disaffected

tended to be higher in their support of McCarthy than

those whose sense of political efficacy was higher along with their socio-

economic status.
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In

l,t.

atuc.„„t to rol.tc the
Democratic prclcrenco to ethnic
background,

Crnlu tcond that McCarthy's support
Increased a„,ons the Canadian born,
lower
efficacy. Democrats, but a.aone the
non-Canada, f orel,n-born. he found
aU.ost no
support lor McCarthy "except a,nonc
the lowest efficacy sroup."
There he found
support to bo "overwhelminji (77. 2%). "39

Craig's analysis of the religious
backgrounds of the voters found that
concerning a sense of political efficacy
Protestants were more likely to support McCarthy than Catholics except
in the lower efficacy scales where a
rela-

tionship between Catholics and candidate
support was shown. ^0

Although McCarthy

was a Catholic it did not seem to lessen his
appeal to Protestants or increase
bis appeal to Catholics.
Crai,-

Religion was not a factor in the campaign.

measured for levels of interest in the primary and
knowledge about

the primary as a way of further exploring this
aspect of efficacy in the voter's

preference decision.

He found that tendencies to support McCarthy increased
with

jjess interest in the primary ami. with .lower efficacy
ratings.

He found that a

similar relationship developed when he controlled for "knowledge
as to when the
prima y would be held."

As for participation, Democrats who reported less pre-

vious participation more consistently supported McCarthy.

The conclusions which Craig developed from the efficacy analysis showed
that McCarthy served to unite Democrats who were less attached to the Democratic

Party, were lower in feelings of efficacy about their involvement in politics,
had less specific knowledge about this primary, and who had less previous ex-

perience in participating in this kind of election.

At the same time Craig

found that "these Democrats were joined by others who were very unlike the
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first £«up...."

Those „.re the ^.^t highly
educot.d and polltlcnlly
c££lcaclc.us
Democrats who were dra,™ together
by the McCarthy candidacy.
Democrats who
ordinarily would be found 1„ opposing
camps, separated by their "very
different
longer-range view of polities and their
own political and social experiences
To relate political opinions to
the voters' candidate preference.
Craig used
data produced from the survey where
the respondents were asked to identify
three
issues on which they thought the
government should take action. The
highest responded issues were:
1.

Ending the war in Vietnam (7354)

2.

Racial problems (1747)

3.

Crime (1348)

4.

Inflation (906)

5.

High taxes (874)

6.

Unemployment (190)

The spread between the first issue and the second was
so great that Craig con-

cluded that Vietnam was the dominant issue of the campaign.

\^hen testing the

relationship between "awareness" and "importance" Craig found that
Vietnam was
held by most (6950) respondents to be "extremely" important with
8535 responses

which identified the Vietnam issues as either "extremely" or "very" important
while, at the same time, he found that

fev/

of the respondents were willing to

class any of the issues as "completely unimportant.

"'^2

Sorting through the issues as related to candidate preference Craig found
that those who thought it was a mistake getting involved in Vietnam tended to

support McCarthy.

The "pull out" voters supported McCarthy while the "try to
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end

U,.e

fi.htin," and the "Btrongor stand"
voters tended to support Johnson.

As the voter tended to .ore
"hawkishness" Craig found they became less
supportive
of the President, criticizing him
for not being :.ore "hawkish.- Craig
concluded
that "approval" or "disapproval" of
the way Johnson was handling the war was
more

important than the respective voter's specific
policy toward the war in Vietnam.
To examine more closely the relationship
between "Hawk" and "Dove" opinions,

Craig created a "Dove" index and tested the
index against background factors and

candidate preference.

Background factors helped explain partially the "Hawk"

support for McCarthy and the "Dove" support for Johnson
but not entirely, as
Craig noted.

Younger Democrats, the least educated, with leas political expe-

rience, and lower efficacy feelings profiled those "Hawks"
who tended to support

McCarthy.

The same profile of "Doves" produced a mixed result.

Craig concluded

that the critical measure was "lack of knowledge" about the primary
which in-

creased McCarthy's support among both "Hawks" and "Doves. "^3

^his

,

he noted,

partly explained the relationship between low education and McCarthy support.
Craig discarded civil rights opinions as having little relationship to candidate preference but found that two other issues, credibility and the current fi

nancial satisfaction of the voter,

v-ere factors.

Especially after the Tet Offen-

sive in Vietnam, voters' support for McCarthy increased as their sense of the

believability of the Johnson administration declined.

Those less satisfied with

their financial situation tended to support McCarthy v;hile those "pretty well"

satisfied leaned toward Johnson. '^^

Regardless of their view of the Vietnam situa

tion, Craig found that those least satisfied with their financial situation

651

supported HcCarchy.

The x-evcrse was the ease with
those of higher financial

satisfaction, belief in the administration,
and war policy approval.

A dissatisfied and skeptical "Hawk" tended
to support McCarthy, revealing
the dissatisfaction and skepticism as dominant
over that voter's war view/*5
Party images and candidate images are
related to candidate preference in

two-party contests as the

A^erl^

Voter studies revealed.

Craig found that a

similar relationship occurred in the New
Hampshire presidential primary.

His

analysis showed that as important as the voter's
perception of the candidates,

perceptions of the Democratic Party were as important
if the credibility of the
incumbent Democratic administration was included in
the party image measures.
The anti-Democratic Party voters tended to support
McCarthy while the pro-party

Democrats leaned toward Johnson.

But Craig also found that neither candidate

was overwhelmingly embraced or rejected by the Democratic
electorate.

As for

candidate image, the more favorable the image of the candidate in
the mind of
the voter the more likely that voter was to vote for that candidate, a factor

that Craig found to be "slightly more pov/erful in explaining voter preference

than party image. "'^^

Craig concluded his analysis of candidate images, party images, and candidate preference by noting:
Voters' images of the two candidates and their images of
the credibility and efficacy of the Democratic party were
both major influences on candidate preference in the New
Hanipshire Presidential primary of 1968.

Voters who favorably evaluated either candidate, relative
to the other, were very likely to prefer that candidate.
At the same time, voters who saw the Democratic party as
credible, as represented by the incumbent administration,
and efficacious, in terms of future prosperity and the
avoidance of larger wars, were much more likely to prefer
President Johnson than were those voters whose opinions
did not favor the Democratic party in these areas.
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In ccneral, then, candidate
images and party images

at

^^^^
influentia/m^^fSdld: e
preicrtncc
r::crir::his'^^:'
in this primary as they
P
appear to have been
In two-party election contests
in the past.
Opinions on
Vietnam wore also important
influences" but less than
party or candidate images. 47

Cralg then examined "Candidate-Issue
Proximity, party images, candidate
Images, opinions, and candidate
preference." ;vi.lle he felt the effort
was "less
than a total success," he did find
it to bo the "most powerful
variable" he had
found "explaining candidate preference ."^8
The question used to represent the
variable was "Which of the candidates
can best handle this issue?" Kn.ile
Craig
did see the proximity of the voter
to the candidate as being an important
evaluator of the result he did feel that
its status as a measure was "unclear"

because it "measured many things at once but
not clearly."

The power of the

measure seemed to come from the fact that it
combined other individual measures
into one index which was found to have a higher
value than any of the single

measures he examined.

He then had to condition his conclusion by
stating that

"other major factors continued to exert influence on
candidate choice, altering
the effect of candidate-issue proximity on candidate
preference. "A9

This latter

conclusion noted that "llawk-Dove" opinion, credibility, and handling
of the war
"continued to influence candidate preference," and with about the same
power observed prior to Craig's use of the candidate-issue proximity measure.

Ihl^

factors , Hawk-Dove opinion, credi bility, and h andlin g of the war, must,

ther efore , be consi dered the
12^1^'

Thes e

i mportant

c oncerns

of the New Hampshi re voter in

Millie the sum of the issues analyzed by Craig may be slightly more power-

ful than the three individual factors as an explanation of the vote, it is the

three factors that seem to relate most closely to the pattern of the campaign
and the reason why McCarthy, and the campaign's strategy succeeded.
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concluded his analysis of the
primary voting behavior by noting
that
-voters' decisions... were influenced
by evaluations of the candidates,
largely
personal ter..s. short and long-range
opinions on the Vietna. war, and evaluations of the current and future
prefot^ance of the Democratic party."
He noted
that the "order" of the above is about
correct but that the "evaluation of
the
Cralfi

m

Democratic party" was about "equal in power"
to the "effect of the Vletnana war
Issues on candidate pref erence."50 ^he
voter in the primary "behaved rationally
accordins to their values and their information
and understanding to that point."
"To this extent." Craig concluded, "the
results of the New Hampshire Presidential primary of 1968 did not undermine
belief in the rationality of the American

voter but reinforced such a belief. "^1
The one factor that Craig's analysis and the data
he used did not account

for was the role of the non-Democratic party adherent especially the Independent voter.

Without the Independents joining the election In significant
numbers

the result would have been as Craig's data revealed.
to one would have voted for Johnson over McCarthy.

Approximately three voters
This would have produced a

victory for Johnson comparable to that which his supporters had predicted
during
most of the campaign.

The Polls

Polling is an important part of most political contests and especially presidential campaigns.

Host potential candidates make their plans many months be-

fore the beginning of the presidential campaign season.
is an activity known as "testing the water"

—

Part of this planning

an activity which is divided
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between public and private
\atc actions.
actinnQ
.

•n,^
Ihe

v-i j
public
actions are usually visits to

a state, meetings with
important officials, and overtures
designed to stimulate

electorate interest.

The private actions occur below
the surface through polls,

selection of voter targets, and
determining probable campaign issue
content.
The New Hampshire McCarthy campaign
did not have the resources or
the time
to pre-plan the campaign.

There were no polls for the candidate,
no issue ex-

periments, or even much other
"water-testing.

"

There was a perceived vacuum;

there were issues that were not being
addressed, and there was a candidate

willing to respond.

The campaign planning and management
had to rest on the

instincts cf the candidate and the experience
of its principal managers.

All

else resembled tinkering with a watch, to
m^ke it run a bit more accurately.

Although there were public opinion probes that
evolved out of the McCarthy
campaign (such as canvassing, Dr. Al Shepard's
motivational research, rumors of
the results of polls taken by other candidates,
and polls taken by academics,

and the networks) a complete survey was not available
to the McCarthy managers.
In this section several polls, taken during the campaign,
will be examined.

Two questions seem most intriguing since all of the polls
missed the final result by a considerable margin.

The first is whether the polls did contain an

inkling of the result and the analysis failed to bring that result to the surface.

The second concerns the adequacy of the survey either as to the questions

asked or the sample used for the assessment.
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^i?f_£Iii^_A9.rv ^ys roll Commissio n ed by ABC Ncvb

.

This survey Is the same as that used
by Robert

voting behavior in the New Hampshire
primary.
the sample universe.

E.

Craig in his analysis of

The principal criticism concerns

As a descriptor of the electorate
and as a basis for ana-

lysis the survey appears thorough.

The election result and the attitudes
which

the survey detected show the Democratic vote
in the primary to be a product of
a number of interacting events and
attitudes.

\^en taken together the result

was a picture of a voting community making
rational decisions.

These vote

decisions were based upon a perception of events,
candidates, party image,
and information received.

If the survey had been available prior to the
elec-

tion and had been analyzed properly it would have helped
refine the McCarthy

campaign strategy.
The survey failed in its capacity to predict a relative final position
for the principal Democratic candidates.

It failed because it did not evaluate

the attitudes of those not registered as Democrats.

Wliat

attracted Independents

to vote was an aspect of the 1968 primary that was not probed nor its importance

appreciated until after the votes had been counted.

A profile of the Indepen-

dent voter, an asse^sraent of what might or might not prompt voting would have

been an Important descriptor for campaign planning and for post-election voter
analysis.

Unlveri;ity of N cw Hamps h ire Survey

.

A political science class at the University of New Hampshire conducted an
early survey to assess issue opinions and voter candidate preference.

The

survey Included a sample drawn from the registered Independents as well as the

registered Democrats and Republicans.

Taken January

5,

1968, the survey pre-
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ceded the public announcement
of McCarthy's New
Hampshire candidacy and reflect
opinions set at a time when
McCarthy's candidacy in New
Hampshire was seriously
doubt.
The findings of this survey
are instructive although limited
in
sample size and. to some extent,
in its interpretation.

m

IVo assumptions had been made
by the New Hampshire McCarthy
leaders.
First, anti- Vietnam war sentiment
was not strong in New Hampshire
as evidenced
by the low level of organized
anti-war activity.
The second assumption was that Robert
Kennedy might well receive a useful
protest vote in the primary much as
Lodge had done in 1964. This latter
aasump
tion was based upon Kennedy's prominent
name and regional identity rather than
a sense that he would himself broaden
and legitimize anti-Vietnam war opinions.

When the UNH students analyzed their survey
(see Table 14.18) they came
close to predicting the primary election result.

With "all voters" included,

the percent support for President Johnson was
49.4,

percent of the Democratic vote.

The actual return was 49.6

What is of special interest is the total per-

cent of "all voters" supporting candidates other than
President Johnson as of
the January

,5th

date of the UNH survey.

Robert Kennedy, the

most,

prominent

name in the survey, received 21.0 percent; Eugene McCarthy,
8.9 percent; and
George Wallace, 5.1 percent.
didates

v/aa

35.0 percent.

The total recorded for the three alternative can-

The "undecided" percentage was 12.8 percent.

It may

be concluded that the campaign began with 35 percent willing to identify with
a

name other than that of the incumbent President.

percent indicated

a

wait and see attitude.

Further, an additional 12.8

This gave an alternate candidate

to Johnson an important early advantage that few recognized.
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ir tUe

McCa„Hy loa.er.

W.Ue-i„

Ke..„,e.,

e.b..ras..ent of

e„c«

of Ku.ene Baniell.

Ms Ap.U

have been badly splintered.
ballots cast.

.eea u„a,ao to foia into

«

the...

or«™i.„ic„

Ce,o.,e Wallace

tUo

the

1967 visit to .a.t.outh College,
the final vote .l,ht

McCarthy received 42.0 percent
of the Democratic

His campaign had been
successful In directing those voters
dis-

satisfied with President Johnson
toward McCarthy's candidacy.
While the data used In the UNH
Student Survey was compiled from
all voters
and not Just Democratic party
registrants. Robert Craig concludes
that the

"...primary was similar to a Presidential
election in all respects except that
it took place within a party's
primary. "53 ^he data drawn from this
early survey and analyzed by Including "all
voters" revealed important aspects of
the
1968 Hew Hampshire primary environment in
196S.

These aspects were omitted in

other surveys which focussed on the specific
category of voter

Democrat

>

-

Republican.

or Independent.

When the data was disaggregated by party
label the results were as the

Johnson campaign organizers predicted.

Table 1A.18 shows President Johnson

having 60.7 percent support among those "strictly"
identified as Democrats,

with Kennedy having 25.6 percent; McCarthy 5.2 percent;
Wallace 1.7 percent,
and 6.8 percent "DK, NA. other."

The figures shift considerably when "Indepen-

dents" and "Republicans" are included.

Johnson's percentage drops to 45 with

the McCarthy and V/allace percentages increasing considerably,
as does the "DK,
NA, other" class.
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on the

hand when the analysis
incorporates "all voters" the
finding
approximates the actual result of
the Democratic primary, while
on the other
hand, when the analysis excludes
the Independents and the
Republicans, the result shifts heavily in favor of
President Johnson. The Republicans
.ust be excluded fro. the analysis because
they are ineligible by law to
vote for a Democratic candidate on a Democratic
ballot.
Nothing the following table, with
Republicans excluded, the relationship
again shifts favorably toward the alternative candidates against President
Johnson. With the "DK, NA, otherone.

responses dropped, the three alternative
candidate possibilities gather Al.5
percent of the responses against 53.1
percent for the incumbent president.

Allotting 60 percent of the "DK, NA, other"
responses to the alternative candidates' total and 40 percent to Johnson, the
gap closes much as did the gap be-

tween the principal candidates in the actual
primary.

McCarthy's appeal to

Independents and Republicans showed some early strength
in this survey, a
factor that became important in the final result.

Wlien the

Republican write-in

votes for McCarthy and for Johnson were added to the
Democratic total, the

Johnson edge shrank to 524 votes or less than one percent
difference in total
votes cast on both party ballots.

The UNH student survey contained an important

prediction of the final result that was not interpreted at the time of
the campaign.
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__JolHlsoj^,Kcn^
Democrats^

60.7%

25.67

Wallac e
97
5.2/

tcv
1.7%
-i

DK.NA,0ther_JV^t-n2___
6.8%

100%
(117)

IndependentsB

45.5

22.2

lo.l

6.0

16.2

100%
99)

(

^3.1

29.9

7.7

3.85

11.5

100%
(216)

DK,NA, Other

Allocated

4.6

29.9

41.5

57,7

3.85

6.9

48.

^iot including Meaning" Independents including "strong" and
"not so stronr"
^
party ident3.f iers.

^Il^±iAlm

"leaning'-'

Independents as well as those with no party identification.

In addition to producing a voter survey that was close
to predicting the

final outcome of the primary, the UNH survey spotted attitudes
on the most im-

portant issue of the campaign, the handling of the Vietnam

x^ar.

Table 14.19

shows the analysis of responses to a scale of three questions from "Pull
out"
to "Take a stronger stand" in Vietnam.

voters" universe of the survey.

The analysis is based on the "all

Again, the "all voters" aggregation appears

not to reflect the actual voting situation, where only the registered Indepen-

dents had a choice of primary ballots, except that in the end the "all voters"

aggregation proved a better predictor of the results than did the strict party

registration identification.
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TABLE 14.19: OPINION ON "WH^T TO DO
IN VIETNAM NOW" BY POLITICAL
PARTY,
JANUARY, 1968-^-*
"Stay
in
,^^ut"

fighting"

7.7%

AO. 2%

M

i.T.

Democrats^

"Take a
Stronger
stand-

38.5%

ah

DK, NA

Other

13.7%

Total

VotLs

100%

28.2%

(117)

Independents

6.1

37.4

55.6

100%
(

Republicans^

9.2

30.3

48.1

12,4

23.9

99)

100%

44.6

(185)

DK, NA, Other

100%
(

All Voters

8. 0

34.5

47.0

10.6

3.4

lA)

100%
(A15)

^^£1 including those "leaning" toward political party.

A contention aade by the organizers of the McCarthy campaign was
that

a

dissatisfied voting population existed who described their position
on the

Vietnam war as being "Let's win the

v/ar

or get out."

As Craig wrote in his

re-cap of the survey conducted by his students, "The Hoeh group was quite
accurate in their perception that strong anti-war sentiment in New Hampshire was
rare. "^^ (See Table 14.19)

Wliile the

McCarthy organizers did recognize the

rarity of vocal and organized anti-Vietnam War sentiment they also recognized
that a statement like "Let's win the war or get out" did not reflect support
for the Johnson war policy.

To develop a campaign that would capture this

sentiment and produce a vote from this feeling would require
considerable care.
This was the justification for the careful preparations of
the pre-campaign and
the care which the McCarthy leaders took to develop the early stages
of the

candidacy.
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The

UNII

survey couflrraed that the

"PuH

out" and "Take a stronger
stand-

exceeded the percentage recorded
for "Stay but end fighting"
in every case.
WlUle the "Take a stronger stand"
.ight put off less imaginative
ca^paig ners,
it did not disturb the Hew
Hampshire McCarthy leaders.

Their political senses

were that the "Hawk" stance was an
acceptable way for a New Hampshire
person to
express concern about the way the war
was being handled.
It was also an accept
able mask for other concerns which were
difficult to express, such as concern
about the impact of the war on the domestic
economy, impact on U.S. world
status, and the success of domestic
policies.

To "Pull out" represented to

many a posture of weakness that they would
not verbalize.
Wlien

sentiments concerning Vietnam policy were
cross-tabulated with can-

didate preference, the view held by the McCarthy
organizers was supported.

Johnson gathe7:ed only ^.4 percent of those expressing
"Pull out" sentiments.
The middle position "Stay but end fighting" did
not generate even a majority

position among Johnson's supporters.

Wliile

Kennedy and McCarthy gathered the

highest percentage of the anti-war expression, they also did well
among the
"Hawks."

Public opinions with which the campaign for McCarthy had to deal,

were ones of dissatisfaction with administration policy but a dissatisfaction
that leaned toward an aggressive stance.

From this the McCarthy organizers

felt that a positive alternative to the administration's stumbling Vietnam

policy would be welcomed.

55.0 percent of all the voters surveyed endorsed

a policy that proposed a change in the current situation in Vietnam.
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TABLE 14.20: OPINION ON "WiLVr
TO

•'Stay

"Pull Out-

Lyndon
Johnson

4.4%

f'l^ht'lnt"
^^^^^"S

39.5%

"Take a

"T""^.^"
stand"

47.8%

other

3%

Total

All
Voters

100%

49.4%

(205)

Robert
Kennedy

16.1

35.6

36.8

11.4

100%

Eugene
McCarthy

10.8

27.0

51.4

10.8

100%
(

George

9.5

V7allace

9.5

66.7

14.3

Undecided

3.8

30.2

49.1

17.0

NA,

5.1

21)

100%
(

8.9

37)

100%
(

21.0

87)

(

12.8

53)

Others
100%

All Voters

8.0

34.5

47.0

10.6

100%

100%

(415)

(415)

Given the fact that Eugene McCarthy was
little known by the respondents at
the time the survey was taken (8.9
percent of all voters January 5, 1968) and
the other possibilities (Kennedy and
VJallace) receded as McCarthy's candidacy

developed, it is not surprising that the "Hawk"
and "Dove" sentiments clustered

around the candidate offering an alternative,

^^at is striking is that the

Johnson campaign organizers neglected to recognize
the deep weakness of their
candidate as registered by the voters' response to the
Vietnam scale.

Johnson managers

seeir.ed

The

to have jumped over this soft spot to a strategy trans-

ferring the popularity of New Hampshire Democratic
Party notables to Johnson.
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..a..
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^

Oove.no., .ohn W. Ki„«.
..3
cove, the wea,.es„.
the

now

stra.e,,

^

.«ch

Bernard

,,,,

I,.

^^^^^

Boutin ..opted to

^^^^^^^^

m

o. event,

Vietnam, especially the
let o«enslve. and the
cater.l
devoloiwient of the McCarthy
candidacy.

Oljverjjuayle and Coiipany Survey
for NBC N ews
Oliver Ouayle and Co.pany

,,as

co^lssloned by the National Broadca.tln.

company (NBC) to survey New
Hampshire voter opinion.
on the "attitudes and responses
of 247

Stated that they were
y
Eleetlo,.....-

ccrt£i:ir) .to
tn _vo_te
'^7r.^,i
-CJLLliLiil

A^Ot resident

Quayle's survey was hased
of New Hampshire who

-t^
in
the t>
DcmocT^a tic Presi dential Primar
y

The respondents were interviewed
between "December 9th and 16th"

1967 and were re-nterviewed on a "panel
basis" between February 22nd and
24th
(1968)
The panel was composed of 157 of
those who had been interviewed in the
.

December survej''.^^
From conversations between Quayle and
the author, Quayle implied that
these
data, or sir.ilar data, were made
available to the White House.

April 10, 1972, Quayle aaid, "NBC says OK
so
did for them in

available,"

'
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.

I

The other earlier survey

(Emphasis added)

Writing to Koeh,

enclose a copy of the survey

w^

I

done for someone _else and is

Several persons involved in the management

of the Johnson campaign stated to the author
after the contest that they had

used a "Quayle Poll" as the basis of their campaign
planning.

66/4

The survey that is discussed
hero vas prepared lor ••in.ediate
internal use
at: NBC and for use on
the air Election Night as
NBC sees fit in accordance
.^th
its own policies. -39
^^^^
^^^^^^ ^^^^ specifically
stated, the survey sa.ple appears
to include registered
Independents. A note
to the effect that "8 percent
are Independents and 92 percent
are Democratsappears to confinn the conclusion
that the survey reached beyond
registered
and -certain- to vote Democrats.
The analysis was written to assist
election
night reporting and to suggest how the
results might be displayed for television
viewing.
The internal analysis is instructive,
first as a profile of the attitudes evident at two stages during the
election period, and second, as an im-

plied basis for campaign strategy adjustments
that were made by the Johnson
campaign.

The word "implied- is used because the author
feels that either an

identical survey was supplied the New Hampshire
Johnson campaigners or

a

similar

survey developing much the same conclusion was
produced by Oliver Quayle and

Company for their use.^^
Quayle

's

polling reached for factors which could serve as useful
inputs

to campaign planning.

His skill in discovering these relationships and then

advising a political strategy made him one of the most sought after
pollsters
in the 1960* s.

His approach Is demonstrated in the NBC poll.^^

It appears from the first item of the NBC analysis that someone wanted
to

know v;hether the interests of the President could be adequately, or better
represented in New Hampshire by the state's top political leadership than by
the President himself.

Although it appeared from Bernard Boutin's conversation
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with Sandra Hoeh, AuoukL
-Ub/.
1967
tlm- the p
thai
President's campaign would be
conducted
without hie actual Dartir-^^•l^•f
or.
paiticipation. the survey in
December may have served as an
additional check for the strategv
-rucegy ot
of hw-lno
.
having his ^interests
represented by surroaate..
It was not too late at that
time to change the strategy
and have Lyndon
John.on enter his name as a candidate
in the primary.
Quayle's "Job Rating"
scale as of Mid-December read:
t

TABLE 1A.21: JOB rUTINGs62

All Democratic Party Primary
Presidential
Voters as of Mid-Decemhpr
Johtnson

Unfavorable

McCarthy

Kennedy

Mclntyre

King

74%

52%

55%

80%

90%

26%

48%

45%

20%

10%

Quayle interpreted the Mid-December finding as meaning
that if "the writeing effort for Mr. Johnson yields a higher percentage
of the primary support

than is presently Indicated in this report, at least
part of the credit must be

accoraad the state's Democratic Senator and Governor

.

"^'3

The Mid-December find-

ing tended to re-enforce Boutin's concept for the write-in
campaign.

King and

Mclntyre would be the leaders and, presumably, transfer their own
popularity to
the somewhat less popular President.

At the worst Johnson retained "74 percent"

favorable, a percentage that may have been the source of Boutin's and Mclntyre's

earJy optimism.
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What «uaylc

£o,...a

.,,c„

„e re.-s..vo,.d in February

that "onl, two Dc
)emocratic rrl^ary voter. tooU a
favorable view of the Presldeafs
record for every
three who had done bo two and a
half .onths earlier."M
j^e shift In the "Job
Rating" showed Johnson declinirf^
ccxining trora
frnT^, his
Tt?o 74
7/
percent December peak to 67
percent
favorable three .eeks before the
election.
The unfavorable view had grov.
fro.
26 percent to 33 percent in the sa.e period
which Quayle interpreted as "a
fourth
again as .any of the same Democratic
Presidential Primary voters took a di.
view
of the Job being done by the
President in February as those who
had held such an
opinion in December,..." The reason
for the "ebb" in Johnson's popularity,
„<,s

Quayle conceded, was because of the "loss
of the Pueblo and the enemy Tet
offlnsive...." He then concluded that
since "fully 33 percent of those Democrats who are willing to rate Mr. Johnson
give him an unfavorable score.

We

regard this as a very reasonable potential
for McCarthy ... or write-in for Robert
Kennedy. "^^
In a section titled "Standings" Quayle found
that the "write-in support of

President Johnson declined more markedly between
mid-December and late February
than did his job rating."

TABLE 14.22: DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY PREFERENCES66
All Democratic Presidential Primary Preferences
Voters
^Itji Un decided In

'67

Dec.

'68

F eb.

With Undecid ed Out
'6 7

Dec.

'68

Feb.

%

%

%

65

55

82

72

Eugene McCarthy

7

16

9

22

Robert Kennedy

6

4

8

5

Others

1

1

X

1

21

24

-

Lyndon Johnson

Not sure

"

%
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Quaylc concluded chat "the sharp
rise
^-isc In
111 McCartl>v'«
a-,
McLaiLhy s standing
among the Granite
State's Democratic Primary voters
rpP„^^o at
n^ least
i
results
y
partially from his active
1

campalgnlnc in the state."

The switch of the Kennedy vrite-in
to McCarthy was

underway at the ti.e of the first
survey.
Kennedy's decline in the second survey.
New Hampshire candidacy in December.
was •ominous."

This was credited by Quayle for
Also, McCarthy had not announced
his

To Quayle the movement away from
Johnson

"Unless his supporters.

..

can halt aud reverse the current tide,

the anti-incumbent total on March
12th could well add to something over
30 percent." This quayle surmised would be a
"distinct setback to Mr. Johnson's

chances for re-election."

He then pursued his analysis a bit
further by not-

ing, "such an anti-Johnson percentage
might be interpreted (falsely, as well

shall soon see) as an expression of dove sentiment
on Vietnam. "^^

Quayle's reasons for predicting problems for Johnson
resulting from the
shift were:

1.

McCarthy has momentum; and,

2.

the increase in the number of

undecided usually indicates that more movement in the
same direction is to come.

The McCarthy canvass analysis had picked up the same shift.

The McCarthy cam-

paign strategy also shifted to take advantage of both the momentum
and the increase in the number of undecideds that the canvassers were
encountering during
Februa ry.

Using a "Key Group Analysis" Quayle concluded that President Johnson received the "support of less than two thirds of the Democratic Primary voters

among only one of the eleven critical segments of the electorate" as of February,

Because of this Quayle felt that "subgroup" preferences were of considerable
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luipoi-tance in the contest.
con t pen-

of the true contest,
on Primary Bay It

lie

t»It

wrote
wrote,

may lbe
"

th«
,

In

thlc.

an.lysU Quayle lost sight

if n,„
...l£
the r.
President runs better than 72
percent

„1U

be due in large part to
his strength a„o„g .e.ocratle
Primary voters of 50 and over
and those resident In
Hillsborough County." The
earlier 72 percent figure cropped
up again at this stage
when his previous

analysis shewed strong trends
wlttling at this figure.

This conclusion .ay

be the basis for Boutin's
continued optin,is» and holding to
the high percentage
for Johnson that he did
until the last few days of the
campaign. The .ost
(iuayle would concede was that
the "McCarthy-Kennedy total would
be something

topping 27 percent" which he felt
would co.e fro. defecting Johnson
supporters
among voters under 35 years old. ^8

Examining volunteered responses to a
list of 32 selected issues, Quayle
found that the New Hampshire voters
placed Vietnam as "far and away" the most
in^portant issue.

Using nine of the thirty-two issues to
profile the voter

opinion and to relate that to candidate
preference. Quayle found that two thirds
of all opinions offered included taxes
and spending, Vietnam, and racial relations.

Of these Quayle found that live Democratic
primary voters expressed

concern over taxes and spending and racial relations
for ever^^ three concerned
about the war in Vietnam, and "on the fiscal
issues of overtaxing and over-

spending and social civil rights... we find five McCarthy
supporters volunteering
concern for every three backing the President "^^
.
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TABLE U.23: KEY GROU?
,\NAI.YSls70

i2l»£231

Kennedy

others

!lilla
%

Overall

9

Sex
Male
Female

21-34
35-49

over

1
/o

22

9

24

9

20

82

72

%

%

%

%

_8_

_5

1

1

81
83

67
78

9

8

4

2

67

11

9

*

68
78

7

4

5

14

24

5

28

75
83

7

19

87

4

2

W
(Not

S

J.)

%

%

(21)

(23)

(17)
(25)

(20)
(27)

(24)
(22)

(19)
(26)

(16)

(25)

(20)
(21)
(21)

(27)
(23)
(22)

l^evel
•

IJpper-Mddle

Middle
Lower

14

18

78
82

5

25

86

82
71
63

8

24
21

85
79

72
71

19

90

78

3

3
8

6

9

9

5

2

(25)

10

8

(15)

(25)
(22)

(24)

(26)

Area
1st CD
2nd CD

10

Special Are a
Hillsborough County

* Less than 0.5 percent

When the issues were examined the pattern of
"favorable" to "unfavorable"
views of President Johnson's performance was more
striking than Quyale seemed to
perceive.

While Vietnam was the top issue, the opinion split
between the two

reactions was quite close

—

53 percent favorable to 47 percent unfavorable.

On
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s.ve.a e.o.o.ic issues

U,e „pi„,„„ .,.,„3.
aohnscn's

po..o»»ee ™s

st.cn,-

Keepi„, .He cos. of Xlvl„, ao™.
"unf avo.able 76 percent;
.olciins Che U„e o„
taxes, "unfavorable"
65 percent; stopping „.ste
In .overn.ent. "unfavorable"
81 percent.
in his

te«

analysis of the following
table. Quayle concentrated
on the war
issue Which he explained with
subjective vie«s of his own.
Tor example, "...doves
are notoriously .ore vocal than
hawks and frustrates." which
see.ed to l.ply the
existence of . majority later
labelled by President Nixon as
the "silent .ajcrlty."
His subsequent discussion of the
issues concentrated on voter
attitudes toward
the war in Vletna.. he did not
pursue the economic issues that
showed such high
levels of "unfavorable" response.

TABLE 14.24: SELECTED NATIONAL ISSUES^^

All
Democratic
Presidential
Primary
Voters
Most
Imp or:.: ant

Handling the War in Vietnam
Working for peace and
Disarijiament

Keeping the cost of living
dovm
The War on Poverty
Holding the line on taxes
Fighting crirae
Help for older people
Handline riots In our
cities
Stopping waste in government spending

47

28

22
19

All Democratic Presidential
Primary Voters Rating
President Johnson's Job
Performance as:

%

%

53

47

(

5)

65

35

(

5)

24

76
46
65

(

5)

54

%

(

7)

(

5)

17
15
15

35
50

50

(11)

80

20

(

2)

13

41

59

(

5)

13

19

81

(18)

.
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tha. ..dove feelings we.o
fa. „...,o,,,e.

Of vie„...'2

^^^^^^^^^^

„o.H haw. and Ad.inlst.aUcn
poin.s

^^^^^

^^^^^ ^ ^^^^^

alnce .he Tec offeasive. he
explained by noUng.

..we

^^^^^^^^^^

.ust .e^.her that these

are the .lews of Baoerat.
and that they are less
hawkish and „o.e In support of
our present policies than the
general electorate across the
nation... How this
interpretation related to the New
Hampshire situation and the
sentient of the
person who would actually be
voting In the March 12th primary
see.s obscure.
Wl^on

quayle combined the two

'.dove.,

questions he found a total percentage
of 21

Which was less than the 27 percent
which he had attributed to the
McCarthy/Kennedy
group earlier. He concluded then
that McCarthy/Kennedy ..are
attracting .ore than
dove support... but did not reach
for a reason for this higher
support.
Instead
he wrote. "Rather surprisingly.
Senator McCarthy's campaigning among
Democratic

primary voters... has thus far left them
surprisingly Ignorant of his stand on
the war. ..73 rm^ conclusion when given
to the leaders of the Johnson campaign,
led them to change their strategy.

They attacked McCarthy directly, charging

that ha had not communicated his policy
proposals toward Vietnam effectively.

They assumed that If McCarthy did make clear
his positions that his support

would recede to the ..dove" figure of 21 percent.
To determine the accuracy of his conclusion about
McCarthy's Vietnam position, Quayle analyzed the McCarthy favorable
responses against the below sequence

of questions.

He reported that

voters identified as a dove

—

'.in

December only 19 percent of these primary

about one in five."

By late February, using the

same analysis he found that .'more than half" of the voters were
"still unaware

672

-

hi. ..a.ce on .He

.a.-

He ..en conclude.

...

POsiUon on Vie.n.. ,.Ue
s.a.aXngl, tu.ns ou.

-..Ms i.nor.nce o. McCa..,^

.o .e t.e .a,or reason
He cur-

rently stands so well a.ong
this electorate vis-a-vis
JoHnson."

TABLE 14.25: ATTITUDES TOWARD
U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM^A

Democratic President Primary
Voter-.'
own Views

"V;e should go all out,
fight an
unlimited viar (short of using
nuclear weapons) and either win
or force negotiations"

WitJlJir^decidelJ^

MthJJndeci^

^^L§1

Dec.

Feb^liS

'67

Feb.

%

%

%

47

35

51

39

29

36

31

40

5

5

7

9

"We should do as v.^e are. keep
on fighting a limited but

Increasing military operations
as necessary while seeking

negotiations"
"We should stay in Vietnam but
reduce military operations"

Not sure

'68

673

TABLE 14.26

Democratic Presidential
Primary Voters \;ho Don't
Know McCarthy's Position
on Vietnam:

Democratic Presidential
Primary
Voters IVho Feel That
McCarthy's
Hawk of LB

^^il^li?
for

Votin^j,

JohnKon
McCarthy
Kennedy
Other

Dove
Feb,_l68

Dec.

'67

%

'68

70

31

92

22
4

21

(32)

(

9)

(

5)

Dec.

'67

Feb,

'68

%

%

%

73

90

77

16

A

22

8

4

1

3

2

:

A

(Not Sure)

Feb.

(22)

(23)

(25)

Almost as a foocnote to this analysis.
Quayle returns to the lack of
support
President Johnson had for his economic
policies as represented by voter
response
to the taxing and spending
questions.

He noted that if Johnson received
less

than "72 percent of the vote" then
"it will be because New Hampshire's
Democratic
Prl.:ary voters have turned away fro.,
him..." on the economic issues.

words,

"In other

if McCarthy/Kennedy come in at
better than 27 percent it will be an across-

the-board dissatisfaction with Johnson generally
rather than on any single issue. "76
Given the fact that President Johnson withdrew
as a candidate shortly after
the New Hampshire primary, a reason for his
action may well be attributed to this

conclusion.

While Quayle does offer a campaign strategy for
dealing with the

voter perception concerning McCarthy and Vietnam policy,
he did not offer a strategy for reversing the President's weakness in terms
of "across-the-board dissatis-

faction with Johnson generally "^7
.

(VM

Returning., to his

preoccupation with the voters uncertainty about
McCarthy,

Quayle found that when asked to volunteer either
praise or criticism of Senator
McCarthy, 62 percent were "Not Sufficiently Familiar
With Him To Coniment." and
of those who did conunent, 16 percent were
"unfavorable" because they did not

like his atand on Vietnam. 78

Testing this reaction Quayle developed the re-

sponses as follows:

TABLE 14.27: ATTITUDES TOWARD STATETiENT "I TEND TO THINK LESS OF EUGENE McCARTHY
BECAUSE HE WANTS US TO KmJCKJ.E WIDER TO THE COMMUNISTS"79
With Undecide d lu

With Unde cided Out

%

%

Agree

21

43

Disagree

27

57

Not Sure

52

Quayle concluded this portion of his analysis by noting

w eaker

on

March 12th than we currentl y sho vz

has not (or Mr. Jolmson

clear to these vo ters.

*

s

supporters have not) made his position on Vietnam
if

McCarthy gains more

it will be because he has been able

Vietnam stance from this electorate
hira as

if the Senator is

it will be in large part because he

And as an obvious corollary,

of the vote than we sh o w,

been able to tag

,

"

.

to

conceal his

(Or the President's supporters have not

opposed to standing firm on Vietnam. )"^^

prods the Johnson campaign to attack McCarthy as a dove.

Again, Quayle
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Although Quayle tried to determine whether
McCarthy's candidacy

..as

viewed

as being devisive by loyal Democrats
he did not develop the issue to the
extent of

Robert Craiii's analysis.

Quayle found that one voter in twelve was

with McCarthy for causing "dissension" within
party ranks.

dissatisfied

He did not question

for dissatisfaction caused by the way the
Johnson campaign was structured or the

voters' perception of Johnson's New Hampshire
campaign tactics (such as the

pledge cards) as these related to voter opinions of President
Johnson himself.

Testing for what had been discussed as Johnson's "credibility
gap," Quayle
concluded, by using a Major words and phrases association test,
that the "gap"
did "not appear to be damaging the President severely among.

..

primary voters."

He noted that only "an eighth of the voters complained that he
(Johnson) was

not completely honest.

... "^^

TABLE 14.28: MAJOR WOPJDS AND PHRASES ASSOCIATED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON^^

All Democratic Primary
Voters
%

Favorable
Hard v7orking
Honest, has integrity
Patriotic
Dedicated
Responsible
A fighter
Courageous

Unfavorable
Wheeler-dealer
An arm tv/ister
Ciin't be believed
Out for himself
Hits below the belt
Crude
Corny

74
65
57
55
53
48
43

25
12
11
10
10
8
7

C)76

Uoins the «mne measure Quayle concluded that
if Senator McCarthy fell below the "mark assigned to

in this report, a part of the reason may
lie in

hirn

the fact that many of these voters have come
to think of him as a fuzzy-minded

and over idealistic living-room liberal,

..

this could «ell cost him votes among

hardhcaded Granite Staters. "^^

TABLE 14.29: M/iJOR WOllDS AND PHRASES ASSOCIATED WITH SENATOR MCCARTHY

Democratic Primary Voters Making
Associations
%

Favorable
Dedicated
Patriotic
Responsible
Hard vrorklng
Honest, has integrity
Fon;ard looking
Courageous

47
47
44
41
38
34
31

Unfavorable
Out for himself
Can't win
Living-room liberal

23
19
19
16
16
16
16

Fuzzy-minded

A dreamer
Not entirely loyal

Too idealistic

Quayle concluded his analysis with a small table representing attitudes in
response

to the statement, "President Johnson has not been entirely forthright

in keeping us informed about Vietnam."
14 percent were "not sure."

to 56 and 44 respectively.

48 percent agreed, 38 percent disagreed,

Taking out the "not sure", the percentages increased

Although Quayle stated earlier that he did not consi-

der the "credibility gap" as "damaging" he concluded his analysis by writing,
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•

'lLll£^9hll^o}Ll3ll^

-s

hort of 73 percent, some of the «hrlnkar.c of his
su p-

2S!lS^^JL.hll±^J:k^i crcdlhillty

r.ap

.

Indeed,

V7e

consider this one of the

very dramatic findings of this survey."

The "56 percent" response to the ques-

tion concerning Johnson's

seems to have startled Quayle in the

f orthrightness

final stages of his analysis.

To offer a possible critique of the Johnson cam-

paign strategy Quayle wrote:
If McCarthy climbs over the 27 mark tlie Johnson strategists
will have erred in placing too much emphasis on selling
Lyndon Johnson (title of basic literature piece is "A
Strong Man in a Tough Job") and too little on Vv'hether or
not the ]J.[]. should stand firm in Vietnam. "^5

Given the thrust cf Quayle 's survey and subsequent analysis, his comments
under the title "A Final Observation" seem to come late in his examination.
These observations conflict with his earlier analysis.

His identification of

Vietnam as the major campaign issue and his lack of attention to the economic
concerns relfccted in his own data appear at odds.
Some political observers have called U.S. policy in Vietnam
the major issue in the Eemocratic Presidential Primary
Election in New Hampshire; as of late February it was not,
and if it should become so the fact will damage Senator
McCarthy. There is certainly frustration and unhappiness
with the fact of the war, and this certainly is a big facBut
tor contributing to the over-all dissatisfaction.
domestic policies, particularly the economy and racial
disorders, contributed. And so the President as a person,
as witness the credibility gap.S6

1968 in New Hampshire presented those analyzing the activity with a con-

fusing picture.

Quayle'

s

analysis seems to jump from reporting results, to

advising on campaign strategy, to interpreting findings for both a news

gathering client and to advising a presidential client.

The misleading aspect

678

of the survey is Quaylc's frequent reference
to a "72 percent" vote for Presi-

dent Johnson

—

a percent that, given Quayle's own analysis,

softened considerably.
on

thir.

should have been

If it is true that the Johnson campaign managers
relied

percentage it is not difficult to see how they were misled.

Starting

a political contest with a large preference bulge is one thing
but expecting

that bulge to stand up during a hotly contested election campaign is quite an-

other

—

especially when one candidate is not actively campaigning.

The Dartmouth Colle ge Survey.

Conducted by students in a Voting Behavior Seminar under the direction of

Professors Roger Davidson and David Kovenock, this survey assessed voter opinion close to the date of the election.

Unlike the UNH Survey, which was con-

ducted early in the election period (January

5,

1968) and was designed to deter-

mine voter concerns, the Dartmouth survey was taken betv/een February 16 and 26,
1968 and

vj'as

designed to anticipate the election result.

The survey sampled 360 cases on an area probability basis which was stratified by county and size of place.

1965 population estimates were used and

the results showed general conformity with expectations based on previous census data and professional polls.

The interviewers experienced an unusually

high "turndovra" rate of about 30 percent.

This had the effect of slightly

inflating the proportion of political actives and slightly deflating the pro-

portion of the less active.

This

v;as

particularly true among the lower middle-

class in the city of Manchester, Kovenock reported.

The estimated error based

on the likely primary voters was expected to be approximately 8 percentage

points.
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The poll used as "likely.- voters
those .ho wore registered, vho had
voted
in the 1964 Presidential primary
and 1966 gubernatorial election,
and who

planned to vote in the 1968 primary.

If the voter was too young to have
voted

in the 1964 Presidential primary then
the 1966 state election served as
evi-

dence of participation.

"Unlikely voters were all others who were
registered

but who failed to meet the other criteria
as "likexy" voters.

The Dartmouth

student pollsters used a paper ballot that
appeared like an official ballot.
To cast a write-in vote one had to write-in
the candidate's name on the paper.

The principal tabular report of the survey was a
preference summary and
a choice sumD-,aiy regarding the Vietnam position.

The survey covered both party

primaries and reported findings for the Republicans as well.

In fact, the press

release issued by Davidson and Kovenock emphasized the Nixon
lead (nearly 75
percent) and the "minima]" effect, on the outcome, of the Romney
withdrawal.

Romney, they predicted, would get less than "8 percent of the vote."
Lest)

certain of the Democratic primary result, Davidson and Kovenock sur-

mised that Jobns-on's write-in effort would give him

a

majority and that "peace

candidate Senator Eugene McCarthy should draw between one-fifth and one-fourth
of the Democratic primary vote."

TABLE 14.30: CANDIDATE CHOICE

Candidate

AE-IONG

DEMOCRATS, BY LIKELIHOOD OF VOTING^

"Likely Voters"

"Unlikely Voters"

All De mocrats

Johnson

48%

McCarthy

17

9

13

9

6

8

26

50

37

Kennedy
DK, NA, Other

Totals

100%
(

65)

36%

.

(

100%

100%

55)

(120)

^ Registered Democrats plus all Independents who said they planned
in the Democratic primary.

43%

to vote
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For some reaaun not altogether clear, this survey
failed to detect the support of

a]

ternative candidates that was found by the

UNll

students in their

January 5tb poll or the findings of the McCarthy canvassing.

President Johnson'

support was at a level close to that which the UNH student poll
reported and cer
taii^y closer to the vote result of 49.6 percent than the 72 percent
that Quayle

mentioned In his survey.
buted to the

.36

The softness in the Dartmouth finding must be attri-

percent turndown of "likely voters" and the 50 percent turndovm

of "unlikely voters".

VJhy

the high turndown rate is not explained.

When Robert Craig examined this survey in his analysis he used
cribe a shift as contrasted with other data that he was examining.

it

to des-

He wrote:

By the end of February, voters were moving toward McCarthy,
some simply moving away from Johnson, so that Johnson
still appeared to be the likely v;inncr in the primary but
his margin was eroding and the "undecided" groups were
closer to McCarthy type "protest" voters than Johnson
"support" voters.
Large-scale shifts began during the
TET impact of early and middle February and continued
a movement of dissent from the administration's policy
handling of Vietnam, either reacting that the policy was
not enough or that it was too much.
The Independent and
undecided voter began to move with the growing shift to
"McCarthy as protest. "^7

Referencing an earlier report of Johnson's support at 60 percent, Craig in
terpreted the findings of the Dartmouth Survey as a major erosion of Johnson's
support

—

Democrats.

from 60 percent to A3 percent with 37 percent "undecided" among all
\^ieii

he examined the second table produced from the Dartmouth Sur

vey relating Vietnam opinion, Craig concluded:
The "undecided" Democratic voter group (26 percent of
all Democrats) V7as heavily opposed to the "moderate"
solution to the Vietnam war and susceptible to a "protest" which combined these points of view as McCarthy's
supporters did.^^
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Davidson and Kovenock lu their pre-prlmary election
press release highlighted as "other findings," the following:
* Only 34 percent of the New Harapshirites who
voted for
Johnson in 196A and only 23 percent of the state as a

whole now favor him for President in 1968. And despite Nixon's commanding lead in the primary, only 36
percent favor him in November.

* Half those surveyed feel the U.S. should take a
stronger stand in Vietnam, even if it means invading
North Vietnam.
Only 11 percent wanted to pull out.
*

Surprisingly, none of this "dove" vote favored Romney
in the primary.

* Nixon's support, while high in all groups, is heaviest among voters with only a grade- school education

and lightest among those college-educated.
Johnson
is doing equally well among less-educated voters,
but loses a considerable percentage of the collegeeducated Democratic voters to McCarthy.

Declining support for Johnson among all voters should have been

a tip off

to Davidson and Kov onock that a coalition of protest was developing that would

increase McCarthy's support.

Romney'

s

departure, v;hile not effecting the Repub-

lican primary election, could be inferred to be of help to McCarthy.

Indepen-

dents might have supported a Republican "peace" candidate, but when Romney

withdrew there remained only one candidate of the "peace protest" variety.
The Dartmouth survey analysis did detect some of v/hat Craig subsequently found

when he aiialyzed the ABC survey and that was the socio-economic split between
voters for McCarthy and voters for Johnson.

Only the "college-educated" loss

to Johnson showed in the Dartmouth survey; whereas Craig found McCarthy drawing

from the lower socio-economic strata as well.

McCarthy's problem was with the
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middle-strata according to the Craig analysis.

With the socio-economic code

another descriptor, religion, was used in the
Dartmouth survey.

They found

that "Johnson is pulling a clear majority of Catholics,
but only 28 percent
of the Protestants."

This finding related to Craig's evaluation,

lie

found

middle-strata support for Johnson among those with more favorable
views toward
the Democratic Party.

In other words, the relationship between being Catholic

and being a long-term, loyal Democrat, and therefore, a Johnson
supporter,

appear to relate; although none of the surveys sought to evaluate these factor

91

Perhaps an explanation for McCarthy's appeal among Protestants, traditionally Republican or Independent voters in New Hampshire, was the opposite
of that among Catholics.

Higher education, higher income, and moderate- to-

considerable distain for the Democratic Party may be reasons for less loyalty
to a Democratic President and greater support for the critic of Johnson,

although McCarthy was a Catholic.

If a religious issue had arisen in New

Hampshire, McCarthy might have benefited by drawing votes from the large

population of middle-strata Catholic Democrats.
As for

tlie

Vietnam issue, the Dartmouth students found the same situation

that the other pollsters found.

There vjere few respondents willing to label

themselves as "Doves" or to identify v:ith a "Dove" policy; but, at the same
time, few respondents were willing to support the Johnson policy on Vietnam.
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TABLE

.14.31;

;;^^^J,j^^ATE^CHOICE

Candidate

T

v\

^n

AMONG LIKELY DEMOCIUTIC VOTERS, BY VIETNAM

"Doves"^

r'\

nct.cirtny

"Moderates"

"Hawks"

11%

50%

61%

56

15

6

20

10

9

20

25

22

40

Kennedy
DK, NA, OLher

.33

TOTAI.S

100%
(

All Voters

9)

11%
(

AO)

100%
(

20)

30%
(108)

DK
20%

100%
(

100%

31)

(

5)

50%

100%

(180)

(360)

^Respondents' Vietnam position determined by response to the question:
of the follov;lng alternatives do you favor?"

"VTnich

U.S. should pull out entirely ("Doves").
U.S. should keep soldiers there but try to end fighting ("Moderates").
(3) U.S. should take a stronger stand, even if it means invading North
(1)

(2)

Vietnam ("llavks").

The McCarthy vote came from voter frustration with the administration's war
policy.

That same frustration may have affected the

tified themselves as Johnson supporters.

tuirtiout of

those who iden-

Participation of the Democratic Party/

President Johnson loyalists may have declined, while the participation of new
voters, Independents selecting the Democratic ballot, and less loyal Democrats

may have increased.

This question will be examined later.

What is important

from each of the surveys examined is that identifying with a "Hawk" position did
not prevent voters from marking their ballot for the "peace" candidate.

A phe-

nomenon that can be explained by understanding the composition of protest and
the ability of the McCarthy campaign to draw that protest to their candidate.

I
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90 Roger Davidson
and David Kovenoclc, press release,
file copy, March 1968).

(Haiiover: David C.

Hoeh

^ICraia conclusions:
In sum, the Democratic voter behaved rationally according to his knowledge at the time, heavily influenced
by the fact that McCarthy
was not expected to be nominated and Johnson was. The New
Hampshire primary vote
was more the diselection of a president than an election of a
president
The
voters behaved similarly to a presidential election with candidate
images, party
Images and political issues influencing their votes in about that order
of importance, even when the issue was one of the most inflammatory in a generation.
The results of the analysis therefore, support both the meta-theory results of
.TJ19. ^llS-j?:}} Voter studies and the belief in the rationality of the American
voter.
(Craig, R.
Op.Cit.
abstract, p. 4.)
,
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,

Dartmouth College Survey, (Hanover: conducted by Political Science students, February 16-23, 1968), David C. Hoeh file copy.
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THE CAMPAIGN EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS

Bff ectiveiiess Questions

This cace study of the 1968 McCarthy ca^^paign
in New Hampshire has had two

principal objectives.
of the campaign

ir.

The first has been to document the origin and
progress

sufficient detail so that it can be examined by
those

may V7ish to determine the nature of domestic politics

a^-.

wlio

that pivotal moment in

United States hiptory.
The second objective has been to examine the impact of such an event,
firut in the conte^ct of how votes are translated into political impact
(see

Chapter XIV) tnd L:econdly, in terms of the effectiveness of
Together,

tlie

a

campaign strategy.

case history, the descriptive discussion of vote impact, end now

the empirical examination of campaign effect,, complete a profile of a political

event that has already significantly affected AiD.erican politics.
To conclude this study the vexing question of the campaign's impact on

vote production must be tested.

Did all of the activity make a difference and

mere importantly, does the strategy which guided the campaign offer the political scientist a chance to empirically measure its effect?

The quefition to be examined in this concluding section is the empirical

question oi T/hether the campaign efforts produced the McCarthy victory or whether

t:he

campaign was merely ancillary to some larger effect such as a national

trend agalxist President Johnson and the Vietnam War.
This question takes on added significance when one examines the aggregate

election results.

A cursory examination indicates that McCarthy's vote appears

negatively related to campaign effort.

In those large cities and towns where
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69.1

McCarthy

tl'c

L)>an in

caii>paisn

t)'o«e tcwnc

wos concentrated the percent return for
McCarthy vas less

where the campaign effort was less or non-exietent

.

Was

there a consistently negative relationship between
campaign effort and McCarthy's

vote

tota;i.?

Could it be that the more effort the campaign expended
the lower the

percentage vote for McCarthy?
fi

Conversely, could it be that by not campaigning in

locality the vote for McCarthy increased?

A second and equally troubling ob-

Sv-rvation was the positive relationship between percent vote Democratic
for

McCarthy and the obvious dominance of
Does it

ft)llo;.7,

a

voting district by the Republican Party.

therefore, that v;here Democrats, as a party, are weakest McCarthy

did better and, conversely, where Democrats are strongest McCarthy's percentage

dnclJnes?
cauipaigr.
a

The strategy adopted by the McCarthy organizers was to prioritize
efforts according to Democratic primary vote output by voting district;

strategy which meant that voting districts with relatively fewer Democrats

received less attention from the campaign.

Generalizing from these
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descriptive observations it is h.ypot:hcsized

that canpaigu activities on behalf of Eugene McCarthy were:

(1)

negatively re-

lated to McCarthy's vote in "traditionally" Democratic areas; and,
ly

(2)

positive-

related to McCarthy's vote in "traditionally" Republican areas.
The above hypotheses are consistent with the findings of the post-primary

researchers who concluded that many of those voting for McCarthy were "hawks"
who did not understand McCarthy's position on the war in Vietnam, ^

This conclu-

sion is vuisettling in that it appears to refute the role and effectiveness of
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the HcCarlby can.palj^n.

Civon those findings no .i^'niUcant rclntionahip
would

appear to exist between the vote decision of a

Nev.

Hampshire presidential pri-

mary voter mul campaign efforts directed toward influencing
that vote decision.
This conclusion, however, fails
havior.

t-.o

consider the complexities of voting be-

Intervening factors may have been operating in the 1968 New Hampshire

primary which marked the "real" effect campaign activities had upon voter
choice
and aggregate election outcome
tors, etc.).

(e.g., party identification, socio-ecouomic fac-

It is these secondary factors which require further study before

making any final judgment about the impact of the campaign's activities on
voter behavior.

Thesis

There is a significant relationship between partisan vote turnout (i.e.,

Republican - Democrat) and McCarthy's vote

(r -

-.2665,

S =

.001).

This rela-

tionship has not been identified in earlier research on the New Hampshire pre-

sidential primary.
v/as

Though negatively related to turnout, McCarthy's vote total

positively related to Republican voter turnout

versely, McCarthy's vote
(r «

-.2369,

S

- .001).

\,fas

(r -

.2880, S = .001).

Con-

negativcl}'' related to Democratic voter turnout

The fact that McCarthy's vote was highest in tradi-

tionally Republican areas (i.e., smaller, rural

to^vTiis

of New Hampshire)

and

proportionately lower in Democratic areas (i.e., the larger cities and urbanized
larger towris of New Hampshire) suggests that party identification played

nificant role in

th^'

outcome of this election.

a

sig-
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To discover the nature of this relationship
It is iir.portant to distinguish

between the rural Rejiublican vote and the rural
Democratic vote in New Hampshir
Given the above relationship one might conclude that
rural New Hampshire Democrate are distinguished from their Republican neighbors
only by party label.
•Rural Democrats covld be seen as voting for McCarthy
to weaken the incumbent

president rather than to support an actual candidacy.

While this would be a

convenient way to explain the rural Democratic vote for McCarthy it does
not
support that conclusion when the characteristics of that vote are exarcined.

The argument fails for two reasons.

First, to vote in a primary election

one must have registered to vote not less than 90 days prior to the date of a

primary and be either registered as a Republican or Democrat, or be listed as
an Independent.

Only the Independent voter has the option of choosing one or

the other party ballot.

This means that a strategy to weaken an incumbent

president would have to be well developed before the close of the registration
period, V7hlch it

v;as

Democratic prlmaTy as

not, or be successful in drawing Independents into the
a

protest as opposed to a direct vote for a Republican

candidate with a chance for nomi:iation.

The closed registration of the New

Hampshire primary mitigates against cross-over voting for the purpose of weakeni^^g candidates.

Historically, candidate weakening has occurred in the candi-

date filing stage of the election rather than in

t'ne

actual voting (i.e., fil-

ing stravj candidates to disperse ethnic votJ.ng blocks).
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Tlie

second argument i«

for the arguiBent
th.nt

will

be.

con-.es.

,„ore.

difficult to .,ake in that the substantiation

first, from observation and second, from
an analysis

reported subsequently In this chapter.

If the rural Democratic

vote were i^erely a label difference between
Republican and Democrat, then that
•difference would fade in general elections as the
Democrats would tend, logically, to vote for the Republican candidate.

This docs not happen.

In fact,

Democrats in dominant Democratic Party cities have tended to
support Republican candidates in close elections, while the rural Democrats
having Republican

characteristics,

iiave

remained loyal to the Democratic Party.

in the calculation of the Republican Normal Vote 1S60.)

(See Manchester

What results from this

observation is a sense of both similarity and difference in the description of
the rural Deiuocratic voter.
and,

to varying degrees,

There is similarity in terms of shared location

socio-economic status, but different in terms of poli-

ticals even ideological persuasion from their Republican neighbors.

A reason-

ably strong thread of liberalism tied to the national image of the Democratic

Party tends ro remain among the rural New Hampshire Democrats as opposed to the

more conservative tendency of the New Hampshire Democrats residing in Democratic
Party dominant voting districts.

This distinction was explored by Robert Craig

in his exauiination of the efficacy of being a "loyal" Democrat and also a Democrat more closely in agreement with the Johnson administration's Vietnam policy.
(See earlier discussion of Craig findings.)

A part of

orientation

tills

drav/n

by

examination lies in a conclusion about party ideological
E.

E.

Schattschneider

.

He concluded that as one party

came to dominate the politics of a state, conservatives tended to dominate the

politics of that party.

For the South the dominant party was the Democratic

and for the North the dominant party was the Republican.

In New Hampshire the
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phenomenon that Schattsdmcider identified took
several forms.

The dominant

party was conservative Republican, principally
rural in its base.

Though the

Republican l^arty had dominated state politics since
the Civil War, its influence
in the cities declined with the industrialization
of the late nineteenth and

early twentieth century. and the migration of ethnic
blocks to these same industrial centers.

The industrial centers, though conservative in their politics,

were Democratic by party label.
As Schattschreider notes, the consequence of a decline in competition and

greater conservatism is a decline in turnout and partisan loyalty.

While the

two party split in New Hampshire left the state V7ith a dominant rural Republican Party and

a

dominant urban Democratic Party

vrith

little inter-party compe-

tition at the local level, at the state level (gubernatorial), and especially
in elections for national office (i.e., congressional and senatorial) competi-

tion was strenuous.

Consequently, turnout for both statewide and national elec-

tions has traditionally been high, but the success rate of the Democratic Party
in electing statewide officials has been low until the 1960s and 1970s.

century the Democratic Party has controlled the governorijhip for
terms or eight of the last seventy-seven years.
pied by Democrats for

bency in this century.

a

a

In this

total of four

The U.S. Senate has been occu-

total of 22 of the past 154 years of senatorial incum-

The

tvjo

congiessioncl seats have been occupied by Demo-

crats for a total of seven years in the last 15A years of incumbency iu this
century.
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mat

thi,:

overwhelming dominance by the Republican Party in
actual office-

holding masks is the fact that elections for governor,
for Congress in the
First Congressional District, and for the two United
States Senate seats have

frequently been close, inter-party contests.
the times these elections

\.-ere

Depending upon the candidate and

decided by narrow margins.

The numerical strength

of the urbaa-based Democratic Party has approached that of the
rural-based Repub-

lican Party for much of this century.

This fact has frequently presented the

dominant Republlcar- Party vrith a substantial challenge lu the larger than local
elections.

To continue to dominate these elected offices the Republicans have

had to couriler Democratic Party numbers with a variety of vote dispersing strategies, first at the candidate filing stage and then by turning out a higher

proportion of their members to vote in the general election.

The combination

of these strategies kept Dem.ocrats out of office and out of the state-based

political pover structure that might have converted New Hampshire into a more
obviously competitive two-party state.
Party to

vrin largei'-than

Part of the failure of the Democratic

local elections may also be explained by the fact that

the dominant urban DeBiocratic Party and the dominant rural Republican Party

have often been ideologically compatible, both shared a conservative philosophy

although widely different in terms of ethnic composition and socio-economic
characteristics.

New Kampshiro is illustrative of an additional explanation concerning its
relatively high turnout rate in its elections.

Because competition for state

and national offices remained intense in spite of the fact that inter-party
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competition had all but vanished at the
local level, turnout in statewide and
congressional district elections had to be
sustained in order to preserve the
don^inance of the Republican Party.

Reflecting on the phenomenon of high turn-

out rates in electoral situations where neither
competition or ideological

difference would prompt such participation, Flanigan
noted:
The high rate of turnout may not have been the
resulC of
political i'jvolvement by an interested, well-informed
electorate!, but on the contrary, may have been possible
at all only because of low levels of information and
interest.
A largely uninformed electorate was aroused to
vote by means of extreme and emotional appeals. Presumably these alarming bits of information in the absence
of a more general awareness of what was at stake produced
firm commitments to vote.
But, by and large, the parties
iPiuipulated the electorate
a manipulation possible because the electorate was not well informed.

™

The political chronicles of New Hampshire are peppered with legends of how
infoxr:.'jtion

was manipulated to influence voting, hew absentee ballots were

solicited to expand rural voting, and how candidacies were filed to disperse
the ethnic voting blocks that gave the Democratic Party potential strength in

statewide elections.''*

Through these tactics and the inability of the Democra-

tic Party to either unify in the face of manipulation or to mount its own

counter-of fensi\e, the Republican Party dominated New Hampshire statewide

politics through the 1960s.

It is still possible to manipulate the Democratic

vote in Manchester to prevent a Democrat from succeeding to the governorship or
to reduce the vote for a particular candidate, such as McCarthy, by applying

the right last-minute charge or presenting the potential voter with a reason
to vote agair.st a particular candidate. ^

Instead of the party organization as
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t-.ho

manipulative and vote ge-neratlng .ourcc.
the activity now 1« carried out

by candidate orgavKlzatious. and ..ost
especially,

the don,inant information source

In Kew Hampshire, the Hmiclijcs ter _Unl£^

Given the pattern of party dominance and the
description of the dominant
party as being ideologically conservative, a
number of alternative consequences

have evolved wliich offer a basis for explaining
aspects of the vote which Senator McCarthy received in the 1968 New Hampshire
presidential primary.
First, a liberal vote had survived both within the
Republican and the

Democratic parties of New Hampshire.

In both parties the liberals survived in

the minority but existed through re-enforcement that was partially
internal and

partially externr.l to the state.
survives partially

«is

The liberal minority of the Republican Party

a vestige of a once powerful progressive movement that

developed in New Hampshire during the beginning of the 20th century.

The des-

cendants of the progressives tended to rem.ain in the Republican Party for

reasons of social status and power.

The Republican progressives sporadically

influenced and frequently controlled the Republican Party during the period
through their activism^ financing and administrative skills.

In other states

where the progressives had been strong, like Wisconsin, they gradually migrated
to the DemccraLic Tcrty as their own party became more conservative and the

Democrats absorbed the principal themes of progressivism.
A second aspect of the surviving liberalism within the Republican Party

comes as a function of New Hampshire's governmental structure and the closed

registration process of

tiic

primary system.

To have inf].uence in the selection
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of a sovernor, the only state official elected
statewide, as has been mentioned

before, some liberals, who might otherwise have been Deniocrats,
registered as

Republicans in order to participate in the Republican primary.

Given that the

Democrats succeeded in electing a governor only four times in the last
77 years,
the Republican gubernatorial primary was viewed by liberal activists as
being

the election, not the inter-party contest held in November.

What appears, therefore, is a continuum in which liberal Republicans and
liberal Deiiiocrats share concerns and issues but not party label, and conservative Republicans and conservative Democrats share political perspectives but
not labels.

The party label becomes a commodity masking ideology depending upon

an individual's need for social-political status (i.e., a

la\\Tyer

having to work

closely with the Republican power structure or an ethnic Democrat seelcing a
federal appointment), or sense of political efficacy (e.g., being a Democrat
is to be on the right side of deeply felt social welfare issues, etc.).

Figure 1

Conservative
Republicans

Liberal
Republicans

Liberal
Democrats

Conservative
Democrcits

The continuum, might also be expressed as a circle with the liberals and
the conservatives sharing respective ideological halves of the circle with the

principal distinction being party identification.
As an example how the liberals of the two parties responded to the options
of the 1968 president d.al primary provides a useful case.

withdrew as

a

VJhen

Governor Romncy

candidate, for the liberals in the Republican Party several op-

tioiis remained.

One, which was most attractive to the strongly identified
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Republican liberal wac to vrite-ln tha name of Governor
Nelson Rockefeller on
the Republican ballot.

11,241 Republican voters took this option.

Those with

what must be presumed to be less attachment to the
Republican Party and. probably of more liberal inclination, wrote in the
on Iheir Republican ballots.

Republicans.

V.Tiile

Senator Eugene McCarthy

McCarthy received a total of 5,511 votes from

Another 1,778 Republican voters

on their ballots.

naiue of

Xvrrote

in President Johnson's narae

precise evaluation of the motives of these voters does

not exist, it seeiDS reasonable to assume that the Republican voter writing-in
the

nam:-,

of a Democrat is in some manner and for some reason misplaced in the

partisan spectrum of New Hampshire.

The reason for this misplacing ties back

to the role the respective parties play in the selection of candidates and the

control of the state government as discussed earlier.

A second factor which helps to distinguish the rural Democrat from the
counterpar-t rural Republican and which may help explain the McCarthy vote among

rural Democrats is the strong pull of the national Democratic Party.

Those

Democrats who respond to issues and political concerns beyond local and state
politJ.cs tGnd to identify more strongly V7ith the policies of the national Demo-

cratic Party.

Wli.lla

the liberal wing of the national Democratic Party may not

be significant in the New Hampshire cities, where conservative Democrats have
traditionally coutrollcd local politics, their importance is far more pronounced
in Republican dorr.inated areas.
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To survive as a liberal Dei.ocrat in a
rural community where one is in the

minority both ideologdcally and in terms of partisan
preference, required substantial Ideological re-enforcement.

This obser^'ation leads to the conclusion

that high socio-economic status is a pre-condition
determining the survival of

the rural Mew Hampshire Democrat,

a

status that presumes a national political

awareness rather than a more provincial intra-state political
orientation.

A

powerful individualism does survive in the small New Hampshire towns which,

while not accounted for by normal indicators of socio-economic status, does sustain a few Democrats in Republican dominant areas for that reason alone.

what extent such pockets of individualism explain a McCarthy vote is not

To
knouTi.

The only test available is one of socio-economic status which will be explored

more fully later in this chapter.
For a number of rural
been substantial.

southeastern border

Nev;

Hampshire voting districts population growth has

A horseshoe of growth communities now extends along the
witVi

Massachusetts, along the seacoast to Rochester in the

east, and northward through the Merrimack River valley to Laconia.

most

;.\ockiiighaia Count)' v/as

Southeastern-

among the nation's most rapidly growing counties as

reported by the 1970 U.S. Census.

Many of the in-caigrants are former Massachusetts residents who bring with
them a more liberal and, usually, Democratic political orientation.

While the

Republican Party continues to dominate the local politics of many of these
growth communities, a new Democratic Party was growing

—

one which had not

been influenced by the Democratic Party tradition of the remainder of the state.

702

These new

No..w

Hampohlre DcB^ocrats tend to bo nationally
oriented in their poli-

tical perspective and retain Inforn^ation
sources, such as the Massachusetts

press and media, that continue their political
orientation.

surprising to find

a

It would not be

higher percentage of these growth communities
supporting

Senator McCarthy even though the number of Democrats
voting are far less than
the number of Republicans voting.

A third factor can only be described as a vote of
frustration and dissatisfaction with the status quo (i.e., an expression of alienation,
confusion, or
cross pressure)

.

It is a voce that went to McCarthy because he V7as perceived

to be an anti-ei^tablishment figure,

an under-dog.

These voters, v;hen registered

as Republicans, tend to follow the editorial lead of William Loeb.

He strikes

out in a random manner that dees not reflect a particular consistency nor does

he ask

hit;

:ceaders to react intellectually.

stimulates an emotional response

—

and frustration in their own lives.
lowed Loeb's lead

ajnd

It is gut, yellow journalism which

especially from those who sense alienation
^

in state politics these voters have fol-

supported the reactionary, Wesley Pov;ell, in his quest

for public office and more recently, Meldrim Thompson in his incumbency as
govei-nor.

rites:

In national politics these same voters tend to support Loeb's favo-

Go.ldwater in 196^+, Mixon in 1968, and most recently, Governor Ronald

Reagan.
As Democrats these voters differ v/lth the liberalism of the national Demo-

cratic Party preferring as does William Loeb, candidates like Governor George
Wallace, Mayor Sam Yorty, or Senator Henry Jackson.

In the 1968 presidential
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j.rlin.ry

Loeb split UhiB bloc of Democrats.

He attacked the Johnson cnmpaign for

its endorsements and urged voters to reject
them as arrogant and establishment

oriented.

The message which Loeb sent was that if being against
the establish-

ment was of a high personal priority then one should vote
for McCarthy.

Since

Loeb could not support McCarthy's anti-war position he garbled this
message and

urged the anti-establislunent bloc to write-in Richard Nixon's name on
their ballot.

2,532 Democratic voters did this.

An unknown number of those Deir.ocrata

did, however, vote their anti-establisliment view and supported the candidate

they felt was anti-establishment, Eugene McCarthy.

Robert Craig found a sugges-

tion of this vote v;ithin his analysis of the Democratic voter.

Both high and

low socio-economic status Democrats supported McCarthy more strongly than did

middle class Democrats.^

The Socio-Economic Status Thesis:
Wlien

An Empirical Test

Robert Craig examined the outcome of the 1968 New Hampshire Democratic

presidential primary he focussed on the relevance of socio-economic status (SES)
and the individual vote decision.

He did not examine the outcome of the election

(in micro ternis) nor did he attempt to relate the findings of a pre-election sur-

vey to the aggregate election outcome.

Three factors did emerge from his analy-

sis that were signif icantJ.y related to individual vote choices.

socio-economic status.

The first was

McCarthy received proportionately more support among the

higher SES and lower SES Democrats than he did from middle class Democrats.

This

finding is supported by the following table and by the summary of pre-election
surveys presented earlier.
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TAISLE 15.01

CANDIDATE PREFERENCE AMONG DEMOCPATS,
BY SUIUECTIVF SOCIAL CLASS
AND READINESS TO IDENTII^ WITH CLASsio

CANDIDATE PREFERENCE
SOCIAL CLAS S

JOHNSON

McCarthy

TOTAL

Yes, Mlddle--Class

69.4

30.6

100% (2020)

No, Middle-Class

87.8

12.2

100%

(

913)

(Total MiddlG-Class)

75.1

24.9

100% (2933)

Yes, Work.lng-Class

60.6

39.4

100% (4586)

No, Working-class

56.2

43.8

100% (1107)

(Total Working" Class)

59.8

40.2

100% (5693)

y2

_

-3/

3df ,8.001

100% (8748)

0.184

Secondly

J

the strength of partisan Identification, was positively related

to support for Johnson.

Those voters iilth a strong Democratic Party attachment

tended to snpport Johnson while those with a v;eak Democratic Party attachment
and independent voters tended to support McCarthy.

TABLE 15.02

CANDIDATE PREFERENCY BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION^-!

CANDID ATE PREFERENCE

PARTY IDENTI FICATIO N

McCAPvTHY

TOTAL

36.8

100% (1455)

Weak Democrat

41.8

100% (3159)

Strong Democrat

26.2

100% (3065)

Independent Democrat

.

X2
C

= 170.063;
"
.147

2df,s.001

100% (7679)
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Thirdly, impliciL

±v.

t.ha

.bovo finding is an additional factor,
political"

efficacy, vhich Craig found was related
to the utility of being a loyal
Democrat
and Johnson supporter or being an
independent Democrat and a McCarthy supporter.

TABLE 15.03

CANDIDATE TREFERENCE BY POLITICAL EFFICACY
INDEX12

CANDIDATE PREFERENCE

POLITICAL
EFFICACY INDEX
1

JOHNSON

iiOw hij. ?.cacy

37.4

McCarthy

TOTAL

62.6

100%

(

329)

62.5

35.5

100%

(

329)

70.2

29.8

100%

(

999)

34.9

65.1

100%

(

736)

64.3

35.7

100% (155/0

80.1

19.9

100%

7

62.5

37.5

100% (2617)

8

36.5

63.5

100%

83.7

16.3

100% (1714)

2
3

4
5

Ambivalent

6

9

High Efficacy
X2
C

= 783.342; 8df .s.OOl
=
.286

(

(

376)

170)

100% (8824)

Of the factors, socio-economic status appears to be the most useful in explain-

ing McCarthy's strength in Republican Party dominated communities.

In order to

explore this point the correlation between McCarthy's percent vote and the percent family income $15,000 or more for all New Hampshire cities and towns of

2,500 population or more was tabulated.

A second correlation for the same
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cities and towns was run for the percent of ir,dividuals who
completed four or

more years of high school.

The strongest relationship is between McCarthy vot(

and income with education supporting the direction of the income
finding as

shown by the following tableu.

TABLE 15. OA
1

3

% Family

Comroimit^

Berlin
Clareuiont

Concord
Derry
Dover
Hudson
Keene
Laconia
Man Chester
Nashua
Portsmouth
Rochester
Salen
Aliens town
Aialierst

Bedford
Boscavo'en

Charles touTi
Conway
Durham
Exeter
Far"isiington

Franklin.

Gilford
Gof f stown

Gcrham
Hampton
Hanover
Haverhill
Hillsborough
HiuF.dale

Hollis

% Vote
McCarthy

51.7
37.9
53.9
A7

.

Income

+ $15,000
10.3
12.2
19.6
20.5

48.0
49.0
46.7
39,4

18. 7

31. 0

15.8
22.3
13.8
11.4
23.3

40.7
69.1
51.0
50.5
39.7
58.8
48.0
44.3
41.

54.6
84.6
57.5
56.5
41.3
61.4
41.3
51.3
57.9
85.0
40.6
63.8
60.0
65.9

21.2
19.0
18. 8

16. 2

40.7
35.0
11.0
9.6
11.0
35.6
17.1
9.5
14.0
29.9
19.3
10.9
19.9
44.1
14.2
11.9
15.0
23c7

1

3

Rank Order
Vote
McCarthy
27

58
25
36

34.5
43
39
56
61
50
5

30
21
55
16

.

34.5
42
47
24
3

20
21.5
48.5
4

48.5
28

17.5

Rank Order
Family lnc(
-h $15,000
53
45
20
18
26
17
24
25
35
16
42
47
13
3A
2

5

49
55
49
4

29

56
41
6

21
52
19

2

1

51

40
46

9

14
8

36
12
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TABLE

1.S.0-J

(Continued)

'

1

3

% Family
%

Community
Hooksett
Hopkinton
Jaf f rey
Kingston
Lancaster
Lebanon
Littleton
Londonderry
Meredith
Merrimack
Miliord
Newmarket
Nev.T^ort

No. Hampton

Pclham
Pembroke
Peterborough
Pittsfield
Plaistow
Plymouth
Raymond
Rye
Scab rook
Somersworth
Swanzey
Tiltou
VJalpole

Winchester
Windham
VJolf eboro

Vote

McCarthY_

Income
+ $15,000

40.7
51.1
48.9
46.8
59.9
48.7
40.3
48.1
100.0
46.8
38.0
40,4
40.1
66.0
57.9
42.6
57.7
37.7
60.3
67.7
45.8
70,8
63.0
12.5
45.5
43.4
53.1
36.1
55.1
63.2

17.8
39.7
15.0
16.9
13.0
16.6
9.9
19.2
14.8
21.1
16.8
11.0
11.1
28.8
22.4
17.1
23.9
9.2
23.3
17.9
9.1
28.3
11.3
19.2
13.5
10.3
14.5
6.3
28.3
9.2

1

Rank Order
Vote
McCarthy

3

Rank Order
Family Income
+ $15,000

50
29
31
37.5
15
32
53
33
1

37.5
57

52
54
7

17.5
44
19
59
18
6

40

28
3

36
31
44
33
54
22
38
10
32

49
48
7

15
29
11
57
14
27
59

4

8

11
45
41

47
22

4

43
53

26
60
23

39
60

5

57

RHO = .5397

8
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15.05
1

5

% Vote

McCarUiy_

Berlin
Clarcinont

Concord
Derry
Dover
Hudson
Keene
Lacoxiia

Manchester
Nar.hua

Portsmouth
llochester

Salem
Mlenstovrn
Amherst
Bedford
Boscawen
Charlestovm
Conway
Durham
Exeter
Farraington

Frank! ill
Gilford
Gof f stovm
Gorham
Hampton
Hanover
Haverhill
Hillsborough
Hinsdale
Hollis
Kooksett
Hopkinton
Jaf f rey
Kingston
Lancaster
Lebanon
Littleton
Londonderry

51.7
37.9
53.9
47.5
48.0
44
46.7
39.4
.

31.0
40.7
69.1
51.0
56.5
39.7
58.8
48.0
44.3
41.9
54.6
84.6
57.5
56.5
41.3
61.4
41.3
51.3
57.9
85.0
40.6
63.8
60,0
65.9
40.7
51.1
48.9
46.8
59.9
48.7
40.3
48,1

yrs+
High School

% 4

41.5
50.6
62.0
61.2
56.7
61.0
61.9
51.6
47.5
56.5
67.0
46.3
64.9
37.9
76.8
68.6
47.7
56.6
70.5
92.0
65.5
46.7
51.9
67.7
54.2
50.4
7f'.7

87.6
53.7
54.2
50.5
73.1
52.5
77.0
59.4
64.3
62.0
60.3
54.9
58.6

1

•J

Rank Order
Vote
McCarthy
27

58

Rank

Oi

4 yrs"l"

Hlrh

S(

61
49

25
36

11

34.5

37

43
39
56

61
50

32
29
47
56
39

5

17

30
21.5
55
16
34.5
42
47
24
3

20

21,5
48.5
4

48.5
28
17.5
2

51
9

14
8

50
29
31

37.5
15
32
53
33

31

58
24
61
7

13
55
38
8
1

21
57
46
16
42

51
4
2

44
42
50
11
45
6

33
25
27
26
41
35
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TABLE 15.03

(Continued)

% Vote

% 4 yrs-h
Hlgji S

McCarthy

Tuff

un

liti

L CU. J.

riti

JL I. ..Liiic;

Mi

1

f n-.

.

*

.

1

100.
46
Jo. 0

CJC

65.3
66.2
68.1
49.4
48.1

.

ri

/.A

/

'4U. 4

1

f*>

t-

JL

U

i

t.-

Uf^H

PJ ttsf told

17.5

57 .5
75 .8
49

44
19
59
13

J/
"^7

.

/

7

nij

OU . J

^Ti

A7

7

66. 9
^ "7 O
67 .

Rayiuoud

HJ . O

^o o

Rye
Seabrook

70.8
63.0
42.5
45.5
42.4
53.1
36.1
55.1
63.2

77.4
44.0
41.6
55.8
51.3
65.1
74.2
74.2
66.6

SomersK'oith
Sv/anzey

Til ton
Walpole
Winchester
VJindhaai

Wolfeboro

14
52
54

52
54
7

.

P1
PI

57

80. 3

.

6

40

.

22

20

61.3

"7

/. 0
C..O
H

*

1

n
9

c
5
/

-I TIT

Rank Order
4 yrs+
High School

37.5

to 0
.

P f\

Rank Order
Vote
McCarthy

3

30
36
8

53
18
15
34

4

5

11
45

59
60
40
48
23

41
46
26
60
23
5

9
9

19

RHO = .5205

The voting behavior studies of the University of Michigan's Survey Research
Center, principally The American Voter
.En&land Voter and Rg-All^nroent

,

-^^

,

and work by V.O. Key, Study on the New

have profiled the sccio-econoraic status of the

American voter and are useful as background for the consideration of the effect
on the New Hampshire presidential primary voter.

The Republican Party remains

strong In the rural communities of the East and especially in northern New EnglaiTd.

The studies show that while for "most social characteristics Democrats,
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and Independents are very heterogeneous"
the social characteristics

K.n,>ublic<'.uis,

of "partisans and independents indicate
that in most ways independents look like

Republicans."

The studies contend that both Republicans and
Independents have

similar levels of education and income, and the
proportions of these individuals
from professional and managerial households are about "30
percent" or "almost
identical among Republicans and Independents."

The proportion from "manual

worker households among Independents, about 40 percent, is closer
to the proportion among Democrats."

The summary notes that Independents are high in both of

these occupational categories because they have lower proportions among
farmers
and retireid members of the electorate.

The studies found that the majority of strong Democrats have not graduated
from high school, but there are increasingly higher levels of education among

each of the party Identification categories as one moves toward the strong Republlcar.a.

Party loyalists derived from various bases such as ethnic group,

religious group and racial group have blurred socio-economic patterns in the
past, but as these groupings begin to orient less toward their background and

wore toward their socio-economic status the impact is less distinct.
Flanigan notes, "old loyalties die hard and provide

a

As

basis for continuing to

appeal to these groups. "^^ A source of political variation in social groups is
the poGsibility that one group may be Democratic in one comjuunity and Republican
in another

To suiiUBarizc, the description of the Republican voter in the dominant Re-

publican voting districls tends to conform to the description of the Republican

voter as a homogeneous class.

They

hiive

been found to have higher levels of
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education, higher incomes and to be
politically conservative.

As a clans, Demo-

crats tend to be the opposite, lower
l^.come, less educated and more
liberal.
Vnuilc this categorization e..plains
traditional voting patterns in general elec-

tions, it is not particularly helpful in
explaining the behavior of higher status DemotratH voting in the 1968 New Hampshire
presidential primary.

What does appear is a relationship between
higher SES communities (i,e.,

Republican voter dominated) and a higher Democratic
vote for McCarthy.

The op-

posite appears also to hold in the lower SES Republican
or Democratic Party

dominated communities which voted more heavily for President
Johnson.
emerges,

therefore, is a picture of a higher SES comBiunity, producing
stronger

vote support for McCarthy than lower SES conmmnities.

voters

s

What

The presidential primary

whether Republican or Democrat, tended to vote more strongly by class

related conservaf ivc/liberal orientation much as they might in a general electi.on,

a major conclusion of Robert Craig's analysis.

In summary, the New Hampshire presidential primary of 1968
appears to have been similar to a Presidential election in
many important ways except one;
it was not vievred as a
Presidential election by everyone but took place vjithin the
context of the tradition of the New Hampshire Democratic
Party's Presidential primary. Voters behaved rationally
according to their values and their information and understanding to that point. ^•'^
VJhat

Crsig d^d not examine was the relationship between socio-economic status

and McCarthy's vote output in strongly Republican voting districts.

A clue that when tied

to an examination of these higher SES communities,

begins to explaJn McC£';.thy's success in Republican voting conuuunities
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Party Identific ation
The long-run social and political patterns
in the American
electorate appear related.
On the other hand, the shortrun impact of social groups on voting
behavior appears uneven and insignificant generally. Occasionally
social
groups appear important nationally ... and under
certain
conditions social cross pressures may operate; but
normally v/e do not expect social factors to shov? the
same consistent, strong patterns with vote choice that we
have
found with partisanship.-^'
'

Although the conclusion drawn for the American voter may
be correct, conditions
in New Hampshire and in the election studies, may not
conform to this view of

the electorate.

The dominant position of the Republican Pcirty in rural and

suburban New Hampshire voting districts and its long-term dominance of state
political affairs may have produced a particular Democratic voter in these
comiaunities as revealed by the socio-economic status of that voter.

To check

this observation it is important to review party identification findings and

the power of party identification as related to the New Hampshire rural Demo-

cratic electorate.
First, voters have been found willing to identify themselves on a scale
as a "strong Democrat, Democrat, Independent, Republican or Strong Republican."

Such identification is useful to the voter as a means of orienting a political

position, responding to political information and creating a voting decision. '^

Partisanship is expressed by the strength of party identification.

A weakness

is expressed by a voter's willingness to shift to vote for candidates of the

other party.

For primary elections (i.e., New Hampshire), strength of party

identification translates into either ideological patterns of liberal or conservative or patterns similar to inter-party contests, of intra-party loyalty
or independence, as Robert Craig found.
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TABLE 15.06

CMDIDATE PREFERENCE BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND
SOCIAL CLASS^^
CANDI DATE PREFERENCE

PARTY
IDENTIFICATION

Independent
Democrat

SOCIAL CLASS
Ygg, Middle
No, Middle
Ye&, Working
No, Working

JOHNSON

MoP ARTVIV
n.CLi/\Ki.nX

TOTAL

73.3
78.0
59.5
53.8

26.7
22.0
40.5
46 2

100%
100%
100%
IUOa

60. 3

(
(
(
{

90)
300)
773)
260)

Weak
Democrat

iGK, Middle
No, Middle
Yes, Working
No, Working

100.0
54.2
46.3

39.7
0.0
45.8
53.7

100% ( 748)
100% ( 258)
100% (1662)
100% ( 434)

Strong
Democrat

Yes, Middle
No, Middle
Yes, Working
No, Working

72.9
83.3
72.2
71.8

27.1
16.7
27.8
28.2

100% ( 922)
100% ( 269)
100% (1579)
100% ( 245)

100% (7590)
As iioted previously, independent voters, either Republican or Democrat,

tend to be socio-economical].y similar to higher socio-economic status Republicans,

Given the Republican dominance of rural politics in New Hampshire seve-

ral consequences for Democrats resv.lt.

Strong Democratic Party identifiers

do so as the result of some social or economic benefit which carries a reward
or re-enforcement.

\>!he.n

the Democrats hold the ^/hite House a limited patronage

system prevails that socially and economically carries a reward.

In state

politics minority status may have its rewards through a status conveying appoint-

ment as a minority member of a board or commission.
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On the other .ide, dominance, of local
Institutious by the Republicans can
r..ean

nity.

hardship for Democrats who mu.t work with
the power structure of

a commu-

This social pressure leads some who might
otherwise be Democrats to

register as Republicans or to retain Independent
status.

These Independent

voters are attracted to vote in primaries only when
the issues and/or the per-

sonalities involved are of special concern which stimulates
their participation.

The question of party identity has been found to extend
further to a sense
of the efficacy of participating politically.

Miile Independents have been

found to be less interested in campaigns or concerned with which
candidate

vriLns,

as is the strong parcisan, there appears to be considerable Independent
voter

interest iu election contests.
once felt.

They are not apathetic and disinterested as was

They do view parties and candidates with the same ideological per-

spective a3 do partisans.

"The only difference between Republicans and Demo-

crats; Republicans with their higher level of education are more likely to view

politics ideologically.

When this conclusion is extended to the notion of

political efficacy, "that is how significantly one views his political activities," the results show "no difference between independents and partisans, but

Republicans

ha\^e a

higher sense of political efficacy than do Democrats "^^
.

The picture that can now be dra^vn of the New Hampshire rural Democratic

voter who supported McCarthy is that this voter was likely to be an independent
Democrat, of higher socio-economic status, have attained a higher level of
education, and one who shares residency with Republicans of a similar description.

The efficacy of being a Democrat, under the circumstances of minority

7,15

party Btatus.

i.ust

come from ot:hcr than traditional
viewn of group associ.t:! on

economic reward, or class identification.

The source must he an ahility to re-

ceive and process information derived externally
from their local residence.

A description of an Independent carries this message
most effectively.
The most nearly correct view of the Independent.
.. is that
Independents are not much interested in politics and
government and certainly not much concerned with partisan
politics
they are not emotionally involved in party
clashes.
On the other hand, Independents appear to have
the Infoi-raation and the perspective on political affairs
necessary for an evaluation of the issues and candidates
as competent as could be expected of partisans.
Independents are no wiser or more virtuous than partisans; nor
are Lhey less so.

—

Information Cost and Voti

A basic assumption of the rational decision making thesis, as applied to
voting, concerns the ability of the voter to receive and process information

pertinent to the decision they are to make.

Such information bears a cost which

Anthony Downs has identified as being of two types:
"non- transferable costs
1.

"transferable costs" and

.

"Transferable costs" are simply the costs of gathering information
v;hlch is most often accomplished by others such as the newspapers,

television, and other media, at little or no costs to the users.
The Information gathered in this manner v;ould be exceedingly ex-

pensive for the individual to acquire but as it is prepared for
consumption, its cost to the user is limited to the cost of access

—

buying the newspaper, having the radio or television, buying the

magazine.
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2,

-Non- transferable costs" are those
vhich come once the information

h3B been accessed and involve the actual
reading, assimilating,
and digesting of the information once it
has been collected.

In

this situation only the individual who is
required to make use of

the infcraiatlon can bear the cost of internalizing
and absorbing
the inf ojrmatioii

The thesis assumes that the availability of information
is not limited and that
the main costs to be borne are those associated with
absorbing the information,

not getting the information.

The follov/ing hypotheses arise from the theory that information access leads
to rational decision making.
1.

The amount of information an individual has is a function of
one's ability to bear non-transferable cost and to a lesser
degree the transfernble costs of obtaining information.

2.

An individual's ability to bear the costs of obtaining inforjnation is a function of that person's leisure time
by leisure time is meant that time not spent in pursuing one's

—

vocational activity.
3.

The amount of leisure time an individual has is a function
of that person's position in society
by position is meant
the class position, socio-economic status, expressed in terms
of material resources which the individual has to command.

—

The consequence of these hypotheses as related to the functioniiig of demo-

cratic governaient may be summarized as follows:

Individuals of a higher socio-economic status will have
higher levels of infonuation and, therefore, are more likely to behave rationally.
Conversely, individuals of a lower socio-economic status
will be less informed and more likely to act irrationally.

717

Those of hlcher socio-economic statue
will have

a

groater ability to ac-

quire information as a function of time,
and cognitive skills possessed by
tbo.7e

individuals.

A campaign, therefore, tries to manage both
costs.

First

the campaign attempts to package and deliver
information at little or no cost
to the voter.

Secondly, a campaign seeks to organize the information
that the

voter receives in a way that will attract attention and
be convincing, considering limited resources and time available for absorption.

Given that the ability to bear the non- transferable cost increases
with
Gocio-econoraic status, the ability to acquire infomation for
the purpose of

making a vc;ting decision also increases.
for

a

The implications of this assumption

campaign are that it must concentrate its energy and resources upon

delivering low cost, easily absorbed information to those of lower socioeconomic status with limited time, energy or cognitive skills to absorb information.

At the same time a campaign must presume that those of higher socio-

economic status can better bear the cost of amassing the information they desire
to make their voting decision and, therefore, the campaign need not exert as

much effort to prepare information that can be absorbed quickly.

In fact, a

campaign may neglect the preparation of specific materials for the higher

socio-economic voters assuming that the normal news gathering machinery will
provide

th;^

information and analysis which will be most useful to these voters.

From this assessment of information cost and the ability to bear such costs
comes a further description of the McCarthy voter.

A rural, higher socio-

economic status, upper educated, Democrat v/ould have greater ability to bear
the noa-transf crable cor.t of making a voting decision.

That voting decision
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might ba prompted by the information cources which
the individual had or could
access easily.

These aources would tend to

interaational in range.

be.

local, state, national and even

The sources would carry Information that pertained to

the individual's vote decision which were more extensive than those
packaged

for consumption by the campaign.

A campaign strategy which targeted the tra-

ditional bases of Deniocratic Party support and neglected areas of traditionally
limited Democratic Party participation, given the foregoing, appears as an effective and rational strategy.

The traditional Democrats, of lower socio-

economic status would be aided in their decision mfiking by the information

packaging of a campaign.

The rural Democrats, of higher socio-economic

sta--

tus, would gather at somewhat greater cost, the information upon which to make

their o\m voting decisions vjithout being specifically addressed by the campaign.

Frcm this analysis emerges an explanation of why the observed relation-

ship batVv'eeu high Republican vote and high percentage vote for McCarthy occurred.

Research Design:

Campaign Impact

The invc;stigation of the question concerning the impact of the McCarthy cam-

paign on votes for McCarthy must rely upon a combination of data sources.

The

ques1:ion cannot be evaluated through a carefully developed research design which

examines specific populations vjhich are manipulated for the purpose of testing
the effec?:s of the campaign.

Vfhat

can be examined are relationships validated

by previous enjpirical findings tested through the examination of the election
results and re-examination of pre-election survey results.

Mthough

this is not

an ideal situation for the determination of causal effects it may be sufficiently

effective to allow inferences to be dravm concerning the effect of the McCarthy
campaign.
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The data sources for this analysis are the
aggregate election results (by

voting district) and voter perceptions and attitudes
drawn from the pre-election
surveys.

Wliilci

it is not possible to compare and contrast
the tvo principal

data sources (because the level of analysis in the case
of the surveys differs

from that of the aggregate election returns), it is possible
to subjectively
infer an explanation for a conmiunity result by describing the
community's

socio-economic characteristics,

characteristics that have been found to be

significantly related to individual level voting behavior. 25

Research Hypothesis
To test the effectiveness of the campaign, five indicators were selected

which represent campaign activities or response to activities that could be
assigned and evaluated for each voting district.

McCarthy campaign visits;
A.

2.

The indicators were;

local campaign organization;

celebrity visit or auxiliary campaign activity; and,

relative to the McCarthy candidacy.

5.

3.

1.

canvassing;

newspaper activity

The indicators were drawn from those as-

pects of the campaign strategy that could be assigned according to levels of
'

impact.

The first four were specific treatments of the campaign which v^ere

applied according to the overall campaign strategy of treating in priority
tliose

communities with the strongest record of Democratic primary voting.

The fifty, "newspaper activity," was selected as a reactive or re-enforcement

variable that could be measured in accord with the particular stand a given
daily newspaper took or did not take toward the McCarthy candidacy.

It was an

important strategy of the campaign to seek attention for the candidacy through
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New Hampshire daily prc.s and, eventually,
editorial

s^athy

with the candidacy.

Together with the tour selected campaign treatments
and the reactive variable of
press attention, a series of discrete variables could
be drawn that accurately

represented the basic strategy and tactics which put into operation
the McCarthy
CcUiipaign„

To test the ytrength of the campaign as may be reflected in the
vote result the following procedure was employed.

Each campaign indicator was opera-

tionalized at the voting district level in terms of actual campaign activities,
and,

therefore, represents a ''hard" measure of the conceptualized campaign

variables.

Vote totals for McCarthy wore examined across each level of cam-

paign activity to determine those factors associated with McCarthy's victory
in New Hampshire.

Independe nt Campa ig n Var iables
Ao

B.

.

McCarthy campaign visits:
1.

Did not visit or campaign in

2.

Visited area cluster of voting districts.

3.

Visited the city or town.

4.

Spolre or caBipaigned

5.

Campaigned in the city or town more than once.

tlie

district.

extensively in the city or

towiv.

Local campaign organisation:
1.

Mo local committee or organization in the district.

2.

City or tovm represented by an area or county organization.

3.

Local organization motivated and staffed from outside.

4.

Local organization locally motivated to support candidacy.

5.

Local org;:nlzation pre-dated McCarthy candidacy with related

political activity.

C.

D.

Caiwassing
1.

City or town not canvassed.

2.

City or town canvassed.

3.

City or tovm canvassed with call-back.

Celebrity visit or auxiliary campaign activity^^
1.

No celebrity visit or auxiliary activity.

2.

Celebrity visit and/or auxiliary activity in the cluster of
voting districts.

E.

3.

Celebrity visit to the voting districts.

A.

Celebrity visit and auxiliary activity in the voting district.

Nev7spaper activity
1.

New Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district
neutral to McCarthy.

2.

New Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district
pro-McCarthy.

3.

Nev7

Hampshire daily newspaper serving the voting district

anti-McCarthy.
In addition to the five campaign variables previously operationalized

sixth factor which measured the priority assigned the voting district was
died.

This variable is operationalized in terms of descending rank, with

higher rankings receiving a greater effort for campaign activities.

s
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While there were many other activities of
the campaign that related to the

campaign strategy, few others could be assigned
specifically to voting districts

Much of the other activity, such as radio advertising,
either was not sufficient
ly discrete to allow for even gross measurement at
the district level, or was

not varied enough to provide a meaningful test of
campaign effect.

Using the five indicators as measures of campaign activity, the
following
hypotheses should be true.
1.

Turnout in voting districts whore the campaign activities occurred

will be significantly higher than in districts where these activities did not occur.
2.

McCarthy's vote is positively related to the amount of campaign
activity on the candidate's behalf.

3.

Campaign activities on behalf of McCarthy's candidacy are significantly related to vote totals for McCarthy in traditionally Demo-

cratic voting districts.
4.

Campaign activities

v^ill

have the greatest impact on voter behavior

in districts characterized by liigher socio-economic status voters.

The second question to be addressed by this analysis pertains to the
strong
tricts.

shox>7ing

McCarthy registered in normally strong Republican voting dis-

The following hypotheses offer an empirically testable explanation of

the election outcome^
1.

Democratic vote perceiitages for McCarthy arc positively related
to Increased voter turnout.
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2.

Democratic vote percentages for McCarthy are
positively related to
increased Republican percentage of the total primary vote
cast

election districts.
3.

Democratic voting for McCarthy in traditionally Republican districts is a function of socio-economic characteristics of the
voter.

A.

The percent vote for McCarthy is positively related to campaign activities on behalf of the McCarthy candidacy.

The Analysis;

McCarthy Vote and Turnout

lixamining the bi-variate relationship between percent vote for McCarthy and

turnout for all election districts we observe a negative correlation (R = -.2369
P- .001).

This evidence suggests that the McCarthy candidacy is more closely

patterned after a traditional Republican candidacy in its appeal to Republican
like voters.

This conclusion is further supported by the correlation between

percent McCarthy vote and voter turnout in predominantly Republican areas
(R = -f.2801 P~

.001).

Within Republican communities McCarthy received greater Democratic voter
support with higher voter turnouts.

As hypothesized earlier (see p. 15-30,

Information Coac and Voting), McCarthy's candidacy had its greatest appeal
high SES Democratic voters.

These voters were

fouxid to be

to

residents of pre-

dominate Republican communities, therefore, accounting for McCarthy's relative
strength, i-e., among

N.ll.

DemooratSj in predominantly Republican communities.

Each of the independent campaign variables
was correlated with the percent

Democratic vote for McCarthy and with the vote result
in each New Hampshire election district (N = 299). 27

i,,

addition to the bi-variate correlations, a multi-

variate analysis was employed in order to assess the additive
and interactive
effects of these campaign activities on the
outcome of the election.
As the following table indicates (Table 13.07) each of the independent
cam-

paign variables was significantly related to the percent Democratic vote cast
for McCarthy.

TABLE 15.07

Campaign

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN McCARTIlT VOTE AND INDICES OF

Local Campaign
Or^anir.at ion

Canvassing
Activities

Auxiliary
Activities

.4562*

.5842*

,5054*

.5851-''^

(P

C.^vMPAIGN

EFFORT

Newspaper
Act ivity
'

--.1601*

Kiguificant at the .05 level)

With the exception of newspaper activities all of the independent measures
of campaign activity were approximately equal in their relationship to the de-

pendent variable.

The effect, however^ of local newspaper coverage did not

produce a strong relationship to the McCarthy vote total.

lationship

xjas

As expected, the re-

negative suggesting that the influence of the conservative

Manchester Union Lea der, though not substantial, did produce a lower percent
of the vote for McCarthy.

As mentioned, it is possible that each of the campaign variables does not
tap a unique dimension, and thus their collective explanatory power would pro-

duce a misleading impression regarding the effectiveness of the McCarthy cam-
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paign.

Though a reasonable intercorrelatlon
would be expected between campaign

Indices, it is thought that each activity
made a unique contribution to the

McCarthy result in New HaiBpshire.

In order to assess the independent effect
of

each campaign activity the partial correlation
coefficients for each cm^paign

activity and the precent of the vote for McCarthy
were examined.

TABLE 15e08

PARTIAL CORRELATIONS BET\JEEN McCARTlIY VOTE
ACTIVITY

Campalgrx

Local Campaign

Canvassing

^^~lj:l§l==-

^c'^^v i ties

-IlPlJj-g

.7615^'

*NOTE:

.0231

Al^ID

Auxiliary
Acti vities

-.0341

.6573*

—

INDICES OF CWi^IGN

Newspaper
Activity
-.4675''^

Partial coefficients provide for relationships between independent
and dependent variables, controlling for all other independent varJ.ablesj in this case, all other campaign activities.

Based on the partial correlations only three coinpaign

.-.Indices

(i.e., cam-

paign visits, auxiliary activities, and newspaper activity) were analyzed in a
regression model.

(Note:

Exclusion of the other two

v:as

based on the absence

of un.^que contribution in the explanation of the dependent variables.)

TABLE 15.09

REGRESSION EQUATION TOR CA>IPAIGN INDICES AND McCARTlIY VOTE TOTAL
IN NEW HAMPSIilPvE

Indlce

Beta

Std. Error

Significant L evel

Campaign Visits

.4972

.005

.005

Auxiliary Activities

.4765

.113

.003

.203

.003

Newspaper Activity
Multiple R - .6929

Multiple r2 - ,48012
F - Ratio Sign. .000

-.106

726

As the above table indicate, the three cui.paign
indices account for nearly
50 percent of the variation in the dependent variable

-

percent McCarthy vote.

As Indicated in the previous correlation analysis,
cair.paign visits and auxiliary

campaign activity account for most of the explained variance
with nev/spaper activity accoi.ntins for less than five percent of the variation
in McCarthy vote
totals.

For the analysis used in this section it has been possible to select only

five of the numerous activities that are presumed to contribute to the outcome
of a campaign.

The five selected offered measures that could be quantified end

related to specific voting district results.

Other activities, as described in

the case study, may be more pov/erful, and even more interesting as explainers,

but because they vjcre either too discrete or not discrete enough it has been

necescary to concentrate on the ones that offer quantifiable variation.

To

fully explore and, perhaps, understand the impact of a campaign it vjould be

useful to be able to evaluate other variables in a fashion similar to those
considered above.

The outcome of such an analysis might permit future campaigns

to be structured more efficiently.

As Senator Eugene McCarthy discussed with his New Hampshire leaders, it was
his hope that his effort in 1968 might change aspects of the campaign in American

politics.

He noted that since the earliest campaigns, new practices have been

added to the process

vriLth

fcvi,',

if any, being discarded along the vray.

As a

result, he felt, campaigns have become exceptionally complex, expensive, exces-

sively demanding upon the energy of both candidate and campaign, and with little
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concern for how most ef flciontly the conununlcation
process misht be facilitated.
To McCarthy it appeared that each campaign invented
a new device or activity
that then became grafted to future cairpaigns without
son^ething being discarded.
It is hoped that this analysis and the case study of the
McCarthy campaign as-

sist in this effort.

First by describing how the campaign developed and was

carried out, and second, by analyzing aspects of the campaign in order
to test
their impact.

When examining the partial correlation coefficients an interesting pattern
is identified.

The relationships between McCarthy's vote total and those cam-

paign activities chiiracterized as purely local in emphasis (i.e., local campaign organization and canvassing activity) failed to produce significant rela-

tionships when controlling for the other campaign indices.

Interestingly these

factors v/hich remained significantly related to the dependent variable

x^ere

those campaign activities which can be characterized as external or statewide
in impact.

Campaign visits and auxiliary activities/celebrity visits were sig-

nificantly related to McCarthy's vote total independent of all other activities.
This would suggest that local campaign activities either were insufficient to

produce a McCarthy vote (independent of other activities) or, more plausible,
that local campaign activities were merely surrogates of the state campaign

strategy and reflected that factor.

This hypothesis will be tested later when

geographical and partisan variations on the impact of campaign activities are
examined.

(See page

15-48, "The Campaign Variables and Republican Areas.")

728

Finally, the effect: of newspaper activities
clearly was masked by other

campaign activities.

When controllins for the effect of local and state
coor-

dinated activities, it was found that newspaper activities
were significantly
related to McCarthy's vote.

Consistent, however, with the earlier

bi-

variate

findingG, the impact of newspaper coverage was generally negative
for McCarthy
(related by the dominance of the Manchester Union Leader in the principal
Demo-

cratic vote produciiig center of the state).

The partial correlation which is

substantially larger, reflects the significant negative impact newspaper
coverage had on McCarthy's candidacy when controlling for the otherwise positive effect of campaign activities.

The five campaign variables accounted for more than 75 percent of the

variation in McCarthy's vote total in normally Republican areas.

This repre-

sents nearly a 25 percent increase over the strength of the same multi-variate

model for all voting districts.

Interestingly, the be ta s, i.e., standardized

partial correlation coefficients, indicate that those campaign variables

characterized by state
activ," ties

—

,

'^^

vride

orien tation such as campaign visits, auxiliary

and newspapers, were most explanatory of the dependent variables

percent vote for McCarthy.

This would suggest that the same factors con-

tributing to McCarthy's candidacy statewide were substantially more effective
in adding to McCarthy's electoral showing in predominantly Republican areas.

The effc'ct of newspaper coverage in Republican areas was positively related
to

McCarthy's vote total, suggesting that editorial and news coverage in Repub-

lican areas tended to provide McCarthy

v/ith a

positive voter exposure.

This
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finding relates well with the characteristics
of New Hampshire's daily and
also, weekly newspaper circulations.

The newspapers that circulate in the

higher GGcio-economic conununities tended to be those that
either supported

McCarthy or presented

hir,

candidacy in a favorable light.

The Manchester Union

Leader, while being the dominant circulation daily newspaper
in New Hampshire,
tends to have its impact in its home area, predominantly Democratic
Manchester.

The higher SES areas, aleo normal Republican areas, tend to be served
by the

regional daily press as has been discussed earlier.
such as the Concord Pp-ily Monitor

.

These regional newspapers,

Lebanon Valley News

,

Keene Sentinel, and the

Portsmouth Heral d, arc the dominant news sources not only in their cities but

within regions that contain many of the normally Republican communities that
supported McCarthy's candidacy heavily.
as shown by these findings.

The role of the press is significant

The impact of the two other variables, campaign

visits and auxiliary activities, depend upon the press for impact as well.
The effect of campaign activities on McCarthy's vote in predominantly

Democratic areas was significantly less pronounced than either for Republican
areas, or for all election districts.
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RESULT OF KULTIPLE REGRESSION WITH CAMPAIGN
VAJUABLES EXPLAINING
PERCENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY VOTE RECEIVED
BY McCARTUY IN
DEMOCRATIC AREAS

Variable

Beta

Campaign Visits

.109

Loca]

Error

Std.

.187

Oreanizat i on

Canvass

203

.

IT/
114

991

Auxiliary Activity
Newspaper

Multiple R

=

.104

.307

-.308

.001

.5633

P -

Multiple r2 = .44
F- Ratio

.

.05

N = 19

= 13.45

The Campaign Variables and Republican Areas
It was earlier hypothesized that the effect of the McCarthy campaign would

be more pronounced in higher socio-economic status Republican areas.

thesis vrould account for the aggregate voter pattern observed earlier.

McCarthy's percent of the Democratic vote

voter turnout. *30

v.'as

This hypoHere,

positively related to Republican

The evidence in the table below substantiates the hypothesis

that McCarthy's vote

\7as

positively related to high status Republican communities.
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TARLE 15.1 J

psULT OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION WITH

CA^ffAIGN VARIABLES EXPLAINING
PERCENT OF DEMOCIUTIC PRIMARY VOTE RECEIVED BY
McCARTUY IN
REPUBLlCi\N C0MIUNITIES31

Variable

Beta

Campaign Visits

.5A8'^

.006

Local Organization

.003

^104

Canvass

.105*

.116

Auxiliary Activity

.472*

.065

Newspaper

.39A'''

.049

Multiple R

= .8735

Multiple r2

-

F- Ratio =

28.76

Std.

Error

P - .05

.7603

N « 38

As in the case of &11 voting districts the influence of newspaper coverage
tended to be negatively related to McCarthy's electoral performance in predomi-

nantly Democratic areas.

Other campaign activities tended to have a neutral

(i.e., insignificant relationships) effect on the McCarthy vote total.

This

supports the general thesis that McCarthy's New Hampshire campaign was effective among higher SES voters, which tended to be most numerous in predominantly

Republican areas.

Conclusions
The results of the two Inquiries are now complete.

The analysis of the

celectcd campaign variables demonstrated that there was a significant relationship between the treatments of the campaign and the vote output for McCarthy.

Without the information that these campaign activities provided the primary
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vote result for McCarthy would have been slgnif iciuitly less.

McCarthy would

have attracted far fewer votes than he did among voters in Democratic
areas, the

principal target of the campaign, and among Democrat:ic voters in Republican
areas, the surprisingly productive localities for McCarthy.

The second inquiry was the investigation of the strong McCarthy showing
among Democrats residing in normally Republican districts.

This analysis identi-

fied the relationship between higher socio-economic class voting districts and
the increased percentage vote for McCarthy.

crats or Independents

vrho

Since only those registered as Demo-

selected the Democratic Party's presidential primary

ballot, could vote in the 1968 New Hampshire presidential primary, the analysis
led to the conclusion that Democrats and Independents residing in normally Repub-

lican voting districts tend to share Republican socio-economic characteristics.
Wlien the

analysis was controlled for partisan areas (i.e., Democratic/

Republican) the relationship between campaign activities and McCarthy's vote
V7as

positive and statistically significant.

In the higher SES normally Repub-

lican voting districts those campaign variables that related to the information

absorbing capacity of higher SES groups
for McCarthy.

v;ere also

connected to the vote output

Newspaper coverage, of the five, was the most powerful in normal-

ly Republican voting districts

—

a variable that relates closely to the

ability of higher SES groups to bear non-transferable information costs.

From this conclusion it is possible to state that the relationship between
socio-economic status and the ability to bear non-transferable information cost
is proven.

Downs' thesis concerning Information costs, when tested in the con-

733

text of th. 1968 New Hampshire
presidential primary, proved that the
ability to
gather and internalize inlor.atiou
was essential but also that ability
was aided
by the efforts of the campaign.
The analysis showed that those with
less re-

Bouvce strength, who tended to reside
in lower SES, and predominantly
Democratic
areas, were less able to bear the
non-transferable costs of vote information.

The election returns showed that
differentiation.

As a result it is reasonable

to extrapolate that higher SES
Democrats residing in Democratic areas, with

independent partisan inclinations, were more
likely to be attracted to McCarthy,
as w^re those of similar characteristics
residing in normally Republican areas.

Information cost and the ability to bear that cost
were important aspects
of the McCarthy campaign strategy that the
McCarthy leaders devised, although

not fully understood.

The energy of the campaign was targeted to reach those

eligible voters who were concentrated in the predominantly
Democratic areas or
areas that tended to produce significant Democratic primary votes.

The stra-

tegy called for the use of campaign tactics that would maximi;ie information
flow.
paperF>,

As the campaign evolved, this strategy was expanded not just to position

speeches, brochures and direct mail, but also to interactive canvassing,

auxiliary activities and media programming.

While these techniques were concen-

trated within the predominantly Democratic areas of the state, the campaign was
able to reach, both directly and indirectly through the media, most of the more

populous voting districts.

VJlthout the foregoing analysis, one might conclude

that the campaign failed in reaching the targeted Democratic population.

McCarthy's percentage of the Democratic vote in the heavy vote producing centers such as Manchester and Nashua was significantly less than that which
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McCarthy attracted elsewhere.

To have reached this conclusion
without looking

further at both the i.pact of the
ca..paign and the vote output would
lead the
casual observer to sumvise that the
vote returns for McCarthy were inversely

proportional to the effort assigned by the
campaign strategy.
fails.

The campaign has been shovai to have
succeeded.

This conclusion

It provided information

for those with the resources to internalize
that information and use that infor-

mation to shape a vote decision.

The campaign succeeded in attracting voters

through its direct efforts, within the predominantly
Democratic areas, though

with loss success than it had within the nomally
Republican areas.
In conclusion,

the campaign that was devised to support McCarthy's
candidacy

was uniquely suited to its task and, as importantly, to the
candidate.
fort

v;as

result.

The ef-

properly conceived, effectively operated, and produced the desired
If there had been a point of inconsistency in the mix between
campaign

and candidate or between campaign and voting population the effort would
have
failed.

Both the campaign and the candidate were credible and were conveniently

translated into information that was within the capacity of those able to bear

higher non-transferable costs to aboorb.

If it had not been able to find this

tone and had not received the interest of those who bear the transferable costs
the result would have been much less than significant.
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'^'^Two activities evolving from the campaign strategy were to circulate in
priority communities celebrities vrho had volunteered to help McCarthy's candidacy,
and secondly, to organize support or auxiliary activities such as "Republicans
for McCarthy" or "educators for McCarthy" or some other group outside the campaign organization for McCarthy.

^''a

Now Hampshire voting district is

a

town or city ward.

•^""'Auxiliary activities include visits by celebrities not accompanying
McCarth}' and organir.ation of support groups especially Republicans for McCarthy.
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The following table is a
'^'"^ ''"'^
McCarthy as
related to the percent vote
Podum'^ """"'l?'
^"^^r^"
""^"^ '"''^ l^epublican
(i.e.,
^
the noriT.al vote) by selected votIng districts.
•

TABLE 15.12

VOTE /iNALYSIS OF DISTRICTS OF
2.500 POPULATION OR MORE BY PERCFNT
VOTE MCCARTHY AND PERCENT VOTE N0R11.M.LY
REPUBLICAN
% Vote

Coniinunity

Berlin
Clareiiiont

Concord
Derry
Dover
Hudson
Keene
Laconio
Manchester
Nashua
Portsruouth

Rochester
Salem,
All tnstowii
/uiiherst

Bedford
Boscawen
Charles town
Conway
Durham
Exeter
Farmington
Franklin
Gilford
Gof f stowii
Gorham
Hampton
Hanover
Haverhill
Hillsborough
Hinr;dale
Hoi lis

Hooksctt
Hopkinton
Jaf f rey
Kingston
Lancaster
Lebanon

McCarthy
51.7
37.9
53.9
47.5
48.0
44

.

46.7
39.4
31.0
40.7
69.1
51.0
50.5
39.7
58.8
48.0
44.3
41.9
54.6
8^1.6

57.5
36.5
41.3
61.4
41.3
51.3
57.9
85.0
40.6
63.8
60.0
65.9
40.7
51.1
48.9
46.8
59.9
48.7

'^°5?.

(No iTD

T

\

^^^^ Order
Vote
McCarthy

Rank Order
Normal
Re£ub_li can Vote

38. 7
41. 9

27

45.0
67.5
59.1
49.2
49.3
49.5
50.8
33.8
59.3
54,2
60.8

25
36
34.
43
39
56
61

27,4
74.0
65.0
50.4
61.1
77.4
49.2
65.1
66.8
38.9
59.4
60.4
47.6
69.4
39.8
64.4
68.3
59.9
75.9
60.3
56.7
51.9
77.7
61.4
37.8

34.5
42

20
43

47
24

25

i

46
19
18
54
31
28
49
14
53
21
15
30

58

55
51

50
17
33
46

30

45
44
42
58
32
39

21.

27

55
16

60

50
r

5

21.5
48.5
4

48,5
28

17.5
2

51
9

14

9

6

8

7

50

28
37

29
31

37.5
15
32

40
5

21

56
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TABLE 15,12/Foot;iote. #29

Littleton
Londonderry
Meredith
Herrljmack

Mllford
Newmarket
Newport
No. HaxDpton
Pelhaiu

Pembroke
Peterborough
Pittsfield
Plolstow
Plymouth
Raymond
Rye
Seabrook
Somers worth
Swaiizey

Til ton
Walpole
Winchester

Windham
Wolf eboiro

(Ccnlinued)

% Vote

% Vote
Republican

M cCarthy

(Normal)

40.3
48.1
100.0
46.8
38.0
40.4
40.1
66.0
57.9
42.6
57.7
37.7
60.3
67.7
45.8
70.8
63.0
42.5
45.5
42.4
53.1
36.1
55.1
63.2

67. 7
71. 3
74.
60.

61.3

Rank Order
Vote
McCarthy
JJ

16
11

JD
1

J/
Ji

9
. _>

29
24
57
38

. j>

41
52

37 .5

55.7
79.2
51.5

JH
7
J./

40. 8

69.5

Rank Order
Normal
Republican Vote

3

iJ

61.

SQ

64.1
79.0
79.4
69.7
74.9
33.3
48.6
57,7
58.4
58.5
64.4

13

81. 8

5

6

4

40

2

4

12

11
45
41
46
26
60
23

8

59

48
36
35
34
21
1

RUG - .7299
N = 62

^^Rcpublican areas are defined as those voting
Republican vote was 53 percent or greater. For the
the 1960 ^^ereral election was selected to determine
by voting districts having a population of 2,500 or
of the Population 1970.

districts where the normal
purposes of the analysis,
the normal Republican vote
more persons, U.S. Census

-^Philip E. Converse, et.al., Elections and the Politic al Order
"The
Concept of a Normal Vote," (New York: John Wiley &~Sons, 1967), p. 9-40.
,

Studenta of the American political
system have marvelled at the success
of the check, and balances built into
the tri-partate constitutional structure

of the federal govern.;ent.

Recognized as veil has been the ability of
the

party system to absorb social change and
to avoid doctrinaire positions that

would

frag-Tieat aad

polarize society.

These systems have been credited with

allowing the political structure to change and to
respond to an evolving civilization.

Unque3tionably a remarkabJe feat given that the
government

ame

from revolution and revolution has been held as an
appropriate recourse should

tyranny sprout from the government.
Uhat has escaped the view of observers are the less obvious
safety valves
that have evolved as a consequence of both the constitutional
structure and
the party system.

In an area where the constitution was notably imprecise,

the selection of the president, there has been continuing democratization.

First the congressional caucus, then the national convention, and most recently,

tha revitalization of the presidential primary.

In an earlier period of

crisis, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, a series of

major reforms of the political system occurred, i.e., the direct election of

United States senators, women's sufferage, and enactment of the primary election.

While the primary was widely adopted for the selection of candidates for

lesser offices, its use in the selection of presidential candidates stagnated
by 1920.

The fact that one state, New Hampshire, preserved the institution

and modified It to produce an early media event, appeared of little signifi-

cance across the broader spectrum of political institutions.

New Hampshire
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kept:

the primary because it fit the
progressive notioa of the electoral pro-

cess; it could be run offJcier.tly

a.s

a

part of the annual town meeting, and

It offered local politicians access to national
politics

From this combi-

.

nation of progressivism and pragmatism there survived
the New Hampshire
presidential primary; an event because it was the first
test of

a

presidential

nominating season and because it responded well to the thirst
of the new
electronic media.
For most, and particularly the political scientists, the primaries
and

especially the New Hampshire primary, appeared to contribute little to the
final selection cf a presidential candidate.

True there had been important

early tests in New Hampshire for Eisenhower in 1952 and for John

F.

Kennedy

in 1960, but in the sum total of convention politics, New Hampshire's contri-

bution faded considerably as any nominating season progressed.
1968 began with serious national crises.

The Vietnam War, the impact of

the military draft, turmoil in the cities, the earlier promise of the Johnson

administration dimmed, young people were in revolt, and
seemed about to shade the nation.

a

cloud of repression

The massive power of the federal government

was doirinated by what appeared to be an invincible President who headed an

administration that seemed determined not to heed the signs
affection.

Among many there was

a

sense of desperation.

of

crisis and dis-

There seemed to be

no way to attract attention, much less to get the government to change its

policies.

Radical groups, radical politics, and talk of direct action became

part cf the political currency of the late 1960's.
to many, was bankrupt.

The political system,

The political parties were the same.

Officeholders
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eit-hcr dldn'L listen or were too
frightened to act.

There would be no time for politics.

The system did not work.

There had to be immediate results.

In the face of such pervasive pessimism and
frustration social upheaval
is often the result.

Violent actions, venting deeply felt convictions,
while

not a part of the American political process, were
certainly not beyond possi-

bility.

A safety valve works when the normal processes uf

system do not.

There

were safety valves in the American political system of the late 1960's.

These

a

were not automatically functioning devices but political structures that re-

quired the manipulation of individuals.

An important, but unrecognized safety

system were the presidential primaries and of these, New Hampshire was the
first.

Like a good safety valve, the New Hampshire primary was ready to serve
and was easily used.

become.

Simply, it just had to be recognized for what it might

What the New Hampshire primary offered was more than a release of

potentially destructive energy, the primary could also divert energy to
productive purpose.

a

The New Hampshire presidential primary safety valve was

uniquely suited to its purpose.

It was first;

it was not expensive to cam-

paign in New Hampshire; the campaign and the results would receive widespread
attention; it was easy to be a candidate in the primary; and it was reasonably easy to organize

a

campaign in the state.

The prerequisites were simple as well.
at least the name of a candidate.

There had to be a candidate or

There had to be an indigenous organization

for the candidate, and there had to be at least some money with which to sup-

port a campaign.

Otherwise the primary offered an open season to the New
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Ha..pshire voter.

There were no convoluted party structures,
complex rules,

massive signature requirements, or conformance
with formal or informal do's
or don'ts to stand in the way of a contest.

That was the way the New Hanip-

shirc presidential primary was in 1967 and that Is
the way it remains.

When frustration had reached its peak

a few

individuals, both across the

nation and in New Hampshire, felt that it was woruh trying
the political system once more.

The quadriennal time lock on presidential politics was about

to open.

What is important about the preceeding case study is that while a political institution like

a

presidential primary is

a

neutral and lifeless form,

it has the capacity to produce results if properly used.

The key to its suc-

cess comas from individuals acting alone and together to attract others to

respond and to express their ovm concerns.

Without the interpersonal connec-

tions that were made in the early stages, without attracting individuals

knew the New Hampshire political environment, it is possible that the political safety valve of the New Hampshire primary might have failed in 1968.

might

liave

It

been too late to make the test in other primaries.

For the future, the New Hampshire presidential primary remains to be

used again to release energy or divert energy, to dissipate ill-conceived

ventures, and to revitc^lize the political system.

It may not be called upon

to function as it did in 1968 again, but the fact that it succeeded then has

not only justified its future but has produced a prodgeny of other primaries

and nominating process reforms that may mean redundence for the political

safety system.

739

For the political scientist tied to the theories
of party responsibility

and convention brokerage, 1968 came as a rude shock.

The results of the pri-

maries and the machinations of the Chicago convention
uncovered a nominating

system that had lost the capacity to respond to the public.

Delegates were

selected through processes that began as much as four years preceding the

convention they would attend.

The students of the much taunted responsible

party had failed to examine how the party selected its presidential candidates
and who actually performed its nominating chores.

The hodge-podge of caucuses,

conventions, delegate appointments, delegate selection and preferential pri-

maries produced confusion which appeared to defy democarcy.

In many states

the few who understood the nominating process often held that information as
a corporate secret.

For political science it may be said that 1968 marked the end of one

era and the beginning of another.

During the decade preceeding 1968, poli-

tical scientists had advocated the vertically integrated responsible political

party structure.

Almost at the same time as this conception of politics

v;as

being pronounced, a noticeable decline in the allegiance of the electorate
to a political party had begun.

In place of the party had emerged the candi-

date as an independent; personality, capab]e of translation via the new medium
of television.

Instead of being a functionary of the party and the recipient

of its rewards, the new candidate sought a personal identity, often created a

separate campaign organization, solicited separate financial backing, and
relied upon the public relations or advertising specialist as the new cam-

paign manager.

The phenomenon of the modern campaign evolved without much

attention from the political scientist.

?A0

After 1968 things seemed to change.

Political science and campaign

management began to see that one had something
to offer the other.
behavior research provided

a

Voting

theoretical underpinning for the pragmatism and

applied management of the new campaign professional.

Campaign techniqi
mes

that had once been viewed as hucksterism by the
political scientist were

being subjected to tests of effectiveness.

novr

Campaigns became sophisticated,

not simply in their organization and selection of tactics,
but also in the

allocation of resources and expenditures of energy.

Whether it was the wide-

spread participation of social scientists in the McCarthy campaign
that brought

campaigns to the attention of researchers, or simply a natural convergence,
politics before 1968 and after 1968 were viewed differently.
The McCarthy in New Hampshire case study documents events and issues,
and the interaction of personalities and institutions across the total fabric

of the campaign.

In this effort it fills a void by going beyond the head-

lines back to the people and actions that shaped the news and produced the

electoral result.

The study attempts to capture the mood of the times, the

sense of desperation, and quixotic quest.

In hindsight, from the persepctive

of the present, 1968 appears almost as an even unreal time.

The

American

Broadcasting System's 1978 program title, "1968 A Crack in Time," captures
the essence of that year.

Since then there has been a convergence not just

in political science between campaign management and electoral process re-

search, but also a convergence in the social condition of the present era.

The individual emerged from the fray of the late 1960's with a healthy skep-

ticism concerning policies, personalities, institutions, and the capabilities

of.

others as well as oneself.

Society became both simpler and more complex,

l^ere once institutions were expected to deliver societal
benefits the individua] found personal responsibility to be as effective.

Where problems had

once appeared capable of solution, i.e., eliminate poverty,
rebuild the
cities, assure society's benefits to all, there emerged a resignation
that

there vlll be

a

continuing struggle.

As the individual had come to the fore in New Hampshire, the action of

individuals began to replace a sense of helplessness with participation.
From

r.he

skepticism that generated this new participation has come an era of

change reflected by new legislation and attitudes as diverse as open meeting/

open information laws, environmental protection statutes, campaign finance

disclosure laws, and other evidence of the worth of the individual.

The in-

dividucil has standing before the institutions of society, standing that ap-

proaches equity.

Since 1968 many safety valves have been inserted in the

American body politic.

The prospect of a runaway government that loomed awe-

somely in 1968 is now v/idely constrained.
to be the responsible individual.

The countervailing force appears

A person much like that which emerged from

the heat of the New Kairpshire presidential primary and went on to become the

phenomenon of the McCarthy movement of 1968.
As the case study documents, transforming a notion of protest into a

viable political force requires an appreciation for the unique political cli-

mate of New Hampshire, the character of the candidate, the mood and receptivity of the voter, and the ability to construct a strategy that would meld
these facotrs into a political canpaign.

The nalti-f aceted venture that

became the McCarthy New Hampshire campaign
relied upon personality, issues,
comm-mications, organization, and especially
management.

Gaining the atten-

tion, cooperation, and full participation of
diverse interests and persona-

lities required not only a deeply shared goal,
but a willingness to serve
that goal with conviction and sacrifice.

There was from the beginning but

one reward, that being the sense of satisfaction that
comes from trying in

spite of what seemed to be insurmountable odds.

The difference between 1968

and the campaign years before the campaign years after is the
sense of deep

personal commitment that came from within the individual when he or she
decided co join the McCarthy campaign.
was personal.

Before March 12th that commitment

It could not be said that the candidate was the pied piper.

The issues of war and social disintegration demanded conviction and sensi-

tivity that extended beyond the attraction of a candidate.

It is for this

reason that the experience of McCarthy in New Hampshire 1968 was intense.
It is also for this reason that the documentation of that campaign survives.

The event and the time were unique.
tegy,

The methods of the campaign, its stra-

its tactics, and its management were in many ways similar to hundreds

of campaigns both before and since.

For the student of the electoral process

the case study is transferable with evidence capable of further examination in

other

con':exti;

.

political event.

For the political historian the case documents an important

For the observer of the American electoral process the case

study affirms the vit:ility of the political system and its ability to absorb

social conflict and to channel that conflict in the direction of institutional
and even societal change.
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Tho ii.pact of the New Hampshire result
contained both an inunediate and
a continuing response.

The nature of the contest between an obscure
United

States senator, an active candidate, and an
incumbent president, a write-in

candidate, made a pyrrhic victory possible.

In conventional terms 42 percent

against A8 percent of the vote would be a defeat, but in
the context of a

presidential primary 42 percent was

a

victory for the challenger.

A victory

that foretold for the incumbent president a trend that would
be difficult to

reverse.

Understanding that political victory may be less than actual victory

was aa important lesson learned from 1968 in New Hampshire.

From a primary,

that many had tnought to be a meaningless contest, came a message.

A message

that a distressed public, a substantial minority of the society, had sought

ineffectively tu convey by other means.
toral event could not be denied.

results were probed.

The message became even clearer as the full

With Republican ballot write-in votes totalled for both

candidates, the result
48 percent total.

Votes cast within a recognized elec-

vras

only a few votes short of the President Johnson's

Protest that had been scrugged aside before March 12, 1968,

was now institutionalized as part of the presidential nominating process.
\\fhile

it might be enough to document the campaign and to assume that it

led to the electoral result, for a political scientist that would not be an

adequate analysis.

There is nothing either

i.n

the campaign or in the result

that by itself supports the thesis of a cause and an effect.

The campaign

was not organized to test empirically the causal nature of campaign activity
but aspects of the campaign did permit such tests.

In face of the puzzling fact that McCarthy received
a larger percentage
of his vote from voters residing in predominantly
Republican voting districts

one might conclude that a campaign targeted toward Democratic
districts had
failed.

The theoretical context for this examination was Anthony
Downs' the-

sis concerning information costs.

A distinction was found between Democrats

residing in predominantly Republican areas and Democrats residing in predomi-

nantly Democratic areas.

An examination of the socio-economic characteristics

of these two groups of Democratic voters found that socio-economic factors

determined the ability to absorb Downs' non-transferable information costs.
The Democrat residing in a Republican area shared the higher socio-economic

characteristics of the Republican community although not the political orientation.

In spite of the fact that these Democratic voters were not targeted

as part of the McCarthy campaign strategy,

they were able to gather their own

vote determining information and in significant numbers voted for Senator
McCarthy.
To test the effectiveness of the campaign, five indicators were selected

representing campaign activities: or the response to activities that could be
assigned to each voting district.

The findings supported the contention that

the strategy of the campaign as measured through the indicators was effective
in producing the vote for McCarthy.

In other words, without the campaign and

the targets selected for priority attention McCarthy's vote would be signifi-

cantly less.

7

AS

For the student of the electoral
process the campaign effectiveness l:Lndings are iruportant.

Wliile other factors such as

party identification and

socio-economic status are important determinants
of election outcomes, especially in bi-partisan elections, campaigns and
especially quantifiable

campaign activities are seen as also contributing
to an electoral result.
This is especially the case in an intra-party
contest such as a primary
election.
It is now possible to say that the McCarthy campaign
was more than a

quest for headlines or a movement to change public policy.

scientist the campaign demonstrated
the individual American voter.

For the political

both the institutional resilience of

The analysis of the campaign affirmed the

importance of the campaign to the electoral decision.

As a result of this

finding and the word that has evolved on campaigns since 1968, the campaign
as a factor in the electoral process must be given a place along with other

empirical findings concerning voting behavior.

«
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-The following table is a rank cider
analysis of the vote for McCarthy -m

^^^^^
TABLE 15.1?.

VOTE ANA]A'SIS OF DISTRICTS OF 2,500 POPULATION
OR MORE BY PTRCENT
VOTE McCARTFA' AND PERCENT VOTE NOPU^l/VLLY REPUBLICAN
% Vote

£^omi;iunity

Berlin
Clarcffiont

Concord
Derry
Dover
Hudson
Keene
Lac on i a
Manchester
Nashua
Portsraoutli

Rochester
Salem
Aliens to^vTi
Amherst
Bedford
Rosca'.i;en

Charles towri

Durham
Exeter
Fa rating ton

Franklin
Gilford
Gof f stovm
Gorham
Haiipton
Har^over

Haverhill
Hillsborough
Hinsdale
Hollis
Kook.?etl

Hopkinton
Jeffrey
Kingsnou
Lancaster
Lebanon

:e^e^::"ioi!

A n V O f ri o t*

KanK Ui

% Vote

Republican

McCarthy

(Normal)

Mr r-^r f-hv

51.7
37.9
53.9
47,5
48.0
44.0
46.7
39.4
31.0
40.7
69.1

38.7
41.9
45.0
67.5
59.1
49.2
49.3
49.5
50.8
33.8
59.3
54,2
60.8
27.4
74.0
65.0
50.^
61.1
77.4
49.2
65.1
66.8
38.9
59.4
60.4
47.6
69.4
39.8
64.4
68.3
59.9
75.9
60.3
56.7
51.9
77.7
61.4
37.8

27

JJ

58

il

51.0
50.5
39.7
58.8
48.0
44.3
41.9
54.6
84.6
57.5
56.5
41.3
61.4

41.3
51.3
57.9
85

.

40,6
63.8
60.0
65.9
40.7
51.1
48.9
46.8
59.9
48.7

iNormai

KepuDii
1?

«

1

^^

.J

1

25
36

34.5
43
39
56
61
50
5

30
21.5
55
16
34.5
42

33
46
h5
44

42
58
32
39
27

60
9

20
43

47
24

25

3

46
19
18
54
31
28
49
14
53

20
21.5

48.5
4

48.5
28
17.5
2

51
9

14

6

21
15
30

8

7

50

28
37

29
31

37.5

AO
5

15

21

32

56

v
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TABLE 15.12/FootuoLe

^^29

(Continued)

% Vote

ComrannJt

Littleton
Londonderry
Meredith
Merrjjnack

Milford
Newinarket
Neijport
No. Hi^pton

Pelham
Pembroke
Peterborough
Pittsf ieid
Plaistow
Plymouth
Rayi^ond
Ilye

Seabrook
Sonersworth
Swanisey

Tilton
Walpcle
Winchester
Windham
Wolf eboro

% Vote
Republican

McCarth"",

(Normal )

40.3
48.1
100.0
46.8
38.0
40.4
40.1
66,0
57,9
42.6
57.7
37.7
60.3
67.7
45.8
70.8
63.0
42.5
45.5
42.4
53.1
36.1
55.1
63.2

67.7
71.3
74.0
60.0
61.3
37.5
55.7
79.2
51.5
40,8
69.5
61.1
6^.1
79.0
79.4
69.7
74.9
33.3
48.6
57.7
58.4
58.5
64.4
81.8

_

Rank Order
Vote
McC arthy
53
33

]

1

9

57
52
54
7

6

29
24
57
38
3

17.5
44

6

11

37.5

19
59
13

Rank Order
Normal
Republican Vote

41
52
13
25
22
4

40

2

4

12

11
45
41
46
26
60
23
5

8

59

48
36
35
34
21
1

RHO = .7299
N - 62

^^Republlcaii areas are defined as those voting
Republican vote was 53 percent or greater. For the
the 1960 general election was selected to determine
by voting dlctrictr. having a population of 2,500 or
of the Population 1970.
^-'-Philip

F..

districts where the normal
purposes of the analysis,
the normal Republican vote
more persons, U.S. Census

Converse, et.al., Electio ns and the Po liti cal Order "The
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 9-40.

C(3nc.ept of a Konaal Vote,"

,

e

.

:
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